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3This thesis is about the relationship between thought and language. It claims that
there is a difference of kind between the mentality involved in responding to the world
and the mentality involved in reflecting on it. I claim that in order to be able to do the
latter one needs to have an understanding of truth. This is because truth is the substantial
property that  organises  language use.  I  make the  further  claim that  this  shows that
language is representational, and that truth is the value that a linguistic representation
should have.  We are then able to  undertake reflective thought  by using language to
represent the way the world strikes us. Reflective thought is then, to borrow Robert
Brandom's phrase, a matter of making explicit what we were already thinking. That of
course is the interesting bit. I find it both amusing and unsurprising that I should have
written a thesis about the problem of coming to clarity about what you are thinking. I
am a very excitable thinker, and, despite my best endeavours, I find myself haring about
all over philosophical landscape. The end result is a garbled mess. I have been fortunate
enough to have met with people kind, patient and clever enough to help me untangle
some of that mess. Before launching into the thesis, I want to explicitly thank a few of
them.
My chief debts are to my supervisors Michael Morris and Sarah Sawyer. I could
not have wished for two better supervisors. They were both ever ready with advice and
criticism, and went well beyond any contractual obligations. They both seemed to have
the happy knack, although of course there is nothing happenstance about it, of being
able to say just  what  was needed to help me obtain to some level of clarity in my
thinking and writing. I can, with a clear conscience, but heavy heart, acknowledge the
shortcomings of  the  thesis  as  entirely my own.  My debt  to  Michael  is  perhaps  the
greater because, in addition to having supervised the thesis, he made me realise that
philosophy was interesting, important and exciting.
Not  being  able  to  type,  I  have  been  ably  assisted  by  a  large  number  of
amanuenses.  These  are,  Rose  Schreiber-Sainthorp,  Lisa  Spoor,  Katy  Owen,  Peter
Myson, Verity Jones, Tom Swaine-Jameson, Oli Wang, Jane Cleasby, Nathan Towle,
Helen Lucas, Alice Cragg, and Rosa Pierce. I have also been supported by numerous
friends. Three deserve a special mention. Reuben Lisgarten whose indefatigable spirit is
an inspiration, and who regularly dropped whatever he was doing to help me out in a
crisis; Elliot Klimek, my housemate, has kept my sane and fed; and Ramona Brunzell,
4who, despite hearing that snow is white and that dogs bark more times than is good for
any human being, kept coming back, probing, challenging and seeking to understand.
She taught me that things are always more complicated than that.
I have been fortunate enough to do my philosophy at Sussex. I have been part of
a kind and supportive graduate community. Writing a DPhil has been a difficult and
humbling experience. The seas of ideas are vast and I am small. I set out confident and
happy in my little coracle. The waves crashed over my head. However, I never felt alone
or that I would drown. That the experience has been, by and large, a positive one, I
believe, is largely down to the support of my friends. Among them, Andy Rebera, Tom
Beament, Chris Allsobrook, Timo Jutten, Tim Carter, Ezra Cohen, Jana Elsen, Christos
Hadjioannou,  Elaine  Finbarr  O-Connell,  Arthur  Willemse,  Gavin  Osbourne,  Dimitri
Kladiskakis, Huw Rees, Gabrial Martin, Alex Elliot and Patrick Levy deserve special
thanks.  All  of them have helped me improve my philosophy, but, more importantly,
their willingness to support and help each other out created an environment in which the
challenge of philosophy was not only worthwhile but fun. 
Although the above-mentioned are,  I  think,  exceptional people,  it  is,  in part,
because they have been part of an exceptional environment. Philosophy at Sussex is, to
my mind, a model of the way the subject should be conducted. Philosophers at Sussex
are encouraged to think about what matters, and to undertake those enquiries as part of a
collaborative effort. That means to support, criticise and learn from each other with the
goal  of  understanding how things  are  and what  they mean.  The lovely thing  about
Sussex is that everyone, from little to big, is encouraged to take part in that endeavour.
Had I not been trained here, I might have been less of a harebrained thinker, but it is
more  than  likely  that  I  would  not  have  studied  philosophy  at  all.  My  biggest
philosophical, and I think personal, debt is to the department, and I heartily thank them
all for the education I have received.
In the end, this thesis is for my grandmother, Alice Myer. From as early as I can
remember, she has had faith in me. She is an inspiration to me. She refuses to know her
place and thinks little of those who do. Despite, or perhaps because of, a lack of formal
education, she remains, even in her 90s, a model of an independent thinker who would
rather be refuted than refute. She will never read the thesis, but I hope I have done
justice to her spirit.
5For my grandmother, Alice Myer
6Truth as an Evaluative Semantic Property:
A Defence of a Linguistic Priority Thesis
Summary
Thinking and using a language are two different but similar activities. Thinking
about thinking and thinking about language use have been two major strands in the
history of philosophy.  One of the principal similarities is  that they are both rational
activities. As a result, the ability to think and the ability to use a language require being
able to recognise and respond to reasons. However, there is a further feature of these
activities: we humans are able to have explicit knowledge of how those activities work
and what is done by performances in those activities. Thus, theorists face at least two
constraints: 
1. An account of a rational activity must be compatible with the possibility of
agents engaging in that activity. 
2. Having described an activity, it must be possible to have knowledge of an
activity which is correctly described like that.
There are a variety of accounts of how thinking works and how using a language
works, and further variation in accounts of what is involved in explicit understanding of
particular  performances.  These  accounts  can  be  distinguished  by their  views  of  the
nature of the reasons that govern performances in that activity and by their views of the
way a description of the activity relates to the way the activity proceeds. I argue that any
description of thinking or language use requires showing how the truth conditions of
thoughts/sentences  are  determined,  and  how  the  truth  values  of  thoughts/sentences
affects  the  way  the  activity  proceeds.  I  then  argue  that  in  order  to  have  explicit
knowledge of what we do, truth has to be a substantial evaluative property of uses of
language, and furthermore a truth conditional theory of meaning has to be taken as the
description of the rationality of using a language.  The big result  is  that,  because in
understanding  language  we  understand  truth,  the  philosophy  of  language  is  first
philosophy.
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8Truth as an Evaluative Semantic Property
Introduction
§1 The Problem
Humans have two related but distinct abilities. These are the ability to think and
the ability to use a language. I am going to investigate these two abilities with the aim of
finding out more about how we stand to the world. I am going to conclude that truth is a
substantial, evaluative semantic property. The question which drives the thesis is: 
What does thinking about what is required of an account of thought and an
account of language reveal about the nature of truth? 
I argue that there are two important constraints, the practical capacity constraint
and  the  explicit  knowledge  constraint.  The  first  constraint  is  imposed  because  an
adequate account of thought must make room for an explanation of our ability to think,
whilst an adequate account of language must make room for our ability to make speech
acts. That is, an adequate account of thought has to be compatible with an explanation
of  thinking,  and  an  adequate  account  of  language  has  to  be  compatible  with  an
explanation of language use.  The second constraint  is  imposed because an adequate
account of thought requires stating what a subject can think and an adequate account of
language requires stating what is understood by competent users of a language. In the
mental case that requires understanding the contents of possible propositional attitudes
and the difference made by adopting different types of attitude to those contents. In the
linguistic  case  that  requires  understanding  the  contents  of  possible  sentences  and
understanding the difference made by presenting those contents with different forces.
One important aspect of both abilities is that they are abilities. That is to say, that
to be able to think or to use language is to be able to do something. I will also describe
them as practical abilities, as opposed to theoretical abilities, because, I will argue, there
is  no requirement  to  have  any knowledge of  content,  however  implicit,  in  order  to
9possess either ability1. In addition, we neither think nor use language in an inexplicable,
arbitrary fashion. It  is  not as if  we find ourselves  adopting a  string of unconnected
propositional attitudes, or making an inexplicable bunch of different speech acts. On the
contrary, there is a rationale to thinking and language use; what we think and what we
say varies with our epistemic state and our priorities2.  As such we can think or use
language well or badly. This being so, any account of thought or language needs to be
such that it can make sense of thinking and language use as something that we do, and
as something that we can do well  and badly.  I  will  call  this,  "the practical capacity
1 This builds on a distinction of Michael Dummett's. In his essay "What Do I Know When I Know a
Language?" Dummett distinguishes between the practical capacity to swim and practical capacity to
speak a language (Dummett, 1993, 95-96). With respect to the former capacity he claims that talk of
knowledge "only has the force of 'can do it as the result of having learned to do it'" (Dummett, 1993,
96). The latter capacity, he thinks, requires being guided by rules which govern the activity ( loc. cit.).
This, he thinks, requires knowing the rules implicitly. However, by the time of his essay "Language
and Truth" (first published 1983) Dummett acknowledges, and seems to endorse, the possibility that
"understanding a language does not amount to knowing anything at  all,  in the sense of knowing
something to be the case: it is simply a  practical ability, namely to use the language and respond
appropriately to the utterances of others when couched in it" (Dummett 1993, 132, my italics). He
then thinks that one cannot give an account of that practical ability without giving an account of "the
large theoretical component in linguistic competence" (Dummett 1993, 133, my italics). He goes on
to say that "speakers do not normally have such knowledge, explicitly or implicitly: but, by stating
what someone would have to know if he were thereby to be able to understand the language, we
characterise  what  it  is  that  a  speaker  is  able  to  do"  (Dummett  1993,  134).  The  idea  is  that  no
knowledge of the content of sentences is required in order to speak a language. Hence, speaking a
language is a practical ability. However, giving an account of the ability to use a language requires
giving an account of the knowledge that would be sufficient to speak a language assuming one had
the  relevant  practical  capacities.  I  am  going  to  endorse  the  view that,  in  the  first  instance,  no
knowledge of the content of sentences is required to use language and argue that reflective speakers
of a language engage in the philosophical project of giving an account of the ability to use language,
and hence come to have knowledge of the theoretical component in linguistic competence. They have
both a practical and theoretical ability. The same goes, mutatis mutandis, for reflective thinkers. 
2 I think that language use is more complicated than thinking. This is because, as I will argue, language
is representational medium where as having a propositional attitude is merely to be in an intentional
state. This allows us to do more with language, such as write poems, tell jokes, drop hints and so on.
Of course, we can do a lot of these things inwardly, but that, I claim, is using language silently rather
than adopting a propositional attitude. In any event, I think it is uncontroversial to claim that such
complicated activities are solely the preserve of linguistic creatures.
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constraint":
PCC: any account of thought/language needs to be such that it can make
sense of thinking/language use as a practical ability which can be performed
well or badly.
PCC provides  a  constraint  on  an  adequate  account  of  thought  and  language.
However, we do not merely engage in thinking and language use; we are also able to
come to have explicit knowledge of what we think and what we do with our language.
That is, as humans we are also able to have explicit knowledge of the contents of our
thoughts  and  sentences.  I  will  reserve  the  label  "grasp  of  content"  for  explicit
knowledge of a content. This means that there are two levels to thinking and language
use. The first level is the practical ability. The second level is theoretical knowledge of
the contents of thoughts and sentences. For example, in the mental realm, on a particular
occasion, wanting to eat peas and thinking that I have some in my freezer, I might find
myself heading there and removing a bag of frozen peas. It may never occur to me that I
had  any  thoughts  on  the  subject.  But,  on  other  occasions,  I  might  go  through  an
elaborate menu planning ritual. At this point, I have explicit knowledge of what I am
thinking.
 I can become even more sophisticated still. I can realise that the components of
that thought can occur and have occurred in a variety of other thoughts. I am explicitly
aware that the very same component of thought, "peas", occurs in my wanting to have
peas and my thinking that there are peas in the freezer. I have a grasp of the thought
component, "peas", and the propositional contents of my desire for peas and belief as to
their location. This explicit knowledge can be more sophisticated. One example can be
found in the work of Christopher Peacocke (1986, 1999). Peacocke develops a theory of
what it is to deploy particular components of thoughts and what it is to have particular
thoughts. This is not different in kind from explicit knowledge of the contents of one's
thoughts.  It  is a more in-depth development of reflection on the contents of acts of
thinking.  This  claim may seem slightly odd. After  all,  a theory like Peacocke's  is  a
description  of  the  capacities  required  to  have  propositional  attitudes,  whereas  most
reflective humans are simply aware of the content of their thinking. If challenged about
her rationale, the cook can say, "I thought that there were peas in the fridge". It does not
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seem as if she has to have any theory about the capacities required for thinking. That I
take the claim to be true is important for what follows. 
The reason that I think our naïve cook's understanding is no different in kind
from Christopher Peacocke's is that I share with Peacocke the view that thinking is an
ability. As a consequence, we both think that an account of what a thinker can do is an
account of what a thinker can think. In addition, to specify what a thinker can think, as
our naïve cook does, is to specify what a thinker can do. As Peacocke puts it, "a theory
of concepts should be a theory of concept possession" (1999, p. 5). To sugar the pill
somewhat it may be helpful to note that this constraint is fairly liberal. All it rules out is
the idealist  conception of  thinking as  a succession of  ideas  which,  because of  their
nature as spiritual substance, are understood by their occurrence. The idealist view is
ruled out because the central problem is seen as making sense of what it is to understand
anything, and the appeal to spiritual substance is seen as a refusal to face up to that
problem. However, the constraint is liberal enough to move from a materialism which
treats  thinking  as  dispositions  to  move  between  states,  through  a  Kantian  view  of
thinking  as  the  ability  to  combine  concepts  in  judgement,  all  the  way  to  treating
thinking as the ability to grasp thoughts in the third realm. 
To make the pill even sweeter I can say the following. The naïve, but reflective,
thinker can, not only be neutral about what is involved in thinking, she does not even
need to see that there is an issue at all. All that the naïve thinker needs to have realised is
that she is recognising and responding to the world. The ability that she is aware of
possessing and is characterising in her attributions of mental content is the ability to
think. It need go no deeper than that. In a similar way, a mediaeval peasant who is able
to recognise that water falls from the sky and can be found in her well need have no
inkling of chemical theory. Nevertheless, she has realised that it is the same sort of stuff
which is in the well and which falls from the sky. The chemistry of water is a vastly
more sophisticated development of that insight.
The claim is central to what follows. The challenge of explicit knowledge is
showing how one can even begin to  understand the ability to  think.  By treating all
attributions  of  content  as  descriptions  of  an  ability,  I  rule  out  "introspection"  as  a
satisfying answer to the question of how explicit knowledge is possible. I hope that this
is not too controversial. Even if self-knowledge is taken to be a matter of introspection,
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then we will still be owed an account of what it is to be able to introspect. That account
will have to be a description of an ability, and, more over, such that we can read off
from that description what it is to have knowledge of what you are thinking. As will
emerge, the central controversy is over whether we need to understand attributions of
content as merely indexing mental states, fundamentally characterised as a dispositional
state,  or whether  an attribution of content  is  an irreducible description of a rational
ability.
The  linguistic  case  is  similar.  One  can  utter  sentences  mindlessly  or  without
explicit  understanding  of  what  one  has  done.  An  extreme,  and  probably  fictitious
example, is the Duke of Devonshire who, according to GE Moore at least, gave a speech
in the House of Lords while still asleep (Moore, 1959). I admit to occasionally noticing
that I have answered a question incorrectly because I have not paid attention to the fact
that  I  am  answering  a  question.  I  suppose  that  sometimes  I  answer  questions
automatically but correctly, and so never notice that I have been talking. A less extreme
example is learning passages by rote in a foreign language and then reciting them. It
also seems to me, and this will figure in what follows, that infant language learners try
out using words the way they try out dropping their spoon to the floor. In both cases
they are trying to see how something works. But that does not imply that infant speakers
have explicit (or even implicit) knowledge of what they are up to. However, in general
speakers can reflect on what they have said, and are able to paraphrase it or provide
elucidations for other speakers. In addition, competent speakers often plot their next
linguistic move in advance. We can do all this because we have explicit knowledge of
the meaning of our words and sentences. Engaging in the philosophy of language, and
beginning to  build a theory of meaning for a particular language is,  once again,  an
extreme example  of  explicit  knowledge  of  a  language.  But,  as  in  the  mental  case,
explicit  understanding  of  our  language  and  ersatz  theorising  about  it  are  everyday
phenomena. This provides a second constraint on any account of thought and language.
I will call it, "the explicit knowledge constraint":
EKC: any account of thought/language needs to be such that it allows for
the possibility of grasp of content.
There is a significant difference between engaging in these practices and grasping
the content of what is done by practitioners. This is most clear in the case of thinking.
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Many non-human animals are certainly engaged in something like thinking. It seems the
most plausible explanation of the complex navigational abilities of rodents that they
understand their environment and are able to plot a course around it. Those are abilities
which require a rudimentary understanding of space and time. Even a cursory amount of
time spent in the company of a pet cat or pet dog seems sufficient to want to attribute
something like beliefs and desires to them3. There is however no grounds for attributing
to non-human animals the sort of reflective understanding which would be required to
3 This is not an uncontroversial statement, and even those who are sympathetic to the claim differ on
the details. Descartes held that brutes had no mental life (2000, p. 296). (Daniel Dennett takes it that
brutes do you have a mental life, but is liberal about what constitutes mentality. He extends it to
thermostats (Dennett, 1989, pp. 29-32). Ruth Milikan takes a similar line, but seems to require an
intentional state to be part of an inferentially articulated network for it to be a mental state (1989, pp.
294-297).  McDowell  denies  that  non-human  animals  have  beliefs  at  all  because  they  lack  the
requisite autonomy to respond to reasons. The thought is that to possess a concept one needs to be
able to respond to a reason as a reason. But, that requires the ability to represent the world, and
representing the world requires explicit knowledge of yourself and of how things are. As a result,
only self reflective creatures can possess concepts, and if thinking involves the use of concepts, only
self  reflective  creatures  can  think  (McDowell  1996,  esp  lecture  VI).  McDowell,  plausibly,  takes
himself to be following Kant. It strikes me as a good reading of "The Critique of Pure Reason", but
the issues are too involved for a footnote. Dummett denies concept possession to non-human animals
but allows them mentality (Dummett, 1993, pp. 148-149). As I read Frege and Wittgenstein, they both
grant full  blown concept  possession, but deny much conceptual  sophistication. Frege also denies
explicit  knowledge  of  content  to  animals.  The  dog  mentioned  at  §31  of  "The  Foundations  of
Arithmetic" seems to be granted the concept of being a dog and the concept of being a cat, but not the
concept of one or of unity. These latter concepts are the product of reflection, and therefore only
available to one who has the concept of a concept (Frege, 1980).  The dog who opens part II of
Wittgenstein's "Philosophical Investigations" can believe that his master is at the door, suggesting that
the dog has the concept of his master and the concept of being at the door. The dog cannot believe his
master will come home the day after tomorrow, which suggests that some concepts, like the day after
tomorrow,  are  too  complex  for  nonhuman  animals  (Wittgenstein,  1997,  p.  174).  Davidson,  in
"Thought and Talk", grants non-speakers mentality but denies them beliefs or other mental states. I
take it he also denies them concept possession. He tentatively suggests that you cannot have beliefs
without the concept of belief. I think he reasons that to have a belief one needs to be aiming at truth
and that one cannot aim at truth without the concept of truth. He certainly thinks that one cannot have
the concept of truth without the ability to understand language use, so non-speakers are also non-
believers (Davidson, 2001, 170). At the very end of the thesis I tentatively endorse such a line of
reasoning.
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have a grasp of the content of mental states. The point is that thinking is something that
we do. It does not require any understanding, implicit or explicit, of what is being done.
To help keep track of the distinction between engagement and reflection, I will label the
former "the ground floor" or "the 0th level", and the latter "the 1st level"4.
So, the answer to the main question:
What  does  thinking  about  what  is  required  of  an  account  of  thought  and  an
account of language reveal about the nature of truth? 
will have to be guided by an awareness that an account of thought or language must
meet the practical capacity constraint and the explicit knowledge constraint. What I am
going to do is show that because any acceptable account of thought or language must
meet PCC and EKC, thinking about thought and language reveals something about the
nature of truth –  namely that  truth is,  in the first  instance,  a substantial,  evaluative
property of sentences.
§1.1 The Problem of Explicit Knowledge
The problem of explicit knowledge is central to the thesis. I want to take some
time to motivate using it as a substantial constraint. To have explicit knowledge is to
grasp what is said about the world when language is in use and what is thought about
the  world  when  creatures  are  thinking.  In  the  linguistic  case,  explicit  knowledge
requires  knowledge  of  meaning  and,  in  the  mental  case,  explicit  knowledge  is
knowledge of what propositional attitudes you and other thinkers can and do adopt. The
linguistic case requires understanding both what can be said and the different ways of
saying it. As will emerge, that is understanding the force and the content of different
uses of language. The mental case requires understanding both mental content and the
difference made by adopting different types of attitudes with those contents. Ultimately,
I hope to show that it is through coming to explicit knowledge of meaning that we come
4 The justification for my slightly fussy insistence that non-reflective mentality and language use is 0 th-
level rather than 1st level is to mark just how little is involved in these abilities. In the long run I am
going to  argue  that  thinking is  intentional  but  non-representational  where  as  all  language use is
representational. I am also going to argue that a piece of text or speech makes a variety of speech acts
even in the absence of an utterer. It will then be useful to have the ground floor to mark the fact that
although language can be used unreflectively what has been done is something at  the first  level,
where as thinking as a response to reasons is at the ground floor.
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to have explicit  knowledge of the world.  The simple thought is  that having explicit
knowledge of the world requires explicit  knowledge of what you believe and know
about the world, and that requires explicit  knowledge of your mental states. But,  as
explicit knowledge of your mental states requires explicit knowledge of a language in
which  you  can  talk  about  what  it  is  that  you  are  thinking,  it  is  through  explicit
knowledge of language that you come to have explicit knowledge of how things are in
the world.
The contrast case is with implicit knowledge. When a thinker only has implicit
knowledge, then it is able to intelligently get itself around its environment. It has the
ability to recognise and respond to what is there in such a way that it is able, when
things go well, to get what it wants. However, such a creature has no more than that
ability. Even if it can recognise and respond to exercises of its mental abilities, it cannot
ask itself, "what is it that I am doing?" To put it another way, even if it can respond to its
mental states,  and thus, in some sense, think about its  thinking, it  cannot ask itself,
"what is it to think about the world?" The reason is that a creature which has the 'mere'
ability to recognise and respond to the world is a creature for which the only notion of
error  available  is  not  having got  what  it  wanted.  It  can  respond to  its  response  as
unsuccessful and, as a consequence, adjust its behaviour. It cannot ask itself, "what did I
think?" It  cannot  ask itself  that  because it  cannot  think of itself  as recognising and
responding to the world. The world is simply that to which it responds. Those responses
are successful or unsuccessful. They are not, for the creature, available as a taking of the
world. They are available only as (types of) events on a par with any other happenings a
creature can recognise and respond to.
My use of the terms is idiosyncratic. The reason is that I want to focus on a
problem  that  I  think  has  been  neglected.  It  is  a  feature  of  contemporary  analytic
philosophy of mind that thinking is treated as a skill. It seems to me that this gives rise
to a problem. The problem, put in its most simple terms, is that skills are things that are
exercised. You can possess a skill without even being aware that you possess it, and,
more problematically for my purposes, even if you know that you possess the skill you
may have no idea what it is that you do when you exercise it. Treating thinking as a skill
requires treating thinking as an ability to respond to the world. But, just because you can
respond to the world in an intelligent way, it does not follow that you can recognise that
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you  are  responding to  the  world  at  all,  and,  a  fortiori,  it  does  not  follow that  you
understand those responses as a recognition of some way for the world to be. This is the
problem of explicit knowledge.
 I am closest to Robert Brandom when he writes:
At the basic level, the question is how the capacity to entertain principles, and so to know
that something is the case, arises out of the capacity to engage in practices – to know how
to do something in the sense of being able to do it. What must practitioners be able to do in
order to be able thereby to say that things are thus and so – that is, to express something
explicitly?
(Brandom, 1998, p. xviii, italics original)5
However,  quite  possibly  like  Brandom,  I  do  not  think  that  the  distinction
between  implicit  knowledge  and  explicit  knowledge  is  the  distinction  between
knowledge how and knowledge that in Gilbert Ryle's sense – Ryle's sense being that
knowledge  that  is  knowledge  with  a  propositional  content,  and  knowledge  how an
intelligently  acquired  ability  characterised  in  dispositional  terms  (see,  for  example,
Ryle, 1949, pp. 40-44). Instead I maintain that the ability to be able to do something is,
as Stanley and Williamson (2001) argue, precisely a form of knowledge-that. It is to
know that taking some course of action is a way of engaging in some activity. What
Ryle, Brandom, Stanley and Williamson, and myself all share is the thought that being
able to do something,  whether  that  is  characterised in dispositional  or  propositional
terms, is a skill.  The disagreement is over the right way of characterising that skill.
What  lies  behind the different  views is  the  same.  It  is  a  rejection of  the  view that
thinking is a matter of a succession of ideas whose very nature is such that they are
private and the having of which constitutes understanding. On the rejected view there is
no problem with explicit knowledge. Being minded, on the rejected view, is a matter of
there  being  a  succession  of  these  special  entities,  ideas,  and  so  the  having  of  a
succession of ideas is sufficient to have an understanding of those ideas. 
Once we reject this view of thinking and replace it with the view that thinking is
a skill, we have to face up to the fact that we are no longer guaranteed an awareness of
5 Where I disagree with Brandom, as will emerge in chapter 4, is that being able to say what you are
doing is not sufficient to have explicit knowledge of what you are doing. One needs to understand
what you say in a way that goes beyond learning how to use self reflective language in a way that
counts as correct by the lights of your community.
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what  we  are  thinking  when  we  exercise  that  skill.  Even  if  we  follow  Stanley  and
Williamson  and  think  that  Hannah's  knowing  how to  ride  a  bicycle  is  a  matter  of
Hannah knowing that [some complex description of what Hannah does when she rides]
is a way to ride a bicycle, we have to acknowledge that, although Hannah might be
aware that she knows how to ride a bicycle, she certainly is not aware of the complex
description of what she does when she rides. 
In addition, it is not just complex skills like bicycle riding that have this feature.
The know-how/know-that distinction collapses in both directions. Something as simple
as knowing that the object in front of you is solid can be treated as knowledge of the
proposition that this object is solid, but, without the rejected picture, it is the ability to
recognise and respond to solidity. In the first instance, that is, very roughly, a matter of
going round rather than trying to go through the object. Something needs to be said
about how we move from the abilities to the kind of understanding that the rejected
picture was meant to make sense of. For if we are not aware of what we are thinking,
then we are not aware that we are thinking about the world, and human beings are very
definitely aware that they are thinking about the world. So, for me, implicit knowledge
is the knowledge that is had by a thinker who is able to do something intelligently. That
can be as simple as recognising and responding to objects, or the more complicated
ability to  set  goals,  all  the way up to the knowledge that  this  is  the way to play a
symphony. The challenge is to show how we can come to think about that knowledge in
such a way as to reveal it as contentful thinking about the world6.
6 It might be worth noting that my use of implicit knowledge does not coincide with treating implicit
knowledge  as,  in  some  sense,  sub-personal  and  unconscious.  Chomsky,  at  least  according  to
Dummett,  uses  "unconscious  knowledge"  in  this  sense  (Dummett,  1993,  p.  xi).  So,  we  have
unconscious knowledge of the syntax of our language, but the knowledge is unconscious because it
will never be revealed to us by introspection. I am happy to allow that we can make much of our
implicit knowledge explicit by introspection. The problem is showing how we can get ourselves into
a position to do that introspection. It might also be worth noting that my use of implicit knowledge
does not coincide with treating implicit knowledge as unconscious knowledge, if that is to imply that
implicit mental states have no phenomenal qualities. I am happy to think that there is something it is
like for the rat to recognise and respond to cheese, and so something that it is like for the rat to have
implicit knowledge that there is cheese present. What I wish to deny is that the phenomenal quality of
experience is sufficient to bring the world into view. To think so is to fall back into a particularly
nasty version of the rejected picture. Phenomenal qualities are not even ideas in the idealists sense.
That is, phenomenal qualities do not bring with them understanding by being had. So, to treat the
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However, it is essential to the notion of a mental state that it is a response to how
things are. Belief are the most straightforward. A belief is a recognition of how things
are.  It  follows  that  beliefs  cannot  be  understood  simply according to  their  roles  in
particular  undertakings.  That  is,  understanding  belief  and  understanding  what  you
believe requires more than being able to evaluate the contribution made by your mental
states to the success of your projects. Grasping the concept of belief requires some other
standard of evaluation. If we allow for the moment that what it is for a belief to be
correct is no more than what is captured by the following schema:
COR: a belief that p is correct when (it is the case that) p,
then we can distinguish between implicit and explicit evaluation as follows. Creatures
who lack explicit  understanding cannot evaluate their  beliefs as correct or incorrect.
This minimal, but pedantic, notion of correctness requires realising that your beliefs are
takings of the world as being a particular way. To evaluate a belief according to COR
requires knowing what  the content  of your  belief  is  and what  situation it  is  about7.
Having that knowledge is to have explicit knowledge.
Whatever notion of truth is appealed to, a belief which meets COR is a belief
which is true. If we grant a response which is the implicit recognition that this is how
things are the title of belief, then, even on the most minimal notion of truth, the ground
floor believer cannot worry about whether or not its beliefs are true. On the other hand,
a creature with explicit knowledge is one which has the concept of truth. There is then a
how possible question facing any theorist of truth: if truth is as your preferred theory
maintains, how is it possible for thinkers to evaluate their beliefs according to COR? 
I can put the point like this. Explicit knowledge is that which brings the world
into view. A person with explicit  knowledge is someone who is aware that they are
recognising and responding to the world. That is, they are able to be pedantic. They can
care about believing truly. The problem of explicit knowledge is showing how we can
what it is like of experience to be explicit knowledge requires a commitment to an unexplained ability
to understand the significance of your experience through understanding the phenomenal qualities of
your experience. But, that is to make the mistake that Ryle railed against.
7 Of course, on some understandings of belief those two bits of knowledge come together. Indeed, it
turns out that the problem with deflationary theories is that they treat content as distinct from what a
belief is about.
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move from an ability to navigate our environment to an understanding of that ability.
The challenge is to show how the question of whether or not things are as they are
believed to be can become a problem for thinkers. 
I will show that it is by coming to understand sentences as representations of
ways for things to be that humans are able to gain explicit knowledge. More over, I will
show that  this  requires languages to be constituted by prescriptive rules for making
linguistic acts in such a way that truth organises language use, and it is through grasping
truth as that which evaluates language use that speakers come to explicit knowledge. All
this  is  a long way off,  I  first  have to  put  the foundations  in place by deflating the
deflationary balloon. The pin is the explicit knowledge constraint. I am going to show
that the deflationary theorist cannot make sense of our having the world in view. This
takes up the bulk of chapters 2 and 3. However, the argument is diffuse, so I am going
to summarise it here.
§1.2 What is a Deflationary Theory8?
8 Although I hope that my characterisation of deflationary theories is sufficiently broad to encompass
the vast majority of what has been passed off as a deflationary theory, there are so many on the
market  that  this  claim  seems  ambitious.  What  I  am  more  than  hopeful  about  is  that  my
characterisation pins down both the minimalism of Paul Horwich and the pragmatic phenomenalism
of Robert Brandom. Horwich and Brandom are what we might call 'thoroughgoing deflationists'. Like
all deflationists they think that truth does nothing more than allow us to talk about the world whilst
talking about thoughts and sentences. As a result, truth allows us to make claims we have no other
way of making, but this is not because gaining the concept of truth gives you insight into anything.
Truth is  a  device,  which if  grasped, allows you to make and understand generalisations (and, in
Brandom's case, make explicit your deontic scorekeeping). Truth is also a semantic notion. So, to be a
deflationist  about  truth is  to  deny that  the  concept  of  truth can  be of  any use  in  understanding
semantics. What makes Horwich and Brandom thoroughgoing deflationists is that they maintain that
what goes truth goes for all other semantic notions, such as reference or F being true of x. They
maintain that there is just nothing to be explained about the relationships between words and the
world. Instead, they think that languages are used in such a way that there is an interpretation of any
language, but providing an understanding interpretations does not require understanding semantic
vocabulary. Because concepts and thoughts are about the world, there are the mental analogues of the
semantic notions of truth, reference and being true of. The thoroughgoing deflationist also denies that
these have any explanatory power or require any explanation. I also want to pin less thoroughgoing
deflationists with my understanding. In particular I have Ruth Millikan in mind. I also have success
semantics and any kind of functional role theory in my sights. These views maintain that there is
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There is a strong equivalence between its being true that p, and p (where 'p' is a
sentence in use). That being so any sentence, S, which can be used to assert that p is true
if and only if p. This gives rise to the following equivalence schema:
ES: S is true in a language, L, if and only if p,
instances of which pair up names of (indicative) sentences of L with sentences in use
that give the contents of those named sentences. This means that truth has a useful, but
unusual,  function.  It  serves to allow us  to  talk about  the world while  talking about
sentences. The very same thing can be asserted by predicating truth of an indicative
sentence or by using a sentence which specifies its content. In other words, this function
of a truth predicate has two aspects, semantic ascent and denominalisation. The function
is useful because there are times when we are not in a position to make a claim in the
ordinary way. Instead, we need to refer to a sentence, or sentences, and say that they are
true.  There  are  times  when  you  might  want  to  affirm an  open-ended  collection  of
claims. For example,  an orthodox Catholic  might  maintain that everything the Pope
says, ex cathedra, is true. She could not, even in principle, do that by making every
assertion  the  Pope has  made or  will  make ex  cathedra.  Instead  she  needs  to  make
semantic ascent by saying something like, "everything the Pope says, ex cathedra, is
true".
All of the above is accepted by everyone (the reason for this emerges in chapter
1).  What makes the deflationist  unique is  that she maintains that there is no deeper
explanation of what two true sentences have in common than that they are both true. In
other words, you have learned the concept of truth as applied to sentences when you
have got to grips with its function as a device of semantic ascent and denominalisation.
As a result, she maintains, that ES tells us everything that there is to know about truth as
applied to sentences. 
something to be explained when it comes to reference and being true of. As a result, they do think
that there is something to be said about what it is for something to be true. What they deny is that the
concepts of truth, reference or being true of have any explanatory role.  In their views, what one
understands are respectable natural scientific properties of words and concepts. The reason I want to
call them deflationary is that, for them, understanding the concept of truth is still to have grasped a
device of ascent. Understanding the concept of truth still gives you no insight into what it is for uses
of language or acts of thinking to be about the world.
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Of course,  we do not just  apply truth to sentences but also to thoughts.  But
again, because of the strong equivalence between it being true that p and p, there is
equivalence schema for thoughts:
ET: the thought that p is true if and only if p,
where, this time, 'the thought that p' is the name of a thought and 'p' is a sentence in use
which gives its content. So, truth also allows us to talk about the world by talking about
thoughts. We can either give the content of a thought by using a sentence, or we can
refer to the thought and predicate truth of it. Truth has the further dual aspect of being a
device  of  mental  ascent  and  denominalisation.  Again,  there  are  times  when  this  is
indispensable. Somebody might legitimately and truthfully say, "I do not know what it
is that Nathan believes but it must be true. There is no other way to explain his success".
For the deflationist,  truth does not become any more interesting when predicated of
mental items. She holds that you have learned the concept of truth as applied to thoughts
when  you  have  got  to  grips  with  its  function  as  a  device  of  mental  ascent  and
denominalisation. So, according to the deflationist the raison d'être of the concept of
truth is to be a device of ascent and denominalisation and there is no more to truth than
that.
§1.3 What is the problem?
Deflationists,  like  everyone  else,  acknowledge  that  it  is  possible,  should  we
wish, to evaluate what somebody claims or what somebody believes according to how
things are in the world. COR captures this way of evaluating beliefs. A similar schema
will capture the equivalent notion for assertions. But, this sort of pedantic evaluation is
possible because beliefs are takings of ways for the world to be and assertions make
claims about ways for the world to be. For that to be the case each belief and each claim
must be about some way for the world to be. In addition, whatever your view of thought
or of language, two different people can believe or assert the same thing. To capture
this, you need to appeal to some notion of what is believed or what is claimed and you
need  a  way  of  describing  those  things  separately  from  the  occasion  of  belief  or
assertion.  In  my  terminology,  this  regimentation  is  done  in  terms  of  thoughts  and
sentences. At the very least, a thought or a sentence is a posit of a theory about what
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someone can believe or claim. In this sense, a thought is what is believed and a sentence
what  is  used  to  make  an  assertion.  Thoughts  and  sentences  are  interpersonally
ascribable and also code the intentional properties of beliefs and assertions. As a result,
it makes sense to say the thoughts and sentences are about situations even when they are
not being believed or asserted. 
The notion of "aboutness" is key here. There is a sense in which the problem
faced by theorists of language and thought is, precisely, making sense of what it is for a
linguistic  or  mental  items  to  be  about  something.  This  problem is  the  problem of
intentionality. Explaining what it is for one thing to be about another is explaining what
it is for that first thing to be an intentional item9. 
Aboutness itself is not much clearer than intentionality, so I want to say a little
bit about how I am thinking about aboutness. The key thought is that what something is
about is captured in terms of evaluation. For example, someone's belief that petunias are
flowers is about a way for the world to be, namely that petunias are flowers, but not
because it was caused by petunias being flowers. After all almost anything could have
caused that belief. Instead, we make sense of the belief as being about that way for the
world to be in terms of COR. At the very least, should we choose to be pedantic, it is
petunias being flowers that makes someone's belief that petunias are flowers correct. Of
course, it is not just particular beliefs that are about ways for the world to be. It makes
sense  to  say that,  even  if  no  one  has  ever  believed  it,  the  belief  that  petunias  are
dinosaurs is an intentional item. In addition, any propositional attitude of any type is an
intentional item, and, as noted above, thoughts, as the possible contents of propositional
attitudes, are also intentional items. The same thing goes for sentences and their uses.
9 Of  course,  some  deflationary  theorists,  notably  Horwich  and  Brandom,  also  attempt  to  deflate
intentionality. For these theorists, there being a characteristic pattern of deployment for a word or a
concept is sufficient for that item to have a referent. The best way of understanding this claim is to
take it as the view that there is neither a reductive explanation of any intentional concept nor is giving
an interpretation of a language an exercise that requires meta-theoretical semantic notions. In other
words, there is no more to any semantic concept than its function as a device of semantic ascent. A
phrase like "is true of" allows us to say things like: 'for any predicate, c, c is true of all and only
things that are c', but for actual predicates like, "is a dog", all we need is, 'for all x, x is a dog if and
only if x is a dog'. The "true of" locution exists because there are as many predicates as there are
properties, and that is a pretty large number, if not infinite, of things.
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But, although we cannot evaluate, for example, desires in terms of their truth value, we
can evaluate them in terms of what  would have to be the case for the desire  to be
satisfied. Similarly, we can make sense of what situation a question is about by making
sense of what a true answer to that question would be. The thought is that we can make
sense of aboutness in terms of the possibility of using truth as a device of evaluation.
The next question is: what does that say about truth? Different forms of Deflationism
deny that we need to understand truth to understand intentionality, either because they
maintain that there is nothing to understand, or because they maintain that intentionality
can be understood in terms of proper or normal functioning. The former option deflates
correctness  along  with  truth,  and  the  latter  option  attempts  to  explain  it  in  natural
scientific terms.
This  is  not  denied  by  deflationary  theorists  of  any  stripe.  Because,  for  the
deflationist  there  is  no  more  to  truth  than  its  function  as  a  device  of  ascent  and
denominalisation, the explanation of what it is for a sentence or thought to be about the
world cannot appeal to the fact that it is true in such and such a circumstance. Instead,
thoughts or sentences are about situations, and, as a result, in such situations they are
true. Now, the thinker who has explicit knowledge is one who is aware that their beliefs
and assertions are true when they capture how things are. That is, they are thinkers who
know that they are thinking and talking about the world. In addition, they know what
situations they are thinking and talking about. However, if the deflationary theorist is
correct,  they  did  not  come  to  that  understanding  by  understanding  truth;  after  all,
according  to  the  deflationist,  there  is  nothing  to  understand.  Instead,  they  had  to
understand some other property or properties of what they think and what they say. The
deflationist is committed to there being these other, non-semantic, properties that both
account for the intentionality of thoughts and sentences and explain the possibility of
coming to be aware of that intentionality. What I try to show is that the deflationist is
unable to meet that commitment.
§1.4 The Argument
The  argument  against  deflationary  theories  aims  to  show  that  deflationary
theories  suffice  only  as  an  account  of  implicit  knowledge.  The  thought  is  that
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deflationary  theories  provide  a  description  of  what  thinkers  can  do  in  dispositional
terms. It is an explanation in terms of one event (normally) causing another. As a result,
a  description  of  what  a  thinker  does  has  no  need  of  substantial  and  irreducible
intentional  vocabulary.  Such  a  description  is  the  description  of  an  ability.  It  is  an
account of implicit knowledge. However, it is not a description in terms of recognition
and response, but a description in terms of what tends to happen that is then seen to be
recognition and response just so long as the subject is located in a suitable environment.
This  is  to  say  that  the  fact  that  mental  states  are  about  anything  at  all  requires
explanation.  That is the sort of explanation that can only be understood by one who
already has explicit knowledge. But, as explicit knowledge is awareness of what you are
recognising  and responding to,  deflationary theories  are  unable  to  account  for  such
awareness.  The simple thought,  here,  is  that  deflationary theorists  attempt to give a
perspective neutral account of language use and thinking, but such a description can
only be intelligently given by one who has already understood her own perspective on
things. The claim is that truth is the property required to make sense of the fact that you
are thinking about the world because it is constitutive of the intentionality of those states
that it is truth which organises those responses. 
The rough outline of the argument is that treating ES as capturing all there is to
truth as applied to sentences means that learning to use a language is no more than
gaining an ability. Of course, one who has explicit knowledge of meaning is one who
knows what they are doing when they are speaking. That is, they know what it is for
their sentences to be true. But, if ES is the beginning and the end of wisdom about truth
for sentences, that claim is unexplanatory of what that knowledge consists in. Instead,
the deflationary theorist has to think that explicit knowledge is a type of mental state
which is  not fundamentally characterised as understanding a language,  even if,  as a
matter  of  fact,  those  mental  states  are  the  states  of  someone  who  understands  a
language. But, a deflationary account of mental states makes the fact that they are about
anything extrinsic to what those states are. That a mental state is about anything is,
according to the deflationary theorist, a matter of some serious empirical work. But, for
that empirical work to be revealing of your access to the world, you need some access to
the world in the first place. All the deflationary theorist really offers is a description of
complex behaviour.
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Why  do  deflationary  theorists  have  to  think  that  explicit  knowledge  is  not
fundamentally characterised as understanding a language? Well, a guiding thought of
the thesis, defended in chapter 1, is that the meaning of an expression is that which is
understood  by  fully  competent  speakers.  Now,  what  is  understood  by  competent
speakers  is  the  contribution  uses  of  an  expression  (tend)  to  make  to  what  is  done
linguistically by different uses of sentences which involve that expression. I call that
contribution the semantic role of an expression. So, I can put the point like this: fully
competent speakers understand the semantic role of each expression in a language, and
what an account of meaning aims to capture is the semantic role of each expression in a
language.  I  now  use  that  thought  to  answer  the  question  at  the  beginning  of  the
paragraph.
Because  deflationary  theories  maintain  that  there  is  no  more  to  truth  as  a
property  of  sentences  than  its  function  as  a  device  of  semantic  ascent  and
denominalisation,  deflationary theories are committed to it  being possible to explain
what  is  done  by  an  expression  without  reference  to  truth.  In  other  words,  for  a
deflationary theory, the semantic role of an expression is captured without reference to
truth as an evaluative property of language use. Truth does not organise language use,
and so use can be described without reference to truth. Instead, the semantic role of an
expression is given in terms of regularities of deployment10. 
What does it mean to explain use without reference to truth? The clue is at the
end of the last paragraph. The idea is that the role of an expression can be described in
10 It  may  appear  that  this  does  not  fit  the  pragmatic  phenomenalism  of  Robert  Brandom.  If  so,
appearances are deceiving. The uniqueness of Brandom's position is that there is no reduction of the
normative. But, the deflationary drift of his thought requires that truth talk does no more than register
a norm. It  is not itself explanatory of that  norm. Instead, Brandom's picture is one in which the
regularities of use have to be understood in terms of what speakers count as correct. To understand a
language is to be able to keep score along with your fellow language users. Truth is meant to be what
competent language users use to register the current state of play. So, although it is true that, for
Brandom, it  is not accidental that speakers aim at  truth, what speakers have to understand is not
fundamentally described as each expression's contribution to the truth values of sentences in which it
can occur. Instead, what is understood are which uses count as correct. There is no deeper explanation
of  that,  and  a  fortiori,  no  explanation  in  terms  of  speakers  grasping  intentional  properties  of
sentences. Once again, a use is not correct because it is true, it is correct and so it is true.
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terms of some regularity for using that expression.  More over,  that regularity is  not
fundamentally described in terms of each expression's contribution to the truth values of
sentences in which it can occur. Views that do make the semantic role of an expression
fundamentally accounted for in terms of its contribution to truth values are views which
treat truth as a substantial property which explains intentionality. Such views make the
intentional properties of expressions both substantial and irreducible. They understand
language  use  in  terms  of  its  intentionality.  On  these  views,  what  speakers  have  to
understand are the intentional properties of their sentences, and they do that by coming
to understand truth. Deflationary views deny that. They try to find a non-intentionally
describable pattern which explains the way an expression tends to be used. They then
need a further account of why anything used like that has any intentional properties.
Deflationary views divide here as to whether or not there needs to be an account of
intentionality, i.e. whether or not there needs to be a reduction of intentional vocabulary
to the non-intentional. Horwich and Brandom deny the need for a reduction, redundancy
theories maintain it.
By  denying  that  meaning  is  to  be  understood  in  terms  of  the  intentional
properties  of  expressions,  the  deflationary  theorist  makes  coming  to  understand
meaning a matter of coming to be able to use an expression in accordance with its
explanatorily  basic  usage  pattern.  It  is  the  ability  to  use  words  to  make  yourself
understood.  This  is  implicit  knowledge.  Somebody  who  has  explicit  knowledge  is
somebody who realises that their sentences are about ways for things to be. That is, ES
captures what it  is  that  they understand.  However,  that  understanding cannot  be the
mere ability to use "is true" in accordance with ES. Being able to do that is to have
implicit knowledge of the meaning of "is true". Because, according to the deflationary
theorist, the ability to use "is true" in accordance with ES is both understanding all there
is  to  understand about  truth with respect  sentences  and implicit  knowledge,  explicit
knowledge is not simply the knowledge that the sentence used on the right-hand side
gives the truth conditions of the sentence on the left. They need to understand what the
sentence on the right says by grasping its intentional properties11. 
11 If  it  is  objected  that  Horwich  and  Brandom both deny that  there  are  any substantial  intentional
properties to be grasped, I can put the worry like this. Both Horwich and Brandom accept that there is
a  difference  between implicit  and  explicit  knowledge.  They both  think  that  being able  to  use  a
sentence correctly is to have implicit knowledge. This is as true of sentences in a theory of meaning
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I can put the point like this, for the deflationary theorist, ES summarises, but
does  not  explain,  explicit  knowledge.  It  is  true  to  say that  a  speaker  with  explicit
knowledge is one who understands that the sentence used on the right-hand side of an
instance of ES gives the truth conditions of the sentence on the left, but according to a
deflationary theory that does not tell us what such understanding consists in. It does not
help to say that she understands that p is true if and only if q, where 'q' is a further
sentence in use. We can always ask what does the understanding of the new sentence in
use  consist  in.  To  provide  something  that  is  not  just  a  summary  of  her  explicit
knowledge, the deflationary theorist must turn her attention to the mental. She must
provide an account of a mental state which is characteristic of explicit knowledge.
Before  turning my attention  to  why deflationary theorists  cannot  provide  an
account of a mental state that is characteristic of explicit knowledge, I want to point out
one moral from the foregoing. Even if the deflationary theorist thinks that, as a matter of
fact,  explicit  knowledge  comes  from recognising  of  sentences  that  they  have  truth
conditions,  what  the  deflationary theorist  owes  is  an  account  of  what  it  is  to  have
explicit knowledge of the truth conditions of a sentence which is not simply a matter of
being able use a sentence to express that understanding. She needs an account of what it
is to understand the 'p's that is not, fundamentally, linguistic understanding.
It is key to a deflationary account of truth that thinking is not fundamentally
characterised in intentional terms. It is easiest to see that with belief by way of contrast
with one who thinks that truth is ineliminable from accounts of the mind. Belief is the
mental  state  that  is  the outcome of  a  judgement.  If  truth  is  treated as  a  substantial
property which is organising thinking, then judgement has to be understood as the act of
taking to be true. In addition, there is no more fundamental account of the nature of
judgement  than  as  the attitude  of  taking true.  Belief  is  then  the attitude of  holding
as it is of sentences free of semantic vocabulary. So, they need some account of what it is to have
explicit knowledge of the sentences used on the right-hand side of instances of ES. As having explicit
knowledge  requires  being  able  to  engage  in  pedantic  evaluation  of  your  beliefs,  that  explicit
knowledge is going to be knowledge of what the 'p's claim. That is, they need an account which is
summarised by ES, but, in the end, would have something unique to say about what it is to have
explicit  knowledge of  each and every sentence.  In  other  words,  they need to make sense of  our
coming to understand the intentional properties of our vocabulary, but what is denied is that that is a
matter of understanding intentional properties themselves.
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something to be true, and again this is a substantial and irreducible claim. This sort of
view characterises mental states according to their intentional properties. It is to treat a
mental state as fundamentally a recognition and response to how things are. If that is
denied, as it is by the deflationist, then, although judgement is still the act of taking to
be true, to take to be true is simply to move into a belief state. The deflationist then
needs some account of what it is to be in a state of belief. That account will be in terms
of some characteristic pattern of interaction with other mental states and behaviour. It
will not be in terms of a belief being the attitude of holding true. It leaves the theorist
with some further work to do.  She needs an account of why those states are  about
anything  at  all.  That  is,  she  needs  some  account  of  why  those  states  have  truth
conditions12.  Once  again,  the  deflationist  might  deny  that  she  owes  any  sort  of
explanation.  She  might  maintain  that  the  fact  that  a  thought  makes  a  characteristic
difference to the activity of thinking is sufficient to account for its intentionality. This is
the option adopted by minimalists and the pragmatic phenomenalists. Alternatively, she
might offer a reductive account of intentionality. This is the option taken by redundancy
theorists.
The moral of the last paragraph is that deflationary theorists are committed to a
complete account of the mental being of the following form:
1. Provide a description of a system;
2. Show why the outputs of that system are about anything.
This is what Jennifer Hornsby has labelled "a two task idea" of the mental (1989, p.
549). Anyone whose idea of the mental is two task has to think that the fact that mental
states are recognitions and responses to ways for things to be requires some explanation.
What they aim to do is provide a description of the responses which constitute thinking,
and then show that, given a suitable environment, anything which tends to respond to
those ways is thinking about the world. Importantly, they maintain that describing the
dispositions  which constitute  mental  states  and showing that  those states  have truth
conditions is a complete description of thinking. By way of contrast, the one task idea is
12 In fact, they also need an account of why truth seems so salient. Alternative predicates could have
been  used  to  interpret  mental  states.  It  is  not  obvious  why we  should  valorise  truth  over  these
alternative predicates. This is the challenge Brian Loar thinks he needs to face (see chapter 2 and
(Loar, 1981 and 1982).
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that we have to start from an understanding of thinking in its own terms, i.e. in terms of
truth as organising rational behaviour, and then work hard to show that there could be a
mechanism which allows us to be rational.
Another,  perspicuous,  way of seeing this  difference is  that  the one task idea
treats the description of mentality as requiring a description of the way the world strikes
the thinker, where as two task idea merely requires a description of the creature's ability.
The former is a description of the perspective of the thinker, and the latter a perspective
neutral account of the mind. A two task view of the mind is clearly sufficient as an
account of implicit knowledge. All that is required to possess implicit knowledge of
some thing is to have the ability to respond to it in a rational manner. This is precisely
what is described by a perspective neutral account of mentality. However, as I showed
above, a thinker with 'mere' implicit knowledge is one for which getting things right is
not a problem. It is one that is not aware that it has a view on the world. For a creature
to gain explicit knowledge they have to become aware that they are thinking about the
world. That requires them to be able to evaluate their beliefs according to COR, which
is  to  say,  according  to  the  truth  value  of  what  is  believed.  The  challenge  for  the
deflationist  is  showing  how  an  account  of  the  mental  life  of  a  subject  as  being
characterised by characterising its dispositional setup can make sense of that subject as
recognising that there is a sense in which its beliefs are correct when true.
Once again, to say that a thinker recognises that her beliefs are correct when
they are true is, according to the deflationist, a summary of what a thinker can do when
she has explicit knowledge. As in the linguistic case, the reason is that truth is simply a
device  of  generalisation.  What  the  deflationist  needs  is  an  account,  perhaps  on  a
piecemeal basis, that explains what it is for a thinker to recognise of any instance of ET
what situation is described by the sentence in use on the right-hand side.  For some
given  p,  the  deflationary  theorist  owes  us  an  account  of  what  knowledge  that  the
thought that p is true if and only if p consists in. It cannot simply be to have the belief
that p. That is a matter of the ability to have, when things go well, a particular type of
mental state with a particular content when it is the case that p. Nor can it be the ability
to believe that you believe that p when in fact you do. On a deflationary view, believing
that  you believe that  p is,  simply,  the ability to move,  when things go well,  into a
particular type of mental state with a particular content when you believe that p. Just as
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in the linguistic case, what is required is knowledge of what situation the thought that p
is about.
The obvious thought might be that knowledge of what situation the thought that
p is about requires the ability to identify the relevant situation in more than one way
and the ability to identify the two modes of presentation13. However, a creature that can
do that is not one that has the world in view. To see this assume that the belief that p and
the belief that q are two ways of responding to the same state of affairs, there might be a
creature that can move into a new belief state that is the belief that the belief that p and
the belief that q are equivalent. This is not so far-fetched. Imagine a rat that can identify
a  particular  location  by  both  its  sight  and  smell.  If  it  is  able  to  use  its  different
experiences in each sensory modality to better get round the world, it makes sense to
say that it is identifying its experiences as being of the same situation and using that to
build a better conception of how the world is laid out. What the rat  is not doing is
identifying the  content of its belief that p and the  content of its belief that q as being
about the whereabouts of a particular location. It does not identify the thought that p or
the thought that q as being about anything.
But, why does it matter that the rat does not identify the thought that p or the
thought that q. as being about anything? After all, as the rat gains more information, and
as things change, the rat will update its conception of how the world is laid out. Its
beliefs are, by and large, going to track the truth. Importantly, it seems plausible that, in
a large number of cases, when the rat discovers that things have changed it will update
its beliefs. It might well also change its beliefs when false beliefs lead to the failure of
its projects. Why is that not evaluating its beliefs according to COR, and, thus, explicit
knowledge?  The  answer  is  that  what  is  being  described  is  a  system  that  acts  in
accordance with COR, but that is not evaluation according to COR. What the rat does is
evaluate its beliefs according to whether or not they lead to success, but because, by and
large, true beliefs lead to success, the rat will end up adjusting its beliefs in accordance
with COR. To do pedantic evaluation, a thinker needs to recognise that its beliefs have
intentional properties. It needs to realise that the content of its belief that p is such that it
makes the belief about some way for the world to be and to recognise what that way is.
In other words, it needs to recognise that the thought that p is true if and only if p.
13 This is exactly the strategy adopted by Ruth Millikan (1987) and (1989).
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By naturalising intentionality the deflationary theorist makes it impossible for a
thinker ever to come to realise that she is recognising and responding to the world.
Mental states are characterised according to their dispositional characteristics. That set
of dispositions is then shown to be a series of responses to ways for things to be. But, no
matter  how sophisticated that  system and how flexible it  is  in its  responses,  such a
system can never come to realise what it  is up to. If such a system is sophisticated
enough to respond to its own responses, it makes sense to describe it as identifying what
it  is  responding  to.  However,  it  is  not  in  a  position  to  evaluate  its  responses  as
meaningful. It cannot think of its responses as being responses to ways for things to be.
So, at best such a system has implicit knowledge of what it is up to. It can never come
to have the explicit knowledge which is characteristic of mature human engagement
with the world.
§2 Minimal Autonomy
Given that non-human animals are able to engage in something like thinking there
is at least some sort of priority of the mental over the linguistic. This much is certainly
true: mental life is  temporally prior to language use.  It seems more than likely that
having a mental life is a prerequisite for being able to use a language14. If that is right,
then, in psychology, there is an explanatory priority of the mental over the linguistic.
However, I will defend the view that it is language and not thought that reveals how we
stand to the world. But, given the temporal priority of the mental, the question now is: 
What is it to have a mental life? It is not a uniquely human phenomenon. A wide
variety of creatures have a mental life. Having a mental life is a practical ability. It is a
way of responding to the world. But, what makes a response a mental response? I argue
that there is a minimal autonomy constraint on the mental. What this means is that a
mental response is something which a creature does, and not merely something which a
creature has. So when a human goes to lie down in the sun, this is the result of the
decision which she has made and not merely a display of positive phototropism15. The
14 This is not the same claim as that thinking is temporally prior to using a language. Dummett's essay
"Truth and Meaning" (Dummett, 1993, p. 147) deals with the various options in the debate. 
15 I take it that this rules out Ruth Millikan's bacteria from having mentality. These bacteria can locate
oxygen free water by having magnetozomes which are differentially responsive to magnetic north.
32
reason why there  is  a  minimal  autonomy constraint  on  the  mental  is  that  a  mental
response is a taking of the world to be a certain way. Creatures with mentality take the
world to be a certain way. 
But what is involved in taking the world to be a certain way? I want to claim that
a  phototropic  plant  does  not  take  the  world to  contain  light  and dark.  It  is  merely
differentially responsive to light levels. In contrast to the plant, a rat which sticks to the
shadows because it fears being eaten has a mental life. This is because it is taking the
world to contain light and dark areas (or at any rate safe and unsafe locations)16. The
The bacteria in the northern hemisphere, when scientists aren't mucking about with magnets, follow
the pull of their magnetozomes towards geomagnetic north, which turns out to be down to oxygen
free water (Millikan, 1989, p. 290).  It is not enough to be differentially responsive to the direction of
the magnetic field for a creature's response to the world to be something that it  does. It  needs a
project. 
It is not clear to me whether Millikan thinks that these bacteria have a mind or merely
that that pull of the magnetosomes represent the direction of oxygen free water. She writes:
Am I really prepared to say that these creatures, too, have mental states, that they think?
I am not prepared to say that. On the contrary, the representations that they have must differ from
human beliefs in at least six very fundamental ways.
Millikan, 1989, p. 294
To my ear, that suggests these bacteria lack mentality. However, she also writes:
In sum, these six differences between our representations and those of the bacterium, or
Fodor's  paramecia,  ought  to  be  enough  amply  to  secure  our  superiority,  to  make  us  feel
comfortably more endowed with mind.
Millikan, 1989, p. 297 
That suggests the bacteria and paramecia are minded, but not very well. Millikan thinks she can
'naturalize' having a project in terms of normal function, where normal function is determined by the
evolutionary history of an organism.  If Millikan is right, then phototropic plants and magnetically
sensitive bacteria do have mentality because they have projects. However, it seems to me that what
bacteria have is not yet a desire let alone a belief. I think that nature, despite selection pressures,
provides no norms. Bacteria can no more be said to want to avoid oxygen than a stone can be said to
want to roll down hill because neither value anything. For a good defence of this view see Morris,
1992, chapter 11. However,  nothing I will  say about the nature of truth turns on that  issue. The
important point is that I am in agreement with Millikan that minimal autonomy is a necessary and
sufficient condition for mentality.
16 I do not wish to be wedded to these empirical  claims. It  seems to me to be reasonable to deny
mentality to phototropic plants as they lack a central nervous system. And it seems odd to think that a
creature whose behaviour is as complicated as a rat's should be no more than a sophisticated input-
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difference is that plants do not do things for a purpose which they set themselves. To
have a purpose which you set yourself is to have a project. This does not require the rat
to have explicit knowledge of what it is doing.  A rat can have a project by desiring
things. It does not need to know, even implicitly, that it desires those things. A creature
with a project has some aims. That is to say there must be something that the creature
wants. The upshot is that a creature can behave with a purpose only when it is possible
for it to have desires. 
I take a desire to be a pro-attitude towards a state of affairs. When I desire a cup
of coffee, I adopt a pro-attitude towards the state of affairs of having a cup of coffee. All
of which is a very long winded way of saying that I want a cup of coffee. However, the
long  winded  formulation  is  revealing.  Explaining  desires  in  terms  of  pro-attitudes
reveals that wanting involves a form of positive evaluation17. When I want a cup of
coffee,  I  must  positively  evaluate  having  a  cup  of  coffee.  At  this  point  we  are  in
normative territory. Wanting a cup of coffee is finding having a cup of coffee good. We
have to introduce the loaded, normative term "good" in order to make sense of positive
evaluation18. However, a creature cannot find a possible situation good, unless it has
output box. If it turns out otherwise, I will be surprised. It will not affect the philosophy. Furthermore,
if  there  is  an  evolutionary account  of  having a project  that  includes positive  phototropism, then
mentality is more widespread than I think. However, a plant has mentality if and only if it reaches the
minimal autonomy constraint,  and a rat  lacks mentality if it  fails  to meet the minimal autonomy
constraint.
17 In fact,  I  think it  involves  a  form of positive evaluation because it  is  in fact  a form of positive
evaluation. To avoid controversy I have only committed myself to the weaker claim. However, it
seems to me that adopting a pro-attitude towards the state of affairs is sufficient for wanting that state
of affairs to be actual. One might try to resist this view because, of course it is possible to have a pro-
attitude towards some state of affairs, say having a cigarette, without doing anything to bring it about.
However, in cases like this, it seems to me that the agent in question wants more than one outcome,
but because those outcomes are incompatible, she is only able to act one way. In addition, on my
view practical  irrationality is  a  pervasive phenomenon.  A smoker who is trying to quit  smoking
positively  evaluates  having  a  cigarette  and  negatively  evaluates  it.  I  find  that  particular  bullet
palatable because it  seems to me that  practical  irrationality is  a  pervasive phenomenon.  Being a
rational agent is a very difficult business.
18 Those who have qualms about normative vocabulary please note that equating positive evaluation
with finding something good is compatible with a deflationary account of goodness. There may be no
more to finding something good than desiring it. 
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some sort of world view. That is, it needs to have a rudimentary conception of how
things are in the world, and how they can be manipulated. But because a belief is an
attitude  towards  how  things  are  in  the  world,  a  creature  which  has  a  rudimentary
conception  of  how  things  are  in  the  world  has  something  akin  to  beliefs19.  By
understanding mentality as a creature's response to the world, we understand mentality
as something that a creature does. A creature with a mental life is one which has an
evaluative worldview. It finds particular outcomes to be good, and that is to take the
world to be a particular way and to desire certain outcomes. But to take the world to be
a particular way and to desire certain outcomes is to have projects of one's own. This
then is the minimal autonomy constraint on mentality:
MAC: a creature has mentality if and only if it has an evaluative worldview.
A creature  that  meets  MAC is  one  which  sets  its  own projects.  However,  a
creature can set its own projects, and thereby meet MAC, without having to do any
reflective work. Our lab rat has the project of finding cheese. This is because it takes the
state of affairs of having cheese to be good. That is, it has a pro-attitude towards finding
cheese. On this view, finding something good is not a matter of representing a state of
affairs as desirable. It is to desire that state of affairs. As long as that is something that
the rat does, it meets MAC and sets its own projects. If a creature meets MAC, it has
attitudes.  The  constraint  is  a  minimal autonomy  constraint  because  there  is  no
requirement that the creature could have done otherwise. It may be that the lab rat is
constitutionally incapable of evaluating eating cheese as anything other than good. If
that is so, then whenever it is presented with cheese it will eat it. Nevertheless, our lab
rat has a desire to eat cheese, and takes the world to contain cheese20.
Invoking  minimal  autonomy  as  the  requirement  for  mentality  helps  us
19 The "something like" is important because at  this stage we should be neutral about propositional
content. We do not need to ascribe full blown propositional content to the mental states of 0 th level
creatures. We might find it useful to reserve "belief" as a label for a propositional attitude, i.e. as an
attitude towards a proposition. Nevertheless, belief like states and desires come together, but there is
an explanatory priority to desires. 
20 It is possible to argue that the only way to meet the minimal autonomy constraint is to represent a
situation to oneself. If that and what follows is correct, only creatures that can evaluate linguistic
practice have mentality. Nothing in what follows turns on this dispute.
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understand why thinking takes place in the "space of reasons"21. A creature who meets
the minimal autonomy constraint is one which takes some situations to be good. That is,
it evaluates situations. But, evaluating a potential situation as good commits a creature,
other things being equal, to doing something. We can put this another way: there is
something that the creature should do. For example, the lab rat that wants food should
go looking for food, and if there is cheese to the left, the lab rat should turn left. The
thought is that without projects a creature cannot be motivated to act, but with projects,
not only is it motivated, there are things it should do.  A creature with an evaluative
worldview is one which can recognise and respond to 'shoulds'. In other words, what a
minimally autonomous creature has to do is respond to reasons. On such an account,
what a rational creature does is recognise of a situation in the world that it provides a
reason for action. For example, our lab rat on finding some cheese has a reason to eat it.
Our lab rat has been looking for food. If it does recognise the cheese as food, it has
succeeded. It has done what it should. If it fails to eat cheese, it has made a mistake. The
rat should eat the cheese because it is food (and the rat has set itself out to find food).
Once a creature has projects a suitably placed observer is in a position to evaluate its
behaviour from the point of view of the creature. This is because the suitably placed
observer knows what it is that the creature should do. 
To  avoid  confusion  it  is  worth  reiterating  that  a  creature,  like  our  rat  that
responds to reasons can do this at the 0th level. It should not be a worry that I have
attributed  too  much  cognitive  sophistication  to  non-human  animals.  All  of  this  is
occurring at the ground floor. Finding something good is desiring it, and that thereby
commits the creature to courses of action which will bring it about. Other things being
equal, that is what the creature will do. This is a description of how the world strikes the
creature. Part of the way that the world strikes the rat is that it should find food. It only
21 The phrase is from Wilfred Sellars ("Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind", sec 36). It  is also
given much play by John McDowell in “Mind and World”. It might be helpful to register a point of
contrast with both Sellars and McDowell. Both thinkers have a thick conception of reason. That is,
they both take being in the space of reasons to be a matter of being able to make inferences. I think
this is right as an account of what it is to be a thinker. However, I am not at the moment asking what
it is to be a thinker. I am trying to characterise being minded. The reasons involved here are much
thinner. Once a creature has projects, features of the world become reasons for particular courses of
action. All the creature has to do, when things go right, is be able to recognise and respond to them.
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seems strange to say that because the rat has no idea that that is how the world strikes it.
In describing what is going on for the creature we have to use a description which could
neither be formulated nor acknowledged as correct by that creature. This in no way
implies that the description is not true of the creature. Thinking is a practical ability, and
wanting, say, food is taking food to be a good. If a creature takes food to be a good its
behaviour can be evaluated by an observer who recognises what the creature is up to. It
is legitimate of the biologist to think that her lab rat has made a mistake when it goes the
wrong way in the maze. The legitimacy of that thought comes from the fact that the lab
rat has made a mistake. However, a lab rat can make a mistake only if it is committed to
a particular course of action22. The lab rat which wants food is a creature that thinks that
food is a good, and, given that it has no countervailing desires, is thereby committed to
go in search of food. If it is to behave correctly, searching for food is what it should do. 
§3 Reason and Evaluation; Three Grades of Evaluative Involvement
I have argued that a creature which meets the minimal autonomy constraint is
one which can respond to reasons. This is because, as I am understanding "reason", a
reason is  something that counts  in favour of a particular course of action,  and here
"course of action" is understood in broad enough terms that it includes having a mental
state.  That "something" is to be understood as encompassing any feature of the world
that could plausibly be thought to count in favour of a course of action. So, it might
include features of situations. For example, that Audrey is your friend might count in
favour of buying her a drink. It might include desires. For example, wanting to whistle
might count in favour of whistling. It might include intentions; that you intended to go
for a picnic with Naomi might count in favour of preparing a potato salad23. 
22 It  might  be  worth  comparing  the  lab  rat  with  a  robot.  Robots  do  not  make  mistakes.  Their
programmers make mistakes. If the robot goes the wrong way in the maze, there is something wrong
with the program, but the responsibility for the program lies with the programmer and not with the
robot. If the robot has been programmed to "learn", then the program has not yet run its course. We
still do not have a mistake on the part of the robot.
23 Here I am following Scanlon who opens "What We Owe to Each Other" with the claim that "I will
take the idea of a reason as primitive. Any attempt to explain what it is to be a reason for something
seems to me seems to me to lead back to the same idea: a consideration that counts in favour of it"
(1998, p. 17).
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Creatures which are able to respond to reasons are creatures which are able to
take things as considerations in favour of courses of action. Of course, sometimes we,
and  other  rational  creatures,  get  things  wrong.  Sometimes  we  miss  an  important
consideration, and sometimes we take something to count in favour of a course of action
when in fact it does not. However, when things go well, when the epistemic situation is
right,  the  rational  creature  gets  the  weighting  of  considerations  right,  and takes  the
correct  course  of  action.  That  we talk  of  "the  correct  course  of  action"  shows that
reasons  are  bound up with  "shoulds".  What  reasons  there  are  determine  both  what
should happen and provide a standard for evaluation. One way of thinking about the
nature of reason is to think about evaluation. This is the strategy that I will pursue.
There are three ways in which something can count in favour of a course of action, and
thus three ways in which  actions can be evaluated. These are:
(a) hypothetical reasoning (means-end)
(b) categorical reasoning (with respect to the good)
(c) procedural reasoning (with respect to rules).
It  is  important  to  note  that,  although  each  type  of  rational  demand  is
characterised  by  a  "should",  each  type  expresses  a  different  kind  of  reason.  A
hypothetical demand like, "if you want to catch the post, you should set off for the post
office now" expresses a different  type of reason from the categorical  demand,  "you
should set off to the post office now, your mother will be disappointed if she does not
get her birthday card on time". That, in turn, is different from the procedural demand, "if
you really believe that it is 4:30, and you want to catch the post, you should set off to
the post office now".
Putting things like this helps make sense of why detachment does not appear to
be formally valid in deontic contexts. Imagine the following scenario, your friend wants
to send anthrax through the post to her sworn enemy. The post is about to close for the
day. It is clear that if she wants to catch the post, she should set off now. She does want
to catch the post, but she should not set off now. She should not be indulging in germ
warfare. Nevertheless, there is something irrational about your friend if she does not run
down to the post office. However, once it is accepted that the "should" of a hypothetical
demand, the "should" of a categorical and the "should" of a procedural demand express
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different types of reason, it is easy to see why having immoral ends does not give you
reason  to  pursue  immoral  acts.  What  we  have  is  a  good  old-fashioned  fallacy  of
equivocation. Consider:
A1. If you want to send anthrax in the post, you should leave now.
A2. You want to send anthrax in the post.
Therefore,
A3. You should leave now.
A1-A3  is  an  invalid  argument  because  A3  is  most  plausibly  read  as  a  categorical
demand. The should of a 1 is a hypothetical should.
Now, it might be objected that there could be, or indeed has to be, a reading of
the "should" of A3 as a hypothetical should, but A1 and A2 do not give you even a
hypothetical  reason  to  leave  now.  The  mistake  here  results  from  confusing  a
hypothetical reason with the conclusion of a piece of practical reasoning. If there is a
hypothetical reading available of A3, then A3 is to be read as an elliptical form of: 
A3a. If you want to do that, you should leave now. 
After all hypothetical reasons are reasons conditional on a particular end. But, the "that"
of A3a refers back to the end of sending anthrax in the post. It makes A3a restatement of
A1. If the "should" of A3 is given a hypothetical reading, then there is no problem with
the validity of the argument but it provides no insight as to what the agent ought to do.
The conclusion of a piece of practical reasoning is a claim about what you, the agent,
have a reason to do. But that is a conclusion about what you think may or should be
done.  It  is  a categorical evaluation about  what  me or should occur.  This  is  because
wanting an outcome is evaluating it as a good.
This is not to say that hypothetical reasons are not really reasons. If some course
of  action  is  a  good  way of  achieving  some goal,  then,  from the  point  of  view of
achieving that goal, the fact that that course of action is a good way of achieving that
goal  lends  weight  to  undertaking  that  course  of  action.  Equivalently,  but  from the
perspective of evaluation, if the question is how to achieve X, then if someone finds a
good way of achieving X, she has done what she should.
There also might also be a reading of A3 in which the "should" is understood as
procedural. In this case as well, the argument is valid and the conclusion true. There is
something irrational about  your  friend if  she,  wanting to send anthrax to her  sworn
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enemy, makes no effort to catch the post. That irrationality stems from her not following
the procedural norms of practical reasoning. She does not do what she has procedural
reasons to do. Once again, the fact that that is the case does not show that she has any
categorical reason to leave the house. Indeed, especially given her murderous intent, she
ought to be concerning herself with the safe disposal of her lethal weapon.
Hypothetical  reasoning  is  means-end  reasoning.  Having  a  particular  goal  in
mind  provides  the  goal  seeker  with  reasons  to  adopt  certain  courses  of  action.  So,
although it is true that all roads lead to Rome, not all roads are equally good as routes to
the eternal city. If you want to get to Rome from London, you should not head north up
the M1. If you want to go to Rome from London, you should fly. This is, perhaps, the
least controversial form of evaluation. There are better and worse ways of achieving
some goal. A creature which meets the minimal autonomy constraint is one that sets its
own goals. Those goals set the benchmark for successful performance. 
However, it is also prima facie plausible that one can evaluate a course of action
without reference to the aims of the agent. We might think that certain courses of action
are dreadful, or that others are mandatory. So, one might think that going to Rome from
London is unduly environmentally destructive. It is a bad thing to do. You might think
that  people  who live  that  far  from Rome should  not  try  to  get  there.  This  sort  of
evaluation  is  evaluation  with  respect  to  the  good.  To  think  that  such  evaluation  is
possible is to think that the world is such that there are reasons to act and refrain from
acting  irrespective  of  an  agent's  projects.  Whether  the  world  is  such  that  there  are
categorical  reasons  has  come  under  sustained  sceptical  attack,  but  until  we  are
convinced by the sceptic we have no reason to rule out the possibility of categorical
evaluation of action24.
The final method of evaluation is with respect to a set of rules. When in force,
rules can prescribe, prohibit or permit. When a set of rules is in force, there is a special
type of activity which I shall label "a practice". The existence of a practice creates new
possibilities of action. It is possible to evaluate the actions which are part of a practice
with  respect  to  the  rules  which  govern  the  practice.  Prescriptions  and  prohibitions
provide  shoulds.  For  example,  it  is  a  rule  of  bridge  that  when  the  card  play  is  in
24 Perhaps the most famous modern example is JL Mackie's "Ethics" (1990, especially chapter 1). The
scepticism  can  be  found  in  the  mouth  of  Callicles  in  Plato's  Gorgias,  and  in  the  mouth  of
Thrasymachus in the Republic, book 1 (both in Plato, 1961).
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progress,  if  at  all  possible,  each  player  must  follow  suit.  This  rule  provides  a
prescription. If North leads a heart, and East has a Heart, East must follow suit. Given
that East can follow suit, East must follow suit. Prescriptions tell us what we must do,
and  "must"  implies  "should".  In  this  way  prescriptions  provide  shoulds.  Similarly,
prohibitions provide shoulds. It is forbidden, in chess, to castle through check. If Black's
Queen is bearing down on an open f-file, White must not castle King's side. "Must not"
implies "should not", so we have another variety of shoulds provided by prohibitions.
Permissions are slightly more complicated. If a rule permits a certain course of
action, it  is neutral about whether or not the action should be undertaken. However,
these permissive rules in part define a practice. They create new possibilities of action
which can be evaluated hypothetically,  or in extreme cases categorically.  In the just
mentioned Bridge example, if East has both the Four of Hearts and the Queen of Hearts,
East is entitled to play either card. But, one course of action will be better than the other.
As the second hand, it is more likely that the low card is the better card to play25.  This
is  hypothetical  evaluation.  On the assumption  that  each  player  is  taking part  in  the
practice  with  the  aim of  winning,  their  actions  can  be  evaluated  in  terms  of  their
contribution towards victory. 
There will  be scenarios  where what  a  Bridge player  does  is  morally loaded.
People play Bridge for money. It seems to me morally dubious to bankrupt somebody
over a game of Bridge. If one player will not quit, but is incapable of playing well, it
seems beholden on her opponents to play badly and ensure that their margin of victory
is not financially ruinous. This is an example of categorical evaluation.  This sort  of
example is far-fetched when it comes to pastimes. However, not all practices are trivial.
Driving on British roads is a rule governed activity.  It is a practice.  Car drivers are
permitted to drive at 20 miles an hour on urban roads. In bad weather doing so can be
dangerous.  Car  drivers  should  not  do  it.  The  existence  of  practices  creates  new
possibilities of action. Those actions, like any other, can be evaluated categorically or
hypothetically.  Permissive  rules  form  part  of  many  practices  by  creating  new
possibilities of action.
Rules are bound up with practices. Indeed, a set of rules defines a practice, and
thereby constitute new possibilities of action. This allows a statement of the rules to
25 Each partnership is aiming to take as many tricks as possible, and, in many setups, playing low as the
second hand maximises the number of tricks a partnership will take.
41
describe the practice. I want to think now about what it is for there to be a practice, and
what it is to take part in a practice. A practice requires more than the possibility of a
description  by  means  of  rules.  Where  there  is  more  or  less  uniform  behaviour,  a
statement of a rule can provide an empirical generalisation of what something tends to
do. But, the fact that one can describe behaviour with rules is not sufficient for there to
be a practice. A computer program determines what outputs a computer will provide
depending on what inputs it is given. A statement of rules will provide a generalisation
of  the behaviour  of  the computer.  Computers  do not  malfunction that  often,  so the
generalisation will  be very accurate.  Let  us assume that  the computer  is  reasonably
simple  and  that  it  is  running  a  single  program.  Perhaps  that  program  generates
approximations of the Mandelbrot set within 20 iterations. The program will only accept
a complex number as input, sets z and n to 0, and goes on generating numbers according
to the iterative formula, zn+1 = zn2 + c, where c is the input. If z ≤ 2 it takes its output as it
next input, c.. If z ≥ 2, it stops. If, after 20 iterations, z is less than 2, it prints its initial
input. Six rules describe the program:
i) take a number, c, as input and let n = 0.
ii) if c is a complex number, generate a number, z, according to the formula:
z1 = 02 + c and add 1 to n.
iii) generate the next number according to the formula: zn+1 = zn2 + c and add
1 to n
iv) If z ≤ 2,  repeat iii.
v) if n = 20 and z ≤ 2, print c.
vi) If z ≥ 2, stop.
Those rules describe the behaviour  of the computer.  However,  there is  not a
practice here. For there to be a practice there have to be practitioners. A practitioner is a
creature who can engage in the practice. The computer is not a practitioner because it
does not engage in anything. Only agents can engage in activities. The rules describe the
behaviour of the computer, but it does not meet the minimal autonomy constraint. It is
not an agent. The computer does not undertake any course of action.
My claim is that to engage in a practice one needs to acknowledge the force of
the rules. One plays Bridge, engages in the practice, by acknowledging the force of the
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rules. To acknowledge the force of the rules of Bridge is not to follow the rules, it may
not  even  be  to  try  to  follow them.  For  teaching  purposes,  one  may  allow  weaker
opponents to withdraw a poor card or alter a bad bid. If one plays like that, there is no
attempt  to  follow the  rules.  However,  one  acknowledges  the  force  of  the  rules  by
recognising that they set the standards for correct and incorrect play. The easiest way to
acknowledge the force of a set of rules is to make explicit reference to the rules. Doing
that requires 1st level abilities. However, having first level abilities is not a prerequisite
of engaging in a practice. The practitioners do not need to have any explicit awareness
that there are rules, or be able to formulate them to acknowledge the force of the rules.
The  acknowledgement  of  the  force  of  the  rules  can  be  implicit  in  practice.  That
acknowledgement could be manifested by a player saying, "well, one should not really
withdraw a card, but it would be a much better game if you did not throw away the ace
of trumps". It would be an odd sort of Bridge player who did not explicitly realise that
there were rules, or who was unable to formulate them. Nevertheless, being unable to
explicitly formulate the rules of Bridge is not a barrier to taking part in the practice. 
A creature that is able to implicitly acknowledge the force of a rule is one which
is able to modify its behaviour in accordance with the rule because it is the rule. The
simplest way to do that is to withdraw actions which are not in accordance with the rule
and to seek to prevent others from breaking the rule. However, as we saw above, it can
also be done by tipping one's hat to what should be done. One might have a certain air
of embarrassment about breaking the rule, or hesitate before doing it. But, a creature
which is worrying about the propriety of performances in this way is not worrying about
whether these performances are a good way of achieving some other goal, or whether
these performances are in themselves good; it is taking part in a practice26.
§4 The Solution? Truth as a Semantic Predicate
26 This  allows  for  the  possibility  of  there  being  rules  without  the  existence  of  sanctions  (contra
Korsgaard, (Korsgaard, 1996, 104). A rule exists when there is the possibility of it being in force, and
a set of rules are in force when agents take part in the practice governed by those rules. Sanctions
certainly enforce rules on agents who have no wish to engage in the practice, but, as we have seen,
rules can be in force so long as practitioners are prepared to modify or evaluate their behaviour with
respect to those rules. 
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Agents undertake courses of action because they have an evaluative world view.
That is, they take the world to be a certain way and hold certain states of affairs to be
good. Holding a state of affairs to be a good outcome commits an agent to trying, where
possible,  to  bring about  that  state  of  affairs27.  Not  all  courses  of  action  are equally
effective at bringing about the states of affairs which an agent takes to be good. So,
there  are  courses  of  action  which  a  creature  with  an  evaluative  world  view should
undertake and others which it should avoid. Somebody who knows enough about an
agent and the world is in a position to evaluate the behaviour of that agent. They can do
this by seeing if the agent's actions are a good way to bring about the agent's desires. It
may well  be that some states of affairs  are in fact desirable while others should be
shunned. If that is the case, some courses of action are good or bad independently of the
way they strike an agent and should be undertaken/avoided irrespectively of what the
agent wants.  Agents that are able to acknowledge the force of rules are able to take part
in  practices.  This increases their  possibilities of action.  In addition,  the rules of the
practice provide reasons for particular courses of action. Where the rules prohibit an
action, that action should be shunned; where the rules demand a particular course of
action, that action should be undertaken. This provides us with three types of reasons,
hypothetical, categorical and procedural. Reasons provide shoulds; a should has both
consequences for action and provides a standard of evaluation.
An agent who is operating at the ground floor is an agent who recognises and
responds to shoulds. Those shoulds can be hypothetical, categorical or from the rules of
a practice. As being able to respond to shoulds is a practical ability, it seems possible
that one can respond to shoulds without having explicit knowledge that this is what one
is doing. If somebody has explicit knowledge about a practical ability, they are thereby
in a position to evaluate their actions and the actions of other agents. Both thinking and
using a language are practical abilities. They are activities that agents undertake. As
adult humans, we are able to have explicit knowledge that this is what we are up to. I
want to show how it is that we are able to make this move. It is time for an outline of a
27 Things are made more convoluted because agents have more than one project. It may be that that a
mouse wants cheese,  takes having cheese to be a good, and also wants to stay alive. If  the only
available cheese is in a mousetrap, its positive evaluation of having cheese is in conflict with its
positive evaluation of staying alive. Going into the mousetrap is a good way of getting the cheese, but
a bad way of staying alive.
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suggestion as to how it is that one moves from the ground floor to the 1 st level. The
challenge  is  to  show how one  can  move  from having  practical  abilities  which  are
exercised in thinking and speaking to having explicit reflective knowledge of what has
been done when those abilities are exercised. The clue is that acts of speaking and acts
of thinking can be evaluated. So, thinking and using a language are rational activities.
As thinking and speaking are rational activities, my simple suggestion is that at least
one of thinking and language use is a practice. The idea is that there are rules which
govern and constitute each practice. Speakers and thinkers at the 0th level engage in the
practice  by  implicitly  acknowledging  the  force  of  those  rules28.  We  gain  explicit
knowledge of the practice by learning to make explicit evaluations of the practice, and,
crucially, coming to see the point of making those evaluations. 
Both practices are intentional, they are about the world. The most obvious way,
which will also turn out to be the only way, for these practices to be about the world is if
the world provides a reason for a speech act or adopting a propositional attitude. For
that to be the case, truth has to be a substantial property that can be used to evaluate
uses of language and acts of thought. If that is right, then no deflationary theory of truth
is  correct.  In addition,  there is  a  crucial  dis-analogy between thought and language.
Language is a representational medium whereas thought, in the first instance, is not. The
idea,  to  be  defended,  is  that  intentionality  is  a  more  widespread  phenomenon  than
representation.  Representations  are  intentional,  but  so are  some non-representational
items. In particular, mental states are intentional but are not representational. It might be
worth noting that I will be using "representation" in a narrower way than it is sometimes
used.  What  I  want  to  capture  is  the  crucial  difference  between  language  use  and
28 It might be objected that this seems to make belief voluntary. It is not as if we have a choice over
what we believe, so how could we implicitly acknowledge the force of whatever rule governs belief?
Forming a belief is something that happens. However, we do change our mind when things go wrong.
We are also embarrassed when we have been foolish. That embarrassment is enough to show an
implicit acknowledgement of the rule which governs belief. It seems to me that plenty of mammals
display embarrassment when they have been foolish. This might be sufficient to attribute implicit
acknowledgement of the rules to them. However, I am going to argue that in fact no non-linguistic
creature  goes  in  for  believing.  This  is  because  belief  aims  at  truth,  and  I  will  argue  that  it  is
impossible to aim at truth without the concept of truth, and that to have the concept of truth requires a
grasp of the concept. 
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thinking. The idea is that sentences are useful by being understood, whereas thoughts
are useful by being had. Both sentences and thoughts are intentional items in that they
are both about ways the world to be. However, for a sentence to make a difference to
what a thinker understands about the world, it must be understood by the thinker. This is
not true of thoughts. Thoughts make a difference to understanding by being had.
As language is a representational medium, linguistic activity is powerful enough
to describe its  own rationality.  The rationality of  linguistic  activity is  rule-governed
rationality. In other words, linguistic activity is part of a practice. A language has the
power (or can be extended to have the power) to describe the structure of the activity,
and to give many of the rules of the practice of using that language. I am going to show
that we can make sense of explicit knowledge by understanding a linguistic practice as
consisting  of  an  infinite  set  of  possible  moves.  These  moves  are,  what  I  will  call,
linguistic acts. A linguistic act is performed by uttering a sentence. That act will be a
way of presenting content with a particular force. The idea is that what a speaker wishes
to  achieve  by making  an  utterance,  makes  no  difference  to  the  significance  of  the
linguistic act she uses to further her projects. Both the content and the force of a use of
language are determined by the rules which govern the practice. Those rules do not
make  reference  to  the  language  user's  intentions.  Instead,  they  determine  the
significance of uses of sentences by determining the grounds and consequences of using
them like that. As what can be done with a language is infinite, it follows that there are
an infinite number of linguistic rules for speakers to get to grips with. 
However, just as there is a finite stock of words from which any sentence can be
made, there are finite number of types of linguistic act. Two acts of the same type have
the same type of grounds and the same type of consequences. For example, it might be
that all assertions should be true and require the withdrawal of any assertion that has
been made to the contrary. Language users have to get to grips with the contribution to
content  of  individual  words  and the  grounds and consequences  of  making different
types of linguistic acts. When they have those two skills,  they are able to make and
understand an infinite number of linguistic acts. As theorists, we can model those two
skills by building a bipartite theory that specifies the rules for performing different types
of act and also specifies the possible contents of those acts by showing how individual
words make a uniform difference to acts in which they can occur. I will argue that those
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models are built by showing how truth organises linguistic practice and showing how
words make a uniform difference to the truth values of sentences in which they can
occur. 
When it comes to specifying the rules for performing different types of acts,
rather than anything technical, the difficulty is working out what the rules are. When it
comes to specifying the contents, things are trickier. It looks like any language that has
the  power  to  refer  to  its  own  expressions  and  contains  semantic  vocabulary,  a
semantically closed language, is going to give rise to the semantic paradoxes. So, any
attempt to give the content of all the possible sentences of that language is going to
result  in paradoxical  claims. However,  we can be neutral  on the possibility of fully
making explicit the rules of a linguistic practice. What matters is that it is possible for
speakers  to  come  to  explicit  knowledge.  A  semantically  closed  language,  which
presumably includes all natural languages, has the power to represent correctly the truth
conditions of a very large number of its own sentences. In other words, we can at least
make a start  on describing our own practice by describing the rules for performing
different types of linguistic act and by giving the contents of unproblematic sentences.
 Speakers exploit this linguistic feature to criticise and commend the speech acts
of  their  fellow language users.  At  the  most  basic  level,  we do this  by chiding and
chivvying along infant language users, "that's not a cat,  silly,  it's  a dog". At a more
sophisticated level, we complain that assertions are not true, but this is in fact what is
going on even at the basic level. The parent who corrects his child's description of a toy
dog as a cat is often not entering into a dispute with the child. He does not think there is
a difference of opinion as to what type of creature is under discussion. Instead, he wants
his child to use words correctly. Of course, children, like adults, do from time to time
mistake toy felines for toy canines, but, at a young enough age, they are more likely to
be misapplying words. What our exemplary infant has to do is learn to apply her words
correctly,  and that  is  to  acknowledge the force of  the rules  which govern linguistic
practice. Once she has learned to do that she is in a position to understand that other
people are evaluating her linguistic performance and to make those evaluations herself.
If she is an English speaker, she can do that by using the phrase "is true". If she speaks
any other language, she will pick up on the truth predicate within that language. When
she sees the point of those evaluations, she has grasped the concept of truth and is a
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resident  of  the  1st level.  If  this  is  right,  then  the  truth  predicate  is  a  predicate  of
evaluation. In addition, we gain our knowledge of truth through our grasping a predicate
of evaluation. That is, we get our concept of truth by coming to understand what it is to
use a truth predicate. For this reason I will call a truth predicate, "a value predicate".
The  claim is  that  it  is  primarily  a  semantic value  predicate.  Truth  itself  is  then  a
substantial semantic value.
I will make two further claims:
I. that there is no other way to ascend to the 1st level; 
II. that our grasp of truth is limited by its use as a semantic value predicate. 
Claim II is important for two reasons. The first is that it is a version of the so-called
"linguistic priority thesis". As the rules which govern thinking and language use are
world involving, both practices are governed by truth norms. But if truth is entirely
captured by a semantic value predicate, then at the very best thinking and language use
are  isomorphic  practices  and language has  the  priority in  that  thinking is  mirroring
language use. I will in fact argue that there is also a developmental priority. I will claim
that  until  we  have  seen  the  point  of  a  truth  predicate,  we  cannot  even  implicitly
acknowledge the force of truth involving rules. I will claim that there is a difference
between having a mental life and being a believer. To have a mental life is to have a
minimally autonomous response to the world, that is, to have an evaluative world view.
But to have beliefs is  to take part  in the practice of thinking. On this  view, having
beliefs is a matter of taking part in a rule-governed activity. I will claim that those rules
are  truth  involving,  and  so  non-linguistic  creatures  cannot  have  their  behaviour
governed  by  such  rules.  Non-thinking  but  minimally  autonomous  creatures  have  a
mental life, but their mental activities are not part of a practice. Instead, they aim at
success.  A description of their  mental  life aims to make sense of their  motivational
structure. It does so by describing what they aim at, and why they might aim at it. It
does not attribute conceptual content to such creatures. If this is right, grasping truth
does not merely open up new possibilities of thinking, it makes belief possible. 
The second reason that the claim is important is that it rules out a variety of
metaphysical strategies. For example, in order to vindicate realism about some area of
enquiry, we would need to show how it is that a realistically conceived truth predicate
could justifiably be thought to evaluate linguistic performances in that area. In other
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words, thinking about language reveals how we stand to the world. There is no other
way of doing it because either we are engaged at the ground level and finding out what
there is, or we are surreptitiously assuming that there is more to truth than its being the
property which evaluates linguistic events29.
If  thinking and language use  are  practices,  then  it  has  to  be possible  to  say
something about the rules which govern the practice. The following is a sketch of my
view of the practices of thinking and using language. In the chapters that follow this
sketch will be fleshed out, and it will be shown that no other understanding of thought
and language is capable of meeting the practical capacity constraint and the explicit
knowledge  constraint.  As  practices  they  are,  in  the  way I  am using  the  term,  rule
governed activities. We are going to focus on the linguistic case because it is the most
straightforward, and, I will suggest, also the basic case. I suggest that something like the
following are the rules which govern language use. In all cases there are grounds and
consequences for each type of linguistic action.
Assertoric practice is the most familiar. I am going to maintain that the rules
here are something like30:
ASS1: One should: assert that p only if p.
ASS2:  If  the  assertion  that  p  is  correct,  one should:  withdraw any assertion
which has been made to the contrary.
Similar rules governs the expression of wishes:
OPT1: One should: wish that p only if one would like for it to be the case that p.
OPT2: If one wishes for it to be the case that p, and it is in your power without
undue effort, one should: make it the case that p.
The "wish" on the left-hand side is a linguistic action. In English
we perform the sort of action when we say things like "I hope you
are well".
29 If it is not already apparent, the spirit of Michael Dummett can be seen clearly here. The thesis is
neither a defence of Dummett's views, nor reconstruction of them. However, my access to these ideas
has been through Dummett, and much of the presentation of them will be with the aid of his writings.
I am enormously indebted to him, but let the reader beware, I am not involved in the business of
Dummett scholarship, nor would I be happy to attribute unhesitatingly these claims to him.
30 There is a discussion of these rules and suggestions of alternatives in chapter 4.
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As a first approximation, questions are governed by the following rules:
INT1: One may: ask whether p.
INT2: If  one  has  been  asked  whether  p,  one  should:  answer  in  the
affirmative only if p.
And commands governed by the following rules:
IMP1: One may: order someone to make it the case that p.
IMP2: If one has received an order to make it the case that p, one should:
make it the case that p3132.
The rules are formulated taking content for granted. When it comes to language,
it is clearly sentences that are used. My claim is that those sentences have contents by
being part of a practice. If that is right, and thinking is an isomorphic practice to using a
language, then acts of thinking also have contents. To take a propositional attitude, on
this view, is to adopt an attitude to a content. Just as we can use sentence with a variety
of different forces, we can take a variety of different attitudes to the same content. What
is  common  across  different  attitudes,  I  will  call  "a  thought".  Taking  propositional
attitudes to involve contents is not controversial. However, the linguistic priority thesis
which I wish to defend says that we cannot grasp the content of our thoughts without
first grasping the contents of our sentences. If that is right, we have to be able to grasp
sentential content without having a grasp of mental content. So, I need something to say
about how sentences and thoughts are content-full that is compatible with our grasp of
content  coming,  in  the  first  instance,  from  our  understanding  of  sentences.  My
suggestion is that there is a primacy to the pragmatic. This is the view that it is only
because there are things that can be done with sentences and thoughts that they have
contents.  I  will  focus  on the linguistic  case because it  is  primary.  In  understanding
language, we start with the possibility of linguistic acts33. Because there is a practice of
31 In all of these rules "p" should be read as a schematic variable ranging over sentences in use.
32 These rules exclude social, practical and ethical considerations from the grounds and consequences of
making linguistic acts. This will strike many as implausible. In chapter 4 there is a defence of the
position, and a proposed alternative.
33 I use the term ‘linguistic act’ to distinguish the view from speech act theories. The full justification
for this terminology will not emerge until chapter 4, but the brief reason is that I hold that unauthored
texts are full of assertions, commands, questions and other linguistic acts.   
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using a language, it is possible to say things. Indeed, that practice consists in a variety of
different types of linguistic act. That practice involves the successions of linguistic acts.
But each speech act is a complete performance.  By definition anything that has the
completeness of a linguistic act is a use of a sentence34. Recognising this allows us to
reformulate our rules for linguistic practice in terms of sentences and a truth predicate.
So for example:
ASS1'. one should: assert S only if S is true.
But, sentences are also grammatical entities. They are composed out of words.
The  conditions  in  which  any given  sentence  is  true  depends  on  the  words  used  to
construct the sentence. Of course words can appear in more than one sentence. This is
the significance of compositionality. Words are the sort of things that make a systematic
difference to the truth conditions of the sentences in which they can occur. On this view,
we start from the idea of the different ways of using sentences. We then ask after the
significance of a particular sentence. The conditions in which it is correct to use it as an
assertion, or express it as a wish, and the consequence of its being issued as an order
depends on its components and method of construction. These depend on the phrases
and the syntax which make up the sentence. It is through understanding how sentences
work that we gain insight into words and syntax.
I have claimed that we ascend to the 1st level when we learn to evaluate sentence
use. Here is a suggestion as to how evaluation might give us a grasp of content. We have
no hope of being able to evaluate a use of the sentence until we have some inkling as to
the part played by the words in determining correct performance with that sentence.
When we grasp the point of a truth predicate we do not merely learn to nod our heads in
approval at some series of sounds but not others, we also see that a series of sounds is a
sentence and understand its significance as dependent on the significance of the phrases
out of which it is composed. In other words, we learn to apply a truth predicate to a
sentence if and only if things are as it says they are. For example, an English speaker
learns to apply "is true" to "snow is white" if and only if snow is white. This, I take it, is
34  Nb. My use of ‘sentence’ it is not quite equivalent to the everyday use. As I use it, a sentence is what
invariant across different types of linguistic act.
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the  reason  for  Frege's  context  principle,  "never  to  ask  the  meaning  of  a  word  in
isolation, but only in the context of a proposition" (Frege, 1980, p. x). If we want to give
an account of meaning we need to understand words as essentially the sort of thing that
can make a systematic difference to the correct use of the sentences in which they can
occur.
§5 The Route Map: Where Next for the Thesis
What follows is a brief outline of the structure of the thesis. The primary goal is
to  show that  the practical capacity constraint combined with the explicit  knowledge
constraint implies that truth is a substantial, semantic property. By "semantic property"
I, at this stage, mean no more than a property which belongs to something in virtue of
its meaning. The interest in truth is that this is the property by which uses of sentences
can be evaluated. A subsidiary aim is to show that our understanding of an evaluative,
semantic truth predicate exhausts all that there is to truth. In doing this I will show that
thinking and using language are only possible because there are practices of language
use and thinking. I will show that this constrains what a theory of meaning can be like.
That of course is revealing about the nature of any language. 
What I am going to do is to use chapter 1 to show that both language use and
thinking are rational activities. I will then show that one big dispute is about the nature
of that rationality. In particular, the question is: is there a distinctive linguistic or mental
procedural rationality? I will also show that how you answer that question depends on
your view of language or thought. I will show that there are three broad approaches to
language and three broad approaches to thought. I will also show that these approaches
are analogous to  each other.  These approaches  are:  treating words  and sentences or
concepts and thoughts as empirical generalisations from the habits of language users or
of thinkers; treating words and sentences or concepts and thoughts as abstract objects in
their own right; and treating linguistic or mental items as abstract objects which are
essentially part of a rational practice. I will also argue that whatever one's approach to
language or thought, language use and thinking need to be modelled with a bipartite
truth-conditional theory.  What has been modelled by such theories depends on one's
understanding of language and thought, but, because the activities are modelled by a
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truth-conditional theory, claims about the nature of language use and thinking can be
made in terms of claims about the nature truth. I am going to show that the possibility of
explicit knowledge of content requires that truth is a substantial evaluative property of
sentences. It  will  also show that a bipartite truth-conditional theory of meaning is a
description of the procedural rationality of using a language. To do that the thesis breaks
down as follows:
Chapter 1: Rational Activities
 Language use and thinking are rational activities.
 There are three broad approaches to the nature of language and the nature of
thought.
 Irrespective of approach, the way the activity proceeds is described by a bipartite
truth-conditional theory.
 The rationality of the language use/thinking and the nature of language/thought
is  determined by the  nature  of  the  truth  predicate  used  in  the  relevant  truth
conditional theory.
Chapter 2: Force and Significance
 Minimalist views cannot explain our explicit grasp of content
 Traditional  Correspondence  views  cannot  explain  our  abilities  to  evaluate
language use and thinking. 
 Intentionality is a substantial and intrinsic property of truth-bearers
Chapter 3: Thought Priority
 Our access to mental content requires understanding linguistic representation
 The meaning of an utterance must be independent of what a speaker means by
the utterance
 Truth must be the substantial property that accounts for our grasp of content
 Rules out all forms of redundancy theories and all forms of interpretive theories
of truth.
Chapter 4: Linguistic Property
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 Rules for thinking cannot be in force for ground floor thinkers, but they can be
for ground floor language users
 Rules out pragmatic phenomenalism, and defends a linguistic practice view.
 Truth is a substantial evaluative property of language use
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Chapter 1
Rational Activities
The  challenge  of  the  thesis  is  twofold.  The  first  fold  is  to  give  the  correct
account of the nature of language and the nature of thought. The second fold is to show
how the correct account of the nature of language and the nature of thought reveals the
nature of truth. Those two folds are brought together in a defence of a version of the
linguistic priority thesis:
LPT: Truth is, in the first instance, a substantial, evaluative property of
sentences.
The thought encapsulated by LPT is that, although both sentences and mental
states have content, it is through our understanding of sentences that we come to an
understanding  of  our  mental  states.  In  particular,  it  is  by  understanding  truth  as  a
substantial and evaluative property of sentences that we come to an understanding of
sentential content. It is then through that understanding that we are able to make sense
of mental states as propositional attitudes with contents. If that is right, then reflective
understanding both of how things are in the world and of how the world strikes us
requires understanding the meaning of sentences.
In this chapter, I am going to show that a philosophical account of meaning must
do more than give an analysis of the nature of meaning. It must also do more than to put
the theorist in a position to state the meaning of any sentence of a language. Instead, a
philosophical account of meaning makes sense of what it is to use language. I am also
going to show that doing that requires making sense of using language as a  rational
activity. The same thing goes for a philosophical account of the mind. Such an account
must do more than give an analysis of the nature of thought, and do more than put one
in a position to state the content of any possible thought. Instead, it must make sense of
the rational activity of thinking. It turns out that whatever one's preferred conception of
language  or  thought,  a  bipartite  truth  conditional  theory  has  some  role  to  play  in
accounting for the activities of using language and thinking. However, the connection
between such a theory and the project of accounting for the relevant activity varies with
your conception of the activity in question. One part, in a bipartite theory, is an account
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of the sorts of things that uses of language or acts of thinking can do. The other part is
an account of the content of those actions. The bipartite theory is a truth conditional one
when both the types of action and the contents are captured using a truth predicate.
However, it turns out that, whatever one's view of the relevant activity, there will always
be a truth conditional reformulation of the bipartite theory available.
However,  a  bipartite  truth-conditional  theory  of  the  relevant  activity  is  not
sufficient to elucidate what we need to know. We also require a philosophical gloss on
those theories35. A bipartite theory captures what is done by any possible move in the
activity, but it takes for granted that we already understand what it is to do any of those
things. A complete account of either language use or thinking requires making sense of
what is done by the various moves in the relevant activity. But, because each action is
described using a truth predicate, the dispute over the correct gloss on a bipartite theory
comes out as a dispute over what it is for a sentence or thought to be true. In other
words, different understandings of the activities are, in fact, different understandings of
the nature of truth. 
The two key questions are: 
Q1. What is it to have a truth value?
Q2. What are the primary bearers of truth?
Those two questions are at the heart of the philosophical puzzle about truth. However,
as a bipartite truth-conditional theory of meaning or thought is an expression of the
explicit knowledge of the theorist, one test of the adequacy of her accounts of the two
activities  is  whether  or  not  they  are  compatible  with  explicit  knowledge  of  those
theories. As a result, the explicit knowledge constraint provides a way of answering the
central philosophical questions about truth.
The strategy in this chapter is as follows: I am going to develop and defend an
understanding  of  Michael  Dummett's  slogan,  "a  theory  of  meaning  is  a  theory  of
understanding"  (see,  for  example,  Dummett,  1993,  p.  3).  This  will  show  that  the
interest, in the first instance, is not in the natures of meaning and thought content, but in
the possibility of using and understanding language and in the possibility of thinking
and understanding thoughts. The next stage is  to show that what we need for those
35 For a good defence of this claim see Davies, 1981, pp. 3-6.
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projects are accounts of language use and thinking (section 1). I then discuss the nature
of rational activities (section 2). I use that account to show that, whatever one's view of
language, language use is a rational activity (section 3). I then show that language use
can be modelled by a bipartite truth conditional theory (section 4). Thinking is also a
rational  activity,  and  can  also  be  modelled  by  a  bipartite  truth  conditional  theory
(section 5). The final stage is to bring together different approaches to the nature of
language and thought and the rationality of language use and thinking to show how they
result in different accounts of truth (section 6).
§1 A Theory of Meaning is a Theory of Understanding
John Foster once wrote:
Thus what began as the demand for an account of linguistic competence turns out to be
the demand for a theory of meaning for English – a theory which give the meaning of
each  English expression on  the basis  of  its  structure.  This  is  hardly surprising.  The
meaning  is  precisely  what  fills  the  slot  that  the  epistemic  character  of  competence
creates. However elaborate its philosophical ramifications, however lofty is ontological
representation, meaning resides in just those facts about a language which its mastery
implicitly recognizes.
(Foster, 1976, p. 1)
Foster  was  not  being  parochial.  Foster  had  no  particular  interest  in  the  linguistic
competence of  speakers  of  English.  His  interest  was in  the way that  an account  of
linguistic competence in a particular language revealed just that which he wanted to
know about the nature of meaning. Here Foster was following Dummett in holding that
"a  theory  of  meaning  is  a  theory  of  understanding"  (Dummett,  1993,  p.  3).
Unfortunately, this slogan is rather gnomic. It needs unpacking.
There are two ways of reading Dummett's slogan, and Dummett, I will show, is
rightly committed to both:
S1. A theory  of  meaning  for  a  language  is  a  theory of  that  which  is
understood by a competent speaker of that language.
S2. A theory of meaning for a language is an account of what it is to
understand a language.
As will emerge, the S1 reading holds that a theory of meaning is a theory of
understanding in the sense that the proper object of a theory of meaning is that which is
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understood by competent speakers. The S2 reading emerges because what we want from
an understanding of meaning is not just  a way of specifying what is  understood by
competent speakers, but also knowledge of what we have specified. If successful, what
we specify are the meanings of the expressions of a language, but what we want is
insight into meaning. We get that insight by making sense of linguistic competence,
which is to say by having an account of what it is to understand a language. I am going
to reserve the term "theory of meaning" for the more narrow project of specifying the
meaning of any sentence in the language, and use "account of meaning" for the project
that locates such theories in an account of linguistic competence.
What we want is  an understanding of meaning. But, not just  any account of
meaning  will  do.  For  example,  even  if  we are  prepared  to  countenance  such  ideal
entities as meanings, we are not given any insight into the meaning of even the most
simple sentences by being told that sentences are meaningful because they are ways of
expressing such entities as meanings. We would still need an account of what it is for
something to be a meaning. At this point it is tempting to reach for analysis. Perhaps
there is something we can say which will elucidate what a meaning is. This is by no
means a benighted project. Indeed, at various points in the thesis I am going to examine
theories that have a view about what a meaning might be. However, by itself such a
theory does not tell us what it is that we want to know. It is words and sentences that are
meaningful. If we accept that words and sentences are meaningful by having meanings,
then, even if we have a clear idea about what a meaning is, we still need an account of
what it is for the objects that we use in speaking and writing to have the meanings that
they do. 
It might be thought that one could account for words and sentences having the
meanings that they do if one could provide constraints on translation. The hope is that,
because one already speaks a language, thinking about what is required to translate your
language into another or another language into it will elucidate what it is for a word or a
sentence to have a meaning. But, as Davidson wrote:
In the general case, a theory of translation involves three languages: the object language,
the  subject  language,  and  the  metalanguage  (the  languages  from  and  into  which
translation proceeds, and the language of the theory, which says what expressions of the
subject language translate which expressions of the object language). And in this general
case, we can know which sentences of the subject language translate which sentences of
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the object language without knowing what any of the sentences of either language mean
(in  any sense,  anyway,  that  would let  someone who understood the  theory interpret
sentences of the object language). If the subject language happens to be identical with
the language of the theory, then someone who understands the theory can no doubt use
the translation manual to interpret alien utterances; but this is because he brings to bear
two things he knows and that the theory does not state: the fact that the subject language
is his own, and his knowledge of how to interpret utterances in his own language. 
(Davidson, 2001, p. 129)
These  two  thoughts  bring  the  problem  sharply  into  view.  A philosophical
account of meaning must do more than have an account of meaningfulness. It must also
do  more  than  provide  a  way of  giving  the  meaning  of  expressions  in  a  particular
language. A philosophical account of meaning needs to show how language works. This
is where the slogan comes into play. As Dummett writes:
To grasp  the  meaning  of  an  expression  is  to  understand  its  role  in  the  language:  a
complete theory of meaning for a language is, therefore, a complete theory of how the
language functions as a language. Our interest in meaning, as a general concept, is, thus,
an interest in how language works; a direct description of the way a language works – of
all that someone has to learn to do when he learns the language – would, accordingly,
resolve our perplexities in a way in which an indirect account, by means of a translation,
cannot.
(Dummett, 1993, p. 2)
But note that what Dummett wants is an account of "all that someone has to learn to do
when he learns the language" (loc.  cit.).  That we do things with sentences is the first
thought on the way to the view that an account of meaning is a theory of understanding
in  the  S2 sense.  Not  everything  that  we do with  sentences  depends  on  their  being
meaningful. For example, we can sing lullabies to put babies to sleep. However, some
of  that  which  we  are  able  to  do  with  sentences  depends  on  the  fact  that  they  are
meaningful.  The  things  that  we  do  with  sentences  which  depend  on  their  being
meaningful are the things that we have to learn to do when we are developing linguistic
competence. Linguistic competence is, thus, a matter of being able to recognise and
respond to the meaningfulness of utterances.  Hence,  Foster's claim that "meaning is
precisely what fills the slot that the epistemic character of competence creates" (loc.
Cit.).
An account of meaning is, then, an account of how language works. It should
59
make sense of the meaning of each linguistic item in such a way that it makes sense of
how the meaning of that item affects what can be done with it. An account of meaning
will  then encompass a theory of understanding in the S1 sense; it will  encompass a
theory of that which is understood by competent speakers. However, it achieves this by
being an account of linguistic competence. It is a description of the understanding of
competent speakers, a theory of understanding in the S2 sense. This is not to say that it
is an account of the mental processes that issue in the ability to speak and understand a
language. Instead, what we want is a theoretical representation, a model, of the ability to
use language.
What  we  want  from such  a  model  is  something  that  makes  sense  of  what
speakers  can  do  when  they  have  competence  in  a  language.  There  is  something
systematic about this competence, so there must be some facts and features of language
use that competent speakers are recognising and responding to. The aim of the theorist
is to give an account of those facts and features in such a way that it captures what a
speaker is able to do. Trivially, this will be a description such that, if you understood it,
the only barrier preventing you from using your understanding to speak the language
would  be  your  all  too  human  inability  to  turn  theoretical  knowledge  into  practical
action. As Dummett puts it, "by stating what someone would have to know if he were
thereby to be able to understand the language, we characterize what it is that a speaker
is able to do" (Dummett, 1993, p. 134). 
Now,  Dummett,  unlike,  for  example,  Davidson  (see,  for  example,  1985),  is
committed to the view that what speakers understand are languages. At this stage, it
would be prejudicial for me to accept Dummett's view. The alternative view is that what
we understand is how our interlocutors are using their words. Of course, Davidson does
not think that we can understand everybody with equal facility, and Dummett does not
think that we do not also understand what our fellow language users wish to convey.
The real dispute between Dummett and Davidson is a dispute over the position of a
theory of meaning in an account of linguistic competence. However, that comes out, in
part, in a disagreement over the proper object of a theory of meaning. For Davidson,
what  we  model  are  the  idiolects  of  particular  speakers  at  particular  times,  and  for
Dummett, French, English, Swahili and other actual languages. So, given that on all
sides  of  this  dispute  a  theory  of  meaning  aims  to  give  an  interpretation  of  some
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interpretable object, the need for an account of meaning to be a description of linguistic
competence provides the following constraint:
LCC: an account  of meaning should state  what  someone would have to
know  if  they  were  thereby  to  be  able  to  understand  the  target  of  that
account.
An account of meaning will then take the following form. On the one hand there
will be a way of specifying the significance of any expression, and on the other hand
there will  be a  gloss  that  makes  sense of  what  it  is  for  an expression  to  have that
significance.  The former project is  a theory of meaning in the narrow sense. It  is  a
theory of  that  which  is  understood  by competent  speakers.  For  reasons  which  will
emerge, the theory of meaning will be a bipartite theory of meaning. The first part is a
specification of the sort of things that can be done linguistically by using sentences. The
second part  is  a  specification of  the  content  of  those sentences  by reference to  the
significance of sub-sentential parts. Such a theory would put the theorist in a position to
specify  what  could  be  done  by  any  use  of  a  sentence  by  making  sense  of  the
contributions made by sub-sentential expressions. By itself, such a theory is very thin. It
needs fleshing out into an account of meaning by describing the activity of using a
language.  That  description  will  take  a  view  as  to  what  it  is  for  a  sentence  to  be
meaningful.  There  are  many views available.  However,  whatever  the  view adopted,
what the theorist needs to do is account for the different kinds of things that can be done
linguistically by using language and account for how the words used make a difference
to what is actually done by uses of language by making sense of what it is to understand
a language. To do so, the theorist needs to provide a model of linguistic competence.
Similar problems bedevil a philosophical account of thinking. Thinking is an
activity. A creature that is thinking is a creature which is responding to the world in a
minimally  autonomous  way.  There  is  a  sense,  then,  in  which  a  creature  which  is
thinking is a creature which is making sense of the world. It has things that it wants, and
it  is  capable of  recognising features of the world.  It  puts that  recognition to  use in
furthering  its  own  projects.  Thinking  proceeds  by  the  adoption  of  propositional
attitudes. A propositional attitude is a possible mental state of a thinker. As a thinking
creature is one that is making sense of the world, a propositional attitude is an attitude
about a way for things to be. There is more than one type of propositional attitude
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(belief and desire are the two classic examples). It is possible to adopt a different type of
propositional  attitude  to  the  same way for  things  to  be,  and,  it  is  possible  to  have
attitudes of a single type about a whole range of ways for things to be. Which situation a
propositional attitude is about is given by specifying its content. I call the content of a
propositional  attitude  a  "thought"36.An  account  of  thinking  needs  to  do  more  than
attribute  propositional  attitudes  to  a  thinker.  It  is  an  account  of  the  mentality  of  a
particular agent. It needs to  make sense of the types of propositional attitudes which
that agent can adopt and show what thoughts the agent can have as the contents of those
propositional attitudes. It also needs an account of what it is to adopt those propositional
attitudes with those contents. That is, it needs to be an account of the agent's minimally
autonomous abilities to recognise and respond to the world.
The overall aim of a philosophical account of thinking is to be a description of
the mentality of a thinker. It needs to make sense of what a creature is doing when it is
exercising  its  minimal  autonomy  in  response  to  its  environment.  It  is  quite
straightforwardly a theory of the understanding of the subject. However,  in order to
achieve its overall aim an account of thinking needs to have a view on two things. The
first thing is a view as to what it is that the subject can think. The second thing is a view
as to what it is to be a thinker. The first part of that project is fulfilled by giving an
account of the types of propositional attitudes a subject can adopt and the contents of
those  attitudes.  Because  thinking  is  a  skill  which  is  exercised  when  a  minimally
autonomous  subject  engages  with  the  world,  this  part  of  the  account  tells  us  what
features of the world the subject can respond to and in which ways she can respond. For
reasons that will become apparent, this is achieved by building a two part theory. I will
reserve the phrase "theory of thought" for these bipartite theories. A bipartite theory
specifies  what  types  of  attitudes  a  thinker  can adopt  and what  thoughts  can  be the
36 Throughout I am going to use the Fregean term "thought" to talk about that which can be the content
of a possible propositional attitude. This is not because I am a Fregean. It is because the alternative is
"proposition". It seems to me that "proposition" suffers from an accretion of theoretical baggage. In
particular, people have held sentences to express propositions. I want to keep the mental realm as
separate as possible from the linguistic. As a result, I need a terminology to talk about the mental that
is as far from the terminology we use to talk about language as possible. Frege's use of "thought" (or
more accurately "Gedanke") somewhat undermines this endeavour (see Frege 1948, ff. pp. 214-215,
1956, ff. p. 292 and 1963, ff. pp. 1-2). However, "thought" still has less theoretical accretions than
"proposition", and quite clearly denotes something mental.
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contents of those attitudes. It does so by putting the theorist in a position to specify
specify the systematic difference that each attitude makes to the activity of thinking. A
full philosophical account of thinking is achieved by giving a gloss on a bipartite theory.
The gloss make sense of what it is to have those propositional attitudes. This needs to be
an account of the understanding of the thinker. It should make sense of what it is for an
attitude to be about a situation and how each attitude can make a systematic difference
to the way the subject responds to the world.
An account of thinking is an account of that which is there to be understood in
the practical abilities of an agent. That requires us to make sense of the way the world
strikes the subject of the account. The constraint on an account of thinking is that one
who understands the account must be able, with the relevant practical abilities, to be
able to think like the subject of the account. Those practical abilities are the unique
sensory abilities of the subject in question, the sophistication of the subject's response
and the ability to turn theoretical knowledge into practical action. The first two practical
abilities are the abilities which an account of thinking is trying to model. The last is a
constraint  which  acknowledges  the  difference  between  practical  and  theoretical
knowledge. Just as, in general, one does not speak by first looking up meanings in the
dictionary, one does not think by appeal to a theory of thought.
In the remainder of this chapter, I am going to show that both using a language
and thinking are rational activities. The next task is to show that those activities are
modelled, in part, using a bipartite truth-conditional theory. I then show that the account
of the activity is completed with a philosophical gloss on the theory. This gloss takes the
form of a dispute over the nature and home of truth. In the remainder of the thesis, I use
the explicit knowledge constraint to demonstrate the right ways of thinking about using
language and thinking.  This is  revealing about  the nature of  truth.  However,  before
doing any of that I need to think a bit more about the nature of a rational activity. It is to
this that I now turn.
§2 What is a Rational Activity?
The  question  of  this  section  is:  what  is  a  rational  action?  I  showed  in  the
introduction that a rational action is an action undertaken by an agent. As an action, it
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does something. So, it is also an event. To distinguish events initiated by agents from
merely causal  happenings I  will  label rational actions,  "agent  authored events".  The
distinguishing features of an agent authored event are that it is something done by an
agent and that it is a response to reasons. This is to say, all reasons apply to actions37. 
Reasons apply to actions, but what is it for a reason to apply to an action? I am
going  to  show  that  agent  authored  events  may  have  grounds  and  will  have
consequences. This distinguishes them from mere causal events which have causes and
effects. The distinction between grounds and consequences and causes and effects is
that grounds and consequences are justifiers for actions. So, rational actions are part of a
normative framework. As such, they can be evaluated by suitably placed observers.
2.1 Grounds and Consequences
I showed in the introduction that,  because being responsive to reasons is the
hallmark of agency, only agents are responsive to reasons. This being so, it is all and
only agent  authored events that  are  rational  actions.  Often,  although not  always,  an
agent authored event is a response to something. For example, the lab rat eats the cheese
37 This makes it look like there is no distinction between theoretical and practical reason. In a way, that
is  correct,  and  in  a  way incorrect.  The way this  is  correct  is  that  both  theoretical  and  practical
reasoning are skills. They are things that we do. The way that it is incorrect is that theoretical and
practical reasoning are different skills. Practical reasoning is a way of navigating one's environment,
and  theoretical  reasoning  is  a  way of  understanding  one's  environment.  Consider  the  following
syllogism:
1. If it rains tomorrow, the game will be called off.
2. It will rain tomorrow.
Therefore,
3. The game will be called off.
I take it that the argument is valid. 3 does indeed follow from 1 and 2. It does not follow that the
conjunction of 1 and 2 is a reason for 3. Instead, the premises are reason for deriving, and hence for
anyone who accepts them, believing the conclusion. They provide a reason for actions. In this case a
reason for deriving 3, and, if believed, believing that the game will be called off. Somebody who has
come to terms with syllogistic reasoning has come to terms with a skill. They have learned how to do
something. In this case they have learned how to do simple theoretical reasoning.
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because it  is hungry and there is cheese in front of it.  Here the lab rat's action is a
response  to  the  cheese  being in  front  of  it.  Given the  rat's  project  of  assuaging its
hunger,  the presence of the cheese justifies the rat's  behaviour.  The presence of the
cheese is a ground for the rat's behaviour.
Many actions are without grounds. For example,  a person might spin on the
spot, or recite a fragment of poetry38. This does not mean that the agent is not engaged
with reasons. Any event makes a difference to the future course of events. However,
more than the actual effects of an action need to be under consideration. Events have
what I will label, 'an upshot'. The upshot of an action is both the effects of the action
(what the action directly brings about), and also what performing the action rules out.
The upshot of an agent authored event makes a difference to the justification of that
event. The upshot of making an action is relevant to the justification of the performance
because what it brings about or rules out can be good or bad, correct or incorrect. For
example, in the game of football each team should do two things: they should score
goals,  and they should prevent the opposition from scoring goals.  The game moves
forward when one team achieves the harder of those two tasks – when they score a goal.
What the players should do is  determined by these two tasks.  When the goalkeeper
makes a save she has done what she should. The striker whose shot was blocked has
failed to do what she should. If the striker scores, the analysis goes the other way round;
the goalkeeper got things wrong, and the striker was correct.
Events which are not agent authored have upshots, and these upshots can be
good or bad. This does not make such events rational actions. For example, when the
wind blows rubbish into the gutter it has the effect that the street sweeper has to clean it
up. The street sweeper's life has been made more difficult by the wind, so, at least from
her perspective, the event is a bad thing. But the behaviour of the wind is not correct or
incorrect because it is not an agent. A severe drought is a bad thing. At worst it can lead
to famine, at best it can lead to increased food prices which negatively impact on poor
people. However, as the weather is not an agent authored action, it is neither justified
38 It is of course possible to provide a rationalisation of such behaviour. One might think that such an
action was done because it was fun, or because the agent wanted to find out what would happen if she
did such a thing. Undoubtedly, sometimes this is the case, but sometimes such rationalisations are
post hoc.
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nor unjustified. I am going to use the word "consequence" to mark the upshot of an
agent  authored  event.  In  this  terminology,  only  agent  authored  events  have
consequences. Events like the wind blowing or severe drought have upshots, but they do
not  have consequences.  In a similar  way it  is  only agent  authored events  that  have
grounds.  The prolonged period of high pressure causes the drought,  but  it  does not
ground it.  The famine, on the other hand, does provide a ground for people to ship
foodstuffs to the affected area. We ought to help our fellow humans when we can; it is a
project we should undertake. So, actions that further that project are justified.  
In summary, rational actions are all and only agent authored events which may
have grounds and will have consequences. Grounds and consequences are both potential
justifiers for actions. Grounds provide reasons for undertaking a particular course of
action because they are justifiers for that course of action. Consequences are the upshot
of  undertaking  a  particular  course  of  action.  They provide  reasons  for  and  against
undertaking a particular course of action because what an action brings about and what
it rules out makes a difference to the justification for performing the action.
2.2 Warrant and Evaluation
I turn now to warrant and evaluation. If an action has a ground, that is at least a
pro tanto reason for performing the action.  Assuming the lab rat  is  out looking for
cheese, there being a piece of cheese in front of it is a reason for the lab rat to eat the
cheese. The cheese is a ground for the action. One of the consequences of the action is
that the lab rat gets fed. As eating is one of the rat’s projects, that consequence provides
a pro tanto reason for the action. A warranted action is an action which it is acceptable
to  perform.  So,  assuming  there  are  no  countervailing  circumstances,  the  action  is
warranted. If eating the cheese is going to result in the rat being caught in a trap, then
the rat really should refrain from eating the cheese. I am assuming that the rat has an
overriding aim of staying alive. If there are no countervailing consequences of eating
the  cheese,  the  rat  has  a  warrant  for  eating  the  cheese.  However,  countervailing
consequences can undermine that warrant. It is possible for an action to be warranted
which lacks grounds. For example, Meg likes to sing in the shower. She finds herself
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doing this one day as she scrubs away. I am going to assume that her singing is not a
response to anything. It has fairly minimal consequences because it does not make much
difference to anything else, but it does bring her pleasure which is a good thing. It has
some other consequences because it is incompatible with various different courses of
action. For example, it is incompatible with her thinking about her day ahead. However,
there is plenty of time for Meg to do that later. Its consequences do not make the action
impermissible. We do not need a reason to undertake an action, and, if undertaking that
action does not  prevent  us  from doing something that  we have to do,  the action is
permissible.  Meg's  singing  in  the  shower  is  a  warranted  action.  However,  it  is  a
warranted action which lacks grounds. An action is warranted either when the situation
is such that the action should occur, or when the warrant comes for free because there is
no countervailing reason which means that the action should not occur.
Because it is rational actions that are warranted or not, and because there are
three distinct dimensions to rationality – hypothetical, categorical and procedural – there
are  three  classes  of  warrant.  An  agent  authored  event  can  be  warranted  in  the
hypothetical dimension. In this dimension the warrant depends on the project in hand. It
can  also  be  warranted  in  the  categorical  dimension.  The  warrant  depends  on  its
categorical moral status. Finally,  it  can be warranted with respect to a practice. The
warrant depends on the permissibility of the action in the practice. Actions that can be
warranted can be explicitly evaluated. Explicit evaluation is a matter of gaining explicit
knowledge of warrants. As there are three classes of warrant, evaluation can also be
done in all three dimensions.
§3 Using Language
In this section I am going to show that the activity of using language is a rational
activity.  The  long-term aim  is  to  show  that  modelling  that  activity  will  involve  a
bipartite truth conditional theory of meaning, or a theory of meaning that is equivalent
to a bipartite truth conditional one. The reason is that, whatever one's view of language
and  language  use,  there  is  more  to  the  activity  of  using  language  than  the  endless
projects  in  which  linguistic  activity  features.  In  addition  to  the  point  of  a  use  of
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language, what there is to be understood is a linguistic act. A linguistic act presents a
content with a particular force. Because truth is a device of semantic ascent, any account
of content is also an account of the truth conditions of a sentence with that content.
Sentences are used to present contents with particular forces, so, equally, any account of
what it is to present a content with a particular force is also an account of what it is to
present the truth of a sentence with that force. So, without any commitment to truth
being a substantial semantic property and irrespective of your view about what it is to
use language,  for  any language,  there will  be a  bipartite  truth-conditional  theory of
meaning39. In order to make it clear that, on any view of language, there is something to
be modelled, I first need to show that, whatever you think about meaning, linguistic
competence is a circumscribable rational ability. This last task is the aim of section 3. 
3.1 Using Language is a Rational Activity
Many uses of language, those uses of language which are uses by humans, are
agent authored. This suggests that they are rational actions. There are, of course, uses of
language which are not agent authored,  and so not all  uses of language are rational
actions. However, there would be no possibility of non-agent authored uses of language,
if  using  language  was  not  something  that  human  beings  did.  Uses  of  language  by
humans are, in the main, intentional actions. Intentional actions are rational actions as
they have  grounds  and consequences.  For  example,  Reuben might  greet  his  friend,
Maria, with a cheery "good morning". In doing so, he will have a purpose for his action,
and it will be part of at least one project. Simplifying things slightly, Reuben's greeting
is part of the project of striking up a conversation with Maria. Reuben's action achieves
this end. Thus that consequence justifies the action. Reuben also has the wider project of
maintaining his friendship. If he is to maintain his friendship, he needs to be polite to
his friend. As a result, the presence of his friend grounds Reuben's action. 
However, uses of language can be distinguished from other intentional actions,
although it  is  not  easy to  demarcate  the difference.  Dummett's  slogan,  "a theory of
39 The phrase  "bipartite  theory"  is  taken  from John McDowell's  "Truth-Conditions,  Bivalence,  and
Verificationism" (McDowell, 1998b, p. 6).
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meaning is a theory of understanding", is helpful here. By making the proper aim of a
theory of meaning the making of a model of a speaker's ability to use and understand
language, we are able to locate what is special about uses of language. Reflective users
of language are able to understand uses of language that fall within their domain of
expertise without reference to the purposes of a particular speaker40. A good example
would be a piece of poetry (or even this essay).  Furthermore expert speakers are able to
understand many novel uses of language. There are two dimensions to this novelty. The
first dimension is the ability to understand uses of language they have not previously
encountered.  The  second  dimension  is  the  ability  to  understand  familiar  uses  of
language  in  novel  situations.  Expertise  in  both  dimensions  requires  the  ability  to
recognise  structure  in  uses  of  language,  and  the  ability  to  class  together  different
linguistic performances as performances of the same type. This ability requires there to
be a systematic nature to language use. However, the two dimensions of novelty mean
that the systematic nature of language use cannot be captured solely in terms of the
projects of the language user and the causes of her utterances. 
The  basic  problem is  that,  because  of  the  two  types  of  novelty,  competent
speakers  know what  their  interlocutors  have  said.  But,  even if  we grant  competent
language users access to the projects of their interlocutors, what has been said is not
captured  in  terms  of  the  grounds  and  consequences  of  an  utterance.  When  Maria
understands Reuben's cheery greeting, she understands that it is a wish for her to have a
good morning.  In this  instance,  the utterance is  grounded partly by the presence of
Maria, and partly by Reuben's desire to have a conversation with her. Having access to
Reuben's  purposes  does  not  thereby allow Maria  to  understand  Reuben's  utterance.
Imagine that the conversation has come to an end. Reuben terminates the conversation
with another good morning. If the friend is to understand this utterance, she needs to
understand that it is a wish for her to have a good morning. This time it is grounded
partly by Reuben's desire to terminate the conversation, and partly by English social
conventions. Again, Maria can know that Reuben wishes to terminate the conversation
without understanding what Reuben utters. The example can be multiplied indefinitely.
The basic point is that nothing about the grounds and consequences of the utterance is
going to explain why it is a wish for someone to have a good morning. The correct
40 My domain of expertise is English.
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interpretation requires understanding what has been said. To deal with this problem the
theorist of meaning must find space for some notion of the linguistic significance of a
use of language. I am going to follow Davidson and call this first component, "the first
meaning" of an utterance (Davidson, 1985, p. 474). The first meaning of an utterance is
the linguistic significance of the utterance. On some views, that is the significance the
utterance has within the language. On other views, that is the linguistic significance
which that particular utterance has. 
3.2 Point, Force and Content
Many uses  of  language  serve  the  purposes  of  language  using  agents.  These
purposes are enormously diverse and, I suspect, open ended. It seems to me that the
range of projects which could be furthered by using a bit of language is infinite. Here is
an example. Ramona might wish to strike up a conversation, and so make a remark
about the state of the weather. She might say, "the weather has turned warm at last". If
she falls  into conversation,  her  action  can be  deemed a success,  and her  behaviour
correct.  Here she has used an assertion,  that the weather has turned warm at last, to
bring about a conversation. The purpose of a linguistic performance does not depend on
the sentence used. For example, Curtis might say to Avis, "have you had enough to
drink?" This could be said in order to elicit information. Perhaps Curtis is worried that
his guests are not well enough watered. On the other hand, it could also be a way of
preventing Avis from drinking any more; imagine Curtis as irritated with Avis' drinking.
It is worth stressing that in this dimension it is also possible to evaluate 'straightforward'
uses of language. Verity might wish to assert that the daffodils are cheerful. If she does
it by uttering, "the daffodils are cheerful", she will have succeeded in asserting that the
daffodils are cheerful.
Uses of language are actions. But, in addition to being, for example, ways of
gaining affection, they are also distinctively linguistic actions. To see this consider that,
as  already  noted,  linguistic  competence  varies  depending  on  one's  linguistic
environment.  At  home,  competent  speakers  use and respond to language with ease.
Unless they have put in a lot of work, they struggle abroad. One way of explaining this
is  to hold that the first  meaning of a use of a sentence has nothing to  do with the
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intentions  of  the  language  user.  On  a  view  like  this,  speakers  are  seen  as  using
sentences,  and  those  sentences  are  seen  as  being  meaningful  because  they  are
constructed from a meaningful vocabulary. The first meaning of an utterance is then
treated as being this linguistic meaning. However, on this view of utterances, languages
provide ways of performing an infinite number of linguistic actions. Those actions are
performed  by  combining  words  together  to  form  sentences.  Learning  to  speak  is
learning how a language works, which is to say learning which combinations of words
form which  linguistic  actions.  Of course,  in  some ways  much more  important  than
understanding language, is understanding other people. On a view like this, people use
their linguistic abilities to understand the language used by their interlocutors, and then
use that information to understand what their interlocutors are up to by using a sentence
with a particular meaning.
However,  one  can  resist  appeal  to  linguistic  meaning  and  still  respect  the
obvious point that understanding language use requires a peculiar form of linguistic
competence. But doing so requires that there is more to understanding each other than
divining the non-linguistic purposes that a speaker might have for using language in the
way that she does.  You also have to work out what it is that your interlocutor has said.
At best, knowledge of their non-linguistic projects might give you some clues as to the
correct interpretation of their utterance, but what successful interpretation gives you is
knowledge of which speech act has been performed, not their non-linguistic purposes
for performing such an act. That is, understanding an utterance requires working out
what a speaker means by the sounds that she makes. McDowell, who adopts this latter
line, puts the point like this:
The primary communicative intention is the intention, for instance, to say such-and-such
to the audience. The appropriate mutual awareness is the awareness that the speaker has
indeed said such-and-such to the audience. Speech acts are publications of intentions; the
primary aim of speech acts is  to  produce an object  –  the speech act  itself  –  that  is
perceptible publicly, and in particular to the audience, embodying an intention whose
content is precisely a recognisable performance of that very speech act. Recognition by
an audience that  such an intention has  been made public  in this way leaves nothing
further needing to happen for the intention to be fulfilled.
(McDowell, 1998b, p. 41)
On this view of language use, speakers have both linguistic and non-linguistic
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intentions. Their linguistic intention is an intention to perform a speech act. It is these
speech acts which competent users of a language can understand. They do so by being
able  to  understand  their  interlocutors  linguistic  intentions.  The  first  meaning  of  an
utterance is determined by how the speaker is correctly interpreted. It is a matter of what
she  is  trying  to  say  by  using  those  words  in  those  ways  to  make  that  utterance.
Linguistic meaning is a by-product of the advantage of having relatively stable ways of
using words to say the kind of things that speakers want to say. 
However, the 'linguistic meaning first' and 'speaker meaning first' views are not
as distant as might at first seem. The reason is that, even in the linguistic meaning first
case, competent language use requires choosing what to say. A competent speaker still
has linguistic intentions. She might want, for example, to assert that daffodils are pretty.
She knows a way of doing that. She might use the sentence, "daffodils are pretty". An
interlocutor who understands the utterance has, not only understood the utterance, but
also thereby recognised the speaker's linguistic intentions. The important point is that
whether or not first meaning is linguistic meaning, using language requires knowing
how to say what you want to say and understanding what other people wanted to say.
Given that, not only is using language a rational activity in that it furthers people's non-
linguistic projects, speakers also have linguistic projects which give them reasons for
speaking as they do. Those reasons are hypothetical reasons. If I want to use English to
assert that daffodils are pretty, then I should choose from a range of utterances among
which will be a use of "daffodils are pretty". If I am to understand English, I need to
understand  the  right  ways  of  saying  all  the  things  I  might  want  to  say.  I  need  to
understand what is correct about saying "daffodils are pretty" as a way of asserting that
daffodils are pretty. Different views of meaning have different views as to what it is that
makes an utterance correct. Further down the line, we will see that many of those views
are not adequate to the task in hand.
On  any view  of  language,  using  language  is  a  matter  performing  linguistic
actions. These actions are things like assertions, questions, orders and so on. They are
distinguished  from non-linguistic  actions  simply  by  being  the  moves  by which  the
activity of using language proceeds. However, the idea that a use of language performs
a distinct linguistic action also brings with it the idea that the action has a content. After
all, a question is a demand for a particular bit of information, an order is a demand that
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something particular  happens,  and so  on.  In  addition  to  recognising  the  purpose  of
intentional  utterances,  linguistic  competence  requires  understanding  the  linguistic
significance of uses of language.  That is,  to be able to recognise and respond to an
action with a content. The linguistic significance of a use of a sentence depends on what
might,  pre-theoretically,  be  called  "the  grammar"  and  "the  meaning"  of  the  bit  of
language used.  For example,  the meaning of "I  am playing cricket" depends on the
words used, the way it is put together and morphological features of the words used. By
playing the permutations with word order, morphology and word use, speakers can use
language to perform innumerable different linguistic actions.
The take-home message is that whatever one's view of language use, there needs
to be a tripartite distinction between the content, the force and the point of an utterance.
The point of an utterance is the purpose for which it is undertaken. The force of an
utterance is the type of linguistic action that has been performed. The content of an
utterance is what is presented with a variety of forces. Here is a way of drawing the
distinction: there are assertions that such and such is the case, questions as to if it is the
case that such and such, orders for it to be brought about that such and such is the case,
and so on. What precedes the that-clause is the force, and the that-clause is the content41.
41 This mirrors and is inspired by Dummett's  distinction between sense,  force and point  (Dummett,
1993, p. 108). However, I do not wish to be committed to anything as technical as sense. The same
point  could be  made by using JL Austin's  distinction between the locutionary,  illocutionary and
perlocutionary (Austin, 1962, pp. 91-103). The major reason I have phrased things as the distinction
between point, force and content is that I am much more familiar with the work of Dummett and I am
with  the  work  of  Austin.  However,  there  are  also  philosophical  reasons.  "Illocutionary",
"illocutionary" and "illocutionary" are terms of art. The distinction I wish to make is not the same as
Austin's. My use of "point" is more wide-ranging than Austin's "perlocutionary". Austin seems to
want the perlocutionary aspect of an utterance to be a matter of a speech act's effects on its recipient.
These  might  be  such  things  as  convincing  someone  or  scaring  someone.  Austin  also  wishes  to
exclude non-interpersonal consequences, such as producing something beautiful or making echoes,
from any of those classes (ibid.  102-103). I am happy to include anything for the sake of which
somebody uses a sentence in the point of that use.  It also seems to me that in Austin's sense there will
be perlocutionary aspects that are unintended. If I shout, "the train is leaving" because I have been
daydreaming and am shocked by my trains imminent departure , as I have it, there is no point to my
act. However, if you are startled by my utterance, then you being startling is its perlocutionary aspect
(ibid. p. 106). 
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3.3 Three Views of Language
There are, broadly speaking, three approaches to the nature of language. These
distinctions will turn out not to be the most helpful way of thinking about language use.
In the end, questions about the nature of truth and the nature of truth-bearers are more
revealing. However, it is helpful to have some way of thinking about the sort of views
of the nature and status of languages that might emerge. The three broad views are:
(a) Use views
(b) Meaning fact views
(c) Linguistic practice views.
(a) Use views treat a language as an empirical generalisation from the habits of
speakers. As I will show in the next chapter, use theorists disagree on what constitutes
use. The dispute is over which concepts can figure in an account of use. In particular,
they disagree about whether or not semantic concepts are indispensable in an account of
use42. On such views, talk of words, sentences and languages is useful in explaining and
Furthermore, Austin, being interested in linguistic philosophy, introduces his distinctions in order to
make sense of the huge number of things that we do by using sentences. He is suspicious of the
attempt  to  regiment  language  in  the  way attempted  by Dummett  and  others.  This  comes  out  in
Austin's rejection of the significance of assessment of speech acts in terms of truth and falsity. For
Austin, truth and falsity are, on occasion, suitable for assessing speech acts, but need have no special
place in the elucidation of meaning (ibid.  pp. 146-147). Austin, it  seems to me, wishes, with his
distinction, to remove theories of meaning from the centre of the philosophy of language. They are to
be replaced by careful consideration of all the multifarious illocutionary acts that speakers go in for.
Following Dummett  (1993, pp. 107-110), it  seems to me that  we cannot make sense of speaker
understanding unless we privilege truth and falsity. At the bare minimum, as Austin acknowledges by
introducing talk of the locutionary, speakers need to understand that the locutionary aspect of a use of
a sentence, the content, is true in such and such circumstances. But, as will emerge, we cannot make
sense of the notion of truth except in terms of the possibility of evaluating linguistic acts, and in
particular of assertion. But, that does mean that we need to privilege truth and falsity in the way that
we evaluate language use. It  also means that we need to distinguish between the point, force and
content of the use of a sentence. It would be both misleading and unfair to Austin to use his labels
here.
42 This leaves my use of  "use theorist" somewhat heterodox. In general, a use theory is taken to be one
that tries to account for semantic properties in terms of dispositions to produce utterances. For my
purposes, I find my taxonomy more useful. Brian Loar (1982, p. 272) and Jennifer Hornsby (1989, p.
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predicting speaker behaviour. The next question a use theorist has to face concerns the
nature and status of languages. On one way of developing the view, speakers do not
understand a  language;  they understand each other.  A language becomes part  of  an
empirical  theory  about  speaker  behaviour43.  The  other  way of  developing  the  view
maintains that speaker behaviour is primary, but that it is such as to give rise to stable
regularities  of  use.  These  stable  regularities  of  use  are  languages.  Because  each
expression in the language has a use, it is meaningful irrespective of the purposes of
particular language users, and linguistic competence requires getting to grips with those
regularities. On both developments of the view, as the whole thing is grounded in the
purposes of language users, it makes means-end rationality fundamental to language use
both in respect to what has been done by a use of language and what an expression
means.  There  are  no  linguistic  norms  which  govern  language  use.  An  utterance  is
correct if and only if it achieves its purpose; from a linguistic point of view, there is no
right thing to say.
In brushstrokes  so broad that  they blur  crucial  distinctions  between different
views, on the no-such-thing-as-language-view, the idea is that what people have to do is
understand  each  other.  They  produce  utterances  and  inscriptions  for  a  variety  of
purposes. However, it is distinctive of the possibility of success in the varied projects
for which people use language that the utterances and inscriptions have a content. That
content is a matter of what the utterer means by the words on that occasion of utterance.
That is a matter of what she is best understood as saying on that occasion. The first
meaning of an utterance is then a matter of how the words used on that occasion are
correctly understood. At least for a core class of expressions, when circumstances are
similar, language users tend to use the same expressions for the same purposes. These
regularities of intentional performance are such that conventional ways of performing
linguistic  acts  are  instigated.  Those  conventions  are  not  just  at  the  level  of  whole
sentences. They are also at the level of sub-sentential expressions. The conventions for
using sub-sentential expressions are such that sub-sentential expressions can be seen as
making  a  systematic  difference  to  what  would  conventionally  be  done  by  whole
561) both acknowledge the possibility of doing things my way.
43 Grice (1959) provides one way of taking this line. Davidson provides a very different way. See, for
example, Davidson, 2005, pp. 49-52, "Knowing One's Own Mind" (Davidson 2001c, p. 28), "The
Social Aspect of Language" (1994) and "A Nice Derangement Of Epitaphs" (1985). 
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sentences in which they can occur. So, importantly, for any use of language there is
something that, if language users regularly did that thing, that use of language would be
a conventional way of doing that thing. Competent language users are taken to be such
that they know what each use of language would conventionally do were it to be the
common use. But, because language use is sophisticated in this way, language users are
able to understand uses of language which are not agent authored events; they are able
to understand what the non-authored uses would do if they were authored by an agent
who would be liable to try to make herself understood like that. 
On the languages-as-regularities development, the activity of communicating is
still taken to be primary. However, the fact that we are able to communicate with each
other  is  meant  to  give  rise  to  languages,  where  a  language  is,  roughly,  a  system
meaning.  Linguistic  competence  is  a  matter  of  using  that  meaningful  entity  in
communication. The first meaning of an utterance is then its meaning in the language.
One way of developing the position is to think that reflective linguistic competence
requires some level of ersatz empirical theorising about languages. Languages develop,
so the idea goes, as stable ways of doing certain things. On David Lewis's development
of the view, they are stable conventions for fulfilling intentions (Lewis, 1979). On Ruth
Millikan's development (1987), languages are "reproductively established families", the
members  of  which  have  "proper  functions"  in  such  a  way  that  sentences  in  their
different moods perform all the linguistic acts one could want.
(b) Meaning fact views hold that the expressions of a language are meaningful in
that  there  is  a  meaning fact  for  each  expression  in  the  language44.  Expressions  are
meaningful but can be used in an indefinite number of ways for an indefinite number of
purposes. So, although linguistic items are taken to be meaningful in their own right,
thinking about language use is still an empirical undertaking. The theorist also needs an
account of linguistic competence. Linguistic competence is a matter of being able to use
a language for your purposes, and respond to other speakers' uses by recognising their
purposes. So, an account of linguistic competence is an account of the way a language is
used. Because, on these views, the meaning of an expression does not determine how it
ought  to  be used,  such views require  an empirical  theory of linguistic  activity.  The
44 David Wiggins labels such a view an "autonomy conception of meaning" (Wiggins, 1997, p. 508).
Wiggins credits John Foster with having propounded the view as against Davidson (Foster, 1976). I
think Wiggins is right in this attribution. 
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theorist looks for a basic regularity of use knowledge of which would explain speaker
competence.  In  other  words,  meaning  fact  views  do  not  differ  from  empirical
generalisation views on their account of the rationality of language use or its evaluation.
On  these  views,  there  are  no  linguistic  norms  governing  language  use.  Instead,  an
utterance is correct in as much as it achieved its purpose. Explaining speakers' ability to
understand  non-rational  uses  of  language  is  straightforward.  Language  users  and
computers are both using meaningful items. Linguistic competence requires the ability
to grasp the significance of any use of a sentence. However, uses by language users are
rational  actions  whereas  uses  by  computers  are  not.  On  these  views,  meaning  is
independent  of  use,  but  what  is  done with  a  language is  accounted for  in  terms of
means-ends rationality.
Of course,  theorists who adopt a meaning fact view are going to want some
account of what constitutes these meaning facts. But, it is not so urgent as on use views.
Irrespective of how languages develop, what develops is something that is meaningful.
Competent  speakers  have  to  come  to  terms  with  the  meanings  of  the  words  and
sentences that they use. They are then able to use them to further their own particular
projects. We also understand any understandable bit of language that we come across.
Making sense of each other and making sense of why our interlocutors might say what
they say is a separate project. The only developments of this view that I am aware of
turn the trick by holding that there are things for a word or sentence to mean. I suspect
that this is because they are impressed by the possibility of saying the same thing in
different languages, and thus hold that there is a contingent connection between a word
and its meaning. The most famous development of this sort of view is Frege's (Frege,
1948)45.
(c) Linguistic practice views  treat uses of language as significant because they
are part of a rational practice. My own view of language is a linguistic practice view, as
is Robert Brandom's (1998). One difference between my view and Brandom's is that
Brandom has a deflationary view of truth where as I treat it as a substantial property. A
rational practice is an activity instituted by a set of rules. The basic idea is that because
there  are  rules  which  govern  the  making  of  speech  acts,  words  and  sentences  are
45 I  think  that  Anandi  Hattiangadi  has  a  version  of  this  view (Hattiangadi,  2007).  Wiggins  (1997)
provides another example.
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significant. The thought is that a use of language can be correct or incorrect from the
perspective of a particular linguistic practice. The next thought is that because there are
procedurally correct or incorrect uses of language, each expression in a language has a
linguistic significance. This is what is grasped by competent, reflective speakers. 
It is important to note that on this sort of view the rules of the practice institute
new  possibilities  for  action.  They  do  so  by  determining  the  grounds  and  the
consequences of making that action. As a result, on this sort of view there can be a
speech act without an actor.  I  am going to coin the phrase "language act"  to  avoid
confusion  with  speech  act  theory.  Language  acts  are  actions  within  the  practice  of
speaking a language. Competent language users avail themselves of those possibilities
to use language to further their own purposes; understanding language is a matter of
grasping the significance of language acts. There is an analogy with chess here. Chess
consists of a series of chess acts. What those acts are gets to be determined by the rules
which govern play. Chess players are then able to use those chess acts to further their
own purposes. In the main, I suppose, chess players play to win. However, they may
also play to explore the possibilities within the game, or even to send coded messages.
Competence in chess requires grasping the significance of different chess acts given the
position within the game; how you then use that competence is entirely up to you. Using
language is a more complicated activity than playing chess.  However, language users,
like chess players, have to come to grasp the significance of different language acts
given a particular context. Part of the complexity of the activity is that that context is
extremely open-ended. It will involve what has just been written or said, but also how
things are in the world. To make things more complex still, how things are in the world
includes  what  has  previously  been  written  or  said.  Nevertheless,  at  heart  linguistic
competence is a matter of coming to terms with a set of rules that govern a particular
linguistic practice.
It is worth noting, if only to set aside, that on all views of language there will
also  be  categorical  warrants.  Because  linguistic  actions  are  significant,  they  have
upshots. Most of those upshots will be morally neutral. Although, given the difficulties
of living well, there will also be plenty of times when speakers are called upon to do the
morally right thing by producing an utterance. For example, more often than not, if you
have a need for some information that I possess, and you ask me for it, I should make a
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true assertion that provides you with the information you require. More often than not, it
would be  wrong to  lie46.  There are  less  extreme examples.  I  think that  the  socially
competent  ought  to  try  to  include  the  socially  awkward.  This  requires  making
conversation.  Nothing  turns  on  this  claim.  It  is  brought  up  party  for  the  sake  of
accuracy, and partly to emphasise how embedded language use is in our day-to-day
activities.
§4 Theories and Accounts of Meaning
I turn now to theories and accounts of meaning. The ability to use language is a
practical capacity.  There can be no more to meaning than is captured by the correct
description of that capacity. As a result, the aim of the theorist is to provide an account
of meaning which makes sense of the linguistic behaviour of the people who use a
language by characterising what it is that speakers are able to do. That is, the theorist is
aiming to provide a model of linguistic understanding. One thing that a description of
that  capacity  needs  to  capture  is  what  it  is  that  competent  users  of  that  language
understand. What is understood by competent speakers is the significance of any well-
formed utterance. So, one thing that an account of meaning has to do is find a way of
stating the significance of any well-formed utterance. This part of the project I have
labelled a "theory of meaning". It should put the theorist in a position to state what
would (standardly) be done by any use of language47. One's view of language does not
46 If you are a soldier and you are asking after the location of an innocent fugitive, it is not obvious that
I should reveal the location of the fugitive to you. There are, of course, arguments to the contrary.
47 In what follows "(standardly)" will appear regularly. This is to mark the distinction between those
who hold that there is a linguistic dimension to evaluation and those who deny one. Those who think
that there is a linguistic dimension to evaluation think that a theory of meaning needs to account for
the way a language is correctly used, which is to say they need to account for the way a linguistic
practice works.  From this  linguistic  perspective,  it  seems reasonable  to  suppress  the  "correctly".
Those who deny that there is a linguistic dimension to evaluation think that a theory of meaning
needs to account for the way that a language is standardly used, although of course standard use does
not  have  to  coincide  with  frequency  of  actual  use.  The  theory  of  meaning  will  have  to  be
sophisticated enough to account for the possibility of there being sentences which are never in fact
used and sophisticated enough to deal with sentences that are so rarely used that they are in fact most
commonly used in a non-standard way. Both parties go about constructing a theory of meaning in the
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make a difference to the mechanics of building such a theory of meaning. It makes a
difference to what the theorist of meaning takes the theory to have done. That is,  it
makes  a  difference  to  how you  understand  linguistic  competence.  On  any view of
language, the data to be modelled are the utterances of a particular group of speakers.
As a result, a theory of meaning for a language is a description of what can be done by
an utterance. The dispute is over the right way of making sense of such a description.
That is, the dispute is over the way that meaning is located in the wider rational activity
of navigating around the world. In summary, in this section, I will show that, whatever
your view of language, an account of meaning needs to be frameable as a theory which
gives  the  (standard)  significance  of  any  possible  use  of  language  together  with  a
commentary that explains what it is to understand what is captured by such a theory.
4.1 Standard Use
Although, in the first instance, using language is a rational activity, except on
rational practice views, that rationality is simply a product of the purposes for which
people  use  language.  On  such  views,  there  is  no  error  involved  in  a  spoonerism,
solecism or  deviation from the dictionary definition of a term.  However,  competent
speakers are able to recognise when such things have occurred, even when it has no
effect on their ability to understand their interlocutors. This is of a piece with competent
speakers having a skill that they have had to learn. As already noted, it  is that skill
which the theorist of meaning wants to characterise. Again, as it is a skill that is being
characterised,  the characterisation needs to  explain what it  is  to use language.  I  am
going  to  use  the  term "standard  use"  to  describe  the  regularity  of  use  which  best
characterises this skill. It is important to note that the standard use, on this definition,
does  not  mean  the  way  an  expression  is  most  commonly  used.  Instead,  it  is  a
hypothetical abstraction from actual performance. The thought is that actual linguistic
performances  are  regular  enough that  actual  language use  can  display an  enormous
regularity and flexibility. Despite that, competent language users can make sense of uses
same way. What they disagree about is the significance of what they have done when they have done
it.
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of  language  that  are  not  agent  authored.  In  addition,  reflective  speakers  can  give
definitions of words in isolation and, if they see fit, police their own and other peoples
linguistic behaviour according to the standard use. In other words, linguistic behaviour
is  such that  there  is  a  notion  of  the  meaning  of  an  utterance  of  a  sentence  that  is
independent of the speaker. The linguistic meaning of an expression is in part captured
by the standard use of that expression. However, it is only on linguistic practice views
that linguistic meaning brings with it procedural warrants.
If the theorist denies the existence of a linguistic dimension of evaluation, she
will take possession of a philosophical account of meaning to put her in a position to
say,  for any given sentence, when that sentence is standardly introduced, and to say
what the standard effect of using that sentence will be. Use theorists will take that to be
part of an empirical theory of the linguistic behaviour of a group of speakers. Meaning
fact theorists will take that to be part of an empirical theory about how groups of people
operate with meanings. If, like me, the theorist acknowledges a linguistic dimension of
evaluation, she will take her theory to put her in a position to state the grounds and the
consequences of using any given sentence. 
4.2 Semantic Role
What  we  want  to  know about  meaning  is  captured  by  a  description  of  the
capacity to use and understand a language. Part of that description must make sense of
what is understood by competent speakers of that language. This part of the account is a
theory of meaning. The aim of a theory of meaning is, then, an account of the way each
expression figures in the activity of speaking a language. I am going to call this feature
"the  semantic  role"  of  an  expression48.  There  are  two  components  that  need  to  be
accounted for; they are:  how an expression is used, and what is done with it when it is
used. As the activity proceeds by the use of sentences, the key notion is the semantic
role  of  sentences.  The  semantic  role  of  a  sentence  is  its  systematic  position  in  the
48 Once I have introduced the role of truth in theory of meaning, it should become apparent that my
understanding of semantic role has been taken from Dummett. Dummett defines "semantic role" as
follows, "the semantic role of an expression is that fact about it in virtue of which it contributes to
determining the truth or falsity of any sentence in which it occurs" (Dummett, 1993, p 285).
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activity of speaking a language. Without a linguistic dimension of rationality, the first
component of an account of the semantic role of sentences requires a description of
when a sentence is standardly introduced, and its effect on which sentences standardly
will,  might or won't come next. With a linguistic dimension, that is a description of
when it is okay, compulsory or forbidden to use the sentence, and a description of what
has to, may or must not happen next. This leaves the following as a criterion of identity
on the semantic of sentences:
SRS: Two sentences have the same semantic role if and only if they are
everywhere  interchangeable  without  affecting  the  rest  of  the
activity.
However,  not  only  sentences  have  a  semantic  role.  Human  languages  are
systematic. Sentences do not have a semantic role willy-nilly. There is an account of
why each sentence has the semantic role that it does. The semantic role of a sentence is
determined by the way it is constructed and what it is constructed from. That is, the
semantic role of a sentence is determined by its sub-sentential parts and the way they
are put together. This feature of a language also needs to be represented by a theory of
meaning for that language. There is no (standard) ground or consequence for using a
sub-sentential expression. This is because (standardly) nothing is done by the use of a
sub-sentential expression. As a result, there is no linguistic dimension of rationality for
using sub-sentential expressions because nothing linguistically has been done by the use
of a sub-sentential expression.
However, on use views the semantic roles of sentences are determined by their
construction because, as a matter of fact, the way sentences are standardly used depends
on conventions for combining together sub-sentential parts. Competent speakers have to
have come to terms with a large array of such conventions. A theory of meaning, on
these views, requires an account of such conventions. Views which appeal to meaning
facts take the semantic role of a sentence to be straightforwardly determined by the
meaning  of  that  sentence.  They  also  assume  that  the  meaning  of  a  sentence  is
determined  by the  meaning  of  its  parts.  So,  on  these  views,  because  the  parts  are
meaningful they have a systematic effect on the way that sentences in which they occur
tend to be used. Linguistic practice views are similar except that they understand "use"
82
as "is correctly used". On linguistic practice views, sub-sentential expressions make a
systematic  difference  to  the  grounds  and  consequences  of  using  a  sentence.  So,
whichever view is adopted, a theory of meaning has to account for the systematic effect
of  using a  sub-sentential  expression.  The systematic  effect  of using a  sub-sentential
expression  has  to  be  cashed  out  as  the  way the  use  of  that  expression  affects  the
(standard)  use of sentences in  which it  can occur.  This systematic  effect  is  the first
component of the semantic role of a sub-sentential expression. So, the first component
of the semantic role of a sub-sentential expression is captured by a description of its
systematic contribution to the semantic roles of sentences in which it can occur. Thus,
the following provides a criterion identity on the semantic role of a sub-sentential part:
SSP: Two sub-sentential parts have the same semantic role if and only
if  they  are  everywhere  interchangeable  without  affecting  the
semantic roles of sentences in which they can occur.
4.3 Semantic Value
We need more than a description of how speakers tend to use/should use their
language. We also want an account of what they have done when they have done it. This
is  the  second component  of  semantic  role.  The sort  of  things  that  we do by using
sentences are: make assertions, ask questions, issue orders and so on. Speakers perform
these linguistic actions by using sentences. In order to understand what has been done
linguistically by a particular utterance,  a competent speaker needs to understand the
(standard) significance of using any sentence. So, a theory of meaning aims to put the
theorist in a position to say what is (standardly) done by a use of any sentence. What the
theorist must show is, for example, why utterances of "humans are featherless bipeds"
are (standardly) the assertion that humans are featherless bipeds, or utterances of "get
thee to a nunnery" are (standardly) the order that the addressee should remove herself to
a nunnery. Putting it schematically,  a theory of meaning should put the theorist in a
position to make claims with the following form:
A use of SENTENCE is (standardly) the LA that p
where 'SENTENCE' is the name of a sentence and LA is a stand-
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in  for  a  type  of  linguistic  act,  and  'p'  is  a  schematic  variable
ranging over sentences in use49. 
Now, as what is understood is both the content and the force of an utterance, a
theory of meaning which puts the theorist in a position to state the (standard) content of
any possible use of a sentence, the different forces uses of sentences can have and what
makes a use of a sentence (standardly) have a particular force will provide the theorist
with what she wants. In other words, if the theorist of meaning provides a theory of
force and a theory of content, provided she can marry up her two parts, the theorist will
be in a position to say what is standardly done by any use of a sentence.
Whatever view of truth is adopted,  we can use truth to characterise both the
nature of linguistic acts and their content. To see this consider that there is a strong
equivalence between a claim, p  (although note that 'p' is a sentence in use), and the
claim that it is true that p.  I will call this claim the 'equivalence thesis':
ET. It is true that p if and only if p.
But, if adding the operator "it is true that" to the front of the claim does not
affect the truth value of that claim, then we can just as well make things explicit by
reformulating ET as:
ET'. The claim that p is true if and only if p
The possibility of reformulating ET as ET' shows, as Michael Dummett pointed
out (1981, p. 444), that any account of truth has to maintain the equivalence thesis,
because without it, one could legitimately accept a claim without accepting the truth of
what is claimed. This would have disastrous consequences for reasoning. It would be
possible to accept a set of premises, and accept that a conclusion followed from those
premises without accepting the conclusion because you would not have been shown a
route from the truth of the premises to the conclusion, and, as yet, given no reason why
you should accept the truth of the premises.
Whatever  view of the nature of a  sentence is  adopted,  we are able  to  make
49 This is not to say that a theory of meaning aims to produce instances of such a schema as theorems.
Indeed, as I am going to show, a theory of meaning will take a bipartite form. One part of such a
theory  will  be  a  theory  of  content.  The  theorems  will  be  statements  of  the  truth  conditions  of
sentences.  The  other  part  will  be  a  theory of  force.  This  will  be  an  an  account  of  what  forces
sentences can be used with and an account of the syntax of a language.
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claims by using sentences. If a sentence is apt to make a claim, then the claim it is apt to
make will be specified by giving its content. The content of a sentence will be specified
by using a sentence (perhaps the very same one, or perhaps one suitably modified to
take account of context sensitive features). However, as we know that the claim that p is
true if and only if p, then a sentence apt to make the claim that p is true if and only if p.
Providing a name, S, for that sentence gives us:
ET''. S is true if and only if p.
But that shows that any view of truth has to make sense of the possibility of
using a truth predicate as a device of denominalisation.  At the very least,  truth is  a
device which will take us from the name of a sentence apt to make a claim, to the
content of that sentence.  In addition,  we can go the other way.  We can move from
making a claim to the claim that any sentence which makes that claim is true. This latter
feature of truth has come to be known as "semantic ascent". That is, a truth predicate
allows us  to  talk about  the world by talking about  words.  This is  a  highly unusual
feature of the predicate, but very helpful in a theory of meaning. As McDowell puts it,
"appending a truth-predicate to a designation of a sentence produces a sentence apt,
once more, for saying something about the world: the very thing, in fact, that could have
been said by using the original sentence" (McDowell, 1998b, p. 7). As Quine makes
clear when he introduces the idea, a truth predicate that applies to names of sentences
allows speakers to make generalisations about sentences, because they have a device for
naming sentences and a device for moving from the name of a sentence to a use of that
sentence. As Quine says:
We may affirm the single sentence by just uttering it, unaided by quotation or by the
truth predicate;  but  if  we want  to  affirm some infinite  lot  of  sentences that  we can
demarcate only by talking about the sentences, then the truth predicate has its use. We
need  it  to  restore  the  effect  of  objective  reference  when  for  the  sake  of  some
generalization we have resorted to semantic ascent" 
(Quine, 1986, p. 12). 
Quine's idea is that, in normal circumstances, indicative sentences are apt for
making claims  about  the  world.  They do so by being about  one,  or  more,  or  even
infinite collections of objects,  and presenting a way for those objects to be50;  hence
50 It might be thought that sentences cannot present ways for the world to be. After all, presenting is an
action, and, it might be thought, it is agents who perform actions, not syntactically complete entities.
However, if we take Quine's talk of 'affirming a sentence' seriously, we have to credit Quine with the
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Quine's  talk of "objective reference".  In  uttering those sentences we affirm that  the
world is as the sentence presents it. That is to say, we make an assertion about things in
the world. However, there are assertions we need to be able to make where we are not
able to make reference to the objects we wish to talk about. However, we can effect the
same result by talking about a sentence or sentences and, by way of a truth predicate,
saying of it/them that it/they is/are true. Quine's thought is that, in doing so, we, in fact,
make the same claim as would be made by affirming the sentence or sentences of which
we  have  predicated  truth.  What  I  am  going  to  show  is  that  it  is  this  useful,  but
insubstantial feature, of truth talk that makes truth suitable to be the central feature of a
theory of meaning.
Any adequate account of truth has to be committed to the equivalence thesis. In
addition,  that  the  equivalence  thesis  is  correct  shows that  truth  is  both  a  device  of
denominalisation and of semantic ascent. So, assertions of a sentence, S, and assertions
that S is true must stand and fall together. Because a theory of meaning is part of an
account of what it is to use sentences, however rich your conception of truth, making
the semantic ascent and rephrasing an account of content in terms of truth conditions
can do no theoretical harm. Somebody who knows the content of a sentence thereby
knows the  truth  conditions  of  that  sentence,  although she  might  not  know that  she
knows that. The only question is: what is the significance of that knowledge?
Answering  that  question  requires  locating  the  theory of  meaning  in  a  wider
account  of  what  it  is  to  understand  a  language.  But,  as,  on  any  view  of  truth,
understanding the content of a sentence is to understand the truth conditions of that
utterance, by framing a theory of content as a theory of truth conditions, the theorist can
answer the question by taking a view as to the nature of truth. 
The deflationary theorist of truth is someone who maintains that truth would be
redundant if it was not for the fact that there are some claims which we want to make
that we do not have a way of making without using a truth predicate. However, for the
deflationist, this function exhausts the nature truth. For her, there is no more to truth
view that sentences present ways for the world to be. What we affirm are claims, and a claim asserts
that the world is a particular way. So, in order to make a claim, there must be a presentation of a way
for the world to be. It looks like Quine's view is that uttering an indicative sentence is to claim that
the world is as the sentence presents it as being.
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than  its  function  as  a  device  which  allows  us  to  generalise  about  what  somebody
believes or asserts without having to specify what it is that they believe or assert. There
are instances when there is no other way of doing that than using a truth predicate. Like
everybody  else,  the  deflationist  will  claim  that  part  of  what  competent  speakers
understand is what it is for their sentences to be true. However, for the deflationist, this
claim does not in and of itself explain that understanding. If there is no more to truth
than it being a device of semantic ascent, then a sentence being true cannot provide a
reason for using it in any way whatsoever. On such views, what does provide a reason
for using a sentence in a particular way is what it means, and the deflationary theorist
will provide some further account, perhaps on a sentence by sentence basis, of what is
understood to make sense of speaker competence.
Truth might be more substantial in one or both of two ways. The first is if truth
is  evaluative.  If  this  is  the  case,  then  truth  is  organising  language use,  and what  a
competent speaker knows is how truth determines how a sentence should be used and
responded to.  This  means that  when she informs us  that  a  fully competent  speaker
knows what it  is for a sentence which specifies a content to be true,  the evaluative
theorist is stating something which in and of itself is meant to be what a competent
speaker understands. Truth is precisely what speakers have to come to understand in
order to understand a language. 
The  second  way  is  that  truth  might  reduce  to  some  substantial  property  or
relation, such as correspondence with a fact. If this is so, then there is something that all
true sentences share, but, if the theorist is to make sense of the equivalence thesis, then
predicating truth of a sentence only makes explicit that the sentence in question, and
that any use of it, has that property also. On this view, if someone knows the meaning of
a sentence which specifies the content of an assertion, she thereby knows the conditions
in which the sentence used to make that assertion is true. She may not yet know what it
is for a sentence to be true, for this is a further property she may not yet have knowledge
of. On such a view, what speakers do is first come to understand what a sentence means
and later come to see that if a sentence means that p, it is true if and only if p. However,
in  coming to learn the meaning of sentences they have to  come to learn their  truth
conditions. So, specifying the truth conditions of sentences does specify what competent
speakers need to have understood. However,  making the semantic  ascent appeals to
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knowledge which the theorist has that a language user does not need. In other words, a
truth  conditional  theory  of  meaning  is  not  a  description  of  the  understanding  of
competent speakers, but it does describe something that they have understood, namely
the truth conditions of each of the sentences which specify contents. 
 In addition to understanding the content of any sentence, a competent speaker
understands what is (standardly) done by uses of that sentence. This understanding is
captured by a theory of force. A theory of force accounts for the (standard) uses of
different types of linguistic act. It does so by putting the theorist who possesses a theory
of content in a position to say what the semantic role of each expression in a language
is.  Because of the centrality of the semantic role of sentences, it  turns that trick by
characterising types of linguistic act. Different types of linguistic act are the different
uses  of  sentences.  So,  the  theory  of  force  looks  to  characterise  the  different  ways
sentences are (standardly) used. A theory of meaning can account for the semantic roles
of sub-sentential expressions by having an account of the syntax of the language. So, a
theory of force includes an account of the different syntactic types of sub-sentential
expressions, for example, nouns, predicates, tense indicators and mood indicators. That
account  is  provided  by  showing  how  different  syntactic  types  of  sub-sentential
expression make a systematic difference to the way the sentences in which they occur
are used. Finally, by assigning a syntactic category to each sub-sentential expression,
the theory of force can be married up with a theory of content to give an account of the
semantic role of each expression in a language51. 
Central to the creation of a theory of force is the characterisation of different types
of linguistic act. To do that the theorist needs to capture what is common to an infinite
range of possible uses of sentences. For ease of exposition I am going to focus on the
assertoric case. If  we were able to list  all  possible assertoric uses of sentences in a
language, we could characterise assertion by writing down that list and then pointing out
that the assertions, in that language, are all and only the members of that list. Of course,
we cannot do that so we need to find a way of characterising all assertions. Assertions
make claims about how things are, so what is wanted is a way of characterising what it
is to make a claim. It is also the case, that when something makes a claim as to how
things are, it is true when that is how things are. But, as I showed above, everybody,
51  Gareth Evans' use of the notation of categorial grammar provides a perspicuous way of seeing how
this task might be achieved (Evans, 1982, pp. 9-10).
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even the deflationary theorist, can use truth talk to capture that generality52. So, without
any commitment to a substantial notion of truth, truth can be used in an account of
assertion.  I  briefly suggested in  the introduction how other  linguistic  acts  might  be
related to truth. I am going to let that sketch (substituting "standardly" for "should" as
appropriate.  All  I  need  for  my  current  purposes  is  the  thought  that  the  (standard)
difference different types of linguistic act make to the activity of using a language can
be characterised according to the truth value of the sentence used to make the linguistic
act. 
To have a full account of the semantic role of an expression, a theory of meaning
needs to say what is (standardly) done by a use of each expression. Now, the semantic
role of a sub-sentential expression is given in terms of semantic roles of sentences in
which it can occur. So, to know what is done by a sub-sentential expression, one needs
to know what is done by sentences in which it can occur. As I showed above, to say
what is (standardly) done by use of a sentence requires an account of force and content.
I have shown how a truth predicate, by being a device of semantic ascent, can figure in
an account of force. 
This shows that language use is a world directed activity. Uses of sentences are
about the world. How they relate to the world is in part a function of their content, and
in part a function of their force. The simplest use is an assertoric one. An assertion is
about the world by being a claim that that is how things are. But, then according to ES,
it is true if and only if things are as they are claimed to be. So, a theory of content for a
language provides an interpretation of the language. In doing so it provides an account
of the actual truth conditions of the sentences of a language. To put it another way, it
does so by showing how the truth value of a sentence systematically depends on the
referents of the sub-sentential parts. Dummett puts the point like this:
It does so by specifying, for each type of expression, what has to be associated with an
expression of that type in order that, for every true sentence in which the expression
occurs,  we  can  exhibit  the  manner  in  which  that  sentence  is  determined  as  true  in
accordance with its composition. Let us say that, for any particular expression of any
given type, that which must, according to the semantic theory, be so associated with it is
52 There may be, although I doubt it,  another way to capture that generality.  However, because any
theory  of  truth  needs  to  make  sense  of  truth's  use  as  a  device  of  semantic  ascent  and
denominalisation, any other theory of force will be equivalent to a truth conditional one.
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its semantic value".
(Dummett, 1993, p. 234, italics original)53
It is important to get the explanatory order right here. There is as yet no reason
to think that the requirement of providing an interpretation for a language forces the
theorist of meaning to adopt a substantial notion of truth value. All she needs to account
for is the fact that each sentence has a content. Correctly specifying that content is to
correctly  specify  the  truth  conditions.  Of  course,  if  a  deflationary  account  of  truth
becomes  the  central  notion  in  a  theory  of  meaning,  it  does  not  also  explain  how
sentences are about the world. For the deflationary theorist, sentences are not about the
world because they are true in such and such a condition. They are about the world, and
so in such and such a condition they are true.
This gives us the following picture of a theory of meaning. A theory of meaning
needs to provide an account of how speakers (standardly) use their language, which is
how they (standardly) use their sub-sentential expressions and how they (standardly)
use their sentences. In addition, a theory of meaning needs to provide an account of
what has been done when speakers use a language. To do that is to give the semantic
role of each expression. Meeting those two challenges involves building a theory with a
bipartite form. One part provides an interpretation of the language – that is, by giving an
account of the semantic values of expressions which have a semantic value. This is a
theory of content. The second part accounts for what is and can (standardly) be done by
different uses of sentences. This is a theory of force. 
Because of the compositional nature of language nothing smaller than the use of
53 People  with  worries  about  intensional  contexts  might  wish  to  modify  Dummett's  definition  as
follows:
SV: that  which  is  associated  with  an  expression  by  a  semantic  theory  such  that,  in  
extensional contexts, for every true sentence in which the expression occurs, we can exhibit the 
manner in which that sentence is determined as true in accordance with its composition. 
Making that modification helps explain why "Diceopolis believes that Hesperus is the evening star"
can have a different truth value from "Diceopolis believes that Phosphorus is the evening star" despite
the fact that the words have all the same referents. The price for making the modification is high. It
requires a loss of semantic innocence. Suddenly words change their meaning in intensional contexts,
it is as if speakers would have to learn to use two languages rather than one. But, that is just not the
case. So, adopting SV at least forces us to admit that there is more to meaning than can be captured
via truth talk,  but  it  is  hard to  then see  what  that  might  be  given that  sentences which involve
intensional contexts are as much about the world as any other.
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a sentence makes a linguistic act. So, in order to provide an interpretation of a language
the semantic value of sentences must be taken as central. The semantic value of a sub-
sentential expression is its contribution to the semantic values of sentences in which it
can occur.  As the (standard) difference that a linguistic act makes to the activity of
speaking a language depends on the semantic value of the sentence used, different types
of linguistic act are classified by the different ways the semantic values of the sentences
used affect the activity. The aim is to provide a theory of force and an assignment of
semantic values such that it accounts for the semantic role of each expression in the
language.  That  theory of  meaning then takes  its  place in  a  description of  linguistic
competence, an account of meaning, by the provision of a gloss that make sense of what
it is to understand what is captured by such a bipartite theory. Because any proposed
theory of content will be equivalent to a truth conditional theory of content and any
proposed theory of force will be equivalent to a truth conditional theory of force, views
of what it is to understand what is captured by a bipartite theory will take different
views about the nature of truth.
§5 The Mental
 I am going to start by showing that thinking is a rational activity. I will go into
more detail about the structure of mental activity, use that to lay out the basic shape of a
theory of thought, and finally move to different views of the mental. I will use that to
show that there are three types of views about mentality and that different views of the
mental require different conceptions of truth. 
5.1 Thinking is a Rational Activity
It  makes  no  sense  to  understand  acts  of  thinking  as  anything  other  than  a
response to reasons.  I argued for this in the introduction.  In brief,  thinking requires
being able  to  set  your  own projects.  Having projects  involves  differentially valuing
situations, and that involves taking the world to be a particular way and desiring change
where appropriate. I glossed that as having an evaluative world view. That evaluation is
a matter of preferring certain states of affairs to others. Once one desires particular states
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of affairs, there are things that one should do, things one should refrain from doing and
things that are acceptable but not the right way to achieve a particular goal. So, having
an evaluative worldview results in some, but not all, courses of action being warranted.
Moreover, one is able, when things go right, to act in accordance with those warrants. A
creature that is able to act in accordance with warrants is a creature that is responding to
reasons. Thus, a creature with an evaluative worldview is one that is able to recognise
and respond to reasons. So, because thinking requires having an evaluative worldview,
being able to think is being responsive to reasons. As will emerge, the key question is:
what is involved in being responsive to reasons?
5.2 Theories and Accounts of The Mental
An account of the mental aims to make sense of what it is to think about the
world. It is an account of the understanding of a thinker. It needs to put the theorist in a
position to say both what the subject can think and make sense of what it is to be a
thinker. What a subject can think is a matter of what propositional attitudes it can have.
So, an account of the mental needs a way of specifying what propositional attitudes a
subject  can  have.  Those  propositional  attitudes  are  mental  states  of  the  thinker.  In
addition, propositional attitudes are about ways for things to be. So, an account of the
mental  needs  to  have  a  view  as  to  what  it  is  for  a  state  of  the  thinker  to  be  a
propositional attitude and what it is for those states to be about ways for things to be.
Just as with accounts of meaning, an account of the mental can be formulated by
dividing  the  project  into  two  sub-projects.  The  first  sub-project  is  to  provide  a
specification of what propositional attitudes a thinker can have by making sense of the
role of each attitude in the activity. The reason for this will emerge, but, in brief, is that
understanding is  a matter of being able to do something. That doing is  a matter of
adopting and dropping propositional attitudes. Specifying what someone can do is to
specify what  propositional  attitude  she  can  have,  and to  specify what  propositional
attitude  she  can  have  is  to  specify  what  she  can  do.  I  am  going  to  call  such  a
specification a "theory of thought". It is the mental analogue of a theory of meaning.
The second sub-project is to provide a gloss on such a theory. That gloss attempts to
make sense of what it is to have each of those attitudes and what it is for those attitudes
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to be about ways for the world to be. If the gloss is to be successful, it needs to make
sense of thinkers as having an evaluative worldview, that is as being able to set their
own projects and recognise and respond to the world accordingly, and, it needs to make
sense of our ability to come to make sense of our own understanding. In other words, it
needs to meet the practical capacity constraint and the explicit knowledge constraint.
For clarity, I want to be clear about how I am understanding thinking and how I
am using my terminology. I take thinking to be a rational practical activity. It is the
activity of recognising and responding to situations in the world in accordance with
your  projects.  A creature  that  thinks  is  one  that  has  propositional  attitudes.  Those
attitudes  are  mental  states.  The  activity  proceeds  by  the  adoption  and  dropping  of
propositional  attitudes.  That  is,  moving  in  and  out  of  different  mental  states.  A
propositional attitude is  an attitude with a content.  That content is  a thought.  Those
attitudes are about ways for the world to be. The content of those attitudes, the thoughts,
determine what ways those attitudes are attitudes about. There are different types of
attitudes,  for  example:  belief,  desire,  hope  and  intention.  These  different  types  of
attitudes are different attitudes a thinker takes concerning ways for the world to be. A
theory of thought is a specification of the attitudes a thinker can adopt. However, it is
more than just a theory that allows us to say what propositional attitudes a thinker can
adopt. It is a description of what a thinker can do. It achieves this by making sense of
content  as  that  which  makes a  systematic  difference  to  the  activity of  thinking and
attitudes as systematic ways of responding to ways for the world to be. An account of
the mental is completed by providing a gloss on that theory by making sense of what it
is  to  be  able  to  have  those  attitudes  and  making  sense  of  how those  attitudes  are
attitudes about ways for the world to be.
5.3 Compositionality of the Mental
Mental activity proceeds by adopting and dropping propositional  attitudes.  A
propositional attitude, in my terminology, is an attitude with a thought as its content.
The type of attitude is  the mental  analogue of force,  and the thought  is  the mental
analogue  of  the  content.  When  somebody adopts  a  propositional  attitude,  she  does
something with a content.  She might believe something, desire something, speculate
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about  something,  and so  on.  As I  showed in  the  introduction,  having propositional
attitudes  is  a  matter  of  responding  to  reasons.  These  propositional  attitudes  are
potentially transitory states of thinkers. However, as Gareth Evans pointed out (Evans,
1982, pp. 102–105) the mental displays a form of compositionality. This Evans labelled,
"the  generality  constraint"  (Evans,  1982,  p.  100).  Thoughts  have  to  be  structured
because thinkers are keeping track of items in the world around them. Having a world
view is a matter of being able to take the world to be a particular way. That requires
keeping tabs on objects as they move around in space and as time goes by. Keeping tabs
on an object requires, when things go well, being able to identify something and re-
identify it. When it comes to objects, it is by their properties that you shall re-identify
them. Re-identifying something by its properties requires being able to recognise and
respond to properties. That involves being able to recognise the same property as it is
encountered  in  different  objects  on  different  occasions  and  in  the  same  object  at
different times and places. I will follow Christopher Peacocke and call such components
of thoughts "concepts" (see, for example, Peacocke, 1999, p. 2). For example, I might
believe that my amanuensis has left, and later believe that my amanuensis has returned.
Those two beliefs are both propositional attitudes of the same type. They are different
attitudes by having different thoughts as their contents. If, as theorists, we are to make
sense of these beliefs as both being about the same person, my amanuensis, we need to
realise that the two different thoughts both contain the concept of my amanuensis. I
might then believe that I  should have left  already. This requires that the concept of
leaving and the concept of returning can be utilised in different propositional attitudes.
5.4 Understanding As an Ability: Mental Role and Mental Value
 An account of the mental is aimed at telling us what it is for a thinker to be able
to think and what  a thinker  does when it  thinks.  What I  am going to  show is  that,
because there is no more to thinking that what a thinker is able to do, this involves
building a theory of thought and providing a gloss on it. The theory theory of thought
must complete two projects. The first project is to make sense of the way the activity of
thinking proceeds. To this end a theory of thought must capture, what I am going to call,
the  mental  role  of  each  thought  which  a  thinker  can  have  as  the  content  of  a
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propositional attitude. It achieves this by capturing the mental role of each concept a
thinker possesses. The second project is to say of any possible thought which way for
the world to be propositional attitudes with that thought as content is about. Because of
the compositional nature of thoughts this is achieved by assigning, what I am going to
call, mental values to each concept a thinker possesses. The gloss on that theory needs
to take a view on whether or not those two projects are only nominally separate. On
some views of the mental, being minded is a matter of being disposed to behave in a
way which is describable according to a conception of rationality, and it is a further
question as to why the states so described are about anything at  all.  These class of
accounts treat mental role as determining mental value,  but that connection requires
some explanation. Such views, as Hornsby points out, face the question: "why truth?"
(1989,  p.  550).  On  other  views  of  the  mental,  no  description  of  thinking,  concept
possession or thoughts is possible other than in terms of the way the world strikes the
thinker. On these accounts, the mental value of a concept determines its mental role.
Adherence to this class requires treating truth as organising thinking.
Thinking is a rational practical activity, and being able to think is being able to
do something. An account of the mental needs to provide a description of what a thinker
can do. What a thinker can do is determined by the concepts she possesses, but what
concepts she possesses is a matter of what conceptual capacities she has. In other words,
accounting  for  what  a  thinker  can  do  requires  describing  conceptual  capacities.
However,  a  conceptual  capacity  is  the  capacity  to  have  a  range  of  thoughts  which
involve  the  concept  in  question.  Those  thoughts  are  the  contents  of  possible
propositional attitudes. Propositional attitudes are typed by their role in the activity of
thinking. So, conceptual capacities need to be typed by the difference they make to the
roles of propositional attitudes in which they can occur. That being so Peacocke is right
in his "Principle of Dependence":
Principle of Dependence There can be nothing more to the nature of a concept than is
determined  by a  correct  account  of  the  capacity of  a  thinker  who has  mastered  the
concept to have propositional  attitudes to contents containing that  concept (a correct
account of "grasping the concept").
(Peacocke, 1999, p. 5)54
54 I  do  have  a  little  quibble  with  Peacocke's  phrasing.  I  think  that  we  are  better  off  thinking  of
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This is, as Peacocke himself points out, "the concept-theoretic analogue of one
of  Dummett's  principles  about  language  (Dummett  1975).  As  a  theory  of  meaning
should be a theory of understanding, so a theory of concepts should be a theory of
concept possession" (1999, p. 5). The simple thought is that accounting for concepts is
done  by accounting  for  concept  possession.  That  in  turn  is  done  by showing  how
possessing a concept makes a systematic difference to the mental life of the possessor.
One aim, then, of a theory of thought is for it to be a description of those responses.
Thinkers can only adopt a propositional attitude when they possess the concepts
which make up the content of that attitude. A thinker possesses a concept when she has
the relevant conceptual capacities. She adopts a propositional attitude by exercising the
relevant conceptual capacities. The exercising of concepts are the incomplete actions in
the activity of thinking. Adopting and dropping propositional attitudes are the complete
actions in the activity of thinking. For the adopting of a propositional attitude to be an
action it needs the potential to have grounds and to have consequences. In summary,
propositional attitudes can have grounds and will have consequences55. The grounds and
consequences of a particular propositional attitude depend partly on the type of attitude
it is and partly on the content of the attitude. That is, partly on whether the attitude is the
attitude of belief, of desire et cetera and partly on the thought which is the content of the
attitude.  This gives each thought a role within the mental life of a thinker.  It  is  the
mental analogue of semantic role. I will label it "mental role". Two thoughts have the
same role  when they have  the  same place  in  the  activity  of  thinking.  That  is,  two
thoughts have the same role when they do not make any difference to the grounds and
consequences of propositional attitudes of which they are the content. A criterion of
propositional attitudes as attitudes towards ways the world to be with thoughts as their content. I
would rephrase Peacocke's principal to reflect this. To wit:  There can be nothing more to the nature
of a concept than is determined by a correct account of the capacity of a thinker who has mastered the
concept to have propositional attitudes with contents containing that concept
55 It also marks a crucial disanalogy with language use. Although, on any account of language use, most
uses of language are rational actions, the description of linguistic activity does not have to proceed by
giving grounds and consequences for using sentences in different types of speech act. Instead, it
might be presented as the standard conditions for introducing a speech act and the standard upshot of
so doing. When it comes to the mental, all mental actions are rational actions. So, any description of
the  activity  of  thinking  does  so  by  giving  the  grounds  and  consequences  of  different  types  of
propositional attitude.
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identity on mental role is as follows:
MRT: Two thoughts have the same mental role if and only if they are
everywhere  interchangeable  without  affecting  the  rest  of  the
activity.
As thinking is a compositional activity, concepts will also have a mental role. Of
course, that role is their effect on the rest of the activity. It is their effect on which
propositional attitudes are adopted or dropped. Two concepts have the same role when
they are everywhere interchangeable without affecting which propositional attitudes are
admissible  at  any  given  time56.  As  the  admissibility  of  a  propositional  attitude  is
determined in part by the thought which is its content, the mental role of concepts is
identified as follows.
MRC: two concepts have the same mental role if and only if they are
everywhere interchangeable without affecting the mental roles of
thoughts in which they can occur.
What a theory of thought needs to do is specify the mental role of each mental
items. Each possible propositional attitude has a unique role,  and so, given the vast
array of things a thinker can think, it is at least a practical impossibility to specify the
role of each one individually. Similarly, each concept can occur in an enormous range of
possible propositional attitudes, and so it is also a practical impossibility to specify its
contribution to the role of each member of a list  of possible propositional attitudes.
However, if, as I am assuming is correct, there is something right about our everyday
psychological  attributions,  then  there  are  a  limited  range  of  types  of  propositional
attitude,  and each type  can be characterised by that  type's  characteristic  role  in  the
activity of  thinking.  The characteristic  role  of  each type  of  propositional  attitude is
characterised in accordance with the way adopting each type of attitude affects what
other attitudes, of both the same and different type, are held. A type of attitude is a
grouping  together  of  a  potentially  infinite  range  of  possible  propositional  attitudes.
Those attitudes are grouped together because they all display a characteristic pattern of
interaction with other attitudes. That pattern of interaction is a matter of tendencies to
56 It does seem a bit odd to think that there could be two different concepts with the same role. There is
nothing  to  individuate  concepts  apart  from  their  role  in  propositional  attitudes.  However,  the
definition does put identity conditions on the role of a concept, and this is enough for my purposes. I
am trying to describe the general shape a theory of thought has to take.
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adopt and drop propositional attitudes in response to the adoption of a new attitude of
that type as well as tendencies for pairs of attitudes to co-occur or not co-occur. It is that
pattern of interaction which a theory of thought tries to describe. Those tendencies are
described in terms of relations between thoughts. It is done by appeal to the notion of an
arbitrary thought as content, and by saying things like, 'adopting the belief that p tends
to result in dropping the belief that p, should the thinker have held the latter belief', or,
'the desire that q tends not to co-occur with the belief that q'. So, what is wanted is a
conception  of  thoughts  that  make sense  of  them as  the sorts  of  things  that  make a
systematic  difference  to  the  activity  of  thinking  by  being  the  contents  of  possible
propositional attitudes.  In addition,  we want a conception of concepts as the sort of
things that make a systematic difference to the role of thoughts in which they can occur
in the activity of thinking.
The former conception,  the conception of thoughts  as  the sort  of things  that
make a difference to the activity of thinking, is  captured by characterising different
types of propositional attitudes in terms of the ways that the contents of those attitudes
affect the rest of the activity. For example, a partial characterisation of belief might be
as follows:
Belief  is  the  attitude  such  that  believing  that  p  is  incompatible  with
believing that not p.
A full characterisation would add further clauses after "such that".
Those characterisations of attitude types aim to characterise each type by showing how
the contents of those attitudes make a difference to the activity of thinking. This brings
with it  the notion of a thought as that which makes a systematic difference to how
propositional  attitudes  interact  with  each  other.  It  also  means  that  giving  a  full
characterisation of the different types of attitudes would give a full characterisation of
what it is to be a thought. With this conception of thoughts in hand, giving an account of
concepts in terms of the capacities of thinkers is a matter of giving an account of what a
thinker has to be able to do in order to have thoughts involving that concept. To make
the account harmonious, that "being able to do" is understood in terms of the transitions
into and out of and between propositional attitudes a thinker who possesses that concept
is going to make.
This is the familiar bipartite theory, but this time of the mental. On the one hand
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we have a description of the types of propositional attitudes that a thinker can have in
terms of the ways that the contents of those attitudes affects the activity of thinking. On
the other hand, we have an account of the contents of those attitudes in terms of the
concepts that makes up those attitudes. However, it is important to note that conceptual
content is understood and characterised in terms of what a thinker has to be able to do in
order to possess that content. What has been described by such a theory is what Brian
Loar has labelled "horizontal connections" (1982).  So far, if someone were to complete
the, admittedly daunting, task of building such a theory, what she would have described
is  the  movement  into,  out  of  and  between  propositional  attitudes.  Ascriptions  of
propositional attitudes would do no more than pick out mental states by characterising
their  dispositional  properties.  Thoughts  are  being  ascribed  as  the  contents  of  those
attitudes as a way of indexing and describing a dispositional setup. However, as Loar
points  out,  "a  propositional  attitude  description  describes  a  person's  state  in  two
dimensions: it places the state within a certain system… and it ascribes truth conditions"
(1981, p. 57). In other words, the theorist also needs an account of the intentionality of
propositional attitudes.
However, an ascription of content to a propositional attitude is an ascription of
something with truth conditions because of the following platitude:
BPLT:     The belief that p is true if and only if p.
The belief that p is the name of a belief, the belief whose content is given by a sentence
which can be used to assert that p. The content of that belief is a thought. In fact, the
thought that p. It follows that following is also a platitude:
TPLT:     The thought that p is true if and only if p.
But, the thought that p can be the content of any type of propositional attitude. So, any
propositional attitude has a content which has truth conditions. In addition,  showing
how possessing a concept makes a systematic difference to the contents of propositional
attitudes in which that concept can occur is showing how that concept contributes to the
truth conditions of thoughts in which it can occur. This allows for a notion of mental
value as analogous to semantic value. It will be defined as follows:
MV: That which is associated with a concept by a theory of thought
such that for every true thought in which the component occurs,
we can exhibit the manner in which that thought is determined as
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true in accordance with its composition. 
Now, it may be that the theorist of the mental holds a deflationary theory of
truth.  If that is the case,  then she will  think there is no more to truth as applied to
thoughts than its function as a device of mental ascent. That is, for it to allow us to talk
about the world whilst talking about thoughts. If so, she will think that truth as applied
to the mental is fully captured by something like TPLT. If so, she will not think that the
possibility of a thought's being true explains the intentionality of propositional attitudes.
She will either think that no explanation is required or will provide some other account
of intentionality.
If the theorist of thought does hold a deflationary view of truth, her theory of
mental content will be a theory of the truth conditions of thoughts. It is just that such a
theory is not explanatory. If the theorist holds a more substantial view of truth she will
still have provided a theory of truth conditions by providing a theory of content. This is
because whatever her theory of truth she has to be able to make sense of TPLT. The
reasoning runs parallel to the linguistic case. TPLT is a condition of adequacy on any
view of truth. If it were not, there would be nothing wrong with you believing that p is
true,  believing that  q  followed from p's  being true  and not  accepting  that  q  is  true
because you would not have been shown a route from the truth of the premises to the
truth of the conclusion. So, whatever one's view of truth, a theory of content is a theory
of truth conditions. 
However, if the theorist is not a deflationist, she will think that there is more to
truth  than  its  function  as  a  device  of  mental  ascent.  If  the  theorist  treats  truth  as
substantial, but not evaluative, she will understand assignments of truth conditions as
embodying information about a curious, but substantial property of thoughts. However,
like  the  deflationary  theorist,  she  will  not  think  of  truth  conditions  as  conveying
information about what a thinker can do. Instead, she will describe what the thinker can
to, and then point out that the contents of the thinker's attitudes have this interesting,
substantial  property.  If  the  theorist  treats  truth  as  an  evaluative  property,  then  truth
organises  the  activity  of  thinking.  In  this  case,  describing  what  a  thinker  can  do,
describing its understanding, is done by showing how the concepts it possesses make a
systematic difference to the truth values of the content of its propositional attitudes, and
understanding  propositional  attitudes  requires  showing  how  the  truth  values  of  the
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contents  make a  systematic  difference  to  the  thinker's  behaviour  (where  'behaviour'
includes both what the thinker does and which attitudes it adopts and drops).
Here is a good place to point out that different views of the mental will be more
or less explicit about a theory of thought being a theory of mental role. Any view which
treats the truth value of a thought as not being explanatory of mental role will have to be
fully explicit that it is a theory of mental role. Its account of conceptual content will be
an account of the kinds of transitions a thinker who possesses a set of concepts will be
disposed to make. On a view which treats truth value as explanatory of mental role,
things will not be so explicit. Such a theory might proceed by assigning mental values
to concepts. However, a mental value is no more than the contribution made by that
concept to the truth values of thoughts in which it can occur. On such views, different
attitude types are described in terms of different responses to the truth of the thoughts
which  can  be  their  contents.  On  this  sort  of  view,  mental  content  is  still  being
characterised in terms of what a thinker can do, although, because the theory makes
sense of what a thinker can do in thick rational terms, this does not have to appear on
the surface of the theory of thought. Nevertheless, on these sorts of views, a theory of
thought is still a theory of what a thinker does.
What about the 'theory of force'? How does truth figure in an account of the
nature of propositional attitudes? I am assuming that there is something right about our
everyday ascription propositional attitudes. This is to say that, whatever one's view of
the mental, there is some explanatory or predictive value in ascribing mental states of
the form 'T 's that p' to a thinker (where 'T' is the name of a thinker and '' is a stand-in
for  a  propositional  attitude).  Those  everyday  psychological  ascriptions  rely  on  the
thought that a thinker's behaviour can be rationalised. What we do, very roughly,  is
make sense of thinkers as wanting something to be the case whilst believing other things
to be the case. In other words, we think of thinkers as being rational and understand
rationality in terms of truth. At this stage, it is possible that that description need be no
more than a model which anything that is to count as a thinker needs to more or less
match.  In  other  words,  there is  no need,  as  yet,  to  think  that  thinking can  only be
understood in terms of the way truth organises thought. The alternative, deflationary,
view  is  that  thinking  is  to  be  understood  as  a  functional  set-up  that  more  or  less
exemplifies  such  a  rational  model.  But,  in  either  case  the  theorist's  account  of
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propositional attitudes must be (at least nearly) equivalent to one given in terms of truth.
In other words, a theory of force for the mental, needs to make sense of beliefs as the
attitude of holding true, desire as the attitude of wanting true, intentions as the attitude
of planning to make true and so on. As will be shown in what follows, different views of
the mental take a different approach to how much more and what type of explanation is
required to make sense of those claims.
A bipartite truth conditional theory of thought, then, makes sense of the activity
of thinking by being a theory of what a creature has to be able to do in order to be a
thinker. It is not yet an account of thinking because it does not yet tell us what is done
when a creature thinks. This is the job of a gloss on the bipartite theory.  This gloss
comes out as a dispute over the nature of truth. Different views of the mental are then a
dispute over what it is to be a rational creature, and that is a dispute over what it is to
recognise and respond to reasons. The first division in this dispute is whether or not
natural science is adequate to account for what it is to be a rational creature. If a natural
science is adequate, we can make sense of rationality in terms of dispositions to respond
in characteristic ways to features of the world.  There is  no more,  on these types of
views, to what is done than is captured by a description of the horizontal connections
between mental states. On such views, thoughts make a difference to the activity of
thinking in the way that temperatures make a difference to the activities of substances.
To ascribe,  for example,  the belief  that  running is  healthy to a  person is  to  encode
information about her mental state. If we ask why did she go running, and cite that
belief as operative, such views understand that claim on analogy with saying that the
kettle is producing steam because the water is above 100° C. The challenge for such
views  is  showing  why  creatures  which  display  such  behaviours  can  be  said  to  be
thinking about the world. Meeting the challenge is a matter of showing why there are
truth conditions at all. I label such views: 
(d) Functional organisation views
On the other side of the division, it is thought that rationality is a sui generis
norm. If this is the case, then no natural science is adequate to make sense of what it is
to be a thinker. Instead, we have to take the view that thinkers are creatures who have
some conception of what follows from what. We account for their behaviour, including
their mental life,  in terms of their being able to make both practical and theoretical
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inferences. Such views think that an account of mindedness must start from the thought
that a creature thinks of a given situation that such and such is the case/should be the
case. On this side of the division, ascribing a content to propositional attitude does more
than encode information about the attitude's horizontal connections. It treats a thinker's
understanding/misunderstanding of the situation as in itself operative in bringing about
their actions. The challenge for these views is making sense of how such recognition
can be possible given that thinkers are, to put it figuratively,  made out of earth and
water. This division further subdivides over the question of whether or not being able to
respond to reasons requires having your mental life governed by rules of rationality. The
denial of that claim allows one to think that rational creatures are merely ones that are
able to behave rationally. I label such views:
(e) Concept fact views.
Maintaining the claim requires thinking that thinkers behave rationally because they
have their mental life governed by prescriptive rules. I label such views:
(f) Mental practice views.
I now want to put a little bit more flesh on those bones by thinking about the
kinds of warrants that the different views are committed to. The first  two ways, (d)
functional organisation views and (e) concept fact views, treat a theory of thought as a
description of the way an agent responds to the world. They disagree about the tools
required for that description. (d) – functional organisation views – commit themselves
to being a natural scientific description of the agents mentality. Of course, that is not
simply a description of what that agent does. After all, they will have to have some way
of making sense of the creature being in error. So, they will look for a model that best
makes sense of the creature's behaviour. That does not need to be an account of that
creature's  dispositions.  For  example,  in  "Truth  rules,  hoverflies,  and  the  Kripke-
Wittgenstein paradox", Millikan attempts to explain the male hoverfly's disposition to
make sudden darting movements in response to a characteristic pattern of stimulation on
its retina in terms of the fly's desire to reproduce and its belief that there is a female
hoverfly in the vicinity (Millikan, 1990, pp. 216–217). Millikan's view is an example of
a view that is able to make sense of the creature as not being very good at thinking,
without appeal to a prior grasp of the structure of rationality. It is an attempt to describe
the way a creature responds to the world by making sense of the way its projects link up
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with  its  behaviour.  On such views,  there  are  no  procedural  warrants  which  govern
correct thinking. There is no space for getting things right according to according to a
procedure57. 
(e)  Concept  fact  views  differ  from functional  views  by maintaining  that  no
description  of  an  agent's  mentality  is  possible  without  describing  it  according  to  a
conception of rationality. That is, it requires describing it according to some notion of
what in fact follows from what. The thought is that any description of the mind requires
a  description  according  to  a  "constitutive  ideal  of  rationality"  (Davidson,  2001a,  p.
223)58. Such  a  view  starts  from  a  good,  but  not  complete,  understanding  of  how
rationality itself works. It uses that understanding to make sense of the mentality of a
creature. Making sense of other creatures has the added bonus of helping expand your
understanding  of  rationality  itself.  Importantly,  on  this  second  way  there  is  no
commitment  to  the  structure  of  rationality  providing  procedural  rules  for  thinking.
Instead, an agent is behaving rationally in as much as they can be made sense of. But,
the idea of rationality is a heuristic tool. It does not govern the mental life of an agent.
Again,  there are  no procedural  rational  warrants.  Such views bifurcate  according to
whether or not a creature, operating at the ground floor, is credited with insight into the
a priori structure of rationality. Frege, when he locates thoughts in the third realm, is
someone who requires thinking to involve just such an insight (Frege, 1956, p. 302).
Christopher Peacocke, unhappy with Frege's inability to account for our insight into the
third realm, denies that such insight is necessary (Peacocke, 1999, pp. 99–124)59.
57 Other defenders of functional views include, Brian Loar, who defends a functional view of the mental
in his book, "Mind and Meaning" (Loar, 1981); Gilbert Harman has a similliar view (Harman, 1982);
Paul Horwich holds a functional view of the mental, his view difference from Loar's being a version
of a language of thought hypothesis (Horwich, 2005, pp.  175-198). Whyte's "Success Semantics"
(Whyte, 1990) is another functional view of the mental; success semantics claims F.P. Ramsey as its
progeniture, in particular his, "Facts and Propositions" (Ramsey, 1927). However, Peter Sullivan has
convincingly argued that Ramsey held no such view (Sullivan, 2013, p. 25). 
58 Although  the  phrase  is  Davidson's,  I  picked  it  up  from  John  McDowell's  "Functionalism  and
Anomalous Monism" (1998a, p.334).
59 I think that Russell's various views of the nature of propositions (Russell, 1904, 1992 and 1921) are
concept fact views. Kathrin Glüer, Anandi Hattiangadi and Åsa Wikforss have also defended such a
view (Glüer and Wikforss, 2009), (Glüer and Wikforss, 2010), (Hattiangadi, 2007). These views take
thinking  to  involve  understanding  a  thought.  I  think  that  Davidson's  anomalous  monism  is  the
progenitor of the second type of concept view (Davidson, 2001a, 214-225). McDowell also adopts
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(f) Mental practice views do ascribe prescriptive force to the ideal of rationality.
They treat thinking as a matter of having one's mental life governed by the rules of
rationality. On these views, given that a creature has desires, and given that there are
things  to  do  and  things  to  avoid,  there  will  be  both  hypothetical  and  categorical
warrants. But, thinking requires following prescriptive rules of rationality. What those
rules prescribe, prohibit and permit will vary according to the situation, but, the idea is,
nothing can  be  a  thinker  unless  it  is  able  to  acknowledge the  force  of  these  rules.
Understanding thinking is then understood in terms of the procedural warrants which
govern correct thought. On the final type of view, thinking is taking part in a rational
practice. Robert Brandon has defended such a view (Brandom, 1998). I am going to
tentatively suggest that this is the correct way of thinking about thinking. However, if
that is right, it turns out it is not possible to think without the ability to use a language60.
§6 Truth
At  the  very  beginning  of  this  chapter,  I  noted  that  the  two  key  questions
concerning truth are: 
Q1. What is it to have a truth value?
Q2. What are the primary bearers of truth?
I also claimed that the right way to go about answering those questions was through
thinking about meaning and thought. I am now in a position to show how one might go
about making good on that claim.
6.1 Recap
An account  of  meaning  and  an  account  of  the  mental  are  both  theories  of
understanding. That is, they are both descriptions of rational, practical capacities. In the
linguistic case, it is a description of the capacity to use and understand a language. In
this type of view (see his "Functionalism and Anomalous Monism", in McDowell, 1998a, pp. 325-
340).
60 Kripke's "Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language" (Kripke, 1984) especially in conjunction with
his deflationary view of truth (Kripke, 1975) seems to have a mental practice view.  Boghossian has
also defended a mental practice view (Boghossian, 2003).
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the mental case, it is a description of the capacity to recognise and respond to reasons.
In the linguistic case that description is given by providing a bipartite theory and a
gloss. The bipartite theory gives the (standard) content of any possible linguistic action
as one part, whilst a description of the different types of linguistic action and the way
different  parts  of  speech  make  a  different  to  which  type  of  linguistic  action  is
(standardly) performed by different uses of language makes up the other part. Whatever
one's  view of  truth,  this  bipartite  theory  is,  at  the  very least,  equivalent  to  a  truth
conditional one. In addition, it captures what is understood by competent speakers of a
language, namely the (standard) significance of any use of a sentence. So, it is a theory
of that which is understood by competent speakers, and what is understood are truth
conditions and how to present them in different ways. The gloss required to turn such a
theory into an account of meaning seeks to make sense of what it is to understand such
things. This comes out as the debate over the nature and home of truth. 
The mental case also requires a bipartite theory and the gloss. In this case, the
theory captures the role of each mental state a thinker can have. It does so by making
sense of what states a thinker can be in in terms of capacities it has to move into, out of
and between mental states. This is one part. It also makes sense of the kinds of mental
states  a  thinker  can  be  in  by capturing  the  systematic  difference  different  types  of
mental state make to the life of a thinker. Again, that bipartite theory will, at least, be
equivalent  to  a  truth  conditional  one  and  provides  a  description  of  a  thinker's
understanding of the world. The gloss on that theory is then an account of what it is to
be a thinker at all and, in particular, must make sense of what it is for those states to be
recognitions and responses to ways for things to be. This also comes out as a debate
over the nature and home of truth. 
6.2 Prescriptions and Descriptions
I suggested that all views of language could be placed into one of three broad
categories, and the same is true of views of thought. These are:
(a) Use views
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(b) Meaning fact views
(c) Linguistic practice views
(d) Functional organisation views
(e) Concept fact views
(f) Mental practice views
(a) – (c) are views of language, and (d) – (f) are views of thought. In both the linguistic
and the mental case, a bipartite truth conditional theory provides a model of the relevant
activity – using language or thinking. The view of language which is adopted affects
how one thinks about that activity. The same goes for the mental case. How the activity
is thought about is reflected in how one understands the significance of the relevant
bipartite truth conditional theory. What we as theorists need to get a grip on is why the
activity proceeds in the way it does. Answering that question requires answering the
further  question  of  how  the  activity  relates  to  the  world.  The  answer  to  the  first
question, why the activity proceeds in the way does, is a matter of deciding on whether
or not there are prescriptive rules which govern the activity. If there are not, the activity
is  described  by finding  law like  generalisations  which  make  sense  of  the  way the
activity proceeds. In other words, the activity is captured with descriptive rules. 
What are descriptive and prescriptive rules? Here are some definitions:
Prescriptive: a rule is prescriptive if and only if it prohibits or prescribes
a course of action.
Descriptive: a rule is descriptive if and only if it describes the course of
action that something will/tends to take.
Prescriptive  rules  provide  oughts.  That  is,  they  provide  rules  for  the  regulation  of
behaviour. However, there is no obvious reason why any actual behaviour will ever or
could ever be in accordance with the rule61. A good example of a prescriptive rule would
be  "thou  shalt  not  murder".  The  sixth  commandment  (or  fifth  depending  on  your
exegesis) prohibits murder. Cain breaks this commandment when he kills his brother.
He has done something that he should not do. 
61 I appreciate that many people think that oughts imply cans. I have never understood the motivation
for this view. But, if the principle seems plausible, then the weaker claim that there is no obvious
reason why actual behaviour will be in accordance with a particular prescriptive rule still holds.
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Descriptive  rules  describe  regularities,  but  they do not  have  anything to  say
about what ought to happen. The interest in descriptive rules accrues because they allow
us to talk about extremely large, and even infinite, classes of situations. Most people are
going  to  think  that  they  are  empirical  generalisations  from observations.  Although,
given a fancy enough metaphysics, it is possible to think that they hold necessarily (and,
given a really fancy metaphysics, you might think that they could be known a priori –
presumably Leibniz is somebody who thinks that). But, even if it is true that they hold
necessarily  and could  be  known a  priori,  then  the  best  that  can  be  said  is  that  the
behaviour of entities  described by a descriptive rule is  behaviour  that had to occur.
However, the behaviour of entities governed by descriptive rules which hold necessarily
is not the behaviour of entities doing as they ought. 
An example of a descriptive rule, to borrow from Paul Horwich is the ideal gas
law (Horwich, 2005, p. 125) and (2010, p. 119). It states that pressure multiplied by the
volume of gas is directly proportional to the quantity and the temperature of the gas.
The  example  is  helpful  because  it  shows that  we have  the  notion  of  an  empirical,
descriptive law that does not have any actual instances. No actual gas is an ideal gas.
Instead an ideal gas is a theoretical posit. The description of the behaviour of an ideal
gas, expressed in the ideal gas law, describes fairly well the behaviour of actual gases,
and thus can be thought to capture what is empirically significant about the relation
between the volume and temperature of actual gasses. For example, if there is a load of
steam in  a  container  of  a  given  size,  the  gas  law predicts  that  as  the  temperature
increases there will  be a more or less directly proportional  increase in  the pressure
exerted  on  the  container.  Importantly,  if,  contrary  to  physics,  the  pressure  did  not
increase at all, the gas has not failed to do what it ought. It has merely confounded our
empirical hypothesis expressed in the ideal gas law. 
The aim of the theorist of meaning or the aim of the theorist of thought is to
provide a description of the relevant activity. These are non-finite activities. The theorist
needs  a  way  of  describing  an  infinite  range  of  possible  uses.  She  does  that  by
formulating rules  such that  a  grasp of  those rules  is  sufficient  to understand how a
particular  group of  speakers/a  particular  thinker  tends  to  go  on.  In  the  (a)  use,  (b)
meaning fact, (d) functional organisation and (e) conceptual fact cases the rules make
sense of what happens by stating something which, if understood, would put one in a
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position to take part in the relevant activity and to have explicit knowledge of what is
going  on.  They  are  descriptive  rules.  Those  rules  can  be  formulated  using  a  truth
predicate. But, it should now be apparent that those rules are descriptive generalisations.
They do not  provide  any reason to  use  sentences  or  thoughts  one  way rather  than
another.  So,  the  truth  predicate  used  to  formulate  those  rules  is  not  an  evaluative
predicate.  On the other hand, (c) linguistic practice and (f) mental practice views take it
that competent language users are able to follow prescriptive rules for use. Grasping
those very rules is sufficient to give one an understanding of both what is done when
language is used and how that affects the way the activity proceeds. These rules govern
how the relevant activity ought to proceed. As those rules are formulated using a truth
predicate and are substantial prescriptive rules, the truth predicate will be an evaluative
predicate. 
6.3 Types of Truth
When I  introduced  the  role  of  truth  in  theories  of  meaning  and  theories  of
thought, I pointed out that a theory of content would, because of truth's function as a
device of semantic ascent, thereby be a theory of truth. I also pointed out that a theory
of force would then be an account of how the truth values of sentences/thoughts affect
the use of any item in the activity. Now, both activities are intentional activities, in the
sense  that  they  are  world  directed.  The  philosophical  interest  in  language  use  and
thinking accrues because we want an understanding of intentionality. That is, we want to
know what it is for those activities to be world directed. However, because truth is a
device of ascent, to say that something is true is to say that this is how things are. Truth
is  predicated of linguistic  and mental  items,  and so those items are true when they
capture how things are. So it is by explaining why it is that truth can serve as a device of
semantic  and mental ascent  that we are able  to  make sense of the intentionality.  In
making sense of what it is to say that different truth bearers are true, we make sense of
the intentionality of thought and language. 
There are two dimensions to the dispute over the nature of truth. One dimension
is whether or not truth is an evaluative or descriptive predicate. The second is whether
or not content accounts for truth or truth accounts for content. Before introducing the
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different  views  of  truth,  I  want  to  note  that  neither  dimension  is  the
deflationary/substantial dimension. I also want to note how I understand that distinction.
Deflationism about truth is a broad church (although in my view, it is more like the
inferno and covers a variety of sins). I hold that the hallmark of a deflationary view is a
commitment  to  the  thought  that  truth  is  simply  a  device  of  semantic  ascent  and
denominalisation. If that is correct, then we only need a notion of truth in as much as
there are claims we cannot make without resorting to semantic ascent.  That thought can
be developed in a variety of different ways. There is no agreed terminology when it
comes to different deflationary views. So, my definitions should be read as stipulative. 
The views of truth that I will be considering are as follows:
T1. Minimalism 
T2. Designation
T3. Redundancy
T4. Interpretive
T5. Pragmatic phenomenalism.
T6. Evaluative
T1.  Minimalism  is  a  view  that  has  been  developed  and  defended  by  Paul
Horwich (1998a, 1998b, 2005, 2010). This is the view that there is no problem with
truth or intentionality. At heart it is a view about meaning. It maintains that there is no
more to the meaning of any expression than propensities to use that expression in a
particular way, and that there is no more to conceptual content then a propensity to think
in a particular way. This includes our propensity to use truth as a device of semantic and
mental ascent. It also includes our propensity to use semantic vocabulary to say things
like, '"snow" refers to snow', and, '"is white" is true of snow', and things like, 'w means
F→ (x)w is true of x  ↔ fx)'. As a result, it explains our propensity to say, "snow is
white" in terms of our propensity to accept, '"snow is white" is true if and only if snow
is white'. It then follows that if we accept "snow is white" it is because we think that
snow is white. If it all works, then, then although we cannot talk about intentionality
without  using truth talk,  there is  nothing to explain.  Such a view treats  a theory of
meaning as  a  description  of  what  language users  do.  The  truth  predicate  is  not  an
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evaluative predicate. It is no more than a device of semantic ascent, and there is no
problem with intentionality. Minimalism denies that there is anything to significant to
grasp. For the minimalist, intentionality is simply a matter of what we do.
T2.  Designation  views  are  views  which  traditionally  have  been  labelled
"correspondence  theories".  The  reason  is  that  they  hold  that  truth  is  a  matter  of
correspondence between truth-bearer and truth-maker. However, "correspondence" is a
broad term. As long as there is a mapping between truth-bearers and truth-makers, then
truth-bearers can be said to correspond to truth-makers. The key feature of a traditional
correspondence view is that the intentionality of a sentence/thought is a matter of it
designating some item in the world. This is perhaps clearest in Russell when he writes:
This constitutes the definition of truth and falsehood that we were in search of. Judging
or believing is a certain complex unity of which a mind is a constituent; if the remaining
constituents, taken in the order which they have in the belief, form a complex unity, then
the belief is true; if not, it is false.
Thus  although truth  and  falsehood are  properties  of  beliefs,  yet  they are  in  a  sense
extrinsic properties, for the conditions of the truth of a belief is something not involving
beliefs, or (in general) any mind at all, but only the objects of the belief. A mind, which
believes, believes truly when there is a corresponding complex not involving the mind,
but only it objects.
(2001, pp. 74–75)
The thought here is that in belief, terms, which, for Russell, are things in the
world, are united together into a complex whole by an act of judgement. That complex
whole is true when it corresponds to some complex whole in the world. The question is
though, which, if any, complex whole? The answer is the one consisting of the terms
united by the act of judgement. Thus, each term in the act of judgement designates a
thing in the world and the complex whole, if it designates anything at all, designates the
corresponding complex whole made out of those terms. Similarly, JL Austin provides a
neat little theory of truth with the claim that given two sets of conventions:
Descriptive conventions correlating the words (= sentences) with the types of 
situation, thing, event, etc., to be found in the world.
Demonstrative  conventions  correlating  the  words  (=  statements)  with  the
historic situations, etc., to be found in the world.
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A statement is said to be true when the historic state of affairs to which it is correlated by
the demonstrative conventions (the one to which it "refers") is of a type with which the
sentence used in making it is correlated by the descriptive conventions.
(1950, p. 116)
Again, like Russell, Austin maintains that truth is an extrinsic property of truth bearers,
which, for Austin, are statements. Truth is reduced to a relation to a historic state of
affairs in which some, but not all, truth bearers participate. But, that relation is one of
designation.
Just so long as "correspondence" is not appealed to as a kind of gentle reminder
that the truth value of a sentence/thought depends as much on how things are in the
world  is  on  the  content  of  the  truth  bearer,  then  the  theorist  is  committed  to  truth
reducing to  a  relation  between truth  bearer  and truth  maker.  This  leaves  both  truth
bearers and truth makers as objects, and leaves the theorist requiring some account of
why and when those objects stand in the correspondence relation to each other. That is
either a matter of the constituent parts designating things in the world, à la Russell, or
the whole designating some state of affairs, à la Austin.
Designation views have to account for the fact that not everything with a content
is truth apt. They need some account of a complete content, such that all and only things
with a complete content are truth apt. Because, on these views, truth is understood as the
relation between a complete item and an entity in the world, the picture that emerges is
that things with the sort of content characteristic of a complete item are such that they
designate a particular truth-maker. As a result, such views deny that truth can be used to
account for content. Instead, they try to give some account of content which can make
sense of designation, and then define truth as a relation between contentful items and
things in the world. The hallmark of such views is that intentionality is understood in
terms of designation.  This  means that  the view Frege propounds in,  "On sense and
reference" is a designation view. Frege understands a sentence to designate an object,
either the true or the false, in virtue of it expressing a thought which has one of those
two objects as its referent (Frege, 1948, p. 216). Of course, Frege does not think of
himself as a correspondence theorist, but, as I read him, this is because he misleadingly
restricts  the  term "correspondence  theory"  to  capture  views  which  treat  truth  as  a
relation between truth-makers and facts. Frege's complaint is that such views are going
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to fall foul of a slingshot like argument, and so embraces the slingshot's conclusion that
there are only two referents for sentences (Frege, 1948, p. 217)6263. 
T3.  There  are  a  large  number  of  redundancy theories.  They all  differ  from
minimalism in accepting that there is a substantial question about intentionality. They
acknowledge that truth is a device of ascent, but look for an explanation of why a given
truth-bearer possesses the truth value that it does. This has to be a property that can be
recognised, and thus accounted for, without reference to truth. They have a substantial
notion of intentionality, but, unlike the designation theorist, deny that intentionality is a
matter  of designation.  According to a redundancy view,  intentionality is  an intrinsic
property of  content.  But,  the  redundancy theorist  denies  that  intentionality  is  a  sui
generis  property  of  mental  states  and  utterances.  Or,  perhaps  more  accurately,  the
mistake is to think that a worldview in something that can only be understood from a
special rational perspective. Instead, intentionality can be explained in natural scientific
terms, and so aims for an account of content that can be given in causal-cum-functional
terms. The right way to go about this, and quite what counts as natural scientific makes
sense of some of the differences between redundancy views. However, all redundancy
views, require some natural scientifically respectable account of proper functioning. The
hope is that we can make sense of aboutness in terms of functional characteristics of
mental states or sentences. Again, truth has its use as a way of talking about content. It
is neither evaluative nor more than a device of semantic/mental ascent. 
T4.  Interpretive  views  maintain  that  truth,  although  partly  definable  by  the
enumeration  of  truth  conditions,  is  an  irreducible primitive.  In  other  words,  they
maintain that, even for a finite, artificial language, L, specifying the truth conditions of
every sentence would do no more than specify the extension of the one place predicate,
"true in L". It would not tell us everything about what all the sentences which were true
in L had in common; namely that they were the true sentences of L (See also, Davidson,
2001, p. 20). Truth appears as the property that is used to make sense of intentionality.
The idea  is  that  truth cannot  be understood in terms  of  the relation  of  designation.
62 For a good discussion of the relevant passages in Frege see Neale, 2001, pp. 80-82. Neale's 2001 also
provides an excellent discussion of the slingshot.
63 By the time of "The Thought" (Frege, 1956) Frege seems to have changed his mind. There is no
longer talk of the true and false. Instead, truth has become a unique property of thoughts. On this
reading, Frege has become an interpretivist.
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Instead, truth emerges as the property that we use to make sense of language users and
thinkers. However, truth is not a norm. Language users and thinkers are not following
any rules. So, truth is not a mark of approval or a norm of judgement. However, we
cannot  make  sense  of  a  creature  as  rational  unless  we  can  describe  its  behaviour
according to the constitutive ideal of rationality. But, that's just means its mental life is,
more  or  less,  organised  according  to  the  rules  of  rationality.  Those  rules  are
descriptions, but it is a description of the rational connections between things, rather
than  the  causal  order  of  things.  This  does  not  require  any sort  of  non-naturalism.
Instead, the interpretivist maintains that the natural sciences are not adequate to make
sense  of  rational  behaviour.  The  reason  for  this  is  that  to  make  sense  of  rational
behaviour one needs to make sense of the point of view of a rational agent. The theorist
is trying to understand how the world strikes the agent. But that, she maintains, can only
be done in terms of what the agent takes to be true. Thus, truth accounts for content
because we make sense of content in terms of what it is that an agent holds to be true. It
is truth, in the guise of holding true, that you need to grasp to gain explicit knowledge of
content. This leaves truth as a substantial but irreducible property.
T5. Pragmatic phenomenalism is the view developed and defended by Robert
Brandom (1994). Like Horwich, Brandom thinks that there is no more to intentionality
than what we do. However, he differs from Horwich in thinking that our propensities to
accept  statements  has to  be understood in normative terms.  As a  result,  one cannot
understand a practice except in terms of the normative attitudes of practitioners. In this
respect Brandom differs from minimalists  and redundancy theorists  by resisting any
attempt to provide a reductive account of content. Because Brandom refuses the siren
call of a reductive account, there is no way of explaining what it is for something to
have content without using truth and other traditional semantic vocabulary. But it is not
in  virtue of having a truth value that,  for example,  an utterance is  a representation.
Rather, it is a representation in virtue of having a particular place in a rational practice,
as a result of occupying that place it has a truth value. On this view, what it is for a
sentence  to  be  true  is  for  it  to  be  correctly  called  true.  The  truth  predicate  is  an
evaluative predicate, but truth is an insubstantial property.
T6.  Evaluative  views  share  the  interpretive  and  phenomenalist  thought  that
intentionality cannot be understood as a relation between contentful items and things in
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the world. They also reject any deflationary hopes with respect to truth. Truth remains
the substantial property which accounts for the point of view of an agent. However, the
evaluativist  shares  with  the  pragmatic  phenomenalist  the  thought  that  behaving
rationally requires taking part in a practice. Truth becomes the substantial property that
organises  language  use  and  thinking.  So,  understanding  somebody's  point  of  view
requires coming to understand the way truth organises a rational practice. That in turn
requires  understanding  what  it  is  to  perform the  kind  of  actions  that  make  up  the
practice.  But,  unlike on the  pragmatic  phenomenalist  views,  that  is  not  a  matter  of
undertaking commitments to behave in a particular way, it is a matter of understanding
what it is for something to be true. Those somethings are sentences. Practitioners who
are behaving correctly try to  make sure that  the sentences  they hold to be true are
sentences  which  are  true.  The  truth  values  of  sentences  affects  the  way  they  can
legitimately be used.
§7 Summary and the Way Ahead
Using language and thinking are rational activities. Meaning and mental content
are captured by describing the capacity to engage in those activities. So, the aim of the
theorist of meaning is an account of what it is to use a language and the aim of a theorist
of thought is an account of what it is to be a thinker. Being able to use a language
requires  understanding  a  language  and  being  able  to  think  requires  being  able  to
recognise and respond to the world. Those abilities are modelled by a theory of meaning
and a theory of thought. A theory of meaning and a theory of thought are both bipartite
theories. The two parts are a theory of content and a theory of force. The theory of
content will be a description of the truth conditions of complete items in the relevant
activity. The theory of force will be a description of the sort of move that can be made
within the activity. Combining the two parts puts the theorist in a position to pick out
performances  within the activity and say what  is  (standardly)  done by them. Those
theories will, at least, be equivalent to a truth conditional theory. 
As, on any view of each activity, the activities are modelled by a bipartite truth-
conditional theory, differences in understanding language and thought come out in terms
of differences in understanding truth. The dispute is in terms of what truth applies to and
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why it  applies  to  it.  In  the  remainder  of  the  thesis  I  am going  to  use  the  explicit
knowledge constraint to show that truth has to be an evaluative and substantial property
of sentences. I start that project by turning my attention two types of view that both, in
their different ways, deny that there is any problem with truth. These two types of view
are minimalism and designation views.
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Chapter 2
Force and Significance
In the previous chapter I showed that thinking was a rational activity, and that at
least some uses of language were rational actions. I showed that a theory of meaning
needs to be a description of the activity of using a language, and that a theory of thought
needs to be a description of the activity of thinking. Whatever one thinks about the
rationality of language use and the nature and status of languages, a theory of meaning
for a language needs to account for the way the activity of using a language proceeds,
and why it proceeds like that. The same goes mutatis mutandis for a theory of thought. I
showed  that,  whatever  one's  view  of  language  or  thought,  the  activity  of  using  a
language and the activity of thinking both had to be describable by a bipartite truth
conditional theory. In the linguistic case the theory needs to put the theorist in a position
to  give  the  semantic  role  of  any  expression  in  a  language.  This  is  achieved  by a
characterisation of the different types of linguistic act, and an account of the content of
each sentence. But, because any view of truth needs to make sense of the equivalence
schema, any account of content will, thereby, be an account of truth conditions and any
account  of  force  shows  how  the  truth  value  of  a  sentence  affects  the  way  it  is
(standardly)  used.   The  same,  with  the  relevant  substitutions,  goes  for  a  theory  of
thought. The end result is that, whatever one's view of language or thought, a theory of
meaning or a theory of thought will be formulateable as a bipartite truth-conditional
theory. However, one's understanding of such a theory depends on how one thinks about
the nature of language use and thinking. Because truth is central to a theory of meaning
and theory of thought, how one understands language use or thinking will be reflected
in how one understands truth. As a result, different views of language use and thinking
are characterised by different views of truth. In addition, the correct account of language
use and thinking will reveal the correct account of truth. 
In this chapter I am going to look at minimalist views of truth and traditional
correspondence theories, designation views. Minimalist views of truth deny that there is
anything more to truth than its function as a device of semantic or mental assent. In
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addition, they deny that there is any problem with intentionality. The idea is that truth
talk allows us to go on talking about reality while referring to sentences or thoughts.
However,  as  Hornsby,  perhaps  cheekily,  suggests,  a  better  way  of  characterising
minimalism is that "truth and falsity are terms for going on talking while adding a word
or two" (Hornsby, 1997, p. 8n). I am going to show that Hornsby's characterisation is
accurate, and, consequently, the position hopeless. Designation views of truth treat truth
as  a  relation  between a  truth-bearer  and  truth-maker.  For  them,  intentionality  is  an
extrinsic  relation  between  linguistic/mental  items  and  things  in  the  world.  On  the
traditional developments of the view, grasping content allows one an a priori insight into
that  extrinsic  relation.  Both  views deny that  there  is  any more  to  the  rationality of
language  use/thinking  than  using  sentences/thoughts  to  further  ones  projects.  On
minimalist views, this is because there is no more to meaning than what we tend to do.
On a  designation  view,  this  is  because  there  is  nothing  right  about  correspondence
between linguistic/mental items and things in the world. As a result, an account of the
activity of using language/thinking is simply an account of what the subject tends to do.
I am going to use the explicit knowledge constraint to show that both types of view are
untenable.  I  am going to show that  minimalist  views are unable to  account  for  our
explicit knowledge of content, and I will  show that designation views are unable to
account for our explicit knowledge of force.
The structure of the chapter is as follows. I first distinguish between two senses
of "normative".These are full-blown prescriptive normativity and norm-relativity. The
former requires substantial oughts, the latter merely measuring rods. I show that apart
from linguistic practice views and mental practice views, no account of language use or
thinking  requires  anything  more  than  norm-relativity.  This  requires  them  to  be
deflationary about linguistic or mental correctness. This is a thought that is going to
occur  throughout  the thesis.  Ultimately,  I  am going to  show that  intentionality is  a
normative property. Having made this distinction, I turn my attention to use theories of
meaning.  I  distinguish  between  broad  and  narrow  use  theories;  the  former  treat
intentionality as intrinsic to what we do with language, the latter seek to understand
what we do in terms of the dispositions to use language, and then seek to make sense of
intentionality after that. I point out that there is the same distinction within functional
organisation theories of the mental. I then turn my attention to minimalist views of truth.
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These combine a narrow use theory of meaning with a narrow functional organisation
theory of content. In addition, they deny that intentionality is a substantial property of
sentences and thoughts. I show that they do not have the resources to make sense of our
explicit knowledge of meaning or mental content. Finally, I consider designation views
of truth. These treat intentionality as an extrinsic property of sentences or thoughts. The
idea is that meaningful items designate things in the world. I show that they are unable
to  account  for  our  ability  to  understand  the  activities  of  language  use  or  thinking,
because they can only make sense of our grasp of truth conditions at the expense of
making sense of our ability to distinguish truth from falsity.
§1 Types of Normativity
In  the  previous  chapter  I  distinguished  between  descriptive  and  prescriptive
rules. I also pointed out that, except on linguistic or mental practice views, a theory of
meaning/thought made sense of the activity in question by appealing to descriptive rules
which best explain the way language users/thinkers tend to go on. In this section, I am
going  to  show  that  if  linguistic  or  mental  rules  are  descriptive  rules,  then  talk  of
correctness with respect to language or the mental needs to be deflated. This is because
there are no longer linguistic or mental shoulds. 
1.1 Normativity and norm relativity
To  help  make  this  point  I  am  going  to  borrow  a  distinction  of  Anandi
Hattiangadi's.  Hattiangadi  distinguishes  between  what  she  labels  "normativity"  and
"norm relativity". Here is how she makes the distinction:
[T]he  word  ‘normative’ is  ambiguous.  First,  it  can  mean  ‘prescriptive’ or  ‘action-
guiding’....  Second,  ‘normative’ can  mean  ‘relative  to  a  norm or  a  standard’....  The
distinction between these two senses of ‘normative’ will turn out to be crucial. To mark
the distinction, I will take ‘prescriptive’ or ‘action-guiding’ to be the primary sense of
‘normative’, and I will use ‘normative’ henceforth exclusively in this sense. I will use
‘norm-relative’ to mean ‘relative to a norm or standard’.
(Hattiangadi, 2007, p. 37)
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This suggests the following definitions:
NORMATIVE:  something  is  normative  if  and  only  if  it  prescribes  or
prohibits a course of action.
NORM-RELATIVE: something is norm-relative if and only if it provides a
standard by which something can be classified64.
1.2 Norm Relativity and Correctness
Hattiangadi's  key  thought  is  that  norm relativity  is  sufficient  to  account  for
linguistic and mental correctness. The thought is that just as the standard metre bar in
Paris provides a referent which determines what it is for something to be a metre in
length, and hence classified as 1m long, the meaning of a word provides a standard by
which something can be classified as that thing. In a similar way, the content of the
concept provides a standard by which something can be classed as falling under that
concept. I am going to focus on the linguistic case because it is easier to frame things in
linguistic terms. But,  the same thing applies mutatis mutandis  to thought.  Given the
nature of the largest thing visible from my window, and the meaning of the word "tree",
the sentence, "the largest thing visible from my window is a tree" is true. It cannot be
that being true is something that a sentence ought to be, because there are no oughts in
the picture. So, a sentence being true is not something which a sentence ought to be.
Instead, the view is that descriptions, being meaningful, say something, and when things
in the world match how things are described, the description is true. Depending on the
theory's view of meaning, "matching" can either be read as a substantial property of a
sentence  or  as  a  marker  that  the  standards  have  been met.  On either  view there  is
nothing substantially correct about true descriptions. The only notions of correctness
available are means-end and categorical. A true description may or may not be useful
for the purposes of a speaker, or may or may not be morally permissible.
It  is  natural  to  describe  a  true  description  as  correct.  So,  somebody  like
Hattiangadi,  needs  an  account  of  why  that  might  be  so.  There  is  an  explanation
64 Hattiangadi's own definition of norm relativity is "Norm-Relativity: S means F by t → (a)(S applies x
‘correctly’ to a ↔ a is f)" (Hattiangadi 2007, 56). Hattiangadi defines norm relativity as a thesis about
language. My definition is wider. It aims to capture the idea that, for example, the metre provides a
standard by which something can be classified as a metre.
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available, and Hattiangadi adopts it. One feature of a standard is that it divides items
(objects or situations) into two classes: those that meet the standard, and those that do
not. Descriptions, being standards, divide items (possible situations) into two classes:
those that are compatible with the description and those that are not compatible with the
description.  It  is  natural  to  describe  a  use  of  a  sentence  as  correct  when no actual
situation is in the incompatible class. Words, also being descriptive standards, have an
extension, and items in the world either fall into that extension or out of it. A situation is
determined by the properties and relations of the objects which make up the situation.
So, whether or not all situations in the actual world are compatible with a description is
determined by which items in the actual world are in the extensions of the words used.
The  result  is  that  the  notion  of  correctness  here  is  simply  that  of  being  the  way
described. As Hattiangadi writes:
Consider,  for  instance,  the  statement  that  the  word  ‘square’ applies  correctly  to  a
particular  table  top.  This  is  not  a  normative  statement—it  is  not  equivalent  to  the
statement that you ought to say that the table top is square quite independently of any
desire (such as the desire to tell the truth, for instance); rather, it is equivalent to the
straightforwardly non-normative judgement that the table top is square and that, in being
square, it meets the standard for the correct application of the word ‘square’. To say that
some use of a term is ‘correct’ is thus merely to describe it in a certain way—in light of
the norm or standard set by the meaning of the term.
(Hattiangadi, 2006, pp. 224–225)
This is deflationary about correctness. There are two ways of reading the claim
to equivalence. The first reading is that the judgement that "square" applies correctly to
a particular tabletop is equivalent to the judgement that the tabletop is square. This is the
redundancy reading.  It  makes the form of words "applies correctly to"  a redundant,
baroque way of saying that the x is F. The second reading, which given the lack of a
comma after "square" is the natural reading, is that the judgement that "square" applies
correctly to a particular tabletop is equivalent to the judgement of the conjunction of the
judgements  that the table top is square  and that it meets the standards of the correct
application of the word "square". This is the deflationary reading. It acknowledges a use
for  the  phrase  "applies  correctly  to".  It  allows  us  to  make  claims  about  language.
Ultimately, however, those claims are transparent. How can, "it meets the standards for
the correct application of" be understood? It has to be that meeting the standard for
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correct application is simply being the way described, in this case being square. 
1.3 Norm Relativity and Rules
A deflationary  view  of  correctness  does  not  preclude  there  being  rules  of
meaning. It is a familiar thought that there is no practical end to the set of situations to
which an expression might apply. For example, "horse" does not just apply to Morley
Street, or even the finite set of all horses that have ever been, but to all horses that have
ever been and will ever be in any location whatsoever. No one could give the extension
of "horse" by listing every horse. Given this, as theorists, for any expression, we need to
find a statement which determines the infinite class of uses which are correct. This can
be done by formulating a rule. Hattiangadi suggests that the general form looks like this:
If an expression, t, means F, then:
R1: (x)(t applies correctly to x ↔ x is f)
(Hattiangadi, 2006, p. 223)65.
But, a rule like R1 is not a prescriptive rule. It does not tell any speaker how to
use  an  expression,  nor  does  it  allow  for  any  specifically  linguistic  evaluation.  As
Hattiangadi writes, "R1 supplies a description of my uses of t as those that are 'correct'
and those that are 'incorrect'" (Hattiangadi, 2006, p. 223). On these views, rules for use
are descriptions which capture the standard use of an expression. But "standard use" is
simply the use which best accounts for meaning. There is no linguistic reason to use a
word in accordance with the standard use. A rule like R1 is a rule which describes an
expression. If it is a good description, somebody who understands the rule knows what
descriptive standard is/tends to be provided by the expression.
Of course, the same thing applies to the realm of the mental. If concepts merely
provide standards of application to objects, and whole thoughts standards of application
to situations, then there are no distinctively mental shoulds. A particular concept applies
to some items and consequently has an extension. A particular thought applies to some
situations and consequently has an extension. It is convenient to label as correct the
application of the concept to an item in its extension, and similarly for whole thoughts.
65 Hattiangadi uses capital letters to name meanings. In this terminology, "red" means RED. so, if "red"
means RED, then for all surfaces, x,  "red" applies to x ↔  x is red. The convention is due to Horwich
(Horwich, 1998b, 15).
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When it comes to thinking about concepts and thoughts we need a way of specifying
their extension, and we do this by appeal to descriptive rules. These rules will capture
the standard use of concepts and thoughts. They do not provide prescriptions. 
Now, the aim of the theorist of meaning and the aim of the theorist of thought is
to provide a description of language use/thinking. These are non-finite activities. The
theorist needs a way of describing an infinite range of possible uses. She does that by
formulating descriptive rules such that a grasp of those rules is sufficient to understand
how a particular group of speakers/a particular thinker tends to go on. In the use case
and  the  functionalist  case  these  rules  are  idealisations  from the  habits  of  language
users/a thinker in the way that the ideal gas law is an idealisation from the habits of
actual gases. In the meaning fact and conceptual fact cases the rules are statements of
pre-given standards. Neither the idealisations nor the standards provide any reason to
use a sentence/thought in some particular way. In addition, I have already shown that
those rules can be formulated using a truth predicate. But it should now be apparent that
those rules are generalisations.  They do not  provide any reason to use sentences  or
thoughts one way rather than another. There is no linguistic reason why, for example, an
assertion ought to be true. So, the truth predicate used to formulate those rules is not an
evaluative predicate. At most, it  might mark a relationship between truth-bearer and
truth-maker.
§2 Use Theories and Truth
In this section I am going to turn to "use theories of meaning". As I understand
the term "use theory of meaning" a use theory holds that there is no more to meaning
than what we do. As a result, it treats a language as a product of the ways a particular
group of speakers go on. A theory of meaning, on this view, need do no more than
describe those ways of going on. This can be done in two ways. The first treats what we
do with a language as no less than talking about the world. On such a view of meaning,
intentionality is a substantial property of utterances. Truth is a substantial property that
accounts  for  intentionality.  The  second  way  treats  what  we  do  in  terms  of  our
dispositions to produce verbal behaviour. It denies that an understanding of language
use requires making sense of how the world strikes the subject. As Hornsby puts it: 
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Such a dispute is  part  of  a broader dispute about the nature of intentionality,  and is
reflected  in  a  disagreement  as  to  what  the  use  of  language  should  be  thought  to
encompass. According to the conception already employed here, use includes all of the
countlessly many things that  people are heard as doing when a fellow speaker,  or  a
theorist supplied with a theory of content and force, comes to understand them. This is a
broad conception. According to another conception of use, which is invoked by two-task
theorists  from  whose  standpoint  "use"  and  "truth-conditions"  are  in  opposition,  use
includes only such facts about what people do with language as can be stated without yet
allowing that speakers relate themselves to the world. This is a narrow conception.
(Hornsby, 1989, p. 561)
The broad conception results in an interpretive theory of truth. The narrow conception
results in a minimalist, redundancy or designation theory of truth.
2.1 Two Types of Use Theory
Both a broad and a narrow use theory start from the thought that there is no
more to meaning than what speakers do. The key thought is the meaning is meant to be
open to empirical investigation. The dispute between broad and narrow theories is a
dispute  over  what  concepts  are  required  for  that  empirical  investigation.  The broad
theorist maintains that truth and other full-blown semantic concepts are indispensable,
and the narrow theorist maintains that it can all be done in terms of dispositions. When
it comes to describing the linguistic behaviour of a particular group of speakers, the
theorist needs to devise a model which will account for actual speaker behaviour. This
empirical  model  should be such that  if  you were to  grasp it,  you would,  given the
requisite  practical  abilities,  be  able  to  understand  what  has  been  modelled.  Now,
competent speakers within a linguistic community, by and large, understand what their
fellow language users are trying to do with their utterances by distinguishing between
what is (standardly) done linguistically by using a sentence in that way and the point of
so using it. So, understanding a model which captures what is (standardly) done by any
use of a sentence by members of a linguistic community will be one that, given the
requisite practical abilities, would allow you to understand the utterances of members of
that community. In other words, it will account for actual speaker behaviour. 
This  is  not  to  say  that  linguistic  competence  within  a  particular  language
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community is a matter of previously gained knowledge of conventions or regularities. It
is significantly easier to understand people who tend to behave linguistically like you
because you can come forearmed with a sense of what they are liable to mean by their
utterances. But, one way of explaining this is in terms of what Davidson labels a "prior
theory" (Davidson, 1985, p. 480). He calls this characterisation of an ability "a theory"
because "a  description of  the  interpreter's  competence  requires  a  recursive  account"
(Davidson, 1985, p. 479), and not because competent speakers are meant to know such a
theory. If you and I are both speakers of the same language, we will both have a largely
shared and sophisticated prior theory for each other. That is, our respective abilities to
understand each other will, by and large, be describable by the same recursive theory. It
is this prior theory, this ability, that, on such views, a theory of meaning is trying to
model. It is not a theory of English, because English, or any other language, is not of
any  philosophical  interest.  Instead,  it  is  a  description  of  the  shared  ability  of
sophisticated  language  users  for  whom  the  barriers  to  communication  are  low.
Alternatively, the use theorist might maintain that the first meaning of an utterance is
the dictionary meaning. In which case she will  think that linguistic competence is a
matter of previously gained knowledge of conventions or regularities. However, those
conventions  come  about  because  of  the  ways  that  individuals  tend  to  behave
linguistically. So, use theories that accept that the first meaning of an utterance is the
meaning in a language also are characterisations of the way that a group of people tend
to behave linguistically.
What that model needs to do is find and state regularities of behaviour. Those
regularities take the form of descriptive rules.  But,  as the potential  behaviour to be
modelled is infinite, and as actual behaviour includes novel and uncommon utterances,
those rules cannot describe any statistical regularities of actual performances. Instead,
just as the ideal gas law explains the way actual gases tend to behave, it builds an ideal
model of linguistic behaviour, and uses that model to explain how languages users in
fact  operate.  As the  empirical  significance  that  the  theory needs  to  capture  is  what
competent speakers would understand to have been done linguistically by any possible
utterance,  the theory needs a description of the types of things there are to be done
linguistically  and  the  semantic  content  of  any  particular  utterance.  However,
recognising that there are types of things to be done linguistically involves recognising
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something systematic about linguistic behaviour. To do that, it appeals to the notion of a
sentence and provides rules which govern the different uses of sentences. That leaves
"sentence" as a term of art in an empirical theory of speaker behaviour. A sentence is a
theoretical posit used to talk about an empirically significant class of utterances. In this
respect  it  is  like  the  ideal  gas.  It  is  a  theoretical  entity  used  to  capture  what  is
empirically significant about a class of possible and actual utterances. The same is true
of words. Here is Davidson expressing the view:
One good way to think of sentences themselves is as shapes, whether verbal, written, or
otherwise signed.… We would have no special interest in the shapes if we did not think
of  them  as  sometimes  instantiated  with  communicative  intent  and  the  instances
understood by an audience. Nevertheless, we need these abstract entities if we want to
theorize.  We cannot  say  much  in  a  theoretical  vein  about  linguistic  communication
without  talking  of  words  and  sentences.  Names  and  predicates  are  likewise  usually
treated as abstract entities, though we may also call instances of these types names and
predicates.  The  abstract  entities  –  words  and  expressions  built  from  words  –  are
indispensable when we want to describe the syntax, semantics and logical relations of
the instances.
(Davidson, 2005, pp. 121–122)
Utterances  in  those  classes  will  be  of  a  variety  of  different  types:  statings,
questionings, commandings and so on, but they will be related in empirically significant
ways. The idea is that the connection between the different utterances in each class can
be modelled as being different ways of using the same sentence. The thought being that
there  is  a  common  content  to  utterances  within  a  class  and  that  the  utterances
themselves  are  different  ways  of  presenting  that  content.  In  other  words,  what  is
required is a theory of content and a theory of force. 
A theory of force shows how the truth value of a sentence affects the way it is
used. So, what are required are rules which show how the truth value of a sentence
affects  the types  of ways it  is  used.  As those rules are part  of a model  of the way
speakers tend to behave, what are being described are the different types of standard
uses (in my sense of standard) of sentences. Having acknowledged that what links the
different utterances in any class can be captured by the truth value of the sentence used
to discuss that class, the next task is to show how the truth value of that sentence is
determined.  This  is  done  by  appeal  to  more  theoretical  entities,  "sub-sentential
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expressions". Each sub-sentential expression makes a systematic difference to the truth
values of sentences in which it can occur. But, this is to recognise structure in the actual
and possible utterances that competent speakers might and do make. It is to assign a
class  of  linguistically  incomplete  but  significant  utterances  to  each  sub-sentential
expression. What makes these utterances linguistically incomplete is that they cannot be
understood as having a role separate from their role in utterances which are describable
as a sentence. Because the standard use of a sentence is determined by its truth value,
identifying the classes picked out by sub-sentential expressions is a matter of showing
how each sub-sentential expression makes a systematic difference to the truth values of
sentences in which it can occur. In other words, linguistically incomplete utterances are
understood  as  making  a  systematic  difference  to  the  truth  conditions  of  complete
utterances.
In summary, a theory of meaning uses sentences of the form, 'S is true if and
only if  p'  (where  S is  the  name of  a  sentence  and p  a  sentence  in  use)  to  capture
something which, in conjunction with a theory of force, models competent linguistic
behaviour. Truth talk is used to enable theorists to talk about sentences. Instances of the
truth schema give,  in  conjunction with a  theory of  force,  give the standard uses of
named sentences.
2.2 Use Theories and Truth
On any use theory, truth is not an evaluative property. The reason is simple: what
makes a use of language correct is it achieving its purpose, or, on some occasions, being
morally commendable. Use theorists cannot accept that truth is an evaluative property.
However, the use theorist can acknowledge that truth is a substantial property. On the
broad conception of use, a grasp of truth is required to make sense of your interlocutors.
To understand what your interlocutors mean you need to make sense of what it is that
they hold true. On such a view, no reductive account of truth is possible. Understanding
what your interlocutors hold true is a matter of grasping what they are saying. On the
narrow conception, all that is required is knowing how your interlocutors are liable to
behave. On the narrow conception of use, the meaning of a word is engendered by some
fact  which  explains  a  speaker's  disposition  to  use  it  in  the  way that  she  does.  To
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understand meaning is to know how words are used. As a result, it adopts a deflationary
attitude towards the truth predicate of a theory of meaning. There is some account of the
content of sentences available. This will be given in terms of whatever fact is taken to
explain a group of speakers dispositions to use words in the way that they do, and then
truth's function as a device semantic sense appealed to in order to give a bipartite truth
conditional theory of meaning. This fact might be a relation, or something that explains
the relation, between words and world.  In which case, the narrow theorist  will be a
designation theorist. Alternatively, the fact will be entirely at the level of our disposition
to use words.  In which case,  the narrow theorist  will  be a minimalist  or redudancy
theorist.
2.3 Use Theories and the Mental
A use theory of meaning can be combined with any view of the mental. You
could, for example, believe that thinking was a matter of an a priori grasp of thoughts
and  their  component  concepts.  If  so,  you  could  maintain  that  sentences  were
conventional ways of expressing thoughts because words were conventional ways of
expressing concepts. However, given the empiricist motivations for use theory, the most
common bedfellow is a functional organisation theory of thoughts. Such a view treats
having a particular propositional attitude as being in a particular functional state. Talk of
"thoughts" and "concepts" are useful in an empirical theory of the mind of a thinker.
Like  "sentence"  and  "sub-sentential  expression"  in  the  mouth  of  an  empirical
generalisation theorist, "thought" and "concept" are terms of art. They are introduced as
part  of an empirical  model of thinker behaviour.  They are that to which a standard
functional role can be attributed, where a standard functional role is that which best
explains the particular dispositions of thinkers66. 
66 In one respect a functional theory of thought is easier to construct than an empirical generalisation
theory for a language. This respect  is because there is a great  deal of voluntary control over our
linguistic behaviour. The same is not true of our mental behaviour. The standard functional role of a
thought may well coincide with the dispositions of the thinker in question. However, this does not
stop "thought" and "concept" being terms of art,  nor does it  mean that  such a theory of thought
describes the actual functional setup of the thinker. Real thinkers are limited. There will be many
things to which they never turn their attention, and many thoughts which will be too complicated for
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A functional theory of thought is also a bipartite theory. It gives a general theory
of propositional attitudes, and supplements that with a theory of content. The theory of
propositional attitudes is done in terms of the truth values of the thoughts involved, and
is married up with a theory of content. That theory of content is an account of the truth
conditions of thoughts. However, the content of a thought is fully determined by the
functional  state  of  a  thinker.  That  is,  mental  content  is  determined  by  the  sort  of
transitions, from mental state to mental state and from mental state to  action,  that a
particular thinker is disposed to make. That is simply a question of transition between
states. It is a matter of the capacity of thinkers. As a result, a bipartite truth-conditional
theory of thought is a description of the dispositional setup of a thinker. Again, as in the
linguistic case, there is a broad and a narrow conception of the dispositional setup of the
thinker. On the broad conception, intentionality is taken to be a substantial property of
mental states. One cannot understand the dispositional setup of the thinker except in
terms  of  what  the  thinker  takes  to  be  true.  On  such  a  view,  truth  is  held  to  be  a
substantial property. These are views, like Davidson's, which maintain that mentality
has to be understood according to the constitutive ideal of rationality. On the narrow
conception, understanding the dispositional setup of a thinker is something that can be
done without reference to how the world strikes the thinker. What is required is a way of
identifying mental states without reference to any intrinsic intentional properties, and
then accounting for the kind of transitions thinkers are liable to make.
As a functional organisation theory of thought describes how a particular thinker
is liable to behave, truth provides no kind of evaluative standard. The only evaluation
possible is in terms of whether or not an agent's actual mental behaviour is a good way
of achieving that agent's goals. So, as in the linguistic case, the functional organisation
theorist cannot be a pragmatic phenomenalist or a mental practice theorist. The broad
functional organisation theorist adopts an interpretive theory of truth, but, if she wishes
to deny that there is anything special about intentionality, she needs to provide a non-
truth-conditional account of content. There are two ways to move here. The first is to
account  for  content  according to  causes-cum-functions.  This  looks to  thought-world
relations to make sense of content. Different ways of developing the view will result
either in a designation view of truth or a redundancy view of truth. Finally, and crucially
them to entertain. For this reason, the actual dispositions of a thinker are not going to be described by
a theory of thought.
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for this chapter, the functional organisation theorist can be a minimalist. In this case, she
will treat content as a matter of our dispositions to move between mental states. 
Before moving on I want to make something clear about minimalism. This is
that the dispositions which are of interest to the minimalist can quite legitimately make
reference to how things are in the world. As Harman puts it, "[w]hat makes something
the concept red it is in part the way in which the concept is involved in the perception of
red objects in the external world. What makes something the concept of danger is in part
the way in which the concept is involved in thoughts that affect action in certain ways"
(Harman, 1982, p. 247). However, the key thought behind minimalism is that reference,
satisfaction, denotation and other semantic vocabulary is as trivial as truth. Assuming
for the moment we can make sense of a thinker being disposed to respond to red objects
in such a way that we want to say it possesses the concept red, what the minimalist
denies is that this is because its belief that, say, the apple it sees before it is red has the
content  it  has  because  of  the  mental  values  of  the  concepts  involved.  Instead,  it  is
functionally organised in such a way that it responds to red things. If it became more
conceptually sophisticated it could become disposed to judge that the concept red is
satisfied by all and only red things.
§3 Minimalism
In this section I am going to turn my attention to minimalist views of truth. I
start by looking at the views of Paul Horwich because he has developed and defended
just such a position. I show that he cannot make sense of explicit knowledge of content.
The problems are not unique to him. I go on to show that treating language use and
thinking as just so much behaviour requires there to be something which has substantial
intentional properties. I take it that intentional items are things that are about situations
and that situation is a way for things to be. An intentional item is about some way for
things to be. In so doing it has intentional properties. Those intentional properties are a
matter of the what situation the intentional item is about and the manner in which it is
about that way for the world to be. So, the assertion that Rose speaks Spanish is about
Rose speaking Spanish. It does so by claiming that she does. The desire that Lisa leaves
the police force is about Lisa leaving the police force. It does so by positively evaluating
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that outcome. Thoughts and sentences are simply about ways for things to be. There is
no particular manner in which a sentence or thought is about a situation. We make sense
of one thing being about a way for things to be in terms of truth and some notion of
correctness. So, the belief that snow is white is about snow's being white because, there
is a sense, in which it is correct only if it is true, which is to say, only if snow is white.
What the minimalist does is deny that there needs to be any explanation of that
correctness. In other words, she denies that we need any explanation of intentionality.
She deflates all intentional properties. Instead, she maintains that, because we can find a
pattern in the way a word is used or a concept deployed, we can explain intentionality
without appeal to any further properties. In particular, she maintains that we do not need
any account  of correctness beyond saying that  a use of a word or deployment of a
concept is correct when it is in accordance with its explanatory pattern. I take the failure
of minimalism to show that there must be some further account of what makes some
uses of words or some deployments of concepts correct and others incorrect. In other
words, we do need some account of intentionality. It follows that there has to be some
further account of what makes a truth-bearer true or false than is given by some version
of the equivalence schema.
3.1 Horwich's Use Theory
Horwich is someone who has a minimalist view. He thinks that truth is no more
than  a  device  of  denominalisation  (Horwich,  1998a,  p.  5).  In  addition,  he  has  a
deflationary view of meaning (Horwich, 1998b). As I see it, the raison d'être of the view
is  that  there  is  no  problem of  intentionality.  He figures  here  because  he  is  a  good
example of such a minimalist view. But the problems are not unique to Horwich. They
are problems for any minimalist view, no matter how the details go further down the
line.  Like  all  minimalists,  Horwich  thinks  that  there  are  no  prescriptive  rules  with
respect to meaning and truth. Instead, like Hattiangadi, Horwich thinks that when it
comes to words,  there are  meanings,  and grasp of meaning provides a yardstick by
which word use can be described as "correct" or "incorrect". In addition, they also agree
that a usage being 'correct' is a matter of its being consistent with the meaning of the
word. Horwich has a view as to the sort of things that constitute meaning. Horwich has
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what he calls "a use theory of meaning" (UTM). He outlines it as follows:
It  begins  by  contending  that  the  meaning  of  a  word  is  the  common  factor  in  the
explanations of  its  numerous occurrences,  and proceeds to  argue that  the underlying
basis  of  each word's  meaning is  the (idealized) law governing its  usage—a law that
dictates the 'acceptance conditions' of certain specified sentences containing it.
(Horwich, 2005, p. 27)
Those  (idealised)  laws  are,  as  already  noted,  descriptive  laws.  They  are
generalisations from the behaviour of speakers. It is an important consequence of the
view that the class of  facts that constitute meaning can be, and Horwich thinks is, a
heterogeneous class. In addition, there is no requirement that a word meaning what it
does is – for example "dog" meaning dog – is a matter of its standing in relation to a
class  of  entities  –  for  example  "dog" being true  of  anything that  is  a  domesticated
canine. In summary, different types of fact can explain the way different words are used,
and there is no reason why any sort of word-world relation needs to be invoked in those
explanations.
The upshot is that Horwich is someone who has a narrow conception of use. For
Horwich the fact which explains our disposition to use a word is what he labels a "basic
acceptance property" (Horwich, 1998b, p. 44). The basic acceptance property of a word
is a statement of a regularity of acceptance that best explains the overall use of that
word. So, Horwich contends, the basic acceptance property of the word "true" "is the
inclination to accept instances of the schema 'the proposition that p is true if and only if
p'" (loc. cit.). As result, Horwich claims that:
According to the use theory of meaning, our grasp of the truth conditions of (say) "snow is
white" is the product of the following three-stage process. First, we know the meaning of
"snow is white" by knowing its mode of construction and the uses of its component words.
Second, we know the meaning of "true" by accepting instances of 'The proposition that p is
true  iff  p'  and  accepting '(u)[u  is  true iff  (( x)(u  expresses  x & x  is  true)]',  and  then∃
inferring instances of the disquotation schema, '"p" is true iff p'– including '"snow is white"
is true if and only if snow is white'. And third, insofar as we understand all the constituents
of that biconditional, we can be said to know that "snow is white" is true if and only if snow
is white.  Thus our knowledge of the truth conditions of "snow is white" derives from our
knowledge of its meaning.
(Horwich, 1998b, pp. 72–73)
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On such a view gaining knowledge of the meaning of "true" does not give you any more
information about meaning. It is simply a device that allows us to, among other things,
model linguistic behaviour.
3.2 Explicit Knowledge
However, modelling linguistic behaviour is not all that there is to a theory of
meaning. A (correct) theory of meaning is an expression of the explicit knowledge of
the theorist. As long as the theorist can make sense of explicit knowledge of meaning,
she can account for her own explicit knowledge of her theory. One approach might be to
provide a model of explicit knowledge, but not just any model will do. A theory which
consisted of theorems of the form 'S means that p' would be sufficient as a model of
explicit knowledge. Such a theory does state what somebody knows who has explicit
knowledge  of  the  meaning  of  a  language.  However,  it  does  not  meet  the  explicit
knowledge constraint. Meeting the explicit knowledge constraint requires showing how
it is possible that we can have explicit knowledge of meaning. That requires doing more
than stating what somebody knows when they have explicit knowledge of meaning. The
challenge is  to show how someone can move from practical competence to explicit
knowledge. At the very least then, a theory which generates theorems of the form 'S
means that p' would need supplementing with an account of how somebody could move
from having the requisite practical abilities to understanding the claims of the theory. 
A bipartite  truth-conditional  theory  of  meaning  is  adequate  as  a  model  of
linguistic  behaviour,  but  inadequate  as  a  model  of  explicit  knowledge.  To see  this,
consider  that  a  theory of  force  provides  a  general  description  of  different  types  of
speech act. Sticking with assertion, it claims that assertions present as true. If the nature
of truth is exhausted by the function of a truth predicate to be a device of semantic
ascent,  a  truth  conditional  theory  of  meaning  for  a  language  models  the  linguistic
competence  of  speakers.  However,  it  cannot  be  all  that  a  speaker  with  explicit
knowledge of meaning knows. The reason is straightforward. Treating truth as a device
of semantic ascent allows the theorist to describe the use and content of a sentence, but
only because sentences have contents and uses which can be described without truth
talk. To make things easier I will stick with assertions. Somebody who explicitly knows
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that the sentence "Frege died in 1925" is true if and only if Frege died in 1925, and who
explicitly knows what is claimed by an assertion of "Frege died in 1925" is somebody
who explicitly knows what that sentence means67. 
So, an account of this explicit knowledge needs to make sense of how reflective
speakers know two things: 
1. "Frege died in 1925" is true if and only if Frege died in 1925
2. What is claimed by an assertion of "Frege died in 1925".
A theory of force will tell us that an assertion of a sentence presents it as true. To present
a sentence as true is to discharge the biconditional which specifies its truth conditions.
The correct theory of force for English entails that an assertion of "Frege died in 1925"
presents the sentence in question as true, while a theory of content says that presenting
"Frege died in 1925" as true is to discharge the biconditional 1. Discharging 1 is done
either by using the sentence, "'Frege died in 1925' is true" or the sentence, "Frege died
in 1925". 
However, so far, what we have is a description of standard behaviour. Nothing
has been said which tells us what is done by an assertoric use of a sentence. Clearly we
do not learn what it is to present a sentence as true by saying that it is what is claimed
by instances of sentences with the form 'S is true'. The theorist is going to focus on uses
that do not predicate truth of a named sentence. However, it does not help to claim that
using,  "Frege  died  in  1925"  is  asserting  that  sentence.  It  is  true  that  asserting  the
sentence "Frege died in 1925" is asserting that Frege died in 1925, but we still need an
account of what it is to assert that Frege died in 1925. There are two ways to move here.
The first is to give a substantial account of what it is to present as true. The second is to
supplement a truth conditional theory of meaning with another theory of meaning. The
former move is not open to the minimalist. The raison d'être of her theory is that there is
no more to truth than it being a device of semantic ascent. But, if truth is a device of
semantic  ascent  there  must  be  something  to  be  done  with  sentences  which  can  be
explained independently of a truth conditional theory of meaning. 
How does Horwich account for his explicit understanding of English, or any
other language that he speaks? Horwich cannot appeal to a grasp of facts like "'dog'
means DOG". For one thing, as he points out, this is, in his view, trivially true. Horwich
67 The example is due to Dummett who makes the same point (Dummett, 1981, p. 444).
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is  quite  prepared  to  countenance  entities  as  meanings.  What  he  is  not  prepared  to
countenance  is  that  these  entities  do  any  work  in  explaining  language  use.  "Dog"
meaning DOG is a consequence of the fact that there is a regular use for the word "dog"
in English. But, on Horwich's view, "'dog' means DOG" is a tautology (Horwich, 1998b,
16).  What  a  speaker  has to know who has  explicit  knowledge of  a  language is  the
idealised law governing the use of "dog". It looks like that is just not the sort of thing
which can be known by even extremely reflective speakers. Horwich puts the objection
rather nicely:
For a sophisticated scientific inquiry might be required in order to reach the conclusion
that “dog” has property ‘u(x)’ [a usage property]; yet without having pursued any such
inquiry, we nevertheless understand the word perfectly well. Nor can one reply that the
inquiry is needed only to make us consciously aware of the fact that “dog” has ‘u(x)’—a
fact which is already known unconsciously by anyone who understands the word. For
the postulation of any such unconscious knowledge is a matter of scientific speculation;
whereas we feel certain that there is something we know when we understand a word.
(Horwich, 1998b, pp. 16–17)
If Horwich puts the objection, then he must have something he takes to be a
rejoinder.  Indeed  this  is  the  case.  Horwich  appeals  to  "implicit  knowledge".  He
suggests:
The fact that the expert and hence communal deployment of “dog” is the result of the
word's having use property ‘u(x)’, constitutes the fact that it means what it does—i.e.
that it means DOG—in the communal language. If a community member's deployment
of the word results from the same property ‘u(x)’,  then the meaning of “dog” in his
idiolect will be the same as its meaning in the communal language. He will then qualify
as knowing implicitly what the word means, and thereby as understanding it.
(Horwich, 1998b, p. 17)
This might do as a definition of "implicit knowledge". It will not do as a solution
to the problem of explicit knowledge. I am very happy to allow for the possibility of
speakers operating at the ground floor to go on in regular and empirically describable
ways. As this is not going to be a species of automatism, I am very happy to allow
Horwich, or anybody else, to label such an ability "implicit knowledge". What I cannot
allow  is  that  such  "implicit  knowledge"  can  be  made  explicit  by  even  the  most
sophisticated scientist without there being more to meaning than communal regularities
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of use. To see this consider that some empirical linguist proposes the following as the
basic use property for the English word "dog":
dog. the  meaning of  "dog"  is  constituted  by the  fact  that  the  law explaining  its
overall use is that English speakers accept, "x is a dog  x has the underlying
nature of domesticated canines".
For philosophical  purposes,  the phrase "domesticated canines" can be replaced with
"dogs".  Unlike Horwich's  "'dog'  means DOG", "x is  a  dog   x has the underlying
nature  of  dogs"  is  not  a  tautology".  It  makes  a  substantial  claim  about  a  material
equivalence between two propositions. Indeed, when an instance of the left-hand side is
true it is because the relevant instance of the right-hand side is true but not vice versa.
So, the right-hand side can be taken to be a reductive explanation of the left-hand side.
However, for a theory to be a statement of explicit knowledge, the theorist must already
have explicit understanding of all the words involved in the statement of her theory. It
has to be that she has explicitly understood what it is to be a dog, what it is to accept a
sentence, what it is to have an underlying nature and so on – which is to say that she
needs not only to possess these concepts, she needs to grasp them.
The problem is that Horwich cannot get inflationary about conceptual content.
Horwich has a prior commitment to a minimalist account of truth. So, Horwich has to
treat the proper object of a theory of thought as the way a thinker is narrowly disposed
to behave, conceptual content is engendered by dispositions to move between mental
states68. Because Horwich is committed to there being no substantial truth values, those
68 In actual fact Horwich's view is that we think in the language in which we think. Perhaps the clearest
example of his views on conceptual  content are found in chapter 7 of "Reflections on Meaning"
(Horwich 2005, 175-198). Here he develops and defends what he labels 'a very simple picture' of the
language of thought hypothesis. The view is that thinking, by and large, proceeds by deploying items
in a language of thought that is an internalisation of one's first spoken language. The semantic and
syntactic items, of that language get their significance "in virtue of their conceptual roles, or, more
specifically, in virtue of certain of their deployments (in postulates, inference patterns, etc.) being
explanatorily basic" (Horwich 2005, 183). As Horwich acknowledges, the actual functioning of our
language faculty, and thus for Horwich, how we think, depends on myriad causal factors (Horwich
2005, 176). Those inference patterns are generalisations of the way thinkers tend to behave. In order
to allow for pre-linguistic thought, there are meant to be some basic concepts which are meant to be
in an innate language of thought. However these basic items still have their meanings in terms of their
functional  roles (Horwich 2005, 184-185).  Horwich did not have to adopt a language of thought
hypothesis, but he did have to adopt a functional organisation view of the mental.
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transitions are not explained in terms of referential relations between mental items and
the world. Instead, possessing a concept is a matter of being disposed to behave more or
less in line with the idealised law describing the use of that concept. For example the
content of the concept of being a dog will be characterised in terms of sensitivity to
dogs. Somebody possesses that concept when they display that sensitivity. Roughly, it is
a  matter  of  being  disposed to  distinguish  between anything that  has  the  underlying
nature  of  domesticated  canines  and  everything  else.  That  is  a  practical  skill,  so
somebody who was able to do that possesses what Horwich labels "implicit knowledge"
of what it is to be a dog. The problem is showing how somebody who can do that is in a
position to gain explicit knowledge of what it is to be a dog. The objection is borrowed
from Horwich himself: inquiry is needed to make us consciously aware of the content
engendering regularity. It is not enough for that inquiry to take place at the ground floor.
It  requires  first  level  explicit  thought.  The output  of  that  reflective realisation is  an
explicit representation of a practical ability. If she is a competent speaker of English, she
will have the linguistic resources to represent her mental abilities. She might say:
dog*. Possession  of  the  concept  of  being  a  dog  is  explained  by  a
tendency to  respond to  some object,  x,  as  a  dog   x  has  the
underlying nature of domesticated canines.
dog* seems to be a reasonable hypothesis as to what it is to possess the concept of being
a dog. However, having more than implicit understanding of  dog*,  i.e. more than the
tendency to  utter  and accept  dog*,  requires  either  the  possibility  of  having explicit
knowledge of the concepts involved without having explicit knowledge of the words
used, or there being more to language use than regularities of performance. The former
disjunct was the hypothesis to be explained on the assumption that the latter disjunct
was false, and this Horwich is unable to do. In other words, Horwich's appeal to implicit
knowledge as the ability to go on in a regular way does not help him account for explicit
understanding of sentential or conceptual content.
3.3 Vertical and Horizontal Dimensions; The Objection Expanded
In effect, Horwich offers a functional theory of both language use and concept
possession. He takes it that our linguistic practice is so organised that we find certain
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patterns  of  sentence use compelling.  For example,  if  an English speaker  accepts an
English sentence, P, and another English sentence, Q, she tends to accept the sentence  'P
and Q',  and if  she accepts the conjunction she tends  to accept both conjuncts.  This
explains the meaning of the English word "and". He then takes it that our mental life is
so organised that we find certain patterns of thought compelling. There will be a mental
analogue to the way a speaker of English uses "and". Somebody whose mental life is so
organised possesses the concept of conjunction. All of which is fine as far as it goes.
However, it does not reach to the world. What it does not do is explain how anyone can
understand these facts about themselves. Brian Loar puts the point well when he writes:
Nothing  in  the  description  of  at  least  some  thoughts'  or  sentences'  conceptual  role
explains why we assign them references or truth-conditions. It is important to maintain a
third person perspective. Apparently a full description of the functional role, for another
person x, of a predicate like "magnetic" – that is, how it functions in x's inferences, etc.
(think of this as the "horizontal" dimension of description) – abstracts from there being
some "vertical" relation such as satisfaction which holds  between that  predicate and
some object y iff y is magnetic. Now this observation is compatible with allowing the
conceptual role of "magnetic" involves x being able to judge that "magnetic" denotes y
iff y is magnetic. But that is just a fact about x’s conceptual organisation and, from our
point of view, does not on the face of it explain why we assign x’s predicates satisfaction
conditions.
(Loar, 1982, p. 274).
Loar,  rightly,  recognises that there is a difference between, on the one hand,
transitions  into,  out  of,  and  between  mental  states  and,  on  the  other  hand,  the
intentionality of those states. That is, there is a distinction between what, if anything,
that state is about and the typical interactions of that state with other states and the
environment. Something more needs to be said about why we even so much think of a
given dispositional setup as being correct or incorrect depending on how things are in
the world. What Loar recognises is that a description of what a thinker can do has two
dimensions. The narrow description is in terms of its dispositions. That is, it describes
the kinds of transitions, perhaps given a particular set of circumstances, a thinker tends
to make. These are the horizontal connections. Describing the horizontal connections
between states (and, indeed, from causes to states and from states to outputs) describes
the way the thinker tends to go on. However, a full description of what a thinker can do
needs to make sense of the thinker as recognising and responding to the world. That is,
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the theorist also needs to make sense of why those states are about anything. This is to
make sense of the vertical connections. By denying that truth organises language use
and  thinking,  and  thus  can  be  used  to  provide  rationalising  explanations  of  what
thinkers and speakers do, the deflationary theorist commits herself to the possibility of
first  describing  the  horizontal  connections  and then  showing why states  that  are  so
identified are about anything at all.
The problem is that the theorist must adopt the third person perspective on the
subject. However, in this case the subject is herself. As a subject she only operates in the
horizontal dimension. She is not even in a position to appeal to a vertical dimension.
But without being in a position to assign a vertical dimension everything the theorist
does  is  on  a  par  with  the  unreflective  speaker  and the  unreflective  thinker.  All  her
beautiful theories are just so much practical behaviour. This precludes the theorist from
having explicit awareness of language use or thinking.
Deflationary theories of truth require a theory of meaning or a theory of thought
which  is  given  in  terms  of  the  horizontal  dimension.  I  am going  to  focus  on  the
linguistic case for ease of exposition, but what I say can be transposed to the mental.
Such a view treats the reference of an expression as a product of the semantic role.
Dummett puts the point like this:
The conception of reference as semantic role is, in itself, purely programmatic: it does
not tell us what the semantic roles of expressions of the various logical types are taken to
be; it provides no model for a semantic account of our language.… [T] he semantic role
of every expression which is a semantically significant unit can always be construed as
consisting in its relation to something in the real world. As thus formulated, however,
this  assumption  is  empty,  since,  whatever  our  conception  of  the  semantic  roles  of
expressions  of  different  types,  we  can  always  express  it  in  terms  of  the  relation  of
reference between expressions and certain non-linguistic entities. On the basis of any
semantic account whatever, there will exist a relation of semantic equivalence between
expressions of the same logical type: indeed, if we suppose ourselves equipped with the
notion  of  truth-value  for  sentences  of  the  language,  we  could  use  the  fact  of
interchangeability  in  all  contexts  without  change  of  truth-value as  a  criterion  for
semantic  equivalence,  even  in  the  absence  of  any  specific  semantics.  Semantic
equivalence  will,  of  course,  be  an  equivalence  relation,  and  hence  will  partition
expressions of any given logical type into equivalence classes. All we now need to do is
take these equivalence classes as corresponding uniquely to abstract entities, which may
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then be construed as the referents of the expressions in each equivalence class.
(Dummett, 1981, pp. 401–402)
The deflationary theorist  is  someone who provides just  such a programmatic
account of a particular language. Doing that is fine but is incompatible with treating
those referents, those equivalence classes, as determined by everyday (or even outré)
worldly objects and properties. In order for that to be the case, we need it to be the case
that "'the referents of our words are what we speak about'" (Dummett, 1981, p. 404). To
do that:
We do not require merely that there be some object which can serve as the referent of a
name, that is, which can satisfy the condition that the referent determines the class of
semantically equivalent names to which the given name belongs:  we require that the
object taken to be the referent be the one to which any predicate in whose argument-
place the name can stand can meaningfully be applied (truly or falsely); and that, among
such objects, that one be taken to be the referent which is such that the resulting sentence
is true just in case the predicate is true of it.
(Dummett, 1981, p. 405)
I am claiming that the reason we need a substantial notion of intentionality is so
that we can give flesh to a theory of meaning. Without it we are left with a picture of
speaker behaviour. It might be a picture we can draw because we could have developed
sophisticated linguistic practices without ever noticing that they were about the world.
Unless they are about the world it is not a picture we can understand. Understanding
that  picture  requires  getting  outside  of  the  practice  to  see why we have  drawn the
picture in the way that we have. That perspective is not available if all speaking and
thinking,  including  speaking  and  thinking  about  speaking and  thinking,  are  pure
practical behaviours. 
The moral is clear. Minimalist theories of truth are inadequate to account for
explicit knowledge of meaning and content. A minimalist truth predicate is adequate to
build a theory of meaning or a theory of thought which models behaviour at the ground
floor. This is as it should be. Agents who are operating at the ground floor more or less
get things right.  On a minimalist  account, getting things right is always in terms of
hypothetical reasons. However,  agents need have no concept of getting things right.
They merely need to be able to respond to reasons, and thus get things right when things
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go  well.  However,  agents  operating  at  the  first  level  have  explicit  knowledge  of
meaning  and  content.  They  are  able  to  evaluate  their  own  and  other  people's
performances. Evaluating performances, on these views, is a matter of recognising the
hypothetical  reasons  that  agents  have  for  those  performances.  As  the  reasons  are
hypothetical,  what  counts  as  a  reason  depends  on  the  agent's  projects.  So,  explicit
evaluation  requires  explicit  attribution  of  projects  to  agents  and  an  explicit
understanding  of  how things  are  in  the  world.  That  requires  grasping  the  concepts
involved in attributing reasons to performers. But, doing that, at the very least, requires
seeing how thoughts or sentences relate to the world. That is, appealing to a vertical
dimension of concept use or the use of sub-sentential expressions. The problem with
minimalist theories of truth is that, by denying any substantial notion of intentionality
and  correctness,  they  fail  to  make  sense  of  how  thinkers  can  recognise  a  vertical
dimension of concept use. So, they preclude themselves from any account of explicit
knowledge of meaning and content.
§4 Inflating Truth and Deflating Correctness
By  deflating  normativity  and  intentionality,  the  minimalist  is  left  with  no
account  as  to  how  it  is  that  she  has  explicit  knowledge  of  the  content  of  her
propositional attitudes or the meaning of her sentences. In particular, she wants to claim
that all linguistic understanding is a matter of being able to use words in accordance
with some regularity of use, and all other understanding a matter of being disposed to
move in and out of, and between mental states. However, those mental states are fully
characterised as a dispositional state, so understanding does not require awareness of
how the world strikes you. But, to claim to characterise even the horizontal connections
between states requires being able to adopt a third personal perspective on your own
dispositional setup. That requires some account of how you ever came to recognise that
you were thinking about how things are, and, indeed, some account of what it is to
recognise of  the  belief  that  p,  which  is  fully characterised in  terms of  it  horizontal
connections, is, when things go well, a response to the fact that p. In other words, the
theorist need some account of how she came to realise that her belief that p was, in
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some minimal sense, correct if and only if p. However, by precluding herself from there
being  anything  that  accounts  for  intentionality,  the  theorist  precludes  herself  from
making  sense  of  how  she  came  to  see  that  the  interpretation  of  her  thoughts  and
sentences given by a theory of thought or a theory of meaning was so much as an
interpretation. What the minimalist ends up with is a picture on which everything is
mere behaviour. The problem was that by deflating both intentionality and correctness
the theorist is unable to make sense of our own ability to model ground floor behaviour. 
I am now going to turn to views that deflate correctness, but treat truth as a
substantial property. In particular those that treat truth as a relation between a sentence
and a truth maker and those that treat it  as a relation between a thought and a truth
maker (designation views). The idea is that words or concepts are such that they stand in
relations  to  worldly  referents.  If  such  a  view  could  be  made  to  work,  then  the
meaning/concept fact associated with each word/concept could provide a descriptive
standard that would allow for norm relativity without  prescriptive rules.  What  I  am
going to do is show that the explicit knowledge constraint rules out these sorts of views.
4.1 Inflation of Semantic Vocabulary
Hattiangadi is someone who has defended such a view. I am going to start with a
discussion of her views in order to bring out the problem. There is this much that can be
said  in  Hattiangadi's  favour,  she  has  no  pretensions  to  deflate  truth  or  meaning.
Hattiangadi is comfortable with the idea of substantial meaning facts. In fact she thinks
that they are simply the sort of thing we cannot do without. As she writes:
Moreover,  the  sceptical  solution  fails  to  supply  a  suitable  surrogate  conception  of
meaning,  since  the  notion  of  communal  agreement  presupposes  representations  with
determinate content. Without assuming semantic realism at the outset, the semantic non-
factualist  cannot  legitimate  meaning  ascriptions  to  sentences  that  comprise  the
conclusion of his argument, and the sentences leading up to it; he cannot claim that his
sentences are true even in the weakest,  deflationary sense.  It  turns out that  the non-
factualist conclusion of the sceptical argument is irremediably self-defeating.
(Hattiangadi, 2007, pp. 210–211)
Hattiangadi  acknowledges  that  she  has  no  theory  as  to  what  constitutes  the
meaning of a word, nevertheless she thinks it is self contradictory to deny there is a fact
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of the matter about the meaning of a word. The problem, as she honestly acknowledges,
is  to  give an account  of  representation  (Hattiangadi,  2007, p.  211).  But,  she argues
whatever account of representation is correct it will not need to meet any action guiding
constraint. She thinks that "if meaning is normative, then semantic facts would have to
be both objective and inherently action-guiding" (Hattiangadi, 2007, p. 209). She also
thinks that nothing could be both objective and inherently action guiding, so drops the
claim that meaning is normative. What I hope to show in this section is that there is no
account of representation as designation that does not treat meaning as objective and
inherently  action  guiding.  In  chapter  4  I  will  show  that  there  is  no  problem with
something being objective and inherently action guiding.
Hattiangadi thinks that there is a fact about the meaning of a word and a fact
about the content of a concept, and, unlike Horwich, these facts are more than whatever
explains a regularity of performance. Grasp of these facts would be sufficient to account
for our ability to explicitly understand claims like R1. However,  Hattiangadi  claims
ignorance of the sort of thing that might constitute a meaning fact. However, she thinks
that this is a form of scepticism which we can live with:
However,  although  we  do  not  now  know  of  a  fact  that  will  decide  between  the
hypothesis  that  I  mean  snow by ‘snow’ and  the  hypothesis  that  I  mean  schmow [a
hypothetical variant word whose application conditions coincide with all of my actual
uses of 'snow' but which differ for some potential uses of 'snow'] it does not follow that
there can be no fact of the matter what I mean. The sceptic places no restrictions on the
sorts  of  fact  we are entitled  to  consider  —he allows even that  the fact  that  I  mean
something by a word is one accessible only to an omniscient God. Hence, the fact that
constitutes what I mean might well be one of which we are not now aware. The sceptic is
not justified in concluding that there is no fact of the matter simply because we do not
know of one.
(Hattiangadi, 2007, p. 210)
The problem, as I showed in the previous section, is that for one to have explicit
knowledge of  meaning more  is  required than  the  bare existence of  a  meaning fact.
Meaning facts need to be such that they determine substantial semantic values, and in
grasping a meaning fact one needs to thereby know what semantic value is determined
by it. But, if we do not have any knowledge of meaning facts, how can we know what
substantial  semantic  values  they  determine?  However,  this  is  not  a  problem  for
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Hattiangadi. She can claim that the sort of meaning facts of which we are ignorant are
facts in a reductive class. In other words, the things of which we are ignorant are the
sort of things that determine why a word has one meaning rather than another. But,
claims like,  '"snow" means snow' are,  unlike on Horwich's  view, substantial  claims.
They convey information about the semantic value of the named expression. Reflective
speakers of English are  able to  grasp such claims,  but because they do not  help us
understand what it is for a word to have a meaning, they do not do anything for the
philosophical project of accounting for meaning. Hattiangadi is puzzled as to what it is
that makes a word meaningful. She does not deny that there are substantial semantic
relations, and thus does not face the same problem as Horwich and other minimalists.
4.2 Representation
Human languages have the power to represent an infinite number of situations.
Reflective speakers of a human language have the ability to explicitly understand an
infinite  number  of  those  representations.  Human  beings  do  not  have  the  ability  to
remember an infinite list of pairs. This precludes linguistic representation being a matter
of the pairing up of the declarative sentences with situations. Instead, language works
by being compositional. Competent human speakers grasp the meaning of a finite stock
of semantic primitives. They also grasp the significance of combining those primitives
in  particular  ways.  A competent  speaker  understands  the  result  of  combining  the
semantic  primitives  in  a  syntactically  correct  manner  into  a  sentence.  So  far,  so
uncontroversial. Competent speakers understand the meaning of sentences because they
understand the meanings of their  parts  and the significance of the way they are put
together. In addition, if something has content, then, as I have already shown, it has
truth conditions. So, as Hattiangadi thinks that sentences have contents, she has to think
they have truth conditions69. It follows that, at the very least, somebody who grasps the
meaning of the sentence needs to be in a position to work out the truth conditions of that
sentence. The question is: how can meaning be such that competent speakers are in a
position such that they can work out the truth conditions of any arbitrary sentence?
69 This is what Hattiangadi does in fact think (Hattiangadi, 2007, p. 12).
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4.3 Correspondence as Congruence
The traditional answer to this question appeals to congruence. The idea is that
each categorematic part of a sentence has a meaning such that it picks out some worldly
item.  Speakers  who  grasp  the  meaning  of  the  words  out  of  which  the  sentence  is
composed are in a position to locate the worldly counterpart of each categorematic part.
They also understand the significance of putting those parts together. For example, the
meaning of "Stravinsky" is such that it refers to Stravinsky, the meaning of "composed"
is such that it stands for the two placed relation of composition, and "the Rite of Spring"
such that it refers to The Rite of Spring. But, this brings in the problem of the unity of
the proposition. There is a significant difference between "Stravinsky composed the Rite
of Spring" and "Stravinsky, the relation of composition, The Rite of Spring". The former
is a sentence, and the latter is a list. They both have unity, but only the former can make
a  claim70.  Another  way  of  putting  the  point  is  by  saying  that  sentences  have  a
completeness which lists lack. According to the congruence theorist the answer is that in
a  sentence,  the  relation  relates,  and  this  will  be  mirrored  in  the  reference  of  that
sentence. This is not the case in a list. It becomes a brute fact about some entities that
they have the completeness characteristic of a claim, and, when we have something with
that completeness, we have a sentence whose reference is a fact. Competent speakers
are able to exploit the fact that the reference of a sentence is a fact to use sentences for
whatever purpose they, the competent speakers, see fit. They can use the sentence to
deny that there is such a fact, to assert that there is such a fact, to lie about the existence
of such a fact, to ask about it, etc.
However, there is a problem with false sentences. Take the sentence "Berlioz
composed The Rite of Spring", this is as complete as our exemplar sentence, and makes
just as much of a claim. It is however false. The problem is that the explanation of the
completeness of a sentence was that when we have a sentence the relation relates the
other items in the sentence into a unity, and this is mirrored in the reference. But, false
sentences are just as meaningful as true sentences. So, in false sentences the relation
relates, and this is mirrored in their reference. The reference of "Berlioz composed The
70 I first spotted this point in Richard Gaskin (Gaskin, 2008, p. 2). Leonard Linsky also makes the same
point (Linsky, 1992, p. 243). Linsky attributes the distinction to Russell and the distinction between a
proposition and a class as many (Russell, 1992, §70). 
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Rite of Spring" is the fact that Berlioz composed The Rite of Spring. This means that we
have to acknowledge that there is no difference in kind between true facts and false
facts. All of which sounds a bit silly. 
That is not yet an objection. The silliness can be somewhat diffused if I change
the jargon and talk about states affairs. There is no difference in kind between true states
of  affairs  and  false  states  of  affairs.  However,  the  real  problem is  that  we  cannot
distinguish the true states of affairs from the false states of affairs. Each meaningful
sentence has a reference. The references of sentences, true and false, make up a single
unified class  of  state  of  affairs.  Russell  tried to  hold this  position  for  a  while,  and
expresses it as follows:
It may be said – and this is, I believe, the correct view – that there is no problem at all in
truth and falsehood; that some propositions are true and some false, just as some roses
are red and some white; that belief is a certain attitude towards propositions, which is
called knowledge when they are true, error when they are false.
(Russell, 1904, p. 523)
But, if the difference between the true facts and false fact is as trivial as the fact that
there is a difference between a red rose and white rose, a preference for true facts is "an
unaccountable prejudice" (Russell, 1904, p. 523). Russell thinks he can live with this
prejudice, but in fact he cannot71. We can distinguish red roses from white roses, and so
can prefer one or other type of rose. But, if the meaning of a sentence is a fact, we
cannot distinguish true facts and false facts. They are all on a par. In building a theory of
meaning  for  a  language  the  theorist  appeals  to  an  understanding  of  assertion  as
presenting as true. She lays claim to an understanding of the difference between truth
and falsity, and this is an impossibility on Russell's short lived view. The fact that we
can have explicit knowledge of what it is to assert shows that meaning and truth are not
both mere congruence with a fact.
4.4 Correspondence as Correlation
The more  modern  option,  which  is  due  to  Richard  Kirkham's  reading of  JL
Austin (Kirkham, 1995, p. 124), is to eschew any congruence between sentence and
71 Like so many of Russell's views, this one was short lived. He was on the verge of giving it up in 1906
(see Russell 1906, §III).
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truth maker. Words are meaningful in such a way that when they are combined together
into a sentence they form a sentence which is also meaningful. That sentence is true
when it corresponds to a fact, and false otherwise. But, correspondence is not a matter
of congruence with a truth maker, it is merely a matter of lining up sentences with facts.
However, competent speakers are in a position to do that lining up for any sentence that
they understand. Reflective speakers have explicit knowledge of those correlations. As a
result, the explicit knowledge required is knowledge of these correlations.
It  looks like there might  be a simple solution.  Given that  we are competent
speakers,  we  know  that  "Stravinsky  composed  the  Rite  of  Spring"  means  that
Stravinsky composed the Rite of Spring, and that "I am happy here and now" means that
the  purported  speaker  is  happy  at  the  purported  time  and  location  of  utterance.
Competent speakers are then in a position to appeal to the disquotational nature of the
truth predicate to specify the truth conditions. All that they have to do is substitute their
statement of meaning into the so-called equivalence schema:
ES. S is true if and only if p
where S is the name of a sentence and p is a sentence in use which can
also be used to give the meaning of S
So, "Stravinsky composed the Rite of Spring" is true if and only if Stravinsky composed
the Rite of Spring, and "I am happy here and now" is true if and only if the purported
speaker is happy at the purported time and location of utterance. 
However,  although  this  method  will  allow  a  competent  speaker  to  give  a
statement of the truth conditions of any sentence, it cannot be a statement of her explicit
knowledge of the truth conditions of a sentence. For any given sentence, she needs to
know which fact it would be correlated with if it were true. The reason she needs to
know this is this is because, amongst other things, she knows what it is to present the
sentence as true. If the sentence is true because it is in fact correlated with some fact in
the world, then to present it as true is to present it as being so correlated. That is, she
needs to know which fact it would be correlated with if it were true. But, all that the
equivalence schema gives us, on this view, is a way of naming the fact in question. In
general, there is something arbitrary about the relation between a name and its bearer.
To learn the use of a name one needs to learn to pair up an object in the world with that
name. But, there are far too many possible facts for a competent speaker to learn which
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fact is correlated with which sentence by learning a whole list of pairings. Instead, if a
true sentence does indeed designate a fact, she needs to understand how the meaning of
the sentence determines which fact it would designate if it were true. But, until we have
an account of how it is that a sentences in use name facts, we are not in a position to
know which fact an arbitrary sentence would be correlated with were it to be true. It is
as if when asked who invented the zip, someone replies, "Julius". When asked as to the
identity of Julius, they reply, "the person who invented the zip". Assuming that some
unique person did invent the zip, the answer to the question is true,  but it  does not
provide any information. 
Among the things that a speaker who has explicit knowledge of the content of a
sentence knows is the truth conditions of that sentence. The fact that correlation theories
have the resources to specify the truth conditions for any given sentence does not show
that the correlation theory has the resources to make sense of the explicit knowledge of
competent speakers. What a correlation theory can do is show that if we can find a
statement  of  the  meaning  of  a  sentence,  we  can  use  that  statement  to  produce  a
statement  of  the  truth  conditions  of  that  sentence.  However,  to  explain  our  explicit
knowledge of what it is to use a sentence with a variety of forces, we need to show how
it is that a competent speaker is able to know the truth conditions of sentences. Finding
a way of specifying the output of that knowledge does not account for that competence. 
In effect,  the correspondence theorist  faces a dilemma: if  she allows that the
meaning of a sentence is its truth conditions, then specifying the truth conditions does in
fact account for her knowledge of meaning. However, she is then unable to account for
the difference between a true sentence and a false sentence. If she wishes to account for
the difference between a true sentence and a false sentence by appeal to whether or not
the truth conditions obtain, specification of the truth conditions of a sentence does not
account  for  her  explicit  knowledge  of  meaning.  Because,  on  this  view,  the  truth
conditions  of  a  sentence  are  its  being  correlated  with a  truth  maker,  specifying  the
meaning of a sentence does not explain why it has truth conditions at all. And even if it
is  taken  as  an  article  of  faith  that  true  sentences  correspond  to  truth  makers,  the
specification  of  a  potential  truth  maker,  T,  of  a  sentence,  S,  does  not  explain  why
something that means what S does should be correlated with T when S is true. In other
words, the correlation theorist has no account of her explicit knowledge.
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4.5 The Mental
The mental sphere has parallel problems. If the content of a belief is taken to be
an item in the world, then we have the immediate parallel problem to the problem of
false facts. To put it another way, if belief is taken to be a two place relation between a
thinker and a fact, then false beliefs have facts for objects, and we can make no sense of
what makes a true belief different from a false belief. 
But, it might be objected, that a belief is a relation between a thinker and a fact,
however true beliefs and false beliefs are all relations to facts which are actual. For
example,  the  belief  that  Donald  Bradman  has  a  higher  batting  average  than  Wally
Hammond is related to the same fact as the belief that Donald Bradman does not have a
higher batting average than Wally Hammond, namely the fact that Donald Bradman has
the higher average. This makes the former belief true and the latter belief false. The
thought would be that there is a distinction between the object and the content of a
belief. The object of a belief is the fact to which it is related, and the content it is what
determines that object. The two beliefs in question have the same object, namely the
fact that Donald Bradman has a higher batting average than Wally Hammond, but a
different  content.  In  the  former  belief,  the  content  is  that  Donald  Bradman has  the
higher average, and in the latter that Wally Hammond scored more runs per innings.
Bertrand Russell tried out this view for a while:
You  may believe  the  proposition  "to-day is  Tuesday"  both  when,  in  fact,  to-day  is
Tuesday,  and  when  to-day  is  not  Tuesday.  If  today  is  not  Tuesday,  this  fact  is  the
objective of your belief that to-day is Tuesday. But obviously the relation of your belief
to the fact is different in this case from what it is in the case when to-day is Tuesday. We
may say,  metaphorically,  that  when to-day is  Tuesday,  your belief  that  it  is  Tuesday
points  TOWARDS the  fact,  whereas  when  to-day is  not  Tuesday your  belief  points
AWAY FROM the fact. Thus the objective reference of a belief is not determined by the
fact alone, but by the direction of the belief towards or away from the fact.
Russell, 1921, Chapter XIII
However, making this modification robs some of the simplicity from the original
theory. There is no longer an account of why each belief has the object that it does.
Remember, a theorist of thought is trying to account for the explicit knowledge of the
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truth conditions. On this view, the truth conditions of the belief are the fact that makes
the belief true or false. In my example, it is the fact that Donald Bradman has a higher
batting average than Wally Hammond which makes the belief that Donald Bradman has
the higher average true and makes the belief that Wally Hammond scored more runs per
innings  false.  This  is  the  mental  analogue  of  a  correlation  view.  And,  as  in  the
correlation case with language, it is not enough merely to specify the truth conditions of
each thought,  we need an account of why they are the truth conditions.  Indeed, the
position is in an even worse state than the correlation theory because truth is no longer a
device of denominalisation.  The phrase used to give the content of a belief is not a
structural descriptive name of the fact, and so we cannot use truth to denominalise it and
state the fact it names. It may be that the object of every belief is a fact, and that there
are no false facts, but that does not explain why each belief has the object that it does. 
The truth maker of the belief is determined by the content of that belief, and the
content determined by which concepts are involved in the belief. So, it is to conceptual
content that the theorist will turn. However, propositional content is not well defined.
There are a variety of approaches. The way to think about them is in terms of different
analyses of propositional attitude ascriptions. To keep things simple consider:
B1: Adriana believes that today is Tuesday
One way of analysing B1 is to treat "today is Tuesday" as a description of a fact and
"that today is Tuesday" as the name of a thought. This then uses the description, "today
is  Tuesday" as  part  of a  structural-descriptive name which attributes to  Adriana the
mental state that points "to the fact 'to-day is Tuesday' if that is a fact, or away from the
fact 'to-day is not Tuesday' if that is a fact" (Russell, 1921, chapter XIII). As a result, the
phrase, "that today is Tuesday" is not only the name of a thought, but the name of a
possible fact. 
Now, both "thought" and "fact" are terms of art. There is no theory-independent
way of deciding on the identity conditions  for either  thoughts  or facts.  Instead,  the
theorist who wants to make play with such entities needs to provide a theory about what
constitutes a thought or a fact and then convince us that this is the right way of thinking
about the world. I have claimed that two thoughts are distinct if and only if they they
have a different mental role. But,  if distinct thoughts have different mental roles, they
have different systematic effects on the activity of thinking. Which is to say, that, even
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when two distinct thoughts are true in all the same situations, a thinker can adopt an
attitude with one of those thoughts as its content that she does not adopt to the other. In
effect, this is to appeal to the Fregean 'intuitive criterion of difference' (Evans, 1982, p.
18). Two thoughts are distinct if and only if they are differently informative. I am going
to focus for the moment on facts. One way of thinking about facts is to treat them as
datable events. That is, as locatable happenings in space-time. However, on this view,
because two thoughts can have a different mental role while being about the same fact,
thoughts are much more fine grained than facts,  Here is Frank Ramsey presenting the
problem, Ramsey uses "event" rather than "fact" in his presentation. This does not affect
the argument as, for the moment, facts are under discussion as datable events:
The truth is that a phrase like "the death of Caesar" can be used in two different ways;
ordinarily, we use it as the description of an event, and we could say that "the death of
Caesar" and "the murder of Caesar " were two different descriptions of the same event.
But we can also use "the death of Caesar" in a context like "he was aware of the death of
Caesar" meaning "he was aware that Caesar had died"; here (and this is the sort of case
which occurs in the discussion of cognition) we cannot regard "the death of Caesar " as
the description of an event; if it were, the whole proposition would be, "There is an event
E of a certain sort, such that he is aware of E," and would be still true if we substituted
another  description  of  the  same  event,  e.g.,  "the  murder  of  Caesar."  That  is,  if  his
awareness has for its object an event described by "the death of Caesar," then, if he is
aware of the death of Caesar, he must also be aware of the murder of Caesar, for they are
identical.  But,  in  fact,  he  could  quite  well  be  aware  that  Caesar  had  died,  without
knowing that he had been murdered, so that his awareness must have for its object not
merely an event but an event and a character also.
(Ramsey, 1927, p. 156)
The problem which  Ramsey has  identified  is  that,  outside  of  the  context  of
propositional attitude ascriptions, there is no problem with the inter-substitution of co-
referring singular terms. This is not the case in ascriptions of propositional attitudes. As
a result, sentences cannot straightforwardly be part of structural-descriptive names of
thoughts because they do not designate thoughts72. The problem is not just with treating
facts as datable events. It is a problem with any view of facts that treats facts as more
fine grained than the sentences we use to talk about them. Just so long as fact identity is
determined by the extensions of the words used in the sentence with which we describe
72 I  take  it  that  this  Alonzo  Church's  version  of  the  so-called  "slingshot  argument"  provides  a
formalisation of this objection (Church 1943, 299-301).
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the relevant fact Ramsey's problem will reappear. It will always be possible to find two
sentences which are about the same fact but which are differently informative. So, on
this analysis of B1, there is no account of which fact a thought corresponds with. In
other words, on this analysis of B1, there is no account of the content of thoughts.
Alternatively,  one might try to bite the bullet and maintain that sentences do
designate possible facts, and that  any difference in the informativeness of a sentence
makes a difference to which fact it designates. Such a view understands the sentence,
"today is Tuesday" as claiming that there is some fact, x, and x is the fact that today is
Tuesday.  It  designates  a  different  fact  from the  sentence,  "yesterday was  Monday".
Doing  this  allows  us  to  keep  our  semantic  innocence  whilst  maintaining  that
propositional  attitude contexts  are  fine grained.  It  would be possible  to  believe that
today is Tuesday without believing that yesterday was Monday because one did not
realise that the fact picked out by your belief is such that, if it obtains, so does the fact
picked out by the belief that yesterday was Monday. John Searle has developed just
such a view (Searle, 1995, pp. 211–212).
However,  this  undermines  the explanatory power of  the theory.  It  is  another
version of the correlation theory. To see this consider, that on this view facts are so fine-
grained that the only way to specify a fact is by using a sentence to form a transparent
name of a belief and saying that it is the fact correlated with that belief, i.e. "the fact
correlated  with  the  belief  that  today  is  Tuesday".  The  theory  provides  no  way  of
specifying a fact other than by specifying the content of a belief. So, like the correlation
theorist, Searle needs to provide an account of why each belief would designate the fact
that it does73. One way to go about this would be to develop a redundancy theory of
truth for beliefs. I will turn to this sort of view in the next chapter. Before then, I am
going  to  look  at  another  way  that  Russell  tried  to  defend  a  version  of  the
correspondence theory. This is the multiple relation theory of judgement.
4.6 Multiple Relation Theories of Judgement
The  locus  classicus for  a  multiple  relation  theory  of  judgement  is  Bertrand
73 It is also not obvious that the theory avoids all versions of the slingshot. Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra
has provided a version aimed against Searle's correspondence theory (Rodriguez-Pereyra, 1998).
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Russell.  He starts to develop it in "On the Nature of Truth" (Russell, 1906, pp. 44–49)
and presents a version in his 1913 "The Problems of Philosophy"  (Russell, 2001, pp.
72–75). The idea is that instead of treating a belief as a relation between a thinker and a
proposition, or between a thinker and a fact, a belief is treated as a multiple relation
between a thinker, objects, properties and relations. The act of judgement unifies these
disparate entities into a single complex whole. That belief is true when the complex
whole created by the act of judgement corresponds to a fact. It is false otherwise. For
example, Clare's belief that tomatoes taste good with salt is a complex whole formed by
Clare's judgement that tomatoes taste good with salt. That judgement unifies the concept
tomatoes with the concept tasting good with salt. The belief is then analysed as a three
placed relation between Clare, the concept tomatoes and the concept tasting good with
salt74. If the judgement is true, then there is a fact that tomatoes taste good with salt, and
that means that there is a four placed relation between Clare, the concept tomatoes, the
concept tasting good with salt, and the fact that tomatoes taste good with salt.
However, the theory also faces the problem of accounting for the possibility of
explicit knowledge of content. The basic question is why should the complex whole
which is  that the three placed relation between Clare,  the concept tomatoes and the
concept  tasting good with salt stand in a relation to the fact that tomatoes taste good
with salt? The problem is that complex wholes are just one more object in the world,
albeit a complex object. Their standing in relation to other complex wholes, facts, is yet
another complex object in the world. As a result, the link between making a judgement
and believing that  something is  true is  severed.  A belief,  on this  view, is  a  relation
between a believer and a series of entities. A belief is true when the complex whole
formed by an act of judgement corresponds to some relation of objects in the world. It is
false otherwise. 
However, because truth is analysed as a relation between two complex wholes,
the truth of a belief is itself another entity. So, on this view, the belief that a belief is true
is the result of a different judgement from the belief itself. When Clare believes that her
belief about tomatoes is true, she is not only part of a three placed relation between
herself, the concept tomatoes, and the concept tasting nice with salt, she is also part of a
relation which relates herself, the three placed relation just mentioned, and the fact that
74 I am here using italics to name concepts. In general I prefer to use a locution like, "the concept of
tomatoes" to turn that trick. However, it is a bit cumbersome here.
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tomatoes taste nice with salt. This brings with it the problem of false facts in a new
form.  Consider  what  happens  when Clare  has  a  false  belief  about  one  of  her  own
beliefs, for example her belief, on a cold day, that the weather is warm. Clare's belief in
the truth of her belief that the weather is warm is a three placed relation formed by an
act of judgement. The relata are:
(d) Clare,
(e) the  complex  whole  her  belief  that  the  weather  is  warm  related  by
correspondence to the fact that the weather is warm,
(f) the fact that the complex whole her belief that the weather is warm is related by
correspondence to the fact that the weather is warm. 
But, unless we are prepared to countenance false facts there can be no such complex
whole formed by Clare's judgement relating i, ii and iii. This is because there is no fact
that  the weather  is  warm, and the fact  that  the weather  is  warm forms an essential
component in two of the complex wholes, ii and iii, which are part of the belief. That is
an intolerable result, but so is acknowledging the existence of false facts. Without there
being a difference between true facts and false facts, there is no difference between a
true belief and a false belief.
It could perhaps be suggested that where the belief is false the worldly element
of the complex is the null set. This would avoid the problem of false facts. However, the
position faces further problems. There is nothing, on this theory,  to stop Clare from
believing that the weather is warm whilst denying that the belief that the weather is
warm is true. On this view, there is the complex of a belief, and then a further fact as to
whether it stands in relation to a fact or to the null set. To believe that a belief is true is
to judge that there is a fact of its relation to a fact. Nothing about the content of a belief
requires  that  a  thinker  makes  that  judgement.  By making truth  a  matter  of  relation
between belief and a fact, the position cannot account for the validity of moving from
"the belief that p" to "the belief that p is true". It makes the fact of that inference a quirk
of  our  psychology,  and  makes  logic  hostage  to  empirical  facts  about  our  mental
organisation.
The deep reason for this is that the view precludes the possibility of explicit
knowledge of content. It is a view that denies that specifying the truth conditions of a
belief captures the content of that belief. This is because, on a multiple relation theory,
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the truth conditions of a belief are the obtaining of a relation of correspondence between
that belief and a fact. Someone who judges that the belief is true judges that the relation
obtains.  They make that  judgement  on the  basis  of  the  content  of  the  belief.  Their
knowledge of the content of the belief must be such that it allows them to know which
fact needs to obtain for the belief to be related to the world in such a way that it is true.
But, as the truth conditions are a correspondence relation holding between a belief, B,
and a particular fact, F, if the content of the belief could by captured by specifying the
truth conditions of that belief, then the knowledge that the truth conditions of B are the
obtaining of a correspondence relation between B and F would have to determine which
fact F was. That looks all right until we consider that in order to know that the truth
conditions of B are the obtaining of a correspondence relation between B and F you
must already know which fact F is. But you have no way of knowing which fact F is
until you know which fact B would be related to if it were true, and no way of knowing
which fact B would be related to until you know which fact F is. You are stuck in a
circle.
4.7 Frege
The  essence  of  a  correspondence  view  is  that  intentionality  is  a  matter  of
designation.  A sentence or  thought  is  meant  to  designate something.  This  of course
immediately  raises  a  problem  with  falsity.  Why  should  a  false  sentence  designate
something? Apart from Russell's earliest view, correspondence theories have all tried to
find a way of explaining the difference between true sentences or thoughts and false
ones. The natural move is to make sense of meaning or propositional content in such a
way that somebody who understands the sentence/grasps the thought knows what item
the sentence/thought would designate if it were to be true. However, this pulls apart
content and truth conditions in an untenable manner. The theory, may be able to make
sense of specifying the truth conditions of each item, but is unable to make sense of why
each item should have the truth conditions that it does. The theory can give no insight
into why a sentence/thought should be correlated with the specified truth conditions. In
this way, specifying the truth conditions does not make sense of explicit knowledge of
content.
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There  is  another  famous  argument  to  the  same  effect.  It  is  the  slingshot
argument. The slingshot starts from two reasonable assumptions:
SA1. Co-referring singular terms are everywhere interchangeable
SA2. Logical equivalents can be substituted for each other.
It then shows that a candidate most one correspondent for all true sentences as follows:
I.   Snow is white corresponds to the fact that Snow is white.
II.  Snow is  white  corresponds  to  the  fact  that  x(x  =  Diogenes)  =  x(x  =  
Diogenes whilst snow is white)75.
III.  Snow is white  corresponds to  the fact  that  x(x = Diogenes)  =  x(x =  
Diogenes whilst grass is green).
IV.  Snow is white corresponds to the fact that grass is green.
(a) "Snow is white" and (b) "x(x = Diogenes) = x(x = Diogenes whilst snow is white)"
are logical equivalents, as are (c) "x(x = Diogenes) = x(x = Diogenes whilst grass is
green)"  and  (d)  "grass  is  green".  As  a  result,  there  should  be  no  problem  with
substituting (a) with (b) or (c) with (d) to the right of "corresponds to the fact that".
However, (e) "x(x = Diogenes whilst snow is white)" and (f) "x(x = Diogenes whilst
grass  is  green)"  are  co-referring  singular  terms  and  so  (e)  and  (f)  should  also  be
interchangeable  to  the  right  of  "corresponds  to  the  fact  that".  Of  course,  the  only
important feature of (a) "snow is white" and (b) "grass is green" is that they are both
true. Any two truths would have done.
Although, I think the slingshot is a powerful argument, and successful against
correlation theories.  There are  ways of  blocking it.  In  particular,  one can deny that
definite descriptions are singular terms and so resist the move from II to III. However,
the argument I have offered is more general than slingshot. The slingshot purports to
show that if sentences designate something, then there are most two things and at least
two things for a sentence to designate. These two things are then plausibly taken to be
the  True  and  the  False.  This  is  exactly  the  moral  Frege  draws  from problems  of
substitution in "on Sense and Reference"76. He writes:
75 "x(x = Diogenes)" should be read as "the unique x such that x is Diogenes"
76 This was not Frege's view in "The Foundations of Arithmetic" (Frege, 1980) or in "The Thought"
(Frege, 1956). at the beginning of Frege's career and at the end, he recognises the unique nature of
sentences. He understands that the semantic value of an expression must be its contribution to the
truth values of sentences in which it can occur.
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Let us assume for the time being that the sentence has a reference! If we now replace one
word of the sentence by another having the same referent, but a different sense, this can
have no influence upon the referent of the sentence. Yet we can see that in such a case the
thought  changes;  since,  e.g.,  the  thought  of  the  sentence  "The  morning  star  is  a  body
illuminated  by the  sun" differs  from that  of  the  sentence  "The  evening star  is  a  body
illuminated by the sun." Anybody who did not know that the evening star is the morning
star might hold the one thought to be true, the other false. The thought, accordingly, cannot
be the referent of the sentence, but must rather be considered as the sense.
(Frege, 1948, p. 33)
and then, after pointing out that in judgement we recognise the thought to be true or
false, as the case may be, he writes:
We are therefore driven into accepting the truth value of a sentence as its referent. By the
truth value of sentence I understand the circumstance that it is true or false. There are no
further truth values. For brevity I call one the true, the other the false. Every declarative
sentence concerned with the referents of its words is therefore to be regarded as proper
name, and its referent, if it exists, is either the true or the false.
(Frege, 1948, p. 34)
But, the foregoing shows that Frege was wrong to treat a sentence as a proper
name for a truth value. Frege faces the same problem as early Russell. Russell initially
tried to treat sentences as names of facts. Some sentences named true facts and some
sentences named false facts. Russell was unable account for our preference for truth
over falsity. Frege faces the same problem. He presents us with two respectable objects.
Some  sentences  name  one,  and  some  sentences  name  the  other.  He  gives  us  no
conception of how it is that we are able to judge that a sentence names the true. He has a
slight advantage over Russell. Russell maintained that there was no difference in kind
between false  facts  and true facts.  As a result  Russell  could not make sense of our
ability to understand presenting as true. For Frege, there is a difference between the true
and the false. So, Frege can maintain that judging a sentence to be true is judging that it
refers to the true. But, we are unable to make sense of our ability to understand the truth
conditions  of  sentences,  and,  thus,  Frege  still  can  not  make  sense  of  ability  to
understand presenting sentences as true. 
Understanding the content of a sentence gives us an understanding of the truth
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conditions of that sentence. But, once truth and falsity are assimilated to objects, the
truth  conditions  of  the  sentence  are  its  referring  to  the  true.  But,  now why should
something with the content that snow is white refer to the true if and only if snow is
white? The answer, for Frege, is that "is white" is a function from objects to the true
when the argument place is filled by an object which is, in fact, white. But, we now
need an account of what it is to be, in fact, white. This is something we can make sense
of when we make sense of predicate "is white" being true of white things,  but that
requires us to make sense of sentences as being true or false. Treating a sentence being
true as a matter of it designating the True leaves us unable to use our grip on what it is
to be true to make sense of which objects fall under which predicate. The problem is
that  when the true and the false  are  just  two objects,  predicates  are  functions  from
objects to one of two objects – the True or the False. We can define a predicate in terms
of which objects will, when supplied as argument, yield the True as value. But, there is
no more to be said about why an object falls within the extension of a predicate. This
results in having to understand what it is to be, in fact, white in terms of membership of
the extension of the predicate "is white". But, we now have no way of making sense of
which objects are members of the extension of the predicate "is white". The same is
going  to  go  for  any other  predicate.  The  semantics  Frege  offers  in  "on  Sense  and
Reference" may be adequate to build a model of a language. It cannot make sense of our
understanding of the language. Truth itself cannot be an object which is the referent of
some sentences. 
The problem is quite general. We do not gain an understanding of language by
treating sentences as designating objects. The same goes for mentality and thoughts. We
do not gain an understanding of mentality by treating thoughts as designating objects.
So, intentionality cannot be explained as a mapping relation between sentences/thoughts
and things in the world. Instead, it has to be intrinsic to a sentence or a thought that it is
about the world. Any account of content has to make sense of that.
§5 Summary and the Way Ahead
Using  language  and  thinking  are practical  activities.  They  are  things  that
creatures can do. Those practical  capacities can be modelled,  in part,  by building a
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bipartite truth conditional theory for each practice.  The theory will take the form of
specifying the different types of linguistic/mental action in terms of the way the truth
value of the sentence/thought used in performing an action affects the performance of
that  action,  and  then  provide  a  method  of  specifying  the  truth  conditions  of  each
sentence/thought. However, the fact that we can build such a theory shows that we have
explicit knowledge of meaning/content. Having explicit knowledge of meaning/content
requires  having  explicit  knowledge  of  the  way the  world  provides  reasons  for  our
behaviour. 
I showed that minimalist views cannot account for our explicit knowledge of
meaning/content because they cannot justify the claim that the referents of all words are
what we talk about, or justify the claim that the referents of our concepts are what we
think about. Appealing to a relation between truth-bearers and truth-makers does not
help. It severs the connection between truth and meaning/content. If the meaning of a
sentence or the content of a propositional attitude is taken to be a fact, then we cannot
distinguish between true facts and false facts, and so have no justification of our ability
to  produce  a  theory  of  force.  If,  instead,  we  treat  meaning/content  facts  as
distinguishable from truth conditions, we cannot make sense of our ability to grasp truth
conditions.  We still  cannot  make sense of  our  ability to  produce  a  theory of  force,
because we cannot make sense of our ability to know what it is for something to be true.
The upshot is that intentionality has to be an intrinsic property of sentences/thoughts. In
the next chapter I am going to look at views that try to make sense of intentionality in
this way. The first set of views I will look at are redundancy views of truth. These treat
intentionality as an intrinsic property whilst maintaining that it can be explained from a
natural scientific perspective. The second set are interpretive theories of truth. These
maintain that intentionality can only be understood in terms of what it is for something
to be true. It will turn out that neither set of views are able to account for our abilities to
theorise about language use and thinking.
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Chapter 3, Thought Priority
In chapter 1 I showed that language use and thinking are rational activities. I
also showed that building a model of linguistic activity or thinking requires using a truth
predicate to build a theory of content and theory of force. I followed McDowell and
labelled such a theory, "a bipartite truth conditional theory". In addition I showed that
how one thinks about the natures of language and thought determines how one thinks
about the rationality of those activities, and also how one understands what has been
modelled  by  such  a  theory.  In  chapter  2  I  argued  that  the  possibility  of  explicit
knowledge of meaning and thought content shows that there is more to truth than it
being a device of semantic or mental ascent, but that lacuna is not filled by treating truth
as  a  relation  between  truth-bearer  and  truth-maker.  In  other  words,  I  showed  that
minimalism about truth is false, but that its failure does not imply that some version of a
designation theory should be adopted.
In this chapter I am going to start my defence of a version of the "linguistic
priority thesis". The version I wish to defend is that:
LPT:  Truth  is,  in  the  first  instance,  a  substantial,  evaluative  property of
sentences.
I am going to claim that thoughts are not properly said to be true or false. Phrased like
that, the claim might raise some alarm bells. After all, when Simon believes that Jack
went up the Hill, and Jack went up the Hill, then surely what Simon believes is true? I
have  no  objection  to  calling  Simon's  belief  true,  or  even  saying  that  what  Simon
believes is true. However, what I am going to deny is that Simon's belief is the upshot of
a  correct  judgement  of  the  truth  value  of  a  thought.  What  has  a  truth  value  is  the
sentence "Jack went up the Hill". That sentence, in this context, is true. It can also be
used to describe Simon's  belief.  But, not only is  Simon's  belief  not the upshot of a
correct judgement of the truth value of a thought, it is also not the upshot of a correct
judgement of the truth value of the sentence. It is a correct response to how things are.
But, because it is about the way things are, a sentence which describes that states affairs
can, in the right context, also describe Simon's belief. This allows for a derivative sense
in which it can be said that Simon's belief is true. This is to follow a hint of Davidson's:
It is often wrongly thought that the semantical concept of truth is redundant, that there is
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no  difference  between  asserting  that  a  sentence  s is  true,  and  using  s to  make  an
assertion. What may be right is a redundancy theory of belief, that to believe that p is not
to be distinguished from the belief that p is true. 
(Davidson, 2001b, 170)
In effect then, I am going to argue that truth values are semantic values. It is
only things that can have a truth value as a semantic value which can be said to bare
truth.  Having,  in  the  previous  chapter,  ruled  out  understanding  mental  states  as
designating things in the world, in this chapter, I am going to look at views which treat
thoughts as a product of what individual thinkers do. I am going to show that, on such
views, the explicit knowledge constraint precludes treating truth as a substantial mental
value. The problem turns out to be that we have no way of grasping mental content
because we have no way of representing what we do. The problem remains in place
whether or not we adopt a redundancy view or an interpretive view of truth. I am also
going to show that the explicit knowledge constraint also precludes linguistic priority
versions of redundancy theories and interpretive theories of truth. The problem turns out
to be that, although we have a way of representing what we do, we have no way of
understanding it as a representation. So, in this chapter, I begin to establish the linguistic
priority  thesis  by  showing  that  explicit  knowledge  of  meaning  or  thought  content
requires access to the standards that govern behaviour. This will pave the way in the
next chapter for showing that truth has to be a substantial value of sentences because it
is only in a language that we have access to the rules that govern behaviour. 
There are two broad strategies for explaining intentionality which I am going to
explore in this chapter. The first is to embrace a redundancy theory of truth. Any view
which accounts for the intentionality of utterances or mental states without reference to
their truth value is a redundancy theory of truth. As I am using the term, a redundancy
view  of  truth  does  not  deny  that  there  are  substantial  truth  values.  It  denies  the
explanatory  value  of  truth.  The  redundancy  theorist  uses  her  explanation  of
intentionality to account for truth, and not the other way round. In other words, she will
try to give a causal-cum-functional account of content. The second way is to treat truth
as an explanatorily basic property; precisely the property which explains intentionality.
This is an interpretive view of truth. Although self-respecting contemporary theorists
will  treat  utterances  and actual  mental  states  as  having causes,  they do not  need to
appeal to these causes in order to make sense of content. What matters is that there is a
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presenting  of  the  world  by  assertoric  utterance  and  the  taking  of  the  world  in  a
believing. When there is such a thing, it is possible to evaluate the event in terms of its
truth value.
The picture that has emerged is this. To deflate normativity whilst avoiding the
twin  pitfalls  of  minimalism and  designation  views,  one  has  to  have  an  account  of
intentionality as an intrinsic property of sentences and thoughts.  One might adopt a
redundancy theory, and attempt a natural scientific account of the way that thoughts or
sentences  are  about  the  world.  This  role  requires  some naturalist  account  of  proper
functioning. Alternatively, you might treat intentionality as the sui generis property of
thoughts or sentences, and maintain that truth is the property which we used to make
sense of such a sui generis property. In the remainder of this chapter I will show that
none of these options are  going to  work.  The basic  problem is  not that  one cannot
capture content in these ways, but rather that without the truth predicate of a theory of
meaning/theory of thought being a substantial, evaluative predicate, there would be no
possibility of explicit knowledge of content. Thus, there would be no capturing content
in those ways. I will start with views that prioritise the mental, and show that neither
view of truth will allow for the possibility of explicit knowledge. The basic problem
turns out to be that thoughts are not representational, but it is impossible to have access
to the content of a thought unless one can represent it. I argue that it is only in language
that  we  can  represent  the  content  of  a  thought.  However,  making  sense  of  the
representational nature of language requires truth to be a semantic property. I then turn
my attention to views that treat truth as a linguistic property. I show that, by deflating
normativity, both the interpretive theorist and the redundancy theorist make the meaning
of an utterance a substantial empirical question, and, as a result, cannot make sense of
our explicit knowledge of meaning.
§1 Mentality and Truth
In this section I am going to turn my attention to thinking. An account of the
mental is an attempt to make sense of what a thinker does when it thinks. One aspect of
that is a theory of thought. That theory aims to capture what a thinker can think by
describing the systematic differences made by the concepts a thinker possesses to the
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mental life of the thinker. In other words, it is a description of the conceptual capacities
of a thinker. The other aspect of such an account is an account of what it is for the
mental states of that thinker to be about ways for things to be. This gloss attempts to
make sense of the description of what a thinker does as a description of the capacities to
recognise and respond to the world. In order to do that she needs to be able to make
sense of an assignment of truth conditions to thoughts. I am going to argue that there is
no way that  she can do that  without  first  coming to grips with the representational
medium that is a language. The basic thought is that in order to assign truth conditions
to thoughts the theorist needs to be able to be able to decompose thoughts into their
component concepts. But, the raw data are acts of thinking. Acts of thinking are not
composed out of concepts. As a result, what the theorist has access to are properties of
her and other creatures minds. She can judge those propositional attitudes to be correct
or incorrect, but those judgements are implicit judgements and do not, even implicitly,
reveal how acts of thinking are about the world. 
1.1 Two types of thought priority theory
The  thought  priority  theorist,  for  my  purposes,  is  somebody who  takes  our
explicit knowledge of mental content to explain our explicit knowledge of meaning. I
have argued that explicit knowledge of mental content requires knowing the grounds
and consequences  of  particular  propositional  attitudes.  I  have  also  argued that  such
knowledge  involves  two  parts:  knowledge  of  the  way truth  values  are  assigned  to
thoughts, and the way the truth value of a thought affects what it is to adopt different
types of propositional attitude to that thought. So, if explicit access to thought content
comes before explicit access to meaning, the theorist needs to vindicate treating truth
primarily as a property of something mental.
As I  have already shown,  thought  priority theorists  divide  into  three camps.
There  are  functional  views,  concept  fact  views  and  rational  practice  views.  In  the
previous chapter, I showed that functional views which denied any substantial notion of
intentionality  were  incompatible  with  the  possibility  of  explicit  knowledge.  I  also
showed that concept fact views which treated intentionality as a matter of a relation of
designation between thoughts and things in the world were incapable of accounting for
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explicit knowledge. In this chapter, I am going to focus on functional organisation views
of thinking, although there will be a brief mention of Frege's late concept fact view
(1956). Functional organisation views subdivide into two camps. I am going to call the
first type of theories "redundancy" theories of thought, because they treat intentionality
to be explicable without reference to truth. The second type I will call "sui generis"
theories of thought. These views deny that intentionality can be understood except in
terms of truth. In other words, intentionality has to be understood on its own terms. The
idea is that intentionality and mindedness have to be understood on their own terms.
Their own terms are reasons and rationality. 
Of course,  everybody has to think that thinking is  a matter of responding to
reasons, and this might make it seem like it immediately rules out the redundancy camp.
This  would  not  be  right.  Having  a  mentality  is  a  matter  of  having an  evaluative
worldview.  That  is,  it  is  a  matter  of  wanting  certain  outcomes  and having a  stable
conception of how things are. But, wanting a particular outcome is sufficient for means-
end rationality. If the rat wants cheese, and there is cheese to the left, the rat should go
left. That "should" is a hypothetical should. If the rat needs to eat, and there is food in
the area, then the rat should go out looking for food. However, it will only do that if it
thinks that there is food to be found. As there is food to be found, it should think that.
Again, this is hypothetical rationality. It is plausible to think that the reasons a creature
responds  to  in  thought  are  hypothetical  reasons.  But,  as  Hattiangadi  points  out,
hypothetical reasons do not impose a normative constraint on action (Hattiangadi, 2006,
p. 228). They are just another way of saying, "this is a good/successful/the only way of
achieving that". In this case the actions are forming beliefs and desires and acting on
them. 
In other words, the redundancy theorist can claim that the difference between
agency and mechanical response stems from autonomy. Just so long as we can make
sense of a creature setting its own goals, then features of the world will be hypothetical
reasons for particular courses of action on the part of the agent. In other words, once a
creature has projects, there are things that it should do. Reasons, on this view, do not
function as motivators. Instead they provide standards for hypothetical evaluation. On a
redundancy view, situations are causal inputs which bring about differential responses
according to the particular functional organisation of the agent in question. But if that
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functional organisation can be understood as giving rise to a particular set of projects,
then, given those projects, the situations which are possible causal inputs also serve as
standards of evaluation for the creature's behaviour.
1.2 Redundancy Theories of Thought
I am not sure we can make sense of the requisite notion of autonomy, but given
that we can, it is possible to hold a redundancy view of the mind. Such a view types
mental states according to their functional role. Simplifying things massively, the rat
believes that there is cheese in front of it because the mental state caused by the cheese
causes the rat to eat the cheese. The rat desires cheese because it is in a mental state
which causes it to go out looking for cheese. On this view, all that is required for a
creature to have mental states is for it to be  able to respond to hypothetical reasons.
However,  this  does  impose  a  further  constraint  on  the  creature.  If  a  creature  is
responding to hypothetical reasons, then the functional organisation of its mind will
display a minimal  rationality.  But,  displaying a minimal  rationality does not require
being aware of any 'demand of rationality' or trying to conform to norms, or of those
norms providing a standard of evaluation.  Instead,  it  is a criterion on responding to
hypothetical reasons that a creature behaves more or less rationally. The rat does not
need to infer p from q just because q follows from p, it is enough that the rat tends to do
so when the inference goes through. This can be cashed out in terms of counterfactual
relations between mental states. The thought is that if the rat were to be in the state of
believing that p, it would tend, in situations in which whether q becomes an issue, to
move into the state of believing that q. As Brian Loar puts it:
How  can  contingent  facts  about  a  physical  system  amount  to  rationality,  whose
ingredients are far from contingent? It is a priori that if certain states are to be counted as
beliefs and desires they must satisfy the constraints of rationality. But that they do satisfy
them can be as contingent as you like; if they fail  to do so they are not beliefs and
desires. It is a fallacy to argue that, since rationality has constitutive force, a physical
system  would  have  to  conform  to  rationality  non-contingently  for  its  workings  to
constitute the workings of a mind.
(Loar, 1981, pp. 23–24)
This sort of view requires a redundancy theory of truth. A theory of thought is a
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description of the way an agent tends to think. But, on a redundancy view, it does no
more than capture the dispositions of an agent. As a result, a theory of thought is taken
to be a set of descriptive generalisations which explain and predict the way a particular
agent tends to think. A theory of thought describes the kind of transitions a particular
agent tends to make. As I showed in the last chapter, such a theory works by assigning
mental roles to thoughts and concepts. Assigning mental roles is meant to explain and
predict  the  transitions  between  the  mental  states  of  a  particular  thinker.  That  is,  it
describes  the horizontal  connections  between different  mental  states.  If  it  is  also  to
explain vertical  connections,  then the theorist  need some handle from outside of an
account of behaviour on why there are these vertical connections. If she can do this, she
will be able to understand the description of the horizontal connections captured in a
theory of thought as also assigning the kind of vertical connections that a particular
functional setup tends to have.
I am going to show that a redundancy theory which denies LPT cannot meet the
explicit  knowledge  constraint.  The  very  simple  thought,  to  be  fleshed  out  in  the
following paragraphs, is that, as reasons are not motivational, there is no way to move
from mere causal response to the position of rational evaluation. Or, to be more careful,
the view does not provide the tools to  move from mere causal response to rational
evaluation. The thought is that without an evaluative property of truth, the only way for
a redundancy view to be true is for it to be unknowable.
1.3 Theories of Thought and Redundancy Theories
There are a variety of redundancy theories of mind. However, what they all have
in common is that they treat a mental state as being a matter of the functional role of
that state. In addition, if they are to be at all plausible, they need to be such that they are
compatible with our ability to build and understand a bipartite truth conditional theory
of  thought.  However,  because  they  are  committed  to  treating  mental  states  as
individuated by the functional role of that state, a bipartite truth conditional theory of
thought is a description of an idealised mind. These redundancy views are the mental
analogue of Paul Horwich's use theory of meaning. A bipartite truth conditional theory
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of thought is a description of what a thinker tends to do. There is no sense in which a
thinker ought to conform to such a theory. However, a creature that does not more or
less conform to the theory cannot be said to be thinking at all77. Brian Loar is somebody
who has developed just such a redundancy view78.
In  this  sense,  the  surface  grammar  of  the  theory  of  thought  is  taken  to  be
misleading.  Theories  of  thought  look  like  they  treat  mental  states  as  relations  to
thoughts, where thoughts are ideal entities to which competent thinkers adopt a variety
of  attitudes.  But,  this  view  is  incompatible  with  a  redundancy  theory  of  mind.
According to a redundancy view, being in the state of, for example, believing that the
pub is open is to be disposed to behave in a very particular way. Crudely put, it is to be
such that if you were to want a drink out with friends, you would go to the pub. It is
incompatible with checking to see if the pub is open. It requires you to believe that it is
later than a particular time. I take it that these are all necessary but not sufficient (not
even jointly sufficient) conditions of being in the state of believing that the pub is open.
The next question is: how can the redundancy theorist  understand a bipartite
truth conditional theory of thought? The first problem that the redundancy theorist faces
is to distinguish between different types of mental states. Like everybody else she needs
to  have  something  to  say  about  how  there  can  be  different  types  of  propositional
attitudes. This she can do. Different types of mental states interact with each other and
themselves in characteristic ways.  Again,  putting it  crudely,  if  the creature desires a
particular object, and believes that it has access to that particular object, then it is going
to appropriate the object of its belief. Beliefs and desires interact with each other in this
characteristic  way.  Different  types of mental  state do not merely have characteristic
interaction patterns with other types of mental state, they also interact with states of the
same type in characteristic ways. For a state to count as a belief state, it has to be such
77 Conformity to a theory of thought is only a necessary condition of being a thinker. It cannot also be a
sufficient  condition.  A well  programmed  robot  may  well  behave  just  like  a  thinker,  but,  by
hypothesis, is not in fact thinking. The challenge for the redundancy theorist is making sense of an
agent as setting its own projects. It  is setting one's own projects that is a sufficient condition for
having mentality.
78 Whyte's  success  semantics  is  another  version  of  a  redundancy  theory  (Whyte,  1990).  Success
semantics are a little more complicated in that they require understanding the functional organisation
of an agent in terms of the goals of an agent. 
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that confusion arises and, more often than not, is resolved when contradictions arise.
For a state to count as a desire, indecision has to result when two or more desires are
incompatible.  These general  functional  constraints  serve  as  the basis  of  a  theory of
force. In other words, belief is a particular type of attitude, but is, for the redundancy
theorist, reducible to a characteristic kind of dispositional set-up.
The  redundancy theorist  then  needs  a  way of  individuating  different  mental
states. This is the role of the theory of content. The difference between, for example,
two different belief states is in terms of their fine grained functional role. That is, which
states, both potential and actual, it is incompatible with and which states and courses of
action, in conjunction with particular other beliefs and desires, it tends to lead to. What
the redundancy theorist needs is something which they can use in conjunction with their
theory of force to pick out any possible mental state.  The theory of content is then, to
use Brian Loar's helpful terminology, a way of indexing particular states. 
1.4 Indexing Mental States
It is important to see just how strange the picture that is emerging is. A system of
indexing does not provide information about the vertical connections between mental
states  and  the  world.  It  does  not  provide  us  with  information  about  what  it  is  for
someone who has the belief that chocolate is a snack to have taken the world to meet a
particular criterion – that of chocolate being a snack. Instead, it provides, in conjunction
with  a  theory of  force,  a  way of  picking out  a  unique functional  state.  But,  as  the
previous  chapter  made  clear,  there  is  more  to  a  belief  than  it  being  a  particular
functional state. There needs to be an account of what it is for the belief that chocolate is
a snack to be true or false. As Jennifer Hornsby puts it redundancy theories take there to
be two distinct tasks:
One is the task of dealing with the features of such states as beliefs and desire in virtue
of which they play the role they do in causal explanation; the other is the task of saying
how such states, and how the sentences of human language, relate to the world at large.
(Hornsby, 1989, p. 549)
But,  as Hornsby goes on to  point  out,  such two task theorists  have to  confront  the
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question: why truth? (Hornsby,  1989, p.  550).  Of course,  I  have already shown one
answer to that question. We have to be able to make sense of truth in order to make
sense of our explicit understanding of theories of meaning and theories of thought. So,
the challenge I am going to pose to redundancy theories is: how do we have explicit
knowledge of truth?
Now, on a redundancy theory, a theory of content needs to do two things. These
are Hornsby's two tasks. The first task is that it needs to individuated particular states,
the second is that it needs to explain aboutness. The hope is that we can find a way of
indexing mental states, and can then assign truth conditions to the indices. The idea
being that the indices pick out all possible functional states of a system. Just so long as
the truth conditions assigned to each index are also the truth conditions of the state
indexed, we will have produced a theory of content. However, there is in principle no
limit to the possible functional states of a system, and so there is no limit to the indexing
system. As result, we cannot, even in principle, assign indices to states in a piecemeal
fashion. This rules out starting with truth conditions and lining them up with functional
states. And, even if we could, it would not fulfil the first task. A 1-1 mapping between
indexes and truth conditions and a 1-1 mapping between indexes and mental states does
not form part of an account of the mental role of different states. It would also not help
to  explain  the  interconnections  between  functional  states.  However,  as  states  are
individuated by their functional role, if the theorist can find an indexing system which
mirrors those functional connections, then, as long as she can find a way of mapping the
indexes to the states, she can capture the mental roles of different states. If she can then
define truth conditions for those indices, she will have completed both tasks. This puts
some serious constraints on the indexing system. But, as it seems plausible that it is
possible to build a truth conditional theory of thought, and that such a theory is built
using sentences, it seems plausible that anything which has the syntactical richness of a
human language can be used as an indexing system. The theorist by using the recursive
apparatus  built  by  Tarski,  can  then  define  truth  for  the  declarative  sentences  of  a
particular language. 
The idea is that anything with the syntactic richness of an actual language can be
used to index mental states. Languages are only special because they are our way of
indexing mental states. In addition, Tarski has shown us how to define truth predicate,
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T-in-L for certain artificial languages. It does not seem far-fetched to think that with
enough ingenuity human languages can be regimented in such a way that they succumb
to Tarski's apparatus. Tarski's apparatus is so helpful because it shows us how we can
define a predicate in a metalanguage whose extension will be all and only the sentences
of  an  object  language,  L,  which  are  preanalytically  called  "true".  In  a  sense,  the
metalanguage in which we define the truth predicate, T-in-L, is an artificial language. It
provides a characterisation of the extension of T-in-L by having an expression for each
of the different subsentential expressions of the object language, and providing axioms,
which when applied, result in formulae of the form "S is T-in-L if and only if p". It thus
provides  a  syntactic  characterisation  of  the  extension  of  T-in-L.  However,  whatever
model  we use,  whatever  interpretation  we give  to  the  primitives,  treating  T-in-L as
equivalent to the everyday notion of truth allows us to capture the valid inferences of L. 
That  is  okay if  the  interest  is  in  capturing  the  valid  inferences  of  an object
language. It does not tell us how to interpret the metalanguage in which we have defined
T-in-L.  In  order  to  do  that,  the  theorist  needs  a  pre-theoretical  grip  on  the  truth
conditions of the sentences of L. In the next chapter, I am going to vindicate treating
sentences as meaningful in such a way that we can have a pre-theoretical grip on the
truth  conditions  of  the  sentences  of  the  object  language.  However,  denying  LPT is
precisely to deny that we get our grip on truth via our grip on meaning. The redundancy
theorist has to treat the truth predicate she defines on her indices as redundant. She can
generate axioms of the form: S is true if and only if p. However, in order to understand
those axioms she needs a prior grip on the truth values of the sentences used on the
right-hand side. Loar is well aware of this. He writes:
On this  sentential-index  theory of  beliefs,  however,  the  situation is  radically altered
[from LPT]. For to each belief a certain sentence is assigned, but that sentential index is
not thereby in the language of the believer. Consequently,  the Tarskian apparatus can
now be employed in ascribing truth conditions to beliefs, not under their descriptions as
sentential attitudes, but interlinguistically ascribable "propositional" attitudes. Now if T
is the appropriate Tarski-type truth predicate for the content language L (i.e. if it catches
the preanalytically [pre-theoretically] correct truth conditions),  the belief that s is true
just  in  case  Ts.  The  inductive  characterisation  of  T  thereby  gives  us  an  inductive
characterisation of truth for beliefs.
(Loar, 1981, pp. 153–154)
170
Loar is taking thinkers to have a pre-theoretic grasp on the truth conditions for beliefs,
and  tries  to  prove  that  they  are  necessarily  equivalent  to  the  'T-conditions'  of  an
“appropriate Tarski-type truth predicate” for the language of the theory. Mental states
with the functional role typical of beliefs happen to have a vertical connection with the
world. So, beliefs do also have truth-conditions. Beliefs can be indexed by sentences for
which it is possible to define a truth predicate, T-in-L. As there is a one-to-one indexing
between  beliefs  and  sentences,  and  each  belief  does  have  a  truth  condition,  each
sentence picks up unique truth conditions giving flesh to an otherwise empty predicate.
This  is,  as  Loar  points  out,  a  redundancy  theory  of  truth  for  sentences  but  a
correspondence (correlation) theory truths for beliefs (Loar, 1981, pp. 166–170).
However, what Loar misses is that he needs an account of how it is that we get a
pre-theoretical grip on truth for beliefs. It is to Loar's credit that he is aware of a series
of issues. The first issue is that by making functional role do the work in individuating
mental states it seems mysterious that they should be about the world at all. The second
issue is that all sorts of non-equivalent truth predicates would be sufficient for indexing
mental states. After all, all that is required is something with fine-grained syntactical
richness. What is important for the indexing system is that it shares a structure with the
structure of a mind. It is the syntactical notion of validity that is doing the trick. So,
there  is  no  particular  reason  why  we  should  be  so  interested  in  the  kind  of  truth
predicates that Tarski showed how to define. A predicate like "is T and for all x, x = x"
would do just as well as the central predicate of the indexing system. The third issue is
that, as Loar maintains that thinking is not in any sense the manipulation of concepts,
thinking is not the internal equivalent of speaking a language. So, there is a problem
working  out  which  sentences  best  index  the  beliefs,  and  that  in  turn  plays  out  in
difficulties  in  providing  interpretations  of  the  theory's primitive  expressions.  Why
should the theory's word "blue" or the relevant Gödel number be satisfied by all and
only the blue objects, and not, say all and only the blue and blue-ish greenish objects?
(Loar,  1981,  p.  182).  The  predicate  thus  defined  will  be  a  different  predicate  but
adequate for indexing mental states.
1.5 No Explicit Knowledge
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The problem Loar sets himself is showing why it is truth, and not some variant
predicate, that we are so interested in, and he takes it that doing that thereby justifies
attributing determinate reference conditions to mental states (Loar, 1981, p. 174). Now,
if  Loar's  strategies  worked it  would thereby justify attributing determinate reference
conditions  to  mental  states.  Loar  could  have  his  redundancy  theory  of  truth  for
sentences, and his correlation theory of truth for beliefs. However, Loar does not notice
that there is a problem making sense of how it is that we ever got our pre-theoretical
grasp  of  truth  in  the  first  place.  On  Loar's  theory  not  only  are  mental  states  not
representational, they are only contingently about the world. On the redundancy picture,
the ground floor thinker is one who has a mental setup which contingently displays the a
priori structure of rationality. That mental setup is not a self-contained system. There are
horizontal  connections  between  mental  states,  but  also  between  mental  states  and
situations  in  the  world.  So,  there  are  horizontal  connections  between  states  of  that
system and the rest of the world. However, in order to recognise that there are vertical
connections between mental  states  and the world,  the ground floor thinker  needs to
come to see how her mental states are also about situations. That is, she needs to gain
knowledge of the correlations between her mental state and the world. Doing that is a
matter  of learning to  attribute mental states to herself  and others using an indexing
system.  The  problem  is  that  the  indexing  system  is  in  and  of  itself  so  much
uninterpreted verbal behaviour. To make sense of it as attributing a vertical, semantic
dimension to her functional states, the infant thinker needs to provide an interpretation
of the indexing system. But, to get in a position to interpret the indexing system, she
needs  a  pre-theoretical  grasp  on  the  truth  of  her  beliefs.  That  is,  she  needs  a  pre-
theoretical grasp on the vertical, semantic dimension of her mental states. And, that is
just what is to be explained. 
The problem can be put another way. Beliefs are such that they are about the
world.  So,  somebody who knows the content belief  is  somebody who knows which
situation that belief is about. However, on a redundancy account, contents are no more
than indices for beliefs. Knowing the content of the belief is just knowing a way of
identifying that belief. It leaves untouched the question of which situation the belief is
about. Brian Loar's ingenious suggestion is that the very same things which we used to
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index beliefs are also the sort of thing for which we can define a truth predicate. Armed
with a grasp of the theory of truth for our indices, we are able to grasp the vertical
connections between beliefs and the world. However, there is just no way of grasping
the  theory  of  truth  for  our  indices.  We  get  our  grasp  of  truth  by  grasping  which
situations our beliefs are about. One wants to say, by grasping the content of our beliefs.
But, the content is just an index. All that matters to an indexing system is that it has the
necessary syntactical richness. 
The problem becomes acute when we think about using Gödel numbers to do the
indexing.  Gödel  numbers  could  be  mapped  to  belief  states,  and,  according  to  the
redundancy theorist,  that captures the content of those beliefs. We might then try to
define a truth predicate for those Gödel numbers. However, as our only grasp on truth is
in terms of the contents of beliefs, our only understanding of the 'meaning' of the Gödel
numbers on the right-hand side of our statements will be in terms of the truth-conditions
of the beliefs that they index. It should now be quite clear that we have not accounted
for our grasp of the intentionality of mental states. We have an uninterpreted indexing
system, which can only be interpreted by appeal to that which it is to interpret. In order
to get a pre-theoretical grasp on the truth of beliefs we need to be able to interpret an
indexing system. And in order to interpret the indexing system we need to get a pre-
theoretical grasp on the truth of beliefs.
This is not yet to say that all redundancy theories of truth are hopeless. What is
hopeless is thinking that our grip on intentionality comes via our understanding of the
content of mental states. So far, it is still possible to maintain that truth is primarily a
property of linguistic items, because what we understand, in the first instance, are uses
of sentences. I am going to come back to these linguistic priority redundancy views at
the  end  of  the  chapter.  What  the  redundancy  theory  needs  is  an  account  of  the
intentionality of sentences that does not require a prior grasp on the intentionality of
thoughts.
§2 Sui Generis Theories of Mind
I now turn to views which see only one task for the theorist of thought. These
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will appeal to an interpretive account of truth. They start from the thought that beliefs,
and other mental states are about the world, and use that to explain why that state has
the horizontal connections that it does. On this sort of view, a creature believes that p
when it takes it to be the case that p. Taking it to be the case that p is seen as constitutive
of  what  it  is  to  be  the  belief  that  p.  So,  such  views  treat  truth  as  accounting  for
intentionality.  Acts of judgement are takings of the world.  On the interpretive view,
taking true is treated as basic. So, an act of judgement has to be understood in terms of
what it would be for the resulting belief to be true where truth is an irreducible and basic
notion. It also requires truth to be an evaluative notion. To understand taking the world
to be a certain way as basic is to understand an act of judgement as setting a criterion
which the world must meet if the judgement is to be correct. The upshot is that, given a
set of projects, situations in the world provide standards for hypothetical evaluation, and
also standards for evaluating an act of judgement qua act of judgement. The judgement
that there is cheese to the left is wrong in all situations in which there is not cheese to
the left. On these views, reasons are both reasons to do something, and also standards by
which acts of judgement can be assessed. The final idea is that we can only understand
what it is to make a judgement in terms of those standards of assessment.
Such a theory does not face the same problem as a redundancy view. Agents are
straightforwardly responding to reasons. It tries to make sense of what thinkers do when
they  are  thinking  by  appeal  to  idealising  explanations.  In  other  words,  thinker's
behaviour  is  made  sense  of  in  terms  of  the  constitutive  ideal  of  rationality.  The
interpretive theorist treats having a conceptual capacity as, irreducibly, the capacity to
adopt a range of propositional attitudes. She treats a propositional attitude as more than
a  disposition  to  respond  to  situations.  Instead,  she  treats  adopting  a  propositional
attitude as a fully fledged response to a reason. Importantly, on an interpretive theory, it
makes sense to think of a thinking creature as trying to be rational. So, on these views,
building a bipartite truth conditional theory of thought requires coming to see how the
truth values of thoughts are determined by different features of the world. It is a matter
of working out how the world strikes the thinker by understanding how features of the
world, including perhaps her mental states, feature as grounds and consequences for that
thinker. The key thought is that instead of capturing a concept in terms of its effect on
the dispositional setup of a thinker, we capture the difference a concept makes to the
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mental life of a thinker in terms of its contribution to the truth values of thoughts in
which  it  can  occur.  Because  propositional  attitudes  are  appealed  to  as  part  of
rationalising explanations of behaviour, they are understood in terms of the way that the
truth values affect the mental and practical life of a thinker. Types of attitude and not
captured  by  describing  characteristic  dispositions,  but  by  thinking  about  what  the
adoption of an attitude of a particular type commits you, permits you, and forbids you to
do. So, truth is seen as organising the mental life of a thinker and conceptual capacities
described by showing  how concepts make a systematic difference to what a thinker is
warranted in doing. In other words, to assign a mental value to a concept or thought is
thereby to assign it a mental role and truth is understood as a substantial, evaluative
property.
This leaves the interpretive theorist with a stronger conception of freedom. The
redundancy theorist  limited  freedom to the  freedom to  set  one's  own projects.  That
allowed her to make sense of situations in the world as providing hypothetical oughts,
and thus as allowing for the evaluation of the creature's mental states. The interpretive
theorist maintains that thinking is taking the world to be a certain way. This is a stronger
conception of freedom. It is the freedom to recognise how things might be, and, when
things go well, how things are. It is also the freedom to respond to that awareness as you
see fit. It is this stronger conception of freedom that helps explain why attributions of
propositional  attitudes  are  done,  on  views  of  this  kind,  in  terms  of  idealising
explanations. We cannot make sense of a thinker who does not exercise that freedom
responsibly. Although she need have no conception that this is what she is up to, what
she has to be trying to do is get things right. What we, as theorists, are trying to do is
make sense of what figures, for that thinker, as a ground for what and what figures as a
consequence of what. We have to be aware that she may, from time to time, through
inattention or confusion, make mistakes, but, by and large we must be able to see her as
getting things right. In so doing, it is more than likely, that we will have to expand our
conception of what is right. When we do, we will have to expand our conception either
of what there is, or of what is rational or both. However, our ever expanding conception
of what there is and of what is rational is used as an ideal by which we make sense of
the  capacities  of  a  thinker.  We  make  sense  of  her  exercises  of  those  capacities  as
governed by that ideal.
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However,  the  kind  of  theories  I  am  looking  at  in  this  chapter  still  have  a
functionalist flavour. They are functional organisation views. They do not treat thinking
as a matter of manipulating concepts and standing in relations to thoughts. If they did,
they would collapse into a mental fact view. I showed in chapter 2 that a designation
development  of  such a  view cannot  meet  the  explicit  knowledge constraint.  In  this
section, I am going to briefly argue that the same is true of interpretive developments.
The  focus  of  the  section  will  be  on  functional  organisation  interpretive  views.  On
interpretive views propositional attitudes are fully fledged responses to reasons, and not
merely dispositions, but, like on redundancy views, that is an ability, albeit a rational
one.  Concept  possession  is  then  a  rational  ability to  keep track  of  a  feature  of  the
environment.  In other words,  one possesses a concept because one can discriminate
items in the extension of that concept from items not in the extension79. Thinking is not
a matter of learning to work with some mind independent Fregean system of thought.
Christopher  Peacocke  is  somebody  who  has  developed  just  such  a  view  (see  for
example, Peacocke, 1986 and Peacocke, 1999)80. 
 The theory distinguishes between complete and incomplete acts  of thinking.
The  complete  acts  of  thinking  are  the  adoption  of  propositional  attitudes,  and  the
79 Discriminating items in the extension of the concept does not require having a conception of concepts
or extensions. It is simply to have a rational ability to differentially respond to things in the world.
80 Peacocke takes his theory to be neutral between LPT and its denial. However, he does think it is
compatible with a strong mental priority thesis, and, is himself, committed to such a thesis (Peacocke,
1997, p. 3). In laying out his views, I am going to treat him as presenting them in defence of a mental
priority thesis. This is perhaps a little unfair on Peacocke as Peacocke does not address the question
of explicit knowledge. However, I think this is because Peacocke does not think, or perhaps does not
notice, that there is a problem. This results in a certain ambiguity about what Peacocke takes to be the
thought priority theory.  On the one hand, he claims that  the linguistic priority thesis claims "the
explanatory priority of thought over language" (Peacocke, 1997, p. 3), and that the thought priority
thesis reverses that priority. On the other, he claims that the thought priority thesis denies that "if
there  can be cases  of  conceptual  thought  without  language,  the philosophical  explanation of  the
nature of thoughts in question must make reference to language at some point" (Peacocke, 1997, p.
4). The latter claim is weaker, and, I think, the actual claim that Peacocke wishes to defend. As will
become apparent,  I  am in  agreement  with Peacocke over  the  weak claim.  However,  I  think the
interest  in  linguistic  priority  has  always  been  strong  claim,  and  that  is  our  access  to  reflective
knowledge is through understanding language not through understanding mental content.
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incomplete acts of thinking are the deployment of concepts. The analogue of the theory
of force accounts for the distinction between different types of propositional attitudes. It
does so in terms of the truth values of thoughts. Concepts are that which explain the
assignation  of  truth  conditions  to  thoughts  and  the  inferential  connections  between
them.  Combining  the  two  parts  provides  an  explanation  of  the  grounds  and
consequences  of  each  particular  act  of  thinking.  The  content  of  a  concept  is  then
explained as that concept's contribution to the truth values of thoughts in which it can
occur, and the content of a thought is its truth conditions. The upshot is that a bipartite
truth  conditional  theory  of  thought  models  the  practical  capacity  of  thinking  by
describing  the  mental  roles  of  concepts  and  thoughts  in  terms  of  their  rational
connections. It thus provides an ideal by which actual behaviour can be understood.
Thinkers regularly fail to live up to that standard and might even be disposed to make
mistakes,  but  the  interpretive  theorist  aims  to  make  sense  of  their  behaviour  by
evaluating it  in  the light  of  the rational  standards described by the correct  bipartite
theory.
2.1 The Analysis of Propositional Attitudes
So far, so familiar. The big questions are, on these views:
A. What are thoughts?
B. What are concepts?
The short answer to A is that a thought is a possible content of an act of thinking. The
short  answer  to  B is  that  a  concept  is  a  capacity  to  have  a  range of  propositional
attitudes. But, I want to be able to have more to say than that. Fortunately, one can. 
On sui generis views an agent adopts a propositional attitude when it recognises
and responds to a reason. Which propositional attitude has been adopted is determined
by how the attitude functions in the mental life of the agent. To oversimplify things, a
rat which has the project of looking for cheese adopts the belief that there is cheese in
front  of  it  when  it  recognises  the  cheese  in  front  of  it.  It  manifests  that  belief  by
gobbling up the cheddar that it has found. It adopts the desire that it should have cheese
when it  wants cheese. It  manifests  that desire by going out looking for the stuff. A
bipartite truth conditional theory of thought models the practice of thinking. It does so
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by putting  the  theorist  in  a  position  to  give  the  grounds  for  and  consequences  of
adopting different propositional attitudes. That is, it allows one to make a statement of
the mental role of each thought. It  also allows the theorist  to specify the content of
anything with that mental role.  However, unlike on the sort  of concept fact views I
looked at in the previous chapter, thinkers are not grasping thoughts or manipulating
concepts, content is still seen as a product of what thinkers do. A theory of thought is
still a description of the dispositional setup of a thinker, but it is a dispositional setup
that can only be understood from the perspective of the constitutive ideal of rationality.
What  then,  on  these  views,  is  a  thought?  Answering  that  question  involves
thinking about  thinking.  Thinking is  an activity that  agents  undertake.  That  activity
involves recognising and responding to reasons. What counts as a reason and how the
agent responds to it both, in part, depend on the attitude of the agent. Importantly, the
same situation on different occasions figures differently as a reason for the same agent.
A theory of thought needs to make sense of this by modelling it. It starts with the basic
mental  acts  which are adopting particular  propositional  attitudes.  They are typed by
their mental role. That is, by the grounds and consequences of adopting a given attitude.
However, as there is something in common between believing that p and desiring that p
or  any other  attitude  towards  the  situation  that  p,  the  theory needs  to  be  powerful
enough to model that. It achieves that goal by taking the bipartite form. It can make
general comments about the propriety of adopting types of propositional attitude with
an arbitrary content,  and then  find  a  way of  specifying  what  contents  are  possible.
"Thought" is a term of art in a theory of that activity. A thought turns out to be the
content of a possible propositional attitude. However, as Dummett rightly complains
against Searle  "content" is not a well defined notion (in Dummett, 1991, p. 252).  In
order to work out what a content is I am going to turn my attention to concepts.
A creature which is thinking is a minimally autonomous creature. A minimally
autonomous creature has something like a world view. That is, there are things that it
wants and, consequently, it has some conception of how things are. But, as I showed in
chapter 1, having some conception of how things are requires being able to keep track
of  objects.  On  sui  generis  views,  a  creature  keeps  track  of  objects  by  recognising
properties, and when it does so it possesses concepts. For example, if a lab rat is able to
recognise  a  variety of  different  objects  as  edible,  it  possesses  the  concept  of  being
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edible. If it can distinguish cheese from chow, perhaps by consistently preferring cheese
to chow, it has the concept of cheese. In addition, the lab rat will be able to recognise
the same object as the same on more than one occasion. When it can do that, it has the
concept of that object. For example, if it can recognise a junction in a maze on a variety
of occasions as the same junction, it possesses the concept of that junction. The upshot
is that possession of a concept is a practical matter. It is a matter of being able to adopt
particular propositional attitudes in response to how things are in the world. Concepts
are that which account for the rational links between different propositional attitudes
and between attitudes and behaviour, but they are also capacities to respond to objects,
properties and relations.
Thinking, on these views, involves recognising and responding to situations as
reasons. A creature that does that is thereby deploying concepts. Because there can be
nothing  more  to  a  conceptual  capacity  than  the  abilities  of  someone  who  has  full
possession of the relevant concept, in describing a concept the theorist describes the
capacity of someone who has gained the complete conceptual capacity. Those capacities
are always the capacities to adopt a range of propositional attitudes. So, a conceptual
capacity is only exercised in the adoption of propositional attitudes, and the concept
captured by describing the capacity involved to have a particular range of propositional
attitudes. But, as there is nothing more to the nature of a concept than is captured by a
description  of  the  capacity  to  have  a  particular  range  of  propositional  attitudes,  a
concept is a capacity to have a range of attitudes. This is well captured by Christopher
Peacocke in his simple formulation of concept possession:
Simple Formulation Concept  F  is  that  unique  concept  C  to  possess
which a thinker must meet condition (C).
… "C" is a genuine variable over concepts, and is a schematic variable.
(Peacocke, 1999, p. 6)
The conditions  (C),  acquisition conditions, specify what sort  of mental capacities a
thinker  has  to  have  in  order  to  possess  a  particular  concept.  Those  capacities  are
specified in terms of the kinds of propositional attitudes a thinker can engage in. Two
concepts differ by being different capacities to have propositional attitudes. This is for
the simple reason that, as a concept is a capacity to have a range of attitudes, if they
were the same capacity, they would be the same concept. Propositional attitudes are
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typed by the grounds for and consequences of adopting that attitude. So, concepts are
typed by the difference they make to the rational connections of thoughts in which they
can occur. As a result, the concept is a capacity to make a series of rational transitions
(including transitions from external input to propositional attitude and transitions from
attitudes to behavioural output)81. 
Now, a  creature  that  is  thinking is  a  creature  with  an  evaluative  worldview.
Having an evaluative worldview is a matter of being able to desire certain outcomes, to
recognise that things are a particular way and to act to fulfil one's desires. A creature
that does that is a concept possessor. But, from this it follows that a creature which has
propositional attitudes is a creature which possesses concepts. The creature in no sense
needs  to  acquire  the  concept  in  order  to  acquire  the  propositional  attitudes,  rather
concept possession is just part  of its capacity to have those propositional attitudes82.
This is brought out by Peacocke's "principle of dependence":
Principle of Dependence There can be nothing more to the nature of a
concept than is determined by a correct account of the capacity of a thinker
who has mastered that concept to have propositional attitudes to contents
containing that concept.
(Peacocke, 1999, p. 5)
81 I take it this is what justifies Peacocke's "principle of dependence": "Concepts C and D are distinct if
and only if there are two complete propositional contents that differ at most in that one contains C
substituted in one or more places for D, and one of which is informative while the other is not"
(Peacocke, 1999, p. 2). Philipse complains that Peacocke's principle of dependence only limits the
domain of concepts on pain of making concepts identical with meanings. Peacocke's principle is the
mental analogue of Frege's account of sense. However, senses are senses of words, and so we can
always ask: is the sense of this word the same as the sense of that word? (This way of thinking about
Frege owes a lot to Gareth Evans and what he labels "the Intuitive Criterion of Difference" (Evans,
1982, p. 18)). Philipse complains that we have no such access to concepts to ask if two concepts are
differently informative (Philipse, 1994, p. 228). I think this objection only looks powerful because of
the  way Peacocke  presents  his  thesis.  Peacocke  presents  his  principle  of  dependence  before  he
discusses  what  a  concept  is.  But,  when  we  see  that  a  concept  is  a  capacity  to  make  rational
connections between a range of propositional attitudes, then the principle of dependence becomes a
priori. It is not introduced to allow us to pick out or distinguish between concepts. It is introduced as
part of an account of what a concept is.
82 I think this helps explain why it seems plausible that thinking is innate, whereas language use has to
be learnt.
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An act of thinking is an intentional mental state. It is about the world. But, it is
about the world by being a rational response to it. In other words, an act of thinking is
not  a  response to  a  thought  but  to  a situation.  But,  if  two creatures  have the same
structure to their rationality, the same structure to their rational responses, they will have
the same thoughts. "Thought", and by extension "concept" are terms in a theory of the
mentality of thinkers. They are part of a theory of what is going on when a creature is
thinking.  A thought  is  that  which  a  creature  thinks  when  it  adopts  a  propositional
attitude. Thus, a thought is the content of a possible propositional attitude. Concepts are
capacities to have propositional attitudes. Attributing concepts to a thinker accounts for
the inferential links between its propositional attitudes. Possessing a concept is a matter
of being able to recognise and respond to a particular item in the world, so a concept is a
way  of  thinking  about  some  item  in  the  world.  Both  thoughts  and  concepts  are
respectable  objects.  Being  the  content  of  a  possible  propositional  attitude  is  a
respectable property. It provides a criterion of identity for something to be a thought.
Being a way of thinking about an item in the world is also a respectable property. It
provides a criterion of identity for something to be a concept. As a result, there is no
reason not to treat thoughts or concepts as objects and quantify over them. Or, to put it
positively, there are thoughts and concepts. However, these objects are what Dummett
labelled "dependent objects". A good example of a dependent object is a chess move: 
There  are  many different  moves  which  [chess]  pieces  have  had  in  obsolete  or  still-
practiced variations of chess,  such as those of the pieces called camel and giraffe in
Tamerlane’s ‘great chess’; and there must be countless other possible moves that might
be assigned to pieces in versions of chess that have never been played or thought of. It is
harmless to say that ‘there are’ such moves; but it would be insane to deny that moves
are of (actual or possible) chess pieces. This ‘of’ of logical dependence is not properly
expressed by saying that a certain move exists only if there is a piece that has that move,
since, as just noted, we can speak of moves that have never been assigned to any piece. It
means,  rather, that to conceive of any move is to conceive of a piece as having that
move.
(Dummett, 1991, p. 249)
For Dummett, chess pieces and chess moves are two distinct kinds of objects
and there can be chess moves that are no longer permitted and chess moves that never
have been and never will be permitted. However, there is no need to ask how chess
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pieces acquire chess moves because a chess move is always a possible movement of a
chess piece. This is not a supervenience thesis. There is no sense in which chess pieces,
or the game itself, are more basic than the moves which might be or might have been
permissible. Chess moves are simply the sort of things which chess pieces can do. The
trick is to recognise that some objects are not 'self-subsistent' (Dummett, 1991, p. 249).
On the positive side of the balance sheet, a dependent object is an object that is always
also a property of another object. Colours are dependent objects. The colour red is a
respectable object,  but it  is  always also a  property of an actual  or possible surface.
Dummett's favourite example is from Frege and it is directions (Frege, 1980, sec. 64). If
you go north and I go north, then the direction of our travel is the same. But, in this
case, the direction is the direction of your line of travel and of my line of travel. Like
chess  moves,  colours  and  directions,  thoughts  and  concepts  are  not  self  subsistent
objects. Thoughts are the contents of possible propositional attitudes, and concepts are
ways of thinking about possible items in the world.
I now have the resources to analyse the following sentence:
S Simple Simon believes that Jack went up the hill,
and thus make sense of what is going on when Simple Simon, or anybody else, thinks.
The question which needs resolving is: is the that clause in S used to:
i. predicate the two place relation of belief between Simple Simon and a thought,
or,
ii. pick out a state of Simple Simon's, that of believing that Jack went up the
hill?
Thoughts are the contents of possible propositional attitudes. However, it does
not follow that a belief is a relation between a thinker and a thought. The previous two
sections have made clear that thinking is recognising and responding to reasons. Simple
Simon  can  do  that  because  he  possesses  the  conceptual  capacities  to  track  Jack's
movements around the landscape. Little Red Riding Hood and Simple Simon can have
the same thoughts because the structure of their mentality is the same. That is, they
recognise  and respond to  the  same reasons  because  they have  the  same conceptual
capacities, and thus posses the same concepts. But, when someone responds to a reason,
what  that  person responds to  is  not  a  thought  but  a  situation.  Acts of  thinking,  the
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adoptings of propositional attitudes, are intentional mental states, and being intentional
mental states, they are not about thoughts, but about situations.  Because a propositional
attitude  is  about  a  situation  it  has  a  content.  But,  a  propositional  attitude  cannot
simultaneously be about a situation and about its own content. As a result, the correct
analysis of S is ii. Believing that Jack went up the hill is something that Simple Simon
does. The phrase which follows "believes that", in this case "Jack went up the hill",
gives the content of the propositional attitude. It is part of a representation of a mental
state. As a result, S describes Simple Simon's mental state. It does so by attributing a
belief to him, namely the belief with the thought that Jack went up the hill as a content.
I take it that this is the result which Davidson aims for in his paratactic account
of belief  (Davidson, 2001b, pp. 93–108). The sort of views which Davidson wants to
reject  are  views  that  treat  the  that-clauses  of  propositional  attitudes  as  referring  to
objects, and then treat propositional attitudes as relations between thinkers and objects.
One reason he wants to reject such a view is that it requires treating words as having a
different  meaning  in  propositional  attitude  contexts.  At  heart,  I  think,  the  view  is
motivated by the attempt to deny that sentences ever designate anything. Instead, they
describe things. The idea is that we need to find a way of describing the mental states of
thinkers, and it is the nature of propositional attitudes that a description of them is going
to require a great degree of sensitivity to the psychological make-up of the agents in
question. It is the properties of an agent's mind that limit which words can be used to
describe them. Davidson's ingenious solution is find an accurate description of what an
agent believes/desires/claimed/etc, and then say, "she V's that" (where 'V' is a stand in
for  a  propositional  attitude verb).  The end result  is  a  description  of  what  a  thinker
thinks.  It  does  not  require  attributing  a  relation  between  a  thinker  and  a  thought.
Davidson's  paratactic  account  is  not the only way of avoiding treating propositional
attitudes as relations between thinkers and contents. One might also treat the attitude
adopted as a property of an agent's total mental state. That would be to understand S as
predicating  the  property  of  believing  that  Jack  went  up  the  hill  to  Simple  Simon.
However,  whatever the correct analysis  is,  the end result  is that clauses are used to
describe mental states not to designate thoughts.
In summary, propositional attitudes are about the world. Propositional attitudes
are the results of acts of thinking. They have thoughts for their content. They are the
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actual or possible mental states of actual or possible agents. Thoughts are the contents
of actual or possible propositional attitudes. They are dependent objects. Two thinkers
have the same propositional attitude, which is to say an attitude with the same content,
when they have exercised the same conceptual capacities in an act of thinking of the
same type. They have the same conceptual capacities when they are able to keep track
of the same features of the world and when the mental roles of the thoughts which result
from an exercise  of  those  capacities  are  the  same.  In  other  words,  when the  same
bipartite truth conditional theory of thought describes both thinkers.
2.2 No Explicit Knowledge
The problem for the mental priority theorist is that explicit knowledge of what
she is thinking requires recognising, of her propositional attitudes, what way for the
world to  be they are about.  Understanding what  situation a propositional  attitude is
about requires knowing what way for the world to be it is a response to. It also requires
understanding what kind of response it is. Furthermore, it requires understanding how
that attitude makes a systematic difference to the activity of thinking. In other words, it
requires understanding the content. 
The next stage of the argument is showing that because a sui generis view of the
mind treats ascriptions of contents as descriptions of the mental roles of states, thinkers
cannot have explicit knowledge of content. The basic problem is epistemic access. On a
sui  generis  view of  the  mind,  having knowledge of  something,  implicit  or  explicit,
requires being able to recognise and respond to that thing. What is required for explicit
knowledge is the concept of a concept, and that concept needs to be gained by coming
to the concepts of your ground floor concepts.  So, what the mental priority theorist
needs to show is how you could recognise and respond to concepts. The reason that she
cannot do so is that, in an important sense, concepts are not parts of mental states. This
is because a propositional attitude is not an attitude to a content, but an attitude towards
a way for things to be. The content of a mental state is a dependent object. It relies for
its  existence  on  being  a  property  of  a  possible  propositional  attitude.  Now,  some
dependent objects might well be recognisable as a property of the self-subsistent objects
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on which they depend. However, that is only possible when the self-subsistent object
can engage in causal interactions, but propositional attitudes are themselves dependent
on abstract objects. A propositional attitude, presumably, depends for its existence either
on a brain state or on a behavioural state of the thinker. The behavioural state of the
thinker is a matter of what a thinker is doing. It is also a dependent and abstract object.
It depends for its existence on a spatially and temporally extended state of the world. It
is this last thing that creatures have access to. Non-language using thinkers are in no
position  to  recognise  and  respond  to  brain  states,  and  being  able  to  recognise  the
physical  manifestations  of  thinking  as  physical  manifestations  of  thinking  requires
already  having  the  concept  of  concepts.  So,  non-language  using  creatures  have  no
access  to  their  concepts  and  the  contents  of  their  mental  states.  They cannot  have
explicit understanding of their own mental states.
This is not true of language users. We can come to an understanding of abstract
objects  by understanding what it  is  for claims about those abstract to be true.   The
simple thought is that claims are made using sentences, and, although sentences are
abstract  objects,  they  are  physically  instantiated  in  utterances  and  inscriptions.  The
thought  is  that  by  gaining  an  understanding  of  truth  as  an  evaluative  property  of
language use, speakers are able to understand how sub-sentential expressions make a
systematic difference to the truth values of sentences in which they can occur.  This
allows speakers to come to understand the intentionality of uses of language, and gives
them the concept of a concept and concepts of their concepts. They are then able to
make sense of themselves as thinking about the world. I then, somewhat stipulatively,
distinguish between sentences and mental states by making the former representations
whilst denying that title to the latter. The idea is that a representation is an intentional
item that requires understanding for its intentionality to be of use to thinkers, where as
mental states are intentional items useful simply by being had. Another way of seeing
this difference is that representations present ways for the world to be, mental states are
responses to ways the world to be. The key thought of this section is that mental states
are had where as sentences understood.
Explicit knowledge of mental content
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The  discussion  of  deflationary  theories  has,  I  hope,  shown  that  explicit
knowledge requires awareness of your own perspective on the world. It is to be able to
understand  yourself  as  recognising  and  responding  to  ways  for  things  to  be.
Furthermore, it requires recognising what it is that you are recognising and responding
to. Somebody who knows all of that is somebody who knows two things: 
 A. What the content of their propositional attitudes are.
 B. What type of propositional attitudes they can have.
In other words, what you have to know is what is captured by a bipartite truth
conditional  theory  of  thought.  What  such  a  theory  captures  is  the  mental  roles  of
thoughts and concepts. So, what those with explicit knowledge of what they think have
knowledge of are the mental roles of their thoughts and concepts. As I showed in the
introduction,  that requires understanding two dimensions.  The first  dimension is  the
horizontal  dimension.  That  is,  the  systematic  difference  each  propositional  attitude
makes to the activity of thinking. The second dimension is the vertical dimension. That
is, what ways for the world to be each propositional attitude is an attitude towards.
Somebody who understands both those dimensions is somebody who understands of
any given propositional attitude what way for the world to be it is a response to, and
what kind of response it is. So, somebody who knows that they believe that there is
cheese in front of them is somebody who realises that they are responding to the thing
in front of them as cheese and that that response is to take it to be the case that there is
cheese in front of them. Somebody who knows that they want to have some cheese is
somebody who knows that they are responding to the state of affairs of them consuming
cheese by wanting it to be the case. 
What makes a sui generis view of the mind unique is that it treats those two
dimensions as only nominally separate. The sui generis theorist maintains that you can
only understand the kinds of responses which thinkers make in intentional terms. That
is, they think that the way to understand the activity of thinking is to see thinkers as
taking attitudes towards ways for things to be. They think that understanding what that
attitude is needs to be done in terms of what makes that attitude 'correct'. This means
that they think the way to understand the activity of thinking, the way to understand
what thinkers do, is in irreducibly rational terms. The minimalist and the redundancy
theorist  maintain that  you can separate  these two projects.  They think that  you can
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understand the responses in dispositional terms, and then show how those responses are
responses to ways for things to be. But, either way, having explicit knowledge requires
knowledge of both dimensions.
What I need to show is that, on a sui generis view, without language, thinkers
cannot come to recognise that they are thinking about the world. To do so, I am going to
reiterate just what is involved in having explicit knowledge of the vertical dimension.
What is required is that thinkers understand what their thoughts are about. To do so they
need to know what it would be for their thoughts to be true. However, the truth value of
a thought depends in part on how things are in the world and in part on the concepts out
of which that thought is composed. Understanding what it is for a thought to be true
requires understanding the contribution of the concepts to the truth value of the thought.
So, somebody who understands what it is for a thought to be true is somebody who
understands of the concepts out of which the thought is composed what their mental
values  are.  That  understanding,  like  all  other  understanding,  requires  having  the
requisite  concepts.  That  requires  having the  concept  of  a  concept.  In  addition,  you
cannot recognise that something is the mental value of a concept without having the
concept of that concept. So, one also needs the concept of the concepts involved. In
other  words,  someone  with  explicit  knowledge  is  somebody  who  has  some
understanding of thinking as the exercise of concepts, and has some conception of the
concepts that they are deploying in their engagement with the world.
Non-language users have no access to mental content
On a sui generis view of the mental, having a belief about a situation requires
recognising and responding to it as a reason to judge that things are that way. Having a
desire is holding something to be valuable. Forming an intention to do something is
being ready to embark on a particular course of action given the right circumstances.
But, all of those are to be in a particular mental state, albeit a state with content. As I
have already shown, for the sui generis theorist, a content is a dependent object. It is not
a Fregean thought, off in the third realm, to be recognised, apprehended and judged,
desired, intended and so on. I am going to focus, for simplicity's sake, on the attitude of
belief. However, what I am going to say can be equally well applied to any type of
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propositional attitude. In belief, to use my hackneyed example, believing that cheese is
present requires recognising that there is cheese present. 
Now, there needs to be some mechanism by which the creature recognises the
presence of cheese as a reason to judge that there is cheese. There are two plausible
mechanisms. These are a direct and indirect mechanism. In the direct mechanism, the
presence of the cheese is taken to be the immediate object of judgement. In the indirect
mechanism it is a sensual experience as of cheese that is taken as the immediate object
of judgement. Importantly, it is a disagreement over mechanism, and not over what is a
reason for what. Both the direct and indirect theorist treats the presence of cheese as a
reason to form the belief that there is cheese. The direct theorist takes the cheese to be
the immediate object of judgement, and the indirect theorist takes it that the mechanism
goes via it being presented as a cheese83. However, whichever mechanism is adopted
propositional  attitudes are,  on sui  generis  views, relational states,  and their  contents
merely  a  way  of  encoding  information  about  those  states.  As  Peacocke  puts  it  in
describing his position: 
According to this proposal, there is some relational property R with two characteristics.
First, the relational property R can be specified by mentioning no relations to concepts or
thoughts but only relations to other empirical things and states. Second, "John believes
that Lincoln Plaza is Square" is equivalent to the conjunction of (5) and (6):
(5) John is in some state S that has the relational property R
(6) the content  that  Lincoln  Plaza is  square is  the  unique content  p  such  that  
necessarily for any state S, S is a belief that p iff S has the relational property 
R.
(Peacocke, 1992, p. 106)
The unique content that Lincoln Plaza is square is a function of possession conditions of
the concepts which are required for a thinker to be able to have propositional attitudes
with that content. In other words, it is a function of the possession conditions of the
concept of Lincoln Plaza and the concept of being square.
But, this means that the content of the state has no role in John's coming to judge
that  Lincoln  Plaza  is  square.  Instead,  talk  of  content  is  useful  to  the  theorist  in
83 Peacocke himself takes that to be a distinction between those who treat the content of judgement to
be neo-Russellian propositions and those who treat the content to be a Fregean senses (Peacocke,
1992, pp. 69-74). For reasons which will become apparent, I think this way of treating the issue is
wrong. Propositions cannot be the objects of judgement, and that is what is under discussion here.
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identifying  a  particular  mental  state.  This  is  structurally  similar  to  the  redundancy
proposal that states are typed by their fine-grained functional role, and indexed using
some other system. Peacocke acknowledges this:
What the requirements  here aim to do is state  the (often counterfactual)  relations in
which a belief state must stand if it is to be the relevant belief that Lincoln Plaza is
square. Two belief states that both meet these requirements may differ radically in their
other actual and counterfactual relations. I am in effect using a notion of the canonical
conceptual role for a belief with a given propositional content. That role is fixed by the
canonical roles, the possession conditions, of the conceptual constituents of the complete
propositional content. My approach is, then, a kind of conceptual-role semantics, under
which attribution of states with conceptual content allows us to classify together two
individuals with very different beliefs and overall psychological economies.
(Peacocke, 1992, p. 111)
There  is  however  an  important  difference.  On  the  redundancy  proposal  the
indexing system has no word-world relations, but this is not the case on the sui generis
proposal. The raison d'être of the sui generis proposal is that rational agents recognise
and respond to reasons. When it comes to forming beliefs, a rational agent makes a
judgement about how things are. This requires making sense of belief as an agent taking
the world to be a particular way. The agent is able to do that because it has the requisite
conceptual capacities, and, as captured by the (C) form, having the requisite conceptual
capacities is a matter of being able to recognise, at least when things go well, when the
relevant mental values are instantiated. The sui generis proposal does not suffer from
the problem that contents lack mental values.
As Peacocke further acknowledges, the  (C) form aims to identify concepts in
terms of conceptual capacities, and as a result "a theory of concepts should be a theory
of  concept  possession"  (Peacocke,  1999,  p.  5).  The  (C)  form results  from treating
concept possession as a matter of having a practical capacity, albeit a practical capacity
that can only be explained by rationalising explanations. That is, by seeing the agent as
trying to respond to reasons. That is, at the very least, trying to avoid error and trying to
bring it about that the world is as it wants it to be. But, having a capacity to recognise
and respond to features of the world in a  rational  manner is  simply something that
agents can do. So, just as thoughts play no role in an agent's making a judgement, but
encode information about what the agent is doing, it is the conceptual capacity of an
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agent that matters, not the concept itself. A concept, like a thought, is an abstract object.
To have the concept of a concept or the concept of a thought, one needs to be able to
recognise that you are responding, rationally, to ways for things to be. In other words,
you need to be on your way to building a theory of concepts.
The question now is: could you be on your way to building a theory of concepts
without  the  ability  to  use  and  understand  language?  The  answer  is  a  fairly
straightforward no. Human beings, like all thinkers of which we are aware, are limited
by their physical make up. For us to come to an an understanding of something we need
there to be some causal mechanism that allows us to have that understanding. This is not
to say that all understanding must reduce to physical properties, or that all the objects
that we understand can be reduced to physical objects. It is simply that we must be able
to show how it is that we came to recognise and respond to an object, and there will
have to be some suitable mechanistic story that makes sense of that ability. 
The  problem  is  particularly  pressing  with  abstract  objects.  However,  many
abstract objects are dependent objects. Numbers are a good example. We can imagine a
dog that stands its ground against one dog, sometimes stands its ground against two
dogs, but invariably retreats when faced with three or more. It makes sense to say that
such a dog has some conception of number. We can credit it with a crude understanding
of a 1, 2, many arithmetic. The dog is able to recognise and respond to the number of
dogs present, at least in as much as it is able to recognise 1, 2 or many as the number of
dogs. However, the number of dogs is a visually available feature of the situation. It is
an  abstract,  dependent  object  that  is  dependent  on  self-subsistent  objects,  the  dogs.
Similarly, the shape of Lincoln Plaza is visually available to John. Non-linguistic infants
can recognise shapes. That is why they push the star-shaped object through the star-
shaped hole. But, again, a star shape is an abstract, dependent object dependent on a
self-subsistent material object84.
84 I think it would be wrong to attribute the concept of the number 1 or the number 2, as defined by a 1,
2, many arithmetic to the dog. Similarly, it would be wrong to attribute the concept of being star
shaped to the infant. What the dog has is an incomplete understanding of the number of dogs in a 1,
2, many arithmetic, and what the child has is the concept of the shape of the star-shaped brick. We
could perhaps start to imagine a non-linguistic creature that could see what was in common between
two dogs and two cats, or was able to group together all the star-shaped things. Although, it does not
seem very plausible that such a creature exists.
190
So, why is it  that thinkers cannot come to an understanding of thoughts and
concepts. What makes these abstract objects special? The answer is that thoughts and
concepts  are  dependent  on  a  further  abstract  object,  namely  possible  propositional
attitudes. Propositional attitudes are mental states, and mental states are typed by the
systematic  difference  they make  to  the  mental  life  and behaviour  of  thinkers.  That
makes them abstract objects. They are plausibly dependent on one of two physically
realisable states of affairs. The first is brain states, but thinkers clearly have no way of
coming to recognise configurations of their own or other peoples' neurons. The second
is the physically describable behaviour of thinkers. However, on a sui generis view of
the mind, that requires seeing yourself and other people as responding rationally to what
there  is  in  the  world.  It  is  not  enough to  be  able  to  recognise  and  respond to  the
behaviour, you need to be able to recognise and respond to the behaviour as rational
behaviour. That requires applying the concepts of concepts and thoughts to what people
do. That would only be possible if we grant non-linguistic creatures the inmate ability to
understand the world in rational terms. It would be to grant non-linguistic thinkers the
innate ability to ascribe concepts and thoughts to people. It would take a pretty diehard
rationalist to think that we have the concept of concepts innately. 
Of course, you might think that people, at least, are primed to come to ascribe
rationality to  events  in  the world and so,  in  some sense,  primed to recognise other
people's behaviour as rational. But, even if that is the case, we still would not have an
explanation of explicit knowledge. Understanding the behaviour as others as expressing
mental states requires evaluating other people's behaviour according to how the world
strikes you. What you would need to be doing is interpreting the behaviour of other
people. In other words, the position would be equivalent to a Davidsonian position, but
without the advantage of focusing on the linguistic behaviour of your interlocutors as
expressions of their propositional attitudes. I show in the next section that even if we
can make sense of non-linguistic creatures as primed to treat actions as expressions of
rationality, without the first meaning of an utterance being its linguistic meaning, there
is still no account of explicit knowledge.
It is worth noting that this problem of our access to abstract objects rules out
Frege's view of the mental in "The Thought" (1956). Frege seems to think that what
human  thinkers  do  is  grasp  thoughts,  and  thoughts  are  entities  in  the  third  realm.
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Admittedly, Frege thinks that our access to such thoughts is through sentences. But, by
making truth primarily a property of thoughts, Frege treats thoughts as self-subsistent
entities. They are not dependent objects. In particular, they do not depend on possible
sentences for their existence. Frege presumably thought that it is through understanding
sentences that we come to grasp thoughts. However, on this view, sentences are not
really things that can be understood. On this view, a thought is not the meaning of a
sentence. The meaning of a sentence is a dependent object. The raison d'être of this view
is that thoughts are self-subsistent objects. So, thoughts are not grasped as the meaning
of sentences. 
Of course, Frege might try to argue that it is through understanding the meaning
of  sentences  that  we come to grasp thoughts.  However,  this  understanding is  not  a
matter of recognising what it is for a sentence to be true, because it is thoughts that are,
strictly speaking, true or false. Frege would need some account of what is understood in
understanding  a  sentence  that  would,  in  the  first  instance,  not  be  a  matter  of
understanding that the sentence presents a way for the world to be, but that made sense
of someone coming to grasp what it would be for the world to be that way. It seems to
me that the picture presented is that hearing enough sentences is sufficient to trigger an
understanding of thoughts. But we are given no reason to think that this could be what is
really going on.
Understanding Representations
However, there is another way to come to an understanding of abstract objects,
and that is through understanding a description of those objects. In particular, it involves
being able to understand what it would be for sentences about those objects to be true.
To see this, consider that it would have been possible for humans to have developed and
played chess without ever making boards or chess pieces. What a chess player has to
learn is which moves are possible and how making a move affects the state of the game.
Now, a chess move is an abstract and dependent object. It is always a possible move of
a chess piece. But, although, as it happens, we do make physical instantiations of chess
pieces,  a chess piece is,  potentially,  a fully abstract  object.  It  can be defined by its
starting position and the moves it can make. Similarly, the board is another potentially
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fully abstract object. It too can be defined by the rules of chess. In other words, the
existence of a set of rules governing chess, another set of abstract objects, is sufficient
to define the game chess and bring into existence both chess pieces and chess moves.
What chess players have to learn is how to follow those rules. In doing so they come to
an understanding of the abstract objects which are the moves, the pieces and the board. 
In practice, we rely on the physical instantiations to come to that understanding.
But  it  is  not  necessary.  However,  if  you  were  not  to  use  a  chess  set,  to  come  to
understand chess you would need a different way of gaining the information required.
You would need some way of coming to understand the rules. That could be done by
coming to understand a description of those rules. Because a sentence is what is used
when we make utterances  or  inscriptions,  we are  able  to  come to understand those
sentences by recognising and responding to them. In the next chapter, I look in more
detail at what it is to understand a sentence, but the short version is that what is required
is coming to understand how truth organises language use. That involves coming to see
how sub-sentential  expressions  make  a  systematic  difference  to  the  truth  values  of
sentences in which they can occur. But, unlike with content, there is no problem with
our  epistemic  access  to  sub-sentential  expressions  or,  indeed,  syntax.  These  are
dependent  objects  which  are  dependent  on  sentences,  and  although  sentences  are
themselves abstract objects, they are regularly physically instantiated. In fact, the real
problem is coming to an understanding truth, but how you do that will be left to the next
chapter.
This marks a crucial difference between sentences and thoughts. Sentences are
understood  where  as  thoughts  are  had.  I  want  to  say,  somewhat  stipulatively,  that
sentences are representations but thoughts are not. The crucial thought is that, although
both thoughts and sentences are intentional items, they play a different role in the life of
thinkers. Both thoughts and sentences are intentional items because they are both about
situations by being correct or incorrect depending on how things are. In other words,
both thoughts and sentences can be true or false. The role played by a sentence, the
difference it makes to what a thinker understands about the world, depends on it being
understood.  Understanding a  sentence  requires  understanding  how its  truth  value  is
systematically determined by the contribution of its sub-sentential parts. That involves
understanding that the sentence presents a way for the world to be, and so assertions of
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that sentence are, in some sense, correct when the world is as the sentence presents it.
You  understand  what  way  the  world  has  to  be  for  the  sentence  to  be  true  by
understanding the semantic values of its parts. A thought makes a difference to what a
thinker understands about the world simply by making a systematic difference to the
activity of thinking. Of course, you still understand a thought by understanding what it
is for that thought to be true. However, thoughts can make a systematic difference to the
what a thinker understands about the world without themselves being understood. This
is not true of sentences.
2.3 Thinking About Thinking
Before moving on I  want  to  note how much can go on at  the ground floor.
Consider the following plausible account of the lab rat. I want to show that it is possible
for thinking about thinking to take place at the ground floor. That is, it is possible that a
lab rat has implicit knowledge of its mental states. It seems to me a plausible description
of the lab rat that it learns its way round the maze by making guesses as to where it
should go. Imagine that it comes to a T-junction, turns left arrives at a dead end, turns
round, goes back to the site of its choice and takes the right-hand exit. It seems to me
plausible to  say that  the rat  arrives at  the T-junction,  guesses that it  should go  left,
reaches the dead end and realises that its guess was wrong85. In other words, when the rat
reaches a dead end it responds to its previous guess as a reason. In fact, it realises that
its previous guess was wrong. As adopting a propositional attitude requires recognising
and  responding  to  a  reason,  and  as  mental  states  are  objects  individuated  by  their
contents, there is no a priori reason why the rat cannot be responding to a very particular
guess, its  guess that cheese is  to the left,  by realising that it  was wrong. Incredibly
sophisticated  thinking  can  take  place  at  the  ground  floor.  But,  no  amount  of
sophistication will allow the rat to know what the content of its guess is. No amount of
thinking will get the rat to the first floor. To do that it would have to learn a language so
85 Of course, it is possible to tell a different story. One might think that the rat reaches the dead end,
realises that there is no joy here and so turns around. When it reaches the site of its error it is aware
that left is no good, so it thinks that the route goes in the opposite direction. I am not worried about
which is the better description of rat mentality. I merely want to show that thinking about thinking
can, and might, take place at the ground floor.
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that it could understand a representation of what it was already doing.
§3 Not Quite Linguistic Priority
In the previous two sections I showed that if, as seems plausible, a theory of
thought is a description of the mental behaviour of an agent, then the ability to build and
understand such a theory requires a representational medium in which to do it. In this
section I  want to show that in fact it  is not enough that we have a representational
medium, we also need to be able to understand that medium as representational. In the
next chapter I am going to show how that is possible if the representational medium,
language, is constituted by a rational practice which is independent of the purposes of
speakers. I will show how explicit knowledge is possible if words and sentences are
meaningful independently of the ways they are used by speakers. But, it might be, and
has been, thought that the meaning of an utterance is a matter of the purposes of the
utterer. The idea being that we can make sense of utterances and of other people at the
same time. So to make it plausible that my way is the right way to think about language,
I need to show that treating the meaning of an utterance as a matter of the purposes of
the utterer precludes the possibility of explicit knowledge of meaning and content. 
Views which do treat the meaning of an utterance as a matter of the purposes of
the utterer are interpretive views of truth. These are views which accept that explicit
understanding  of  how  things  are  in  the  world  and  explicit  understanding  of  what
somebody thinks requires the ability to understand language use. However, such views
do not think that understanding language use is a matter of understanding the meanings
of sentences. The hallmark of these views is that we gain explicit knowledge of how
things are and also the content of mental states by coming to explicit understanding of
utterances. Utterances tend to be rational actions in that they are, in general, produced
for some linguistic purpose. Explicit understanding of those utterances is a matter of
grasping the purpose of those utterances. So, the hallmark of interpretive views is that
understanding linguistic behaviour is really a matter of understanding each other.
3.1 How Interpretive Views Work
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The problem identified with mental priority views is that mental states are about
the world but, just so long as they are taken to be no more than responses to the world,
they are not representational. This leaves talk of thoughts and contents as devices of
mental  ascent.  Talk of  thoughts  and talk of contents  become ways of  talking about
mental  states  rather  than  what  they  are  about.  But,  this  means  that  we  have  to
understand language use in  order  to  gain explicit  knowledge of the contents  of  our
mental states, and even that we have such things. Interpretive views do not want to drop
the  plausible  thought  that  mental  states  are  responses  to  the  world,  but  they
acknowledge that we need an understanding of language use in order to have explicit
knowledge of how things are and of the contents of those mental states. The very simple
thought is that language users, among other things, make utterances which make claims
about how things are. If one can come to understand what has being claimed, one is in a
position to understand how things might be in the world. In addition, if one can make
sense of somebody thinking that the world is that way, one can make sense of them as
believing that things are that way. One ends up with the potential for knowledge of how
things are, and the potential for knowledge of what people believe. It is not difficult to
extend the picture to include other propositional attitudes.
However,  these  views  deny  that  understanding  an  utterance  is  a  matter  of
coming  to  understand  something  that  would  be  meaningful  independently  of  the
occasion  of  utterance.  So,  what  we cannot  do  is  simply learn  a  language,  where  a
language is the sort of thing that is meaningful independently of how it is in fact used,
and use that to work our way into a theory of mind. But, for the reasons given above,
nor  can  we  simply  gain  a  theory  of  mind  and  use  that  to  work  our  way  into  an
understanding of utterances. Instead, on these views, it has to be possible to do both
things together. The simple thought is that we are able to recognise linguistic behaviour
as being rational.  That is,  we are able to recognise linguistic behaviour as having a
point. The picture is that what we get access to are bits of purposive behaviour. What we
are trying to understand is what our interlocutors are up to. In other words, we are trying
to  understand  why they would  behave  like  that.  So,  making  sense  of  utterances  is
making sense of utterers. But, the utterance itself does not drop out of the picture. If our
interlocutor is a competent speaker, what she will have done is performed a particular
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linguistic act. She might, for example, have claimed that there is milk in the fridge by
saying, "there is milk in the fridge". In making sense of her, you need to make sense of
why she would have claimed that. So, what you need to do is realise that she has made a
claim with a particular content. Alternatively, she might ask if there is milk in the fridge
by saying, "is there milk in the fridge?". In this case, you need to realise that she has
asked a  question  with  a  particular  content.  The same thing  goes  for  other  types  of
linguistic  act.  In making sense of competent linguistic behaviour  you need to make
sense of contents being presented with different forces. But, you do that by making
sense of why other people might want to do such a thing. In other words, what we are
trying to do is interpret each other.
In brief then, here is the problem faced by interpretive theorists. Such a theorist
accepts that thinking is a matter of responding to the world. She acknowledges that it is
not representational, and so accepts that we do not have explicit knowledge of mentality
without learning to use and understand language. However, she is not prepared to think
that in the first instance what we understand are languages. Instead, she thinks that what
we understand is  the point  of  linguistic  behaviour.  However,  linguistic  behaviour  is
articulate. So, what we need to do is make sense of our ability to come to understand
articulate  linguistic  behaviour  by  making  sense  of  it  as  rational  behaviour  without
making reference to our own grasp of mental content. I am going to put the problem like
this: how is it that we interpret other people without a grasp of a language or of mental
content?
Davidson  is  someone  who  takes  it  that  understanding  language  use,
understanding  linguistic  behaviour,  is  a  matter  of  interpreting  other  speakers.
Interpreting other speakers is a matter of being able to "give the meaning of an arbitrary
utterance by members of a language community" (Davidson, 2001b, pp. 160–161). I am
going to focus on Davidson in order to bring out the proposal. I am then going to show
how the problems that beset Davidson beset even non-Davidsonians. I am then going to
show that the problems Davidson faces are insurmountable.
Because speakers are able to understand almost any utterance produced by their
interlocutors, what we need is a way of modelling that competence. The problem is that
the  competence  we are  trying  to  capture  is  a  competence  to  understand a  limitless
number  of  utterances.  The  thought  is  that  interpreters  are  able  to  discern  syntactic
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structure  in  the  utterances  of  their  interlocutors.  This  allows  them to  have  a  go  at
assigning semantic values to the parts in order to establish their semantic roles. In other
words, they are able to see how the parts of each utterance make a systematic difference
to the truth value of the utterance. As a result, a Tarski style theory of truth goes some
way to capturing the linguistic competence of speakers. 
Such a theory may be taken as giving an interpretation of each sentence a speaker might
utter. To belong to a speech community—to be an interpreter of the speech of others—
one needs, in effect, to know such a theory, and to know that it is a theory of the right
kind.
(Davidson, 2001b, p. 161)86
It is important to note that claiming that such a theory is a model of linguistic
competence, rather than an attribution of implicit knowledge. There is no claim that
competent speakers know any such theory. As Davidson writes:
In any case, claims about what would constitute a satisfactory theory are not… claims
about the propositional knowledge of an interpreter, nor are they claims about the details
of the inner workings of some part of the brain. They are rather claims about what must
be said to give a satisfactory description of the competence of the interpreter. We cannot
describe what an interpreter can do except by appeal to a recursive theory of a certain
sort. 
(Davidson, 1985, p. 476)
Davidson's talk of a "language community" may make it seem like Davidson
thinks  that there are languages,  where a language is  what  is  spoken by a particular
community.  There  is  a  sense  in  which  this  would  be  right.  However,  it  is  a  dull
empirical sense87. Davidson is aware that people in a similar location tend to exhibit
86 Nb. Davidson's use of "sentence". It is similar to mine except that for Davidson a sentence is a term
of art in an empirical theory, whereas for me there are sentences. 
87  Davidson writes in "the social aspect of language", "I am happy to say speakers share a language if
and only if they tend to use the same words to mean the same thing, and once this idea is properly
tidied up it is only a short, uninteresting step to defining the predicate 'is a language' in a way that
corresponds, as nearly as may be, with ordinary usage. What bothers Michael [Dummett] is not my
failure to take this step (somewhere I do take it), but my failure to appreciate that the concept of a
speaker meaning something by what he says depends on the notion of a shared language and not the
other way round" (Davidson, 1994, p. 3). Davidson does not accept Dummett's criticism. He remains
wedded  to  the  idea  that  the  interest  in  truth  conditional  theories  of  meaning  are  as  theories  of
interpretation of people, not as descriptions of languages.
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similar linguistic behaviour. He is also aware that as a matter of fact it is quite difficult
to understand people who do not behave like you. Interpreting other people's linguistic
behaviour is not easy. It cannot be done on a piecemeal, utterance by utterance basis.
This is because one makes sense of an utterance by making sense of why somebody
would say that. This requires you to know an awful lot about her. You do not need to
know everything that she thinks. But, you do need to know a lot about what concepts
she possesses, and knowing what concepts she possesses is a matter of knowing which
inferences she would be prepared to make given a set of background beliefs and desires.
However, knowing what inferences somebody would be prepared to make is a matter of
knowing  what  they  take  to  follow  from what.  But,  because  we  have  no  language
independent access to the contents of their mental states, that is a matter of being able to
assign truth conditions to their utterances. So, what Davidson hopes to model is the kind
of skill possessed by people who are able to understand each other effortlessly, and that
is the skill possessed by people who know a lot about each other's conceptual repertoire.
As  it  happens,  that  is  going  to  be  a  model  of  what  people  who  share  patterns  of
linguistic  behaviour  are  able  to  do.  He is  quite  happy to  talk  about  people  in  that
position as sharing a language or as belonging to a single language community. It does
not follow that what these people understand is a shared language in any interesting
philosophical sense.
Davidson's view is that we come to the interpretive encounter primed with what
Davidson labels a "prior theory" (Davidson, 1985, p. 479). A prior theory is a theory of
how somebody is likely to speak and what their utterances are likely to mean. But, the
speaker  may  confound  expectations.  This  might  be  deliberate,  as  in  the  case  of  a
witticism, or accidental, as in the case of a slip of the tongue. If interpretation is to be
successful, the interpreter cannot simply plug the utterances into her prior theory to get
an interpretation out. Instead, she has to on-the-fly work out what her interlocutor has
said. As Davidson points out, the theory which correctly models what somebody who
said  might  turn out  to  be different  from the  prior  theory.  He labels  it  the  "passing
theory" (Davidson, 1985, p. 480). 
A passing theory is not a theory of what anyone (except perhaps a philosopher) would
call an actual natural language. 'Mastery' of such a language would be useless, since
knowing a passing theory is only knowing how to interpret a particular utterance on a
particular occasion. Nor could such a language, if you want to call it that, be said to have
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been learned, or to be governed by conventions. Of course things previously learned
were essential to arriving at the passing theory, but what was learned could not have
been the passing theory.
(Davidson, 1985, p. 480)
So, on Davidson's view, what models interpretation is a theory of truth that gives
the content of a particular utterance, by a particular speaker at a particular time. This is
the passing theory. It is true that in order to be able to be able to interpret, you need to
know a lot about your interlocutor. In particular, you have to have a pretty good idea
about  what  she  might  be  likely  to  mean  by  an  utterance  at  any given  time.  That
competence is modelled by another theory of truth. This is the prior theory. But, it is not
the theory of truth that gives the content of what she actually says. In other words, we
have to  be able  to  interpret  a  particular  speaker's  particular  utterance.  As Davidson
points out in "The Social Aspect of Meaning", the view commits us to thinking that
sharing a repertoire of words and syntactic devices which you have learned to employ in
similar ways is not sufficient to explain interpretation, and furthermore, it is not even
necessary (Davidson, 1994, p. 2).
Davidson's use of the word "interpretation" is particularly apt. For Davidson, an
interpretation is  a matter  of assigning values to the semantically relevant  parts  of a
person's  speech.  To  do  that  the  interpreter  must  be  able  to  analyse  the  linguistic
behaviour into its syntactic elements and then assign values. Given the compositional
nature of human speech, assigning values requires the ability to assign values to a stock
of semantic primitives, and then develop a theory that recursively assigns values to all
other semantic elements. By making the central semantic value truth, Davidson makes
coming to understand another person's speech just like providing an interpretation of an
artificial language. 
Importantly, the difference between interpreting another's speech and providing
an interpretation of a formal language is that the former is an empirical matter and the
latter stipulative. The picture is that an interpreter tries out a variety of interpretations
until she lands upon one that more or less gets things right. The basic data of such a
theory are which sentences the subject holds true. Knowing that a speaker is committed
to a particular piece of uninterpreted speech is not by itself very helpful. The interpreter
has no idea what values should be assigned to the words used. The way in is to see
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language use as intentional actions on the part of speakers. The interpreter makes sense
of what might be held true by making sense of the behaviour of her subject. This is
where the principle of charity comes into play. It is both the working assumption and a
prerequisite  of  the  possibility  of  interpretation  that  the  subject  is  not  hopelessly
irrational.  You  have  to  interpret  your  interlocutors  according  to  the  way the  world
strikes you, and it is a precondition of interpretability that your subject is rational. As
Davidson puts it,
No simple  theory can  put  a  speaker  and  interpreter  in  perfect  agreement,  and  so  a
workable theory must from time to time assume error on the part of one or the other. The
basic  methodological  precept  is,  therefore,  that  a  good  theory  of  interpretation
maximizes agreement. Or, given that sentences are infinite in number, and given further
considerations to come, a better word might be optimize.
(Davidson, 2001b, p. 169 italics original)
Davidson goes on to observe that on this picture, "the concepts of objective truth,
and of error, necessarily emerge in the context of interpretation" (Davidson, 2001b, p.
169).  The  thought  being  that  truth  is  a  property of  interpreted  sentences.  On some
interpretations, a sentence is true. If someone gives it one of those interpretations, and
holds the sentence under that interpretation to be true, she has got things right, otherwise
she is in error. In this respect Davidson treats truth as a semantic value.
However, Davidson also thinks that getting the concept of truth brings with it the
concept of belief, and with it the more general concept of a thought. As he writes:
Since the attitude of holding true is the same, whether the sentence is true or not, it
corresponds directly to belief. The concept of belief thus stands ready to take up the
slack between objective truth and the held true, and we come to understand it just in this
connection. 
We have the idea of belief only from the role of belief in the interpretation of language,
for as a private attitude it is not intelligible except as an adjustment to the public norm
provided  by  language.  It  follows  that  a  creature  must  be  a  member  of  a  speech
community if it  is to have the concept of belief. And given the dependence of other
attitudes on belief,  we can say more generally that  only a creature that  can interpret
speech can have the concept of a thought. 
(Davidson, 2001b, p. 170)
The idea is that prior to trying to interpret others we never notice that we are in
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error, because the only norms by which to judge our judgements would be our own
judgements88. That makes no sense, and it is only when we encounter others that we
notice that there are differences of opinion. More specifically, we get the notion of error
when we notice that people do not hold all of the same utterances to be true. So, we get
the notion of error from the notion of truth, and truth applies to utterances. Transposed
into my idiom what Davidson is  saying is  that  we move to the first  floor,  we gain
explicit  knowledge of mental content,  by getting the concept of truth as a semantic
value of  an utterance.  It  is  through interpreting others  that  we are  able  to  interpret
ourselves89.
3.2 Redundancy Theories
One interesting feature of interpretive theories is that, despite crucial differences,
they share a common core with linguistic priority developments of a redundancy theory.
A linguistic priority redundancy view seeks to find some account of language use that
makes intentionality an intrinsic property of sentences. What is required is an account of
language use such that sentences are about the world. On these views, language use
gives rise to philosophically interesting systems of meaning. These systems of meaning
88 Whatever the correct analysis of Wittgenstein's private language argument, his comment at §258 "one
would like to say: whatever is going to seem right to me is right. And that only means that here we
can't talk about 'right'" is surely correct (Wittgenstein, 1997). There has to be some conception of
standards that are independent of my act of judgement, before I can make sense of being in error.
89  Davidson actually goes further; he denies that there is any ground floor thinking at all:
Can a creature have a belief if it does not have the concept of belief? It seems to me it cannot, 
and for this reason. Someone cannot have a belief unless he understands the possibility of being 
mistaken, and this requires grasping the contrast between truth and error—true belief and false 
belief. But this contrast, I have argued, can emerge only in the context of interpretation, which 
alone forces us to the idea of an objective, public truth. 
Davidson, 2001b, p. 170
I am not sure that belief requires understanding the possibility of being mistaken or that one needs the
concept  of  truth for  understanding  error.  My lab rat  understands (implicitly)  that  it  has  made a
mistake, and plenty of brutes hesitate before rushing in – surely a recognition that they might be
wrong. But perhaps Davidson means that a belief must aim at truth, and that is not something that can
be done without the concept of truth. 
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are languages and are taken to be respectable objects rather than theoretical posits used
to predict and explain speaker behaviour. Millikan's view, for example, treats words and
syntactic devices as historical items. The idea is that they are meaningful because these
historical items have proliferated as a result of having served a specific function. The
idea then is that this "proper function" – the function that explains the proliferation – of
a linguistic device is what any production of a lexical or syntactic item does. However,
as Millikan writes:
But although the stabilizing function of a language device is independent of the purpose of
the particular speaker who utters it, it is not independent of speaker purposes in general.
The survival of a public language element without change of function must depend upon
their being a critical mass of occasions upon which speakers and hearers use the element
such  that  it  performs  its  stabilizing  function  in  accordance  with  the  speaker's  and  the
hearer's purposes.
(Millikan, 1987, pp. 52–53)
Without  this  thought  Millikan's  position would be dead in the water.  As she
rejects what she labels "meaning rationalism" – the view that we can grasp the meaning
of the term by a priori reflection – Millikan has to have some account of how we ever
came to  linguistic  understanding.  If  the  meaning of  the word is  whatever  historical
feature of its use best explains its proliferation, then grasping meaning requires serious
empirical  study.  One  cannot  undertake  that  empirical  study  until  one  has  some
sophisticated, reflective understanding of the world around you. But, the fact that we
can  and  do  use  words  for  communicative  purposes  without  reference  to,  or
understanding of,  their  proper  functions  suggests  that  the  way in  is  via  learning to
interpret others. Once you have worked your way into explicit knowledge, then you can,
should you wish, choose to use words and sentences correctly. However, working your
way into explicit knowledge is a matter of interpreting the behaviour of other people. 
David  Lewis  is  another  redundancy  theorist.  He  thinks  that  languages  are
conventions for uses of words and sentences. At heart, a convention is a regularity of
use. For Lewis, linguistic behaviour is regular enough, and with good reason, that it
gives rise to objects for which there is a function from sentences to truth values (albeit
that  the  actual  mechanism goes  via  sets  of  possible  worlds).  Although  only  a  tiny
handful of speakers ever achieve the sophistication of being able to map sentences to
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truth  values,  most  competent  speakers  do  manage  to  understand  the  meaning  of
sentences, and that is to know when they are true and know when they are false. They
are then able to use those sentences for their own purposes. However, our way into
understanding the meaning of languages is via understanding each other (Lewis, 1979,
pp. 562–567).
What links redundancy views with interpretive views is a diehard empiricism.
Crucial to all of the views is the rejection of meaning rationalism. Meaning rationalism
is the view that a competent speaker can have a priori knowledge of the meaning of her
utterances or the contents of her propositional attitudes. Meaning empiricists maintain
that it takes empirical work to discover what intentional items are about. As Millikan
sees it, the problem that besets traditional correspondence theories of truth come about
because the theorist thinks that one could have access to a correspondence theory, as it
were, from the inside. Instead, one needs to step back from thought and language to see
how utterances and mental states map onto the world. One challenge for the view is
showing how one could ever move from the inside position to the outside position to
make the required empirical investigations. In response, the position tries to make sense
of our ability to make sense of other people. The inside position is the position of an
interpreter. A grasp of the skills required for interpretation allows you to investigate the
mappings  between  mental  states,  uses  of  sentences  and  the  world.  On  the  diehard
empiricist development, that comes out as an empirical hypothesis. It is tacked on to an
interpretive theory of understanding.
But, even on an interpretive theory understanding an utterance is a matter of
building an empirical theory of what your interlocutor means. The outputs of that theory
are statements of what your interlocutor has said.  But,  the interlocuter's  sayings  are
pieces of behaviour no different in kind from any other intentional actions. The radical
interpreter does not try to understand the language of her subject. Instead, she tries to
understand the subject himself. As Hornsby puts it:
An  interpretational  truth-theory  enables  one  to  see  speakers'  productions  of  noises  as
contentful  utterances  by  way  of  assisting  in  the  task  of  seeing  those  productions  as
intelligible speech actions, having some purpose. But any hypothesis about the purpose of
the person who used words on an occasion goes hand-in-hand not only with a hypothesis
about the content of her utterance but also with a hypothesis about her mental states. Any
such hypothesis is thus potentially confirmable or disconfirmable by reference at least to
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linguistic actions of that person…, and also to actions of any kind of that person on other
occasions.  We  cannot  understand  people  on  the  basis  of  what  they  do  with  words
considered separately from all the other things they and others do. An account of the use of
a language is just one part of the total account of the lives and minds of the people who
speak it.
(Hornsby, 1989, p. 554)90
I am going to show that such empirical theorising about speaker behaviour has
to  come  after  understanding  a  language,  and  that  the  possibility  of  understanding
language requires a defence of meaning rationalism.
3.3 The First Objection: No Way In to Reason
I have two objections to treating understanding utterances as a matter of making
sense of your interlocutors. The first objection is that it seems impossible for a non-
linguistic creature to make sense of its interlocutors as behaving rationally. Prelinguistic
creatures can be granted an evaluative world view. That is, they want certain state of
affairs  and  they  have  some conception  as  to  how things  are  and  how to  go  about
achieving their goals. What they do not have is the concept of truth. They do not have
the concept of truth because the concept of truth emerges in the activity of making sense
of  other  people.  It  is  the  concept  that  is  used  to  interpret  other  people.  Competent
language users are able to make sense of other people because they are able to make
sense of what other people hold true and what other people present as true. But, truth is
the concept  you need in  order  to  be able  to  do that.  Making sense of other  people
requires recognising that they are rational. So, you get the concept of truth when you are
able to recognise that people ought to have a reason for what they do. The problem is
seeing how one could ever come to recognise that other people are rational without
having  the  concept  of  truth.  But,  how  can  one  have  the  concept  of  truth  without
recognising that other people are rational?
90 Hornsby,  unlike  Davidson,  is  prepared  to  acknowledge  a  philosophical  use  for  languages.
Presumably, she thinks, with Lewis,  that a language is something that develops from regularities of
use.
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Perhaps the thought is like this: first you bimble around the world getting things
right for the most part. However, without realising it you are making errors and learning
from them. You improve your abilities to bimble around the world. Among the things
that  you  encounter  are  other  people.  They  too  have  to  be  negotiated.  They  are
particularly tricky because they are also trying to negotiate you. Among the things that
they do is make sounds. In trying to work them out, you try to work out why they make
those sounds. Eventually it dawns on you that they are committed to these sounds. They,
of  course,  are  competent  speakers  and are  holding those sounds to  be true  under  a
particular interpretation. Eventually, you hit upon this hypothesis. Then you realise that
they hold a sentence to be true because that is how they believe things to be. In realising
that, you realise that they have a perspective on the world which largely coincides with
yours, but that means that you have realised that you have a perspective on the world.
That amounts to knowing how the world strikes you. This gives you the tools to utter
sounds with a particular interpretation intended, and to engage in argument with other
people. Without sentences being representational independently of speaker intentions,
you have come to explicit knowledge of the content of your own and others' minds and
explicit knowledge of what you and other people are saying.
The reason I think that the picture fails is that I do not think it can make sense of
the  infant  speaker  ever  coming  to  the  hypothesis,  even  implicitly,  that  competent
speakers  hold  a  sentence  true  under  a  particular  interpretation.  Doing  that  requires
realising that they, your interlocutors, have a perspective on the world. But, how are you
to realise that they have a perspective on the world without the ability to see that they
disagree with you? And how are you to see that they disagree with you when you have
no conception that you have a perspective on the world? On the Davidsonian picture, I
cannot so much as hold a sentence true or become aware that I am believing anything
until I have the concept of truth and error. But, that requires I notice that you disagree
with me. And noticing disagreement requires recognising that you believe things and
that you are rational. Doing that requires the notion of truth and error. 
The basic problem is that to get into explicit  thought at  all the infant has to
recognise her interlocutors as rational agents.  That is, as having projects and attitudes,
and, at the very least explicable according to a constitutive ideal of rationality. In other
words, she needs to take her fellow humans to be, by and large, keeping track of the
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truth and behaving in ways that are consistent with what is it that they want. She can
only do that if she has some conception of their having an evaluative worldview. That
is, some conception of them as minded – which is to say, having a more or less stable
conception as to how things are, and as having particular desires. That is, she has to
notice other humans as sui generis from inanimate objects by being autonomous and
having a perspective on how things are. But, doing all that requires noticing that her
interlocutor's  have  beliefs,  and  that  is  something  that  cannot  be  done  without  the
concept of belief.
Davidson himself makes the following suggestion as to how we get into explicit
knowledge:
The triangle I have described [formed by two agents and the world] stands for the simplest
interpersonal situation. In it two (or more) creatures each correlate their own reactions to
external phenomena with the reactions of the other. Once these correlations are set up, each
creature is in a position to expect the external phenomenon when it perceives the associated
reaction of the other. What introduces the possibility of error is the occasional failure of the
expectation; the reactions do not correlate.
(Davidson, 2001c, p. 129)
It is certainly the case that if a creature has correlated external phenomena with
the reactions of other creatures and those correlations fail, then error has occurred. But,
how is the creature to notice that error has occurred? The creature is, roughly, treating
everything in the world as causal. It has hypotheses about how other things react to each
other  and  it.  It  might,  for  example,  have  come  to  the  conclusion  that  unsupported
objects fall to earth. One day it encounters a helium balloon gently drifting upwards. It
might come to expect that shiny silver objects are liable to float away. The worry is that
a prelinguistic infant is never going to be able to notice that people get things wrong
because it will treat everything like the helium balloon. In trying to correlate its actions
with things in the world and other objects' reactions, it will never notice that some of
those objects have purposes.
It  might  be  thought  that  this  still  has  not  created  a  problem for  Davidson.
Davidson might reply, but of course, it all comes at once. Getting the concept of truth
just  gives you the realisation that  your interlocutors have projects  and attitudes,  the
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realisation that you have projects and attitudes, the notion of a perspective of the world,
and the idea that people say things to each other by using sentences. However,  this
would be to treat the problem as to how it is that the infant comes to notice that people
are holding utterances true. The objection starts earlier. The problem is that the infant
can  only  ask,  "why  does  my  father  make  those  sounds?"  looking  for  a  causal
explanation. The infant can drop her spoon to see if it falls to the floor to try to work out
how gravity works, and prod her father to see how he reacts. What his projects are
cannot become a problem for her until she has a perception of him having a mind. That
requires her to have a conception of him holding something true, but she cannot get to
that conception until she has a notion of him as rational. As a result, on the Davidsonian
picture, she needs another way in to the concept of rationality than coming to make
sense of other people. She in fact already needs the concept of wants and beliefs, and
that requires the untenable thought priority thesis.
I think there is a possible line of response, although it is a little bit desperate.
The thought might be that we have evolved to be the sort of creature that looks for
teleological explanations. If so our proto-thoughts about other objects in the world are
not  in  terms  of  their  causal  powers,  but  in  terms  of  their  projects.  The infant  who
encounters  the  helium balloon does  think  of  the  helium balloon  as  trying  to  move
upwards, it also assumes that most objects are trying to move downwards. Of course, it
is not literally true to say that the pre-linguistic creature thinks of object as trying to do
things. That would involve the creature having a full-blown conception of mindedness.
But, it is also not literally true to say that the rat thought that unsupported objects fell to
earth. In order for the rat to think that it would need the concept of the cause. It quite
clearly does not have that. The thought would be that in both cases we have to appeal to
a proto-concept. The next claim would be that there is nothing more mysterious about
having a proto-concept of a purpose than having a proto-concept of a cause. The final
step is to say that at some point, humans, and humans alone, manage to hit upon the
hypothesis  that  speakers  are  holding things  to  be  true.  Humans  are  able  to  do  that
because they come to recognise that people have the purpose of presenting utterances as
true. Once they have they have a genuine, if confused, concepts of having a purpose,
reason, error and everything else required for recognising perspectives on the world. All
that remains is to sharpen up those concepts.
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I think this line of response is a little bit desperate because we can say what it is
for a rat to have the proto-concept of a cause. It is simply for the rat to expect things, for
example, to fall to earth when unsupported or move when pushed. It is not so obvious
what it would be for it to have the proto-concept of a purpose. Having said that, it is
common for adult humans to attribute purposes to inanimate objects (even when we
know full well that they do not). So, that might count as evidence that we are hardwired
to expect things to have a will. However, I have another, and I think deeper, objection. It
is to that which I now turn.
3.4 The Second Objection: Still No Way Off The Ground Floor
There is a decisive objection.  It  is that without our first understanding being
understanding of sentences considered as speaker independent objects, there is no way
off the ground floor. In brief, the problem is that interpretational theories of meaning are
models  of  what  speakers  do when they understand each other.  They do not  in  fact
provide an interpretation of one language in another language. This creates a mystery
about what is understood on the right-hand side of the theorems. The point can be seen
this way: the theorist who is describing the process of interpretation of one speaker by
another produces a  recursive theory of truth.  That  theory is  in the 'language'  of the
theorist. When she says, "'there is milk in the fridge' is true if and only if there is milk in
the fridge", she says something in her 'language' that models the understanding of her
subject.  The sentence used on the right-hand side of the biconditional  is  a sentence
which the theorist understands and knows to capture what is understood by her subject.
The problem is making sense of the theorist as having explicit understanding. However,
what the theorist does is just a more sophisticated version of what we do all the time
when we understand each other. So, if the theorist has no explicit understanding then
nor do we. I take it that that is hopeless.
The argument in his briefest form looks like this:
D1. Understanding is a vulnerable state; it could have been wrong.
D2.  To  have  explicit  knowledge  of  something  requires  understanding  a
representation of that thing.
D3.  Explicit  knowledge  of  something  requires  the  possibility  of  being
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wrong in your understanding of a representation of it.
D4.  On  Davidson's  view  of  language  there  is  no  possibility  of
misunderstanding a representation.
Therefore,
D5. On Davidson's view of of language there is no explicit knowledge.
D1. Understanding is a vulnerable state; it could have been wrong.
To understand something, for example that there is milk in the fridge, is to be in
a state of awareness about how things are – in this case, that there is milk in the fridge.
That is to be in a state with a particular content. To have content, as I showed in chapter
1, is to have truth conditions. But, the moral of the previous chapter is that having truth
conditions is, at the very least, a matter of intrinsic intentionality. We need an account of
content that thereby explains intentionality. In other words, understanding something is
a matter of taking the world to be some particular way. Understanding is a factive state.
Somebody who understands that there is milk in the fridge has recognised a fact. But,
this is a cognitive achievement. It requires having correctly taken the world to be such
that there is milk in the fridge. It is the notion of taking that is crucial. The reason that
we can evaluate some takings as correct is that all takings are conjectures as to how
things  might  be.  And,  a  conjecture  is  the  sort  of  thing  that  can  be  wrong.  So,
understanding is a vulnerable state; it could be wrong. Davidson is quite right in the
quote above (2001b, p. 170) when he remarks that the concept of belief takes up the
slack between the objectively true and the held true91.
D2.  To  have  explicit  knowledge  of  something  requires  understanding  a
representation of that thing.
I showed in the previous chapter that having explicit knowledge of meaning or
mental  content  requires  a  grasp of  the substantial,  intrinsic  intentional  properties  of
91 I also think he is right to think that only the concept of truth can make sense of the intentionality of
mental states. But, that claim is not required for this part of the argument to go through. All that is
required is some account of the vulnerability of states of understanding. That requires some account
of why they are evaluable with respect to how things are.
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sentences and thoughts. In section 3 of this chapter I showed that even having fully
fledged rational responses to situations in the world was not sufficient to have explicit
knowledge  of  how  things  are.  Even  if  we  think  of  being  minded  as  the  rational
deployment of concepts in judgements that are aiming at truth, thinking is going on at
the ground floor. It remains a practical skill. It is the rational ability to navigate one's
environment. That has to be understood as being able, when things go well, to respond
correctly to how things are, but it does not give you explicit knowledge. So what does?
The simple thought is that if you can understand a representation of something, then you
will be able to have explicit knowledge of that thing. I am going to flesh out that simple
thought.
A representation of, for example, a situation, that there is milk in the fridge, is
the sort of thing can be judged to be true. But, representations are intentional items; they
are the sort of things that can be evaluated as true or false. I showed in the previous
section that sentences are representational, and thoughts are not. The thought being that
sentences  make  a  difference  to  the  life  of  a  thinker  by being  understood,  whereas
thoughts make a difference by being had. As a result, sentences can be used to make
claims about the world, whereas thoughts occur as the contents of judgements. A claim
about the world is distinctive in that it says that such and such a situation is the case, or,
as one might say it claims that something is true. But, just as we can make the semantic
ascent, we can make the semantic decent. Grasping truth as a device of disquotation is
to recognise that when you disquote, the sentence which remains makes a substantial
claim about  the  world.  The thought  is  that  to  recognise  that  you  have  a  device  of
disquotation is to recognise that sentences are about the world. So, somebody who has
grasped truth is somebody who has grasped that sentences represent ways for things to
be. As a result, gaining understanding of what a sentence means is also gaining explicit
knowledge of how things might be in the world. Thus, having explicit knowledge of the
representational nature of sentences gives you explicit knowledge of how things might
be  in  the world,  and,  as  there is  no other  way to  gain  explicit  knowledge,  explicit
knowledge of how things might be in the world requires understanding a representation
of that thing.
D3. Explicit  knowledge of  something requires  the  possibility  of  being wrong in
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your understanding of a representation of it.
D3 follows immediately from D1 and D2, but it is important so I am going to
say a little bit about it. D3 shows that truth is not merely a device of disquotation. What
is understood when you understand a sentence is not the legitimacy of the inference
from 'S is true' to the use of the sentence which gives its truth conditions. Instead, what
you understand is what it would be for S to be true. Nothing less will do. This is, in a
nutshell, the objection against minimalism. But, now note, this is substantial knowledge.
To make a claim about the truth conditions of a sentence is to make a risky claim. It is
precisely the sort of thing that you could be wrong about. So, explicit knowledge of how
things are requires the possibility of going wrong in the way you represent it not just
because you are confused about what is in front of you, but because you are confused
about the right thing to say about it. In the latter scenario you might be able to recognise
and respond to what is in front of you, but be unable to talk about it.
D4. On Davidson's view of language there is no possibility of misunderstanding a
representation.
An interpretive  theory of  truth  bears  several  similarities  to  minimalism.  The
chief similarity is that both theories take it that utterances are meaningful. If one had
access to the meanings of a language, a Tarski style theory of truth would serve as a
definition of truth for that language. It follows that when it comes to truth  tout court,
rather than true-in-English or true-in-Ndebele, it is the operator locution that does the
work. An English sentence, S, that can be used to assert that p, according to these views,
is true because it is true that p. In other words, the truth of S is a matter of S meaning
that  p  whilst  p.  However,  there  is  a  crucial  difference  between  minimalism  and
interpretive theories. According to the minimalist, there is no real interest in building a
Tarski style theory of truth; according to the interpretive theorist there is. She claims
that we have no access to the meaning of sentences, and so we cannot simply define a
truth predicate for a language. Instead, the attempt to define the truth predicate is an
attempt to interpret the language. The idea is that we discover what people mean by
discovering what they hold true. As Hornsby puts it:
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As we saw, an interpretive account of a particular language L contains a definition of truth
in L which speaks to  potential uses of the sentences of L – to what would be said if one
were used by an L-speaker. Within such an account, we find, for instance 'sentence that s is
true in L iff p'; and where this assists in interpretation, the place of 'p' is taken by a sentence
in a theorist's  language, fitted for  the expression of  the thinkable that  a speaker would
express if, as a speaker of L, she used the sentence s.
(Hornsby, 1997, p. 19)
So, unlike the minimalist, the interpretive theorist thinks that truth has its use in
making sense of what people mean by the words that they use, and, by extension what
they  think.  Unlike  the  minimalist,  the  interpretive  theorist  maintains  that  there  are
substantial intentional properties of utterances and mental states; truth is the property
that is used to make sense of those. A theory of truth as an account of the semantics of a
language makes substantial and interesting claims about the relation between words and
the world. However, I am going to show that this benefit of the theory is illusionary, as
we have no way of understanding such a theory. 
The crucial problem with an interpretive theory arises because it denies there are
languages  (a problem Hornsby obscures  by talk of "speakers  of L").  To understand
somebody's utterance of "there is milk in the fridge" you need to find an utterance of
your own that says the same thing. But, because of the meaning empiricism, this is an
empirical matter. As I showed above, the constraint here is the principle of charity; you
are trying to make sense of what somebody might be doing, and you do that by trying to
make them make sense. You make them make sense by, roughly, interpreting then in
such a way that what they do is consistent with them being rational. Somebody comes
out as rational, when we are able to make sense of her as updating her beliefs according
to the way the world strikes her. So, somebody comes out as rational when her errors
are explicable. The normal case will be the one in which somebody comes out as having
largely true beliefs92. Now, nobody can claim a monopoly on how things are. We can be
confident that we have good epistemic access to the facts, but we cannot guarantee of
any particular belief that it is true. Of course, we would not believe it if we did not think
92 Annoyingly,  being  rational  is  not  as  simple  as  having  largely  true  beliefs  because  of  bizarre
possibilities like this one: imagine somebody with a deep, unshakeable but incorrect conviction that
the fact that something looks true to them is an excellent reason to accept its negation.  The paranoid
exemplar is going to largely have false beliefs, and spend a lot of time falling into ditches.
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that it was. So, in making sense of what other people hold true, you have to interpret
them according to your own lights.
The resultant interpretations are T-sentences. These are sentences like "'there is
milk in the fridge' is true if and only if there is milk in the fridge". But, if you are to
have explicit understanding of those T-sentences, you need access to your own lights.
That is, you need to have explicit knowledge of what it is that you have said. However,
the meaning of your utterance, the meaning of the right hand side of the T-sentence, is a
product of your intention to produce something with just that meaning. The problem is
that, as Davidson rightly insists, you do not have access to the content of your own
mind through a kind of evidential introspection (Davidson, 2001c, p. 35). As I showed
in section 3, even if there is the possibility of thoughts without language, your only
access  to  those thoughts  is  by representing  them in a  language.  But,  for  Davidson,
because uses of language are bits of intentional behaviour conceptually on a par with all
other intentional actions, there is no more to what has been said by a use of language
than how it is correctly interpreted. So, to gain explicit knowledge of thought content or
meaning you need to be able to adopt the position of interpreter towards your own
utterances.
There is something odd about the thought that speakers adopt the position of
interpreter with respect to their own utterances. It is the reverse of the thought that the
speaker must first form an intention to say something, and then find a way of putting it
into words. And, of course, that is not what Davidson thinks. Instead, using language,
like all other intentional behaviour is a response to the world. Somebody who goes to
the fridge to take the milk out of it is somebody who believes that there is milk in the
fridge, and somebody who utters "there is milk in the fridge" in response to a query
about its location is somebody who believes that the utterance claims that there is milk
in the fridge. And, just as you cannot, in normal circumstances, end up with largely false
beliefs, you cannot but end up meaning what you say. So, the T-sentences that a speaker
might utter about her own utterances cannot help but end up being true. When she, for
example says "'I have arthritis' is is true if and only if I have arthritis", the T-sentence is
guaranteed to interpret her utterance. In addition, that is something which the speaker
can know a priori about those T-sentences. Indeed, this is part and parcel of coming to
realise that she can interpret her own utterances. Once she realises that her utterances
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are bits of intentional behaviour, she will realise that sincere assertoric utterances are
guaranteed to be expressions of what she believes. Familiarity with devices like "I think
that" and "the content of my thought is that" will enable her to realise that claims like "I
think that there is milk in the fridge" are also guaranteed to be true. However, as John
Campbell complains about this sort of view "all we have is that the representations are,
one way or another, being interpreted so that they come out true" (Campbell, 2002, p.
133). This can be hard to see because, unlike on the minimalist view, the T-sentences do
make substantial claims about the world. From the third person perspective you have to
work quite hard to assign truth-conditions. You can go wrong, realise that you have
gone wrong and try again. That perspective is simply not available from the first person
perspective. There is no real possibility of the misassignment of truth-conditions. But,
as I showed above, explicit knowledge of how things are, requires the possibility of
misunderstanding the words that you use. It is only when that is the case that you have
access to the content of your thoughts. So, what is required from an adequate account of
truth and meaning is the possibility of falsely denying that you have arthritis despite
knowing that you have an inflammation of the joints, perhaps because you have not read
Davidson and so do not realise that gout is a form of arthritis.
3.5 Redundancy Theories Again
In the next chapter, I am going to sketch out just such an account of truth and
meaning. But, before doing that, I need to turn my attention to redundancy theories that
allow for linguistic priority. These views allow for the possibility of the first meaning of
an utterance being the meaning in a language. On redundancy views, sentences end up
having  intentional  properties  because  of  suitable  natural  scientifically  describable
characteristics. What is required is some account of use such that sentences end up with
an ersatz version of correct use. A bipartite truth conditional theory of meaning is then a
description of these ersatz standards. To discover the meaning of a sentence, one needs
to do empirical work into the current and historical uses of these sentences to discover
what standards they set.  So,  these views are also meaning empiricist  views, and, as
noted above, our way into empirical theorising is through understanding each other.
I am going to focus on Millikan's view to show how the line of objection works.
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For Millikan, a sentence is about the world because it is a representation of it, and being
a  representation  is  such  that  gaining  information  from  it  requires  identifying  its
semantic value via the semantic values, if any, of its parts (see, for example, 1987, p.
239). So, somebody who understands a sentence must be able to do just that. However,
good  naturalist  that  she  is,  Millikan  is  not  going  to  allow  that  understanding  the
sentence is a matter of having a thought before the mind's eye. Instead, it is to be in a
mental state such that one has identified the values of the sentence. That occurs when,
on hearing the sentence, one adopts the mental state that is about the same situation the
sentence  represents,  and  then  enters  a  new  mental  state  that  identifies  the  mental
intentional icon with the sentential intentional icon as being about the same situation. As
she writes:
Speaking  now  quite  generally,  in  order  that  a  correct  act  of  identification  should  be
performed we need at least two intentional icons, one element of each of these icons having
the same real value as one of the elements of the other. Then, an act of correct identification
is performed by any interpreting device that uses these icons jointly in order to perform a
proper  function  where  the  Normal  explanation for  proper  performance of  this  function
makes reference to the fact that the real value of these two elements is the same. That is, the
interpreting device will be able to accomplish what good it does Normally only  because
these elements map the same. The act of identifying operates upon as intentional icons. But
in so doing it identifies variants in the world.
(Millikan, 1987, p. 242, italics original)
But, an interpreting device that does what good it does by, Normally, identifying
one thing as the value of two intentional icons is a device that allows the creature to
make practical and theoretical inferences that will, in general, be successful because it
has correctly picked out some item in the world as the value of the two icons. It does not
output explicit knowledge. What Millikan has accounted for is our practical, ground
floor abilities to use and respond to language. To have explicit knowledge the thinker
needs to find a sentence that describes what act of identification she has made. Now,
presumably,  Millikan thinks that there is  some evolved structure in the mind which
Normally functions to output a sentence that describes the way that things strike you.
So, when there is a memory of there being milk in the fridge, this language function, if
it has been adapted through living in the south-east of England, outputs "there is milk in
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the fridge",  in  response to tokens of "is  there any milk?".  The output  is  a token of
English. But, all there is to understanding English is learning to respond to it and getting
others to respond to you. That shows, that all there is to speaking a language is the
practical capacity to use a language. There is no explicit knowledge of meaning.
But,  why couldn't  we  come  to  explicit  knowledge?  Somebody says  to  you,
"there is milk in the fridge". You hear that utterance and are able to go to the fridge to
get  milk  from  it.  You  have  correctly  identified  what  the  utterance  means.  When
somebody else utters, "is there any milk?" You are able to reply, "there is milk in the
fridge." Is that not precisely explicit knowledge of English? If you were to travel to
Twin-Earth where fridge like objects hinged to the left were ceremonial receptacles for
milk, and fridge like objects hinged the right were fridges, learning Twin-English would
be  a  little  trickier  than  providing  a  1-1  mapping  from English-English  into  Twin-
English. You would have to find at least two new words, one for the ceremonial milk
receptacles and one for the fridges. Does this not show that you are in fact learning a
language when you learn to interpret others, and more over, can be wrong about what
your own words mean, and thus about what you think?
It does indeed show that you can misunderstand others, but it does not show that
you can misunderstand yourself. The new immigrant to twin earth lacks the concept of a
ceremonial fridge. She will be confused about why some milk is drinkable and some is
taboo. At some stage she will come to recognise the difference between fridges and
fridge like religious artifacts. She will start to use the language of her new compatriots.
However, at no point can she have explicit knowledge of the meaning of her words. Her
utterances on arrival will be false claims in English, but what she will mean by them is
just  what she thinks they mean. What she thinks they mean will be a matter of the
concepts she has developed in her home environment. The longer she spends in her new
environment the more reasonable it is to say that her concepts are now concepts of the
things around her, and what she means by her words will also be a matter of the things
in her environment. But, now she is still right about what she thinks she means by her
words. There is no real possibility of her misunderstanding herself.  She never gains
explicit knowledge of how things are. She just becomes more and more adept at getting
round the environment. But, of course, the fact that we can say that about her shows that
we do have explicit knowledge. Something has gone wrong with the redundancy view.
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§4 Summary and the Way Ahead
In this chapter I looked at a number of different ways of understanding truth in
terms of what we do. I started with views that tried to understand truth in terms of the
functional organisation of the mind. I showed that even if that functional organisation is
described in terms of the 'constitutive ideal of rationality', sentences are no more than
indexes of mental states. It becomes impossible to make sense of our explicit knowledge
of  meaning  and  content.  The basic  problem is  that  there  is  no  epistemic  access  to
thoughts, because thoughts are dependent objects. They are that which, in conjunction
with a type of propositional attitude, individuates mental states. They are not objects of
awareness. I then turned to views that treat sentences as meaningful, but make their
meaning  dependent  on  the  ways  they  are  used  by  speakers.  I  argued  that  explicit
understanding,  like  all  understanding,  is  a  vulnerable  state.  There  is  a  cognitive
achievement to understanding because it is the sort of state that can be evaluated as
correct or incorrect. However, if the meaning of an utterance is a matter of what the
utterer  means  by it,  and  that  is  a  matter  of  her  mental  state,  then  there  is  no  real
possibility of the utterer misunderstanding her utterances. The best that can be said is
that  we  are  guaranteed  to  be  right  about  what  we  think  about  ourselves,  and,  are
unlikely to be wrong about what we think about the world. But, this just writes large the
fact that we have the abilities to navigate our environment. It does not account for our
explicit knowledge of meaning, mental content and how things are in the world. In the
next chapter, I am going to vindicate treating truth as a substantial, evaluative property
of a speaker independent linguistic practice. The strategy is to show that this is what is
required for genuine explicit knowledge of how things are.
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Chapter 4
Linguistic Priority
In the last two chapters I looked at views that tried to deny that there was any
distinctive rationality to language use or thinking. In chapter 2 I discussed two types of
view.  The  first,  minimalism,  not  only  deflates  normativity  but  also  deflates
intentionality.  The second type of  view,  designation,  deflates  normativity but  leaves
intentionality intact. Designation views try to make sense of intentionality in terms of a
relation between truth-bearer and truth-maker. I showed that neither view could make
sense of our understanding of the rationality of language use or thinking. In the previous
chapter I looked at views that made descriptions of the activities of using language or
thinking central  to  their  accounts.  These  views divided between those  which  try to
describe the relevant activity in physical-cum-functional terms and those that attempt to
capture the activity by means of idealising explanations. The regulative ideal by which
the theorist makes sense of the way the activity proceeds is the constitutive ideal of
rationality. The former result in redundancy views of truth, the latter interpretive views.
I showed that both types of view, by treating thinking as a matter of responding to the
world, require talk of content to be a way of describing the attitudes of a creature. It
follows that grasping content requires understanding a linguistic description. As a result,
language has that much priority over the mental. I also showed that meaning cannot
simply be  a  matter  of  whatever  is  involved in  understanding each other's  linguistic
behaviour.  I found two problems with the view. The first  is a problem of origin: to
understand that people were trying to say anything you would have to understand them
as rational, but you cannot understand them as rational until you can understand them as
trying to say something. The second problem is that you understand linguistic behaviour
according to the way the world strikes you, but you do not have access to the way the
world strikes you. Ultimately, you would be left in the dark about what you and other
people were thinking and saying.
In  this  chapter  I  turn  to  rational  practice  views.  A rational  practice  view of
language  use  maintains  that  a  bipartite  truth-conditional  theory  of  meaning  is  a
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description  of  a  particular  rational  practice.  It  maintains  that  the  expressions  of  a
language are meaningful because there are prescriptive rules which govern the grounds
and consequences of different ways of using sentences. The same thing goes,  mutatis
mutandis, for a rational practice view of thought. Such views understand the activity of
using a language or the activity of thinking as a matter of taking part in a rule governed
practice.  The chapter is  in  three parts.  I  first  complete my defence of the linguistic
priority thesis by showing that one cannot make sense of ground floor thinking as a
matter of following rules. I then turn to Robert Brandom's pragmatic phenomenalism
(Brandom,  1998).  Here  he  takes  linguistic  practice  to  be  instituted  by  our  deontic
attitudes.  Brandom  maintains  that  our  taking  actions  to  be  correct  is  sufficient  to
institute a rule governed practice of using a language. Making sense of content is then a
matter of making explicit the rules that have been instituted by our attitudes. I show that
as, for Brandom, there can be no reason why we adopt the deontic attitudes that we do;
Brandom excludes himself from the possibility of explicit knowledge. Finally, I turn to
my own simple view of language which is that a bipartite truth conditional theory of
meaning for a language is a description of a particular linguistic practice. I show that
what it is to be a ground floor speaker is to recognise the procedural reasons generated
by the  existence  of  a  particular  linguistic  practice.  I  then  show  how  we  can  gain
genuine, explicit knowledge of meaning, and thereby thought content, by grasp of truth
as a substantial evaluative property of sentences.
§1 Against Mental Priority
I have argued, by a process of elimination, that at least one of the activities of
thinking  and  using  a  language  is  a  rational  practice.  Rational  practices  are,  by my
definition, rule governed activities. So, there are rules which govern at least one of those
two activities. However, to take part in a rational practice requires more than behaviour
which is in conformity with the rules. Instead, those rules need to be in force for the
practitioners. The prescriptions, prohibitions and permissions provided by the rules of
the  practice  must  in  some  way  be  recognised  by  the  practitioners.  Ground  floor
language use, on a linguistic priority view, would be a matter of having your linguistic
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behaviour governed by the rules of the practice, and explicit knowledge of meaning
would be a matter of having a grasp of those rules. The same goes, mutatis mutandis,
for  a  thought  priority  view.  In  this  section,  I  am  going  to  show  that  rules  which
determine meaning/content cannot be in force for practitioners by guiding their use. I
am then going to show that there is an asymmetry between the linguistic case and the
mental case. Treating thinking as being constituted by a rational practice requires the
rules constitutive of the practice to guide the mental life of thinkers. Because linguistic
practice is public and out in the open, this is not the case with a linguistic practice. The
rough idea is that the existence of a linguistic practice creates procedural reasons for
action which can be recognised as reasons for, say withdrawing an assertion, without
any conception that there are rules.
1.1 The Guidance Hypothesis
It is a natural thought that it is a condition of a set of rules being in force for
practitioners that the rules are sometimes motivational for the practitioners. Glüer and
Wikforss put the point like this:
What does being ‘governed’ by a rule R in one’s reasoning require? Clearly, it does not
require that every single thought or inference be in accordance with R. Nor is mere being
in accordance with R sufficient for following R, not even on a regular basis: no matter
whether  we are concerned  with rules  for  action or  rules  for  reasoning,  a  distinction
between merely regular performance and rule-following is essential in this context.
Intuitively, what is required for following a rule R is that the performances in question
can be explained by reference to R… On a very natural reading, this simply means that
R plays a role in the motivation S [the subject] has for what she does.
(Glüer and Wikforss, 2009, p. 55) 
It would further seem that the potential for motivation by something requires, at
the very least, awareness of that thing93. It might be thought that in the case of rules it is
93 Glüer and Wikforss, it seems to me, do take it that motivation has to require awareness. The sentence
which fills the ellipsis is as follows: "This explanation is available because S herself takes a certain
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not just enough to be aware that there is a rule, one also needs to know or have a belief
about the content of the rule. For example, if I can follow laws regulating speed limits,
then I have to be aware that there are rules which prescribe a certain speed limit. At the
very minimum, it looks like I need to be able to make a guess with a definite content,
perhaps that the speed limit is not less than 20 miles an hour. Once I have made that
guess, I can have a desire to conform to the speed limit, and so the desire to conform to
my guess about the content of the rule. I am going to reserve the term "guidance" for
behaviour that is motivated in this way. In other words, when I speak of guidance by a
rule, I mean to speak of behaviour motivated in part by a subject's thought about the
content of a rule.
GUIDANCE: a subject, S, is guided by a rule if and only if S takes the
content of the rule to be a reason to conform her behaviour to the rule,
and S has an opinion as to the content of the rule94.
Interestingly, although it seems to be a common assumption that meaning and
mental content must be normative, it is not clear to me that anybody has in fact accepted
the guidance thesis when it comes to language use or thinking95. But, one might reason
to  it  as  follows.  The  problem,  as  Kripke  made  clear  (Kripke,  1984) is  that
attitude to R: S, if you will, accepts a commitment to conform her behaviour to R". I am going to be
suggesting that this thought is false.
94 This is not how Dummett uses "guidance". Dummett is quite happy to talk about guidance where
rules are in force for a practitioner but the practitioner has no awareness that there are rules. So, for
example, in "What Do I Know When I Know a Language?" When discussing somebody who has
learnt chess without ever explicitly being introduced to the rules of chess, Dummett writes, "someone
who has learned the game in this way could properly be said to know the rules implicitly. We might
put the point by saying that he does not merely follow the rules, without knowing what he's doing: he
is guided by them" (Dummett 1993, p. 96, italics original). I think this unfortunate terminology has
led to some of the confusion.
95  Paul Boghossian writes: "many writers seem to assume that the connection is straightforward; they
may be represented as reasoning as follows. Expressions come to have correctness conditions as the
result of people following rules in respect of them; hence, exploring the possibility of correctness is
tantamount to exploring the possibility of rule following" (Boghossian 1989, p. 151). The fact that he
gives no references to these "many writers" makes me suspect that in fact there is, or was, a general
sense in the philosophical ether that the normativity of meaning required guidance by a rule, although
nobody was/is  brave  enough to  develop  the  thesis.  It  is  also  possible  that  Boghossian  does  not
conflate rule following with guidance.
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sentences/thoughts have conditions of correct application. These conditions of correct
application  are  infinite.  Given  that,  no  list  of  uses  can  capture  the  correctness
conditions. Rules are then appealed to in order to describe the correctness conditions. In
addition,  perhaps  as  a  result  of  the  sort  of  considerations  I  have  considered  in  the
previous two chapters, those rules are taken to be prescriptive in order to account for
why there are correctness conditions at all. If acting in accordance with a prescriptive
rule is taken to require guidance, the activities of using a language and thinking are
taken to involve being guided by a rule.
Given that I think that nobody has seriously considered the guidance thesis it
might be wondered why I am going to dedicate such time to it. There are two reasons
for this. One is dialectical. If the guidance thesis goes through, so does a form of mental
priority. One simple way to see this is to imagine that a bipartite truth conditional theory
of thought provides a description of the rules which guide a thinker. The theory provides
an account of the mental roles of thoughts and concepts. But, unlike on the sui generis
views considered in the last chapter, individual thinkers have access to these rules –
after all, they are being guided by them. So, even if we had to learn a language in order
to make explicit those rules, it would make sense to say that truth is primarily a property
of thoughts. So, if I can rule out the guidance thesis, I rule out one way of motivating a
thought  priority  thesis.  Of  course,  one  might  try  to  show  that  the  rules  governing
thinking are in force without guiding practitioners, but, their being in force shows that
truth is primarily a property of thoughts. So, I also want to try to show that mental rules
cannot be in force at all. The second reason is more constructive. It is to get clear about
what  is  involved  in  following  a  rule.  I  think  people  have  thought  that  given  that
guidance by a rule is impossible, we need to drop our commitment to the normativity of
meaning and content. This is certainly true of Glüer and Wikforss who, after showing
that guidance is impossible, conclude that "rules governing reasoning in the required
sense seem positively impossible" (Glüer and Wikforss, 2009, p. 64). What I am going
to show is that the normativity of meaning or content requires rule governed behaviour,
but that does not require guidance by rules. This is a good thing because Glüer and
Wikforss are right that guidance is impossible in both the linguistic and the mental case.
1.2 Content Engendered Normativity and Content Determining Normativity
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The relationship between rules and normativity is a tricky subject.  I want to
show that thinking is not taking part in a rational practice. So, I need to show what
distinguishes a rational practice view of thinking from a Peacocke style (sui generis)
view of thought. To do this I am going to borrow from Glüer and Wikforss. Glüer and
Wikforss  distinguish  between  what  they  call  "content  engendered  normativity"  and
"content determining normativity" (Glüer and Wikforss 2009, p. 33). Where there is
content  engendered  normativity,  there  is  an  ought  which  follows  directly  from the
content of a propositional attitude. Here is a plausible example: if Aleema entertains the
thought that her friend is in France, and her friend is in France, she ought to believe that
her  friend is  in  France.  Here  the  content  of  Aleema's  thought,  that  her  friend is  in
France,  is  thought  to  generate  an  ought,  that  she,  Aleema,  should  believe  just  that.
Content  determining normativity is  the  view that  there is  content  because there  are
oughts. As applied to the mental, this is the view that it is the rules which a thinker
follows that determine the contents of her thoughts. If content determining normativity
is true, you do not have any propositional attitudes unless you are following a set of
rules, and, in addition what those propositional attitudes are gets determined by the rules
you are following.
A sui generis view of thought holds that mental contents are engendered by the
ways that we respond to the world and that there are rational relations between them.
Chief  among those relations is  implication.  The view holds that relations cannot be
understood in physical-cum-functional terms. Instead, it  requires an understanding of
implication. To understand the mental one has to understand implication. This is simply
the notion of what follows from what. It is very tempting to start introduce normative
talk here, and suggest that if P implies Q, then it is correct to infer Q from P. Such talk is
not false,  but can be misleading. There is  nothing, on these views, normative about
implication. The behaviour is not correct because it is in accordance with a prescription.
It is simply that to infer Q from P when P implies Q is to have behaved rationally. On a
sui  generis  view of thought,  to  make sense of thinking is  to  make sense of it  as  a
rational. Doing that is to make sense of mental behaviour as rational or irrational. That
there are rational relations between thoughts irrespective of the actual mental behaviour
of a thinker means that the actual mental behaviour of a thinker can be described as
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rational  or  irrational.  If  we want,  we can use "correct"  as  a way of saying,  "is  the
rational action". It does not follow that there are any rules for thinking, except in the
sense that descriptive rules are required to capture what follows from what. I take it that
I have shown that a sui generis view of thought is incompatible with truth primarily
being a property of thoughts.
There is however a problem, which I will return to below, and that is making
sense of why there should be rational standards at all.  One way of doing that, is to
appeal to genuinely prescriptive rules which govern thinking. This treats a theory of
thought as a description of the way that an activity should proceed. It provides more
than a standard by which we can make sense of mentality. It tells us what ought to be
done, what may be done and what ought to be shunned. This is the rational practice
view  of  the  mental.  It  is  the  view  that  thinking  involves  following  genuinely
prescriptive  rules.  Treating  thinking as  a  matter  of  following genuinely prescriptive
rules is compatible with both content determining and content engendered normativity.
It might be that it is the contents of your mental states which require you or permits you
to adopt or drop other mental states. However, such a view is not compatible with truth
primarily being a property of mental states. I showed in the previous chapter that we
have no access to mental content unmediated by our grasp of language. So, prelinguistic
thinking  cannot  be  guided  by  the  normative  properties  of  mental  contents.  If  the
guidance hypothesis is going to help the mental priority theorist, she is going to have to
try to make sense of the rules as determining content.
1.3 Content Determination and Guidance
It  looks  implausible  that  one  can  be  guided  by  a  rule  that  also  determines
content.  There  are  a  variety  of  regresses  lurking  in  the  area.  One  regress,  due  to
Brandom (Brandom, 1998, p. 20) is that rules themselves can be applied correctly or
incorrectly. But, if applying something correctly is a matter of being guided by a rule,
we need to be guided by a further rule for applying the first rule. Of course, the second
rule can be applied correctly or incorrectly, which only goes to show that those who are
applying it are guided by a further rule. It quite clearly could not be rules all the way
down,  because  it  would  follow  that  we  could  never  apply  a  rule.  Another  regress
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concerns the content of rules. It can be found in Boghossian (Boghossian, 1989, p. 152),
and is developed in more detail by Glüer and Wikforss (Glüer and Wikforss, 2009).
Rules have contents. It is because,  "thou shalt  not murder" says something different
from, "thou shalt not commit adultery" that they are different rules. If following a rule is
a matter of being guided by it, it is the content that is in some sense doing the guiding.
As I showed above, that requires having some access to the content of the rule. Thinkers
have access to contents by having mental states which themselves will have contents.
"On pain of regress, then, it cannot be true that mental expressions [concepts in my
terminology] themselves acquire meaning [content in my terminology] as a result of
anyone  following  rules  in  respect  of  them"  (Boghossian,  1989,  p.  152)96.  It  is  this
regress that I am going to develop. It might be worth noting that although the problem is
our access to the content of a rule, those rules are going to be content determining rules.
According to the guidance thesis you cannot put a rule into action unless you
have an opinion about what the content of that rule is. So, if a rule is to be action
guiding, one must already be in a position to know what it says. Knowing what a rule
says, is a matter of understanding its content. If the rules are content determining, the
question now is: can we make sense of being able to understand a content that is both
content  determining  and  action  guiding?  It  is  quite  clear  that  the  understanding  in
question cannot be explicit understanding. This is because the idea was that we make
sense  of  our  explicit  understanding  by  making  explicit  the  rule  we  were  already
following. One cannot be required to have explicit understanding of the content of a rule
in order to follow it at the ground floor. At this point one might be tempted to appeal to
implicit understanding. But that cannot help. The implicit understanding which would
be  required  would  be  implicit  understanding  that.  It  would  be  no  more  than  an
unconscious version of explicit understanding. On this hypothesis, having thoughts at
all is a matter of following rules, and following a rule is a matter of being guided by it.
But guidance requires, at the very best, the ability to have a guess at content. Guessing
at content requires the ability to form a belief, B1, about that content. But, if content is
determined by the existence of rules, forming a belief requires the ability to follow a
rule. So, forming B1 involves following a rule, R1, which determines the content of B1.
96  Boghossian sets up his regress in terms of a language of thought. He claims that this is for ease of
formulation, and that nothing hangs on the hypothesis. I think is right to regress can be set up without
a language of thought. I am not sure that the language of thought makes for an easier formulation. 
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Following R1 requires the ability to have a guess at the content of R1, or the ability to
form a belief, B2 about that content. Forming B2 requires following a rule R2, and we are
caught  in  the  eddy of  a  vicious  process.  Implicit  understanding  does  not  help  the
guidance theorist avoid the maelstrom.
1.4 Following Without Guidance
Perhaps the problem is with the guidance thesis alone. After all, the guidance
thesis is going to ruin the idea that language use is a matter of taking part in a rational
practice. If following a rule required being guided by it, then following a linguistic rule
would also require access to the content of the rule. Imagine that the following is a rule
which is partly constitutive of a linguistic practice:
RQ. If asked whether it is the case that p, one must: answer in the affirmative if
and only if it is the case that p. 
If somebody is to be guided by RQ, she needs to have a belief about the content of RQ.
So,  she  needs  to  understand  the  rule.  If  that  understanding  is  understanding  of  the
sentence used to express RQ, she must already understand a language to be guided in
her linguistic practice. That looks pretty hopeless. However, if that understanding is of
something  mental,  then  she  needs  access  to  mental  content  without  understanding
language. I showed in the previous chapter that such a position was hopeless. Contents
are ways of describing mental states. They are not objects of awareness. So, if I am right
about the fact that using a language is taking part in a linguistic practice, there must be
an account of rule following which does not involve guidance. I think that there is, but it
is not available to the thought priority theorist.
I pointed out in the introduction that you could manifest your ability to follow a
rule by acknowledging the force of the rule. This could be done by hesitating before
breaking it,  seeking to make reparations if you break it,  correcting the behaviour of
others and so on. Dogs which have been trained not to sit on sofas, but readily push
their luck when confronted with new sofas or tired owners are dogs that are, when they
are being good, following the rule: do not sit on the sofa. If I am right so far, they do not
have access to the content of that rule. So they are not being guided by the rule either.
However,  the rule has created new reasons for action.  These reasons are procedural
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reasons. Sitting on the sofa is something that the dog is not allowed to do, and it is
something that the dog is aware of. So, it does not sit on the sofa. But, that prohibition
and the reasons it brings with it are instituted because there are a system of laws which
govern the dog's behaviour. The dog needs no conception that there are rules. It merely
needs to know what is and is not permitted. The moral is that rules can be in force by
creating new procedural reasons for practitioners to respond to. Those reasons will be
recognisable as features of the world.
Uses of language are events in the world. They are sometimes made in response
to features of the world, and they have consequences which are further events in the
world. The infant speaker can recognise a use of language as a response to a situation,
and can recognise which responses to that use of language are appropriate. Like the dog,
she can do this without being aware that her interlocutors are, sometimes, following
rules. She needs no conception that there is a linguistic practice. Her own attempts at
language use will, some of the time, be corrected according to the rules of the practice.
This will help her learn what is appropriate and what is inappropriate. Importantly, she
can do all this by responding to perceptually available features of the world. She does
not need any access to mental content. In section 3, I am going to develop this thought
in more detail and show how the infant speaker can move from ground floor language
use to first floor grasp of meaning.
Could the same thing apply in the realm of the mental? If so, then rules for
adopting  different  propositional  attitudes  could  be  in  force  by  creating  procedural
reasons which thinkers can recognise and respond to.  But,  how could non-linguistic
creatures come to be aware of those procedural reasons? It seems to me that this is a
prima facie impossibility. To recognise a procedural reason one needs to recognise a
requirement or prohibition. That is one needs to recognise some features of the world as
requiring you to behave in a certain way or to refrain from behaving in a certain way. I
want to make sense of ground floor thinking (or at least mentality) happening without
the infant being trained into thinking. I want to make sense of thinking as being a way
of  responding  to  the  world.  It  seems  to  me  that  recognising  requirements  requires
training. You cannot know what is required of you without being trained in some way to
recognise those requirements. If that is right, no animal is born with mental abilities.
They would all need to be trained in some way. This seems to create a serious problem
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of origin. Even if that problem could be overcome, or it is denied that one needs training
to recognise requirements, the thought priority theorist would still need to make sense
of the world appearing to the pre-linguistic instant as requiring her to adopt different
propositional attitudes. For example, it would have to appear to her to believe, when her
father hove into view, that there is somebody present. That does not look like the sort of
requirement she can be aware of until she has the concept of belief.  It seems to me that
there is no way for mental rules to be in force at the ground floor.
§2 Pragmatic Constitution
In section 1, I argued that pre-linguistic thinking could not be a matter of taking
part in a rational practice. The problem is that there is no way that the rules constitutive
of the practice could be in force. Combining this with the results of the previous two
chapters shows that truth is primarily an evaluative property of sentences. The question
that remains is: does truth also account for intentionality? In this section, I focus on
Robert Brandom, who has argued that truth is an evaluative property of sentences but
that  there  is  no  problem  of  intentionality.  I  am  going  to  show  that  this  view  is
incompatible with our explicit knowledge of meaning and thought content.
2.1 Regulism and Regularism
One moral which we can draw from the guidance problem is that for content
determining rules  to  do any work they need to  be in  force without  our having any
knowledge, either implicit or explicit, of them. As Glüer and Wikforss put it "after all,
CD [content determining] normativity has to back off yet another step [from explicit
knowledge];  it  not  only reckons  with  necessarily  implicit  rules,  but  with  rules  you
cannot  even  intend  to  follow"  (Glüer  and Wikforss,  2009,  p.  60).  There  is  a  view,
developed and defended by Robert Brandom (Brandom, 1998), which, following Glüer
and Wikforss yet again, I have labeled "pragmatic phenomenalism". This view attempts
to account for our ability to follow rules without having access to the rules themselves.
Brandom's  view  is  developed  to  avoid  the  twin  pitfalls  of  what  he  labels
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"regulism" and "regularism". Regulism is the view that:
Norms just are rules of conduct. Normative assessments of performances are understood
as always having the form of assessments of the extent to which those performances
accord  with  some rule.  Reference  to  proprieties  of  performance  is  taken  as  indirect
reference to rules, which determine what is proper by explicitly saying what is proper.
(Brandom, 1998, p. 19)
Regularism is the view that "the practices in which norms are implicit are understood
simply as regularities of performance" (Brandom, 1998, p. 27). 
The problem with regulism is that it seems to invite a regress. As Brandom puts
it: 
A rule specifying how something is correctly done (how a word ought to be used, how a
piano ought to be tuned) must be applied to particular circumstances, and applying a rule
in  particular  circumstances  is  essentially  something  that  can  be  done  correctly  or
incorrectly… 
If correctnesses of performance are determined by rules only against the background of
correctness  of  applications  of  the  rule,  how  are  these  latter  correctnesses  to  be
understood? If the regulist understanding of all norms as rules is right, then applications
of the rule should themselves be understood as correct in so far as they accord with some
further rule. Only if this is so can the rule-conception play the explanatory role of being
the model for understanding all norms.
(Brandom, 1998, p.  20, italics original)
The problem with regularism is simple: merely behaving in regular ways is not
sufficient for someone to be following rules, at least not in the sense that her behaviour
can be said to be rule governed. Mere regularities of behaviour can be captured by
descriptive rules, but fitting some generalisation is not sufficient to be taking part in a
rational practice.
2.2 Brandom's Regress
On the  face  of  it,  Brandom's  regress  is  different  from the  regress  discussed
above.  I  am going to  show that  in  fact  it  is  not.  Brandom's  regress  is  presented as
applying to following any rule, not just to rules which determine mental content. This
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makes it look like Brandom might think that it is impossible to ever comply with a rule
by following it. However, if he thought this, he would be wrong. Imagine there is a rule
which says that Rosa must return her library books by 25th August. Rosa knows what the
rule prescribes and so follows and complies with the rule by handing back her library
books on 24th August. Indeed, in this scenario Rosa is even guided by the content of the
rule. 
The  problem  is  not  that  it  is  somehow  impossible  to  comply  with  rules.
Brandom is concerned about the origin of normativity. He wants to know what it is that
makes something correct. The regress only gets going when we ask: what is it to apply
the rule correctly? The thought is that there has to be something which determines an
application of a rule as correct or incorrect; for example, something that would make
fining Rosa a correct application of a rule were she not to have handed back her library
books by the 25th. If we think that the only thing that can make something correct or
incorrect is a rule, then we are in trouble. We need a rule to determine the application of
any rule. Of course, that "any rule" applies to rules which determine correct application
of rules, and we are locked into an infinite process.
However, why should we be worried about what makes Rosa's action correct
with respect to the rule? Rules determine what we must do, can do, or have to refrain
from doing. The rules of Rosa's local library determine the date by which Rosa must
have handed back her library books. If Rosa understands the regulations from her local
library, she knows what the last date is for handing in her library books. If we know
what the rule says, we know when it has been followed. There does not need to be any
further questions about what makes some action in compliance with the rule and other
actions not in compliance with the rule. However, Brandom's problem begins to bite in
the context of asking what is it to follow a rule and not merely to behave in accordance
with it. Following a rule is something that practitioners must be able to do. 
If following a rule involves guidance by that rule, rule following requires that
Rosa has access to what the rule says. This is not hard when it comes to Rosa trying to
comply with rules governing the return of her library books. She knows what the rule
says, and so she knows how to comply with it. The rule can straightforwardly guide her
in some of her interactions with the local library. However, when those rules determine
content things are not so straightforward. Rosa cannot already know what the contents
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of the rules which determine the contents of her thoughts are. It is here that the problem
with correct application arises. Knowing, implicitly or explicitly, the content of a rule is
a matter of knowing how it is correctly applied. And now Brandom has his regress. It
cannot be that Rosa explicitly knows the content of content determining rules. But, how
can she implicitly know that contents are correctly applied one way but not another?
Knowledge of what a rule allows, prohibits or enforces requires knowledge of what it
says. Implicit knowledge cannot be any more than the ability to comply with the rule.
But, if we are to avoid regularism, then it looks like we need to appeal to the ability to
follow another rule which determines the correct and incorrect application of the first
rule. But, it cannot be that following a rule R0 requires the ability to follow another rule,
R1, because she cannot know what the content of R1 is, unless she knows how R1 is
correctly applied. Following R1 requires knowing what the content of R1 is. Of course,
on this hypothesis knowing the content of R1 is a matter of being able to follow a further
rule, R2. The regress is well under way97. Brandom's regress turns out to be a version of
the regress I have already considered.
2.3 Pragmatic Phenomenalism
Brandom's solution falls  on the regulism side of the problem. He thinks that
"norms explicit as rules presuppose norms implicit in practice" (Brandom, 1998, p. 20).
The  thought  is  that  assessments  are  made  without  reference  to  rules.  Rules  are  a
97  I think that this is the sort of situation that Brandom has in mind. I take it this is why he immediately
goes on to introduce Wittgenstein's discussion of interpretation (Brandom, 1998, p. 20). The problem
Wittgenstein is discussing at §201 is a problem of knowing what a rule says. He suggests we are
tempted  by  the  idea  of  providing  'interpretations',  with  an  interpretation  being  understood  as
something that tells us how to apply a rule.  As Wittgenstein points out, any further entity,  set of
instructions, image or what have you has to be applied correctly. This initiates the infinite process.
Wittgenstein  remarks  that  we  should  think  of  an  interpretation  of  the  rule  as  an  alternative
formulation of the rule, and not as a rule for applying it. Given that Brandom links his regress to
Wittgenstein's concern about interpretation, it suggests that Brandom is in fact worried about how we
can understand a rule. It is that worry that underpins his quest for an account of what it is to be in
compliance with a rule. If we can be in compliance with the rule, we need to have some awareness of
its normative force. That is why the question, "where does the normative force come from?" becomes
pressing. This is how Hattiangadi understands Brandom (see Hattiangadi, 2003, p. 421). 
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convenient  tool  we have  for  making  explicit  our  practices  of  assessment.  Brandom
writes:
The direction of explanation to be pursued here first offers an account of the practical
attitude of taking something to be correct-according-to-a-practice, and then explains the
status of being correct-according-to-a-practice by appeal to those attitudes...
Another  central  explanatory criterion  of  adequacy for  such  a  conception  of  implicit
practical  normative  knowing-how is  that  it  be  possible  in  terms  of  it  to  understand
explicit  knowing-that.  The  effect  is  to  reverse  the  regulist-intellectualist  order  of
explanation.  The  regulist  starts  with  a  notion  of  norms explicit  in  principles  and  is
obliged then to develop an account of what it would be for such things to be implicit in
practices. The pragmatist starts rather with a notion of norms implicit in practice and is
obliged  then  to  develop  an  account  of  what  it  would  be  for  such  things  to  become
propositionally explicit, as claims or rules.
(Brandom, 1998, pp. 25–26)
The key claim here is that assessment as correct is prior to being correct. 
Before going on to look at why I think Brandom's view fails, I want to note that
Brandom is aware of just how difficult the problem is. Brandom presents what he labels
the "gerrymandering-of-regularities argument" (Brandom, 1998, p. 29). The problem is
that rules make explicit regularities of practices of assessment. But, now we need to
know  which  regularity.  The  basic  problem  is  that  rules  have  infinite  application,
whereas practices of assessment are necessarily finite.
The problem is that any particular set of performances exhibits many regularities. These
will agree on the performances that have been produced and differ in their treatment of
some possible performances that have not (yet) been produced. A performance can be
denominated 'irregular' only with respect to a specified regularity, not  tout court. Any
further performance will count as regular with respect to some of the patterns exhibited
by the original set and as irregular with respect to others. For anything one might go on
to do, there is some regularity with respect to which it counts as "going on in the same
way,"  continuing  the  previous  pattern...  For  the  simple  regularist's  identification  of
impropriety with irregularity to get a grip, it must be supplemented with some way of
picking out,  as somehow  privileged,  some out of all  the regularities exhibited...  The
simple regularity view offers no suggestions as to how this might be done and therefore
does not solve, but merely puts off, the question of how to understand the normative
distinction between what is done and what ought to be done.
(Brandom, 1998, p.  29)
Hattiangadi sums up Brandom rather nicely when she writes,  "[t]o Brandom,
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Wittgenstein's problem suggests the need for a pragmatic conception of rules as implicit
in practice, yet one that treats normative vocabulary as irreducible to naturalistic terms"
(Hattiangadi, 2003, p. 423). How does Brandom think he can do that? The answer is
Brandom's deontic  scorekeeping model.  This is  a  model which treats  evaluations as
always part of an evaluative practice. The important point is that practices are public.
They require a variety of practitioners taking part. Each participant has a deontic status.
Deontic status is cashed out in terms of what commitments a practitioner has undertaken
and what entitlements she has (some of those entitlements will be earned and some
come for free). But, the pragmatism, the pragmatic phenomenalism, comes in because
having a deontic status is a matter of the deontic attitudes of the practitioners. This is the
scorekeeping.  Practitioners  keep track of  commitments and attribute  entitlements by
adopting a deontic attitude to their fellow practitioners (and themselves). That deontic
attitude is treating someone as committed or entitled. Importantly, adopting a deontic
attitude is a practical matter. It has effects on the rest of the practice.
2.4 Has Brandom Merely Postponed the Problem?
The problem is making sense of what it is to adopt a deontic attitude. As Glüer
and  Wikforss  point  out,  adopting  a  deontic  attitude  is  something  that  can  be  done
correctly or incorrectly,  and that  makes it  seem as if  it  reintroduces the problem of
regress and gerrymandering. Glüer and Wikforss argue that it indeed reintroduces that
very problem (Glüer and Wikforss, 2009, pp. 61–62). I am going to explore that issue.
Brandom tries to make sense of adopting a deontic attitude like this:
Adopting this practical  attitude can be explained,  to begin with,  as  consisting in the
disposition or willingness to impose sanctions. (Later, in more sophisticated practices,
entitlement to such a response, or its propriety, is at issue.) Attributors of these statuses
may punish those who act in ways they are not (taken to be) entitled to act, and those
who  do  not  act  in  ways  they  are  (taken  to  be)  committed  to  act.  What  counts  as
punishment  may  (according  to  the  one  who  interprets  a  community  as  exhibiting
practices  of  this sort) be specifiable in nonnormative terms, such as causing pain or
otherwise negatively reinforcing the punished behavior. Or what counts as punishment
with respect  to  a particular  practice may be specifiable only in  normative terms, by
appeal to alterations in deontic status or attitude. 
(Brandom, 1998, p. 166)
234
Hattiangadi, who also discusses this passage, takes it  that the Brandom view is that
practices of sanction constitute adopting normative attitudes, and that those practices are
the beatings over the head with sticks, exclusion or other behaviours specifiable in non-
normative terms (Hattiangadi, 2003, pp. 425–426). She writes,
Brandom's  picture  is  still  largely,  or  perhaps  even  entirely,  founded on dispositions:
normative statuses are derivative of normative attitudes, and the latter are explained in
terms of responsive discrimination and propensities to impose physical sanction. Since
these practices  institute  conceptual  content,  the ingredients  are all  assembled for  the
explanation of conceptual content. 
(Hattiangadi, 2003, p. 426)
This,  Hattiangadi  points  out,  raises  the  gerrymandering  objection.  No  amount  of
practical, non-normative, behaviour can be sufficient to constitute a norm describable
by an explicit rule. When a community, for example, excludes members who do not
share toys that behaviour is compatible with the following two rules: 
TR1. You must always share your toys. 
TR2. You  must  always  share  your  toys  with  Algernon,  Ernest,
Marmaduke, Percival… (The list being completed by the names
of everyone the observer has seen members sharing toys with or
being sanctioned for not sharing toys with). 
One would like to  reply on Brandom's  behalf  that  this  is  a  trivial  epistemic
problem. It is true that radical interpreters are not going to be able to definitively assign
a norm to the community based on their non-normative behaviour. But, that does not
mean  that  there  is  not  a  norm implicit  in  the  practice.  It  all  depends  on  how the
practitioners are in fact taking the situation. 
The  problem  with  the  reply  is  that  the  sanctioning  behaviour  is  meant  to
constitute not just the norm but thought content itself. On Brandom's picture, taking a
situation to be a certain way is constituted by adopting a deontic attitude towards it. This
is Brandom's pragmatism about meaning and content. An item is meaningful/contentful
if  and  only  if  it  is  part  of  an  inferentially  articulated  network  (see,  for  example,
Brandom, 1998, p. 131). But, something is part of an inferentially articulated network is
a matter of it being treated as having normative consequences. That is achieved by the
adoption of deontic attitudes which attribute deontic statuses to practitioners. Deontic
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statuses are the commitments and entitlements to performances which speakers have,
gain  and  lose.  Which  commitments  and  which  entitlements  follow  from  particular
performances determine the contents of practitioners'  minds. But those commitments
and entitlements are determined by the deontic attitudes of practitioners. They are the
attitudes implicit in practice. So, there is no more to the meanings/content of anybody's
sentences/thoughts than what is available to a radical interpreter.
However,  I  think  that  Hattiangadi  has  misunderstood  Brandom.  She  treats
Brandom  as  being  a  dispositionalist  at  heart.  Hattiangadi's  Brandom  requires  non-
normative sanctioning, beatings with sticks, to institute normative sanctioning. I think
this misses Brandom's insistence that things are normative all the way down98. In the
quote from page 166 Brandom suggests that  beating with sticks  is  just  one way of
sanctioning behaviour. Another way is change in deontic score. That does not need to be
explained  in  terms  of  any  non-normative  behaviour.  It  is  simply  a  matter  of  how
practitioners  keep track of commitments  and entitlements.  Some changes in  deontic
score permit beating with sticks. Some changes will only have normative consequences.
What is made explicit in rules are the ways the practitioners keep track of commitment
and entitlements, not the ways practitioners reward and punish each other.
However, keeping track of deontic score can be done correctly or incorrectly. It
cannot  be that  whatever  score keepers  do is  correct.  Doing that  would just  make a
mockery  of  the  idea  that  people  are  keeping  track  of  deontic  score.  Deontic
scorekeeping at least has to look like it is guided by a prescriptive rule, but if there is no
possibility  of  failure,  there  is  merely  a  complex  descriptive  rule  that  captures  all
performances past, present and future. So, what Brandom needs is an account of what it
is to keep track of deontic score correctly, where that "correctly" is understood in a full
blooded normative sense. In other words, as Rosen puts it:
E  is  correct  (permissible,  etc.)  iff  E  is  correctly  taken  to  be  correct
(permissible, etc.),
(Rosen, 1997, p. 167)
and Brandom needs an account of that.
There is a further important constraint here, and that is "correctly taken to be
98  Hattiangadi is alert to this reading (see, for example, Hattiangadi, 2003, p. 425 & p. 427). She thinks
making  Brandom  a  dispositionalist  at  heart  is  the  most  plausible  reading  available.  I  suspect
Hattiangadi thinks that Brandom is both confused and inconsistent.
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correct" has to  be instituted by our attitudes.  It  cannot be by appeal either  to some
normative  fact  or  to  some prior  rule.  This  is  not  just  a  quirk  of  Brandom's  project
stemming from his suspicion of normative facts. It is the whole raison d'être true of
pragmatic phenomenalism. We are looking for an account of what it is to follow a rule.
The thought was that the existence of rules might have been helpful in explaining rule
following as long as we could make sense of being guided by a rule. It turns out that
guidance  is  just  not  possible,  at  least  for  rules  which  are  constitutive  of  content.
Following Brandom, we try to account for rule following in terms of the prior notion of
a normative attitude, but that involves making sense of correctly taking a performance
to be correct.  Of course,  we now need an account  of  what  it  is  to  correctly take a
performance to be correct.  The thought  might  be that  what  it  is  to  correctly take a
performance to be correct is for the attitude of correctly taking a performance to be
correct to be correct; and for that attitude to be correct, if and only if that is correctly
taken as correct; and so on for all attitudes. The next move would be to try to show that
that regress is not vicious99. But, even if that could be achieved, it does not help matters.
It is true that for any given normative fact, the regress permits us to cite another fact in
virtue of which it obtains. But at no stage is this further fact one that is in any clear sense
of our making. The regress provides no insight in to how anything we do determines
what is correct according to the norms implicit in our practices. Here it suffices to note
that even after the regress has been made fully explicit, it makes sense to suppose that
each and every one of our actual assessments is in fact incorrect. It is compatible with
(3) [the principle cited above] that all of the norms governing our performances and their
assessment have been imposed by an inscrutable God, and that our best guesses about
where to draw the lines are systematically false to the normative facts. 
(Gideon Rosen, 1997, p. 168)
A regress, be it ever so benign, does not help account for what it is to follow a rule.
2.5 A Different View of Making it Explicit
It seems to me that what Brandom does, and what is missed by the critics I have
been considering is just how serious Brandom is about the phenomenalism. That is, how
serious Brandom is about treating what we do as prior to what there is. This explains
why  Brandom  defends  a  deflationary  view  of  truth  and  intentionality.  For
99  But, see Glüer and Wikforss 2009, 62-63 who argue that the regress is not in any way benign.
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phenomenalism, the notion of a fact is a theoretical notion. Facts do not make anything
the case.  They are appealed to as part  of the practice of talking about our practical
attitudes. There is a crucial difference between Brandom’s deflationary view of truth
and Horwich's minimalism, and that is that for Brandom truth is an evaluative notion. In
very broad brush strokes, the view is that given the past behaviour of speakers certain
linguistic  performances are  permitted.  Producing a particular  linguistic  performance,
then affects what might come next. In Brandom's vocabulary, at each moment there is a
particular deontic score, and that score changes each time a new linguistic performance
is made. Truth talk is used by practitioners to make explicit the deontic score. Highly
reflective speakers will also use truth talk to describe the ways in which they keep score.
Of course, we are those speakers and a bipartite truth-conditional theory of meaning is a
description  of  our  own scorekeeping  practice.  However,  there  is  no  question  of  us
responding to normative or non-normative facts. Fact talk and world talk are in the same
idiom as truth talk. They are part of a description of our attitudes. For example, if you
are entitled to a token of "Brandon wrote a book", you are entitled to a token of "it is
true that Brandon wrote a book" and "it is a fact that Brandon wrote a book". The latter
two utterance  types  are  used  to  register  entitlements.  They do so  by endorsing  the
original utterance. 
Glüer and Wikforss, Hattiangadi and Rosen are all looking for an account of
where normativity comes from. I have been following them in that quest because I am
looking for an account of what it is to follow a rule that does not require being guided
by it. The critics are looking for some fact that would account for rule following. They
see  in  Brandom a  theory  that  tries  to  construct  that  fact  out  of  practical  attitudes.
Unsurprisingly, they discover that Brandom cannot avoid the twin pitfalls of regress and
gerrymandering. This is because any normative account of the normative still has not
located normativity, whereas any non-normative reduction will not have the infinitary
character required to capture the normative. I think they have been misled by the way
that Brandom presents his view. I take it that what Brandom is trying to do is show that
there is no requirement to account for the source of normativity100. Brandom writes:
100  The "our" is important. "Making it explicit" opens with the claim that "'[w]e' is said in many ways"
(Brandom, 1998, p. 4). I think it is possible to make sense of that opening by seeing the book as a
quest, not to find the normative, but to make sense of who can be called "we". The answer is those we
can make sense of, which comes to the same thing as those we can dispute with. The class of those
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So the  theoretical  attempt  to  track  down the 'source'  of  the  normative dimension  in
discourse leads us right back to our own implicitly normative practices. The structure of
those practices can be elucidated, but always from within normative space, from within
our normative practices of giving and asking for reasons. That is the project that has
been pursued in this work. Its aim is not reductive but expressive: making explicit the
implicit structure characteristic of discursive practice as such.
(Brandom, 1998, p. 649)
I think the picture is like this: we do keep track of deontic score. This involves
the adopting of normative attitudes to each other's performances. The "we" in question
is all language users. The reason that the "we" is language users is that one can only
properly adopt a deontic attitude when the question, "is that attitude correct?" is a live
question.  It  becomes  a  live  question  as  part  of  the  project  of  making  explicit  our
discursive practices. Making explicit our discursive practices is a question of arguing
about the right way to make judgements. Anyone with whom we can argue is someone
who we can make sense of, this is because they are somebody who knows what it is to
keep deontic  score.  Those  that  we cannot  argue  with  do not  have  a  different  score
keeping practice, they are those that do not have any scorekeeping practices at all. This
is not because those we can argue with have access to some set of normative facts, or
are following some set of rules. It is because engaging in that sort of argument is what it
is to keep deontic score. It does not mean that whatever we think is right is right, rather
it means we need to keep arguing about what is right, and part of doing that is making
our reasoning explicit in the form of rules. If that is right, Brandom's book is best seen
as a piece of critical philosophy. It makes clear to us what we are doing when we make
explicit our discursive practices.
2.6 Stuck on the Ground Floor
The question now is: can we make sense of such pragmatic phenomenalism?
The answer is no. The problem is that Brandom cannot distinguish between the ground
floor and the first level. If that is right, then there is no making explicit, merely more
we can make sense of is coextensive with the class of those we can dispute with because we can
make  sense  of  somebody only  when  we  share  a  normative  practice  with  her,  and  we  share  a
normative  practice  with  someone  when  we  are  able  to  argue  about  the  right  way  of  deontic
scorekeeping.
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and more behaviour.  The fundamental  performance is  making an inference.  That is,
moving from one token to another. Taking part in a normative practice is being able to
regulate one's own and others' inferences. Some of those tokens are linguistic, and I will
focus on those for ease of exposition, although the same thing could be said about the
mental.  In  the  practices  which  take  place  in  my vicinity,  if  somebody says  "she is
German" they accept a commitment to endorsing "she is European". If you asked me
why,  I  might  say "if  somebody is  German,  then  she  is  European".  Competence  in
English entitles one to tokens of that type. If you push me to explain why that is, I might
say,  "it  is  because  Germany  is  a  country  in  Europe,  and  Germans  are  natives  of
Germany, whilst Europeans are natives of Europe. So, given the geographical location
of Germany, somebody who is native of Germany is somebody who is native of Europe.
Therefore, somebody who is German is somebody who is European". If you carry on
pushing me, and I have read enough Brandom I might start talking to you about sub-
sentential substitutional commitments and entitlements. That reveals that the one thing
Brandom cannot do is give you a reason for a particular scorekeeping practice. This is
not surprising. It is a direct consequence of the view that assessment as correct is prior
to being correct. What I want to show is that there have to be reasons for our evaluations
if we are to make sense of our practices of evaluation. Our practices of evaluation are
expressions of our explicit knowledge of meaning and thought content. So, if I am right,
there have to be reasons for our evaluations if we are to make sense of our explicit
knowledge.
In  particular,  Brandom has  precluded  talk  of  truth  and  representation  in  any
substantial  sense  from  being  a  reason  for  saying  something.  Brandom  has  a
prosentential theory of truth. This treats "...is true" as "as a syncategorematic fragment
of prosentences and then understands this new category by semantic analogy to other
proforms,  in  particular  to  pronouns"  (Brandom,  1998,  p.  302).  The  idea  is  that
concatenating "is true" with a device that picks out a sentence forms a prosentence, and
prosentences function just like pronouns. That is, prosentences inherit the function of an
antecedent sentence to which it anaphorically refers. This is a deflationary theory. As he
writes: 
A feature dear to the hearts of the prosententialists is the metaphysical parsimony of the
theory. For what in the past were explained as attribution of a special and mysterious
property  (truth)  to  equally  mysterious  bearers  of  truth  (propositions)  are  exhibited
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instead as uses of grammatical  proforms anaphorically referring only to the sentence
tokens that are their antecedents
(Brandom, 1998, pp.  302–303). 
The attraction of the theory to Brandom is that it allows us to treat taking-true as
prior to being true. The fundamental linguistic move, when it comes to truth, is assertion
of an atomic sentence. In this context, an atomic sentence is one which contains no
sentential  connectives,  quantifiers  or  talk  of  truth.  Asserting  an  atomic  sentence  is
understood as uttering a particular linguistic token in such a way that one lays claim to
be entitled to make that performance. So, if I utter, "Tom buys a sink tidy", in the right
circumstances, I am laying claim to be entitled to make that performance. If you utter,
"what Jacob says is true", your utterance is to be understood as a prosentence. That is, as
a 'lazy' way of uttering, "Tom buys a sink tidy". Your uttering, "Tom buys a sink tidy" is
endorsing my entitlement to my performance. Truth talk becomes part of the practice of
deontic scorekeeping.
The problem is that we are not in a position to say any of this. The basic actions
are  utterances  of  sounds  and  inscriptions  of  marks.  Brandom,  like  the  deflationary
theorists I considered in chapter 2, illegitimately helps himself to a vertical dimension of
interpretation. Here is an illustration of how he does it. Imagine a particularly dopey
group of people. They have a sophisticated linguistic practice, one that includes talk of
truth, quantification, anaphoric dependence and a sophisticated semantic vocabulary. In
fact, the linguistic practice of this people looks and sounds just like English. The only
difference is they never think to enquire what they are up to. They happily sanction each
other physically, and normatively without ever taxing themselves about the rationality.
In other words, despite the fact that their vocabulary includes words which are direct
translation of "refers", "denotes", "satisfies" and so on it never occurs to them that there
are any word-world relations. Interestingly, if asked "are their word-world relations?",
they would take themselves entitled, and perhaps obliged, to answer, "yes". 
Now, along comes an English radical anthropologist. She observes this group of
people. She is able to codify and describe their practice (in fact this task is no harder
than  codifying  and  describing the  practice  of  English  speakers).  If  she  does  this
correctly, she will have built a Taski style theory of truth for their language which, using
Taski's recursive machinery, can correctly assign truth conditions to any sentence in the
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language.  Both  the  dopey  speakers  and  the  radical  anthropologist  will  endorse  the
propriety of uttering any of the theorems generated. The difference is that the radical
anthropologist makes sense of those theorems as assigning word-world relations.
The question now is, can we make sense of the difference between the radical
anthropologist and her dopey subjects? On Brandom's theory the answer is "no". He will
say that the dopey subjects were a convenient step in the dialectic. There are no dopey
subjects and interpreters, we are all both dopey subject and interpreter. That is what it is
to be one of us. But,  I  think that shows that Brandom has collapsed the distinction
between the linguistic and the meta-linguistic.  All  that remains are bits  of linguistic
behaviour. That just means we cannot make sense of deontic scorekeeping. It is only
from the position of somebody outside of the practice that we can make sense of there
being a vertical dimension of propriety. From inside the practice we happily move from
one bit of behaviour to another. Intentional vocabulary, like with Horwich, allows us to
go on "talking whilst adding a word or two" (Hornsby, 1997, p. 8n).
It might be helpful at this point to contrast Brandom's view of interpretation with
Davidson's. I take it that Davidson has a similar view about language use. Language in
the end is just so much sound and mark making. However, for Davidson it signifies
something because each of us do in fact have beliefs. There is something that counts as
'our  lights'.  This  makes  "holding  true"  a  substantial  attitude.  It  is  what  allows
interpretation to get going. Brandom has no such luxury. He wants to say the same thing
about the mental as he does about the discursive. We do not have content for mental
states prior to mental behaviour. Instead, our minds are organised in a particular way.
That is cashed out in terms of the way we are disposed to move (both in a physical sense
and in the mental sense). But, that is something that cannot be said unless there is some
significance to our language. Brandom's pragmatic phenomenalism might well escape
both  the  regress  of  rules  and  the  gerrymandering  argument,  but  by  collapsing  the
distinction between the linguistic and the metalinguistic and the distinction between the
mental and the meta-mental it fails about as badly as any theory can fail. It makes it
impossible to say or think anything.
§3 How Rules Can Govern Behaviour
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I have claimed that at least one of thinking and using a language is a rational
practice. I have understood a rational practice to be a rule governed activity. Rational
practices  are  activities  that  agents  can  engage  in  because,  as  agents,  they  can
acknowledge the force of the rules. If one can acknowledge the force of a set of rules,
those rules can govern one's behaviour. However, in section 1 of this chapter, I followed
Glüer and Wikforss to show that rules which are constitutive of mental content or of
meaning are not rules that can guide agents in their thinking or speaking. In section 2, I
discussed Brandom's pragmatic phenomenalism about rules. On this view, it is practices
all the way down. The idea is that being a speaker and being a thinker is a matter of
being able to adopt deontic attitudes to performances. Among those performances are
performances which are taken to reflect on the propriety of other performances. But, in
reality there is  no such distinction between ground level performance and reflective
performance.  I  showed  that  this  precludes  us  from  having  explicit  knowledge  of
meaning or of thought content.
In this section I am going to give an account of what it is for rules to be in force
for agents. The previous two sections help make it clear what constraints the account is
going  to  have  to  meet.  In  the  first  instance,  I  need  an  account  of  rule  governed
behaviour  that  allows  for  rules  to  be  constitutive  of  content  and,  in  some  sense,
motivational of agent practice. In addition, those rules need to be genuinely prescriptive.
That is they need to provide a full-blooded notion of correctness. A full-blooded notion
of correctness is one where behaviour is correct because it is in compliance with what
ought to happen, and not merely in the etiolated sense of 'in line with a description'. The
crux of the problem is showing how norms can be implicit in practice. We cannot let a
rule guide us unless we know the content of the rule, but nor can we know the content
of content engendering rules in advance of being able to follow them. However, rules
cannot be implicit  in practice simply because of what we do. We need a reason for
keeping score the way we keep score, if we are to make sense of making those reasons
explicit. What follows is a simple suggestion as to how it is possible to take part in a
rational practice.
3.1 Rules Create Reasons
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The very simple thought is that rules create reasons. For example, the Bridge
rule which prescribes following suit when possible gives South a reason to play her
singleton Queen of hearts when East has led a heart. The next simple thought is that
practitioners  do not  need to  have  any conception  that  there  are  rules  to  be able  to
respond to the reasons generated. They merely need to be able to recognise and respond
to the procedural reasons that the rules institute. So, continuing the previous example,
South need have no conception that there are rules governing the play of the cards, she
does  not  even need  the  conception  of  a  rule.  All  she  needs  to  be  able  to  do  is  to
recognise  and respond  to  East's  lead  as  a  reason  to  play  her  singleton  queen.  The
important point is that recognising and responding to reasons is not mere behaviour. As
noted in the introduction, recognising and responding to a reason is recognising and
responding to an ought.  Recognising and responding to  oughts  is  different  to  being
differentially  disposed to  respond  to  situations;  it  is  the  behaviour  of  an  agent.  To
respond to  a  reason is  to  take  the  situation  in  the  world to  require,  recommend or
prohibit a particular course of action. However, that does not require any awareness,
implicit or explicit, of content. In the Bridge example, South does not need to have any
recognition of the content that she should play her Queen. In particular, she does not
need a pro-attitude to that content. Instead, recognising and responding to East's play as
a reason to play her Queen is something which she can do at the ground floor.
3.2 Making it Explicit
On my view, one can take part in a rule governed activity if one can recognise
and respond to the procedural reasons instituted by the rules which govern the activity.
If one is recognising and responding to those reasons, then one is following the rules of
the activity. On this view, there is no appeal to guidance by the rule or the claim that our
practical attitudes are prior to the rules. There are these procedural reasons only because
there are rules. But, because the rules are prior to the reasons, on my view, it is possible
to move to the first floor. One can gain explicit knowledge of the rules of the practice
because one can reflect on the source of reasons one is following. South can ask herself:
why should I play my singleton queen? With enough mental sophistication, she is going
to be able to formulate the rule which says that players must, where possible, follow
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suit.
Dummett has suggested just such a view of language:
Understanding a language does not amount to knowing anything at  all,  in the sense of
knowing  something  to  be  the  case:  it  is  simply  a  practical  ability,  namely  to  use  the
language and to respond appropriately to the utterances of others when couched in it.
(Dummett, 1993, p. 132)
But, for Dummett, that does not preclude language being a rule governed activity. Using
a  language  and  responding  appropriately  to  the  utterances  of  others  is  a  matter  of
recognising  the  procedural  reasons  generated  by the  rules  of  a  particular  linguistic
practice. Dummett compares this view of linguistic competence with the competence
required to solve a Rubik's cube.
[S]omeone may be able to "see" what rotations are needed to bring one of the small cubes
into its correct position on Rubik's cube without disturbing certain others, and yet be unable
to explain the principles he follows. What cannot be supposed is that he does not follow a
system capable in principle of being codified and so known explicitly.
(Dummett, 1993, p. 133)
The  thought  is  that  a  particular  orientation  of  the  sides  of  a  Rubik's  cube
provides a reason for making a specific turn. But, there are only these reasons because
there are principles which determine the effect of rotating the sides of a Rubik's cube,
and, in the context of trying to make uniformly coloured sides,  those principles are
prescriptive rules. People do not solve Rubik's cube blindly. That is to say they are not
merely differentially responsive to the orientation of the cube. They are able to solve the
cube when they can respond to the procedural reasons. It is plausible that there are
people  who  have  learnt,  without  being  taught,  to  solve  the  cube  who  could  not
formulate the principles which govern the rotations that they make.
On this  view using a language is  similar.  The rules of a particular linguistic
practice determine what one is allowed to say, has to say and is forbidden from saying.
In  doing  so  the  rules  determine  procedural  reasons.  Learning  to  use  a  language  is
learning to recognise and respond to those reasons. For example, it is learning that the
fact that Saffron is dancing procedurally prohibits the assertion that she is not dancing.
Or, more plausibly, that the fact that Teddy is on the table requires the assertion that
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Teddy is on the table in response to the question, "where is Teddy?". The important
point is that the rules do not need to guide practitioners, nor in any sense are the rules
determined  by  the  scorekeeping  practice  of  practitioners.  The  practitioners  are
ultimately responding in the way that they respond because of the existence of the set of
rules.  This  meets  Glüer  and  Wikforss'  motivational  constraint.  The  rules  are
motivational not by providing a content towards which practitioners adopt pro-attitudes.
Instead,  the  rules  create  a  new set  of  reasons,  and  those  reasons  can  motivate  the
behaviour of practitioners. Similarly, it is not that practitioners count things as correct
which means that there are rules, practitioners count things as correct because there are
rules. However, performances can count as correct and be counted as correct without the
practitioners recognising that there are rules. Practitioners can and do keep score simply
by scoring according to the rule-instituted procedural reasons. The practice, and thus
meaning, is made explicit by formulating the rules which govern the practice.
§4 Linguistic Priority and Explicit Knowledge
One thought  that  has driven the whole thesis  is  that  given the possibility of
theorising  about  meaning  and  content  it  is  possible  to  have  explicit  knowledge  of
meaning and content. I have tried to show that this is not a trivial constraint. I have also
tried to show that this involves a grasp of truth. So, I need to show that even if it is
possible to follow linguistic rules at the ground floor, it would also be possible to have
explicit knowledge of meaning. In this section, I am going to show how treating truth as
the central semantic value in a theory of meaning allows us to gain explicit knowledge
of meaning and content.  I am going to show that, because sentences have a syntax,
sentences represent how things stand in the world. I am going to show that by grasping
the concept  of truth as a semantic  value of  sentences,  speakers can understand that
sentences  represent,  how  they  represent  and  what  they  represent.  Grasping  what  a
sentence  represents  also gives  the  person who grasps  it  explicit  knowledge of  how
things might be in the world. This allows one to have explicit knowledge of the content
of one's thoughts.
4.1 A Sketch of the Practice
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In the previous section I suggested that the activity of using a language is taking
part in a rational practice. The result is that understanding the meaning of an expression
requires understanding the correct use of that expression. However, nothing precludes
us from using a substantial notion of truth to capture the correct use of an expression. I
showed in chapter 1 that a use of language is an action. I also showed that there is a
hypothetical dimension to those actions. The hypothetical dimension is the point of the
action. Some examples of the hypothetical dimension are stating information, telling
jokes, writing poems, eliciting information and making demands. It is the purpose for
which  a  particular  person  uses  a  bit  of  language.  My claim is  that  there  is  also  a
semantic dimension to the use of an expression. This is because the activity of using a
language is part of a rule governed rational practice. The existence of that practice is
independent of the intentions of language users. The actions described in the semantic
dimension are purely linguistic actions. They are what uses of sentences do. 
It  is  important to  note that the view implies that there is  a sense of "use of
language" and of "linguistic act" in which the performance of a linguistic act by a use of
language is independent of language users.  When I talk about a use of a sentence or a
linguistic act, there is no requirement that it  has been produced by a language user.
When the monkeys with typewriters finally get round to knocking out a masterpiece,
that masterpiece will be understandable because it consists of uses of language. The
reason  for  this  is  that  the  rules  of  a  linguistic  practice  determine  the  linguistic
significance of any use of a sentence. It makes a "sentence" simply that which can be
used to perform a linguistic act, and it makes a linguistic act that which has a linguistic
significance. The significance of a use of a sentence depends in part on the content of
that sentence and in part on its force. But, the force and the content of a sentence in use
are both constituted by the rules governing language use, and those rules are in force
whether  or  not  speakers  are  complying  with  them.  So,  the  first  sentence  of  The
Wasteland, "April is the cruellest month, breeding/ lilacs out of the dead land, mixing/
memory and desire,  stirring/  dull  roots  with  spring  rain"  is  an  assertion.  However,
nobody asserts it. It is because the sentence has assertoric force that it is an assertion. At
the ground floor, linguistic competence is a matter of learning to use and to respond to
sentences  correctly,  and  at the  first  level,  the  reflective  level,  it  is  grasping  the
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significance of so doing. Of course, once one has reflective competence you can use all
the basic uses of sentences for your own purposes. This will include using assertions to
elicit information, and using interrogatives to issue orders. It opens up the possibility of
distinguishing speaker  meaning from linguistic  meaning.  My claim is  that  linguistic
meaning is first meaning.
It  is  important  to  note that  "sentence" has  here a  technical,  non-natural  use.
Sentences are what make linguistic acts. They also occur as a component of linguistic
acts. When a sentence is used as a complete sentence it has a force. Sentences can also
be  used  without  any  force,  for  example  when  they  occur  as  the  antecedent  of  a
conditional: "if it rains tomorrow, the game will be called off". A use of language is
effected by a use of words, and words do not change their meaning as they occur in
sentences with different forces or with no force. For example, "Will it rain tomorrow?"
is a sentence with interrogative force. It is the same sentence as "it will rain tomorrow"
and the sentence which is the antecedent of the previous conditional. What varies is the
force. This is the point that Geach found in Frege (Geach, 1965, p. 449). 
I contend that force roughly coincides with grammatical mood. I confess that
being  a  fairly  monoglot  English  speaker  I  find  it  difficult  to  think  of  sentences  in
subjunctive, potential or conditional moods as performing different linguistic actions
from sentences in the indicative. There is however a simple test. Rational actions may
have  grounds  and  will  have  consequences.  Now,  linguistic  practices  determine
procedural  grounds  and  consequences  for  uses  of  sentences.  There  is  a  linguistic
practice when there are a set of rules which determine the grounds and the consequences
of different linguistic acts. The rationality of these linguistic acts is describable by using
a truth predicate. So, there are linguistic actions where there are truth involving rules
which govern the performance of those actions. If one could show that there was a
difference in the rules which govern the use of sentences in the indicative and sentences
in  the  subjunctive  mood,  one  would  have  shown  that  indicative  and  subjunctive
sentences perform different actions. If one could not, then the difference is not in the
action  that  they  perform,  they  are  both  assertions,  but  in  the  way truth  values  are
assigned.  On  the  latter  hypothesis,  the  difference  between  the  subjunctive  and  the
indicative is like the difference between the present and the past. It is equivalent to a
difference in tense rather than a difference in force.
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Here, repeated but modified into the truth idiom, is my sketch of the rules which
govern and determine the performance of different linguistic acts:
ASS1': One should: assert S only if S is true.
ASS2': If S is true, one should: withdraw any assertion that you have made
which is incompatible with S.
OPT1':  One should: wish for S to be true only if one would like it to be the
case that S is true.
OPT2': If one wishes for S to be true, and it is in your power without undue
effort, one should: make S true
INT1':  One may: ask whether S is true.
INT2': If one has been asked whether S is true, one should: answer in the
affirmative only if S is true.
IMP1': One may: order someone to make S true.
IMP2': If one has received an order to make S true, one should: bring 
it about that S is true.
Given what I have said above about the relation between truth and force, it seems that I
should  acknowledge  that  promising  is  a  distinct  linguistic  action  governed  by  the
following rules:
PRM1: one may: promise to make S true.
PRM2: if one has promised to make S true, one should: bring it about that S is 
true.
I am not committed to these formulations being correct. Nor am I committed to
these  rules  being exhaustive  of  linguistic  practice.   Perhaps  there  are  distinct  rules
governing assertions  in  different  grammatical  moods;  perhaps  there  is  the linguistic
action of making things so. This would be a use of a sentence that had the same grounds
as an imperative, but different in that using the sentence makes it true. These rules are
presented as tentative. However, for my purposes their correctness and completeness
does not matter. I am not trying to give an account of linguistic practice. I am trying to
think about the general shape that account of linguistic practice has to take.  It is of
course important for my purposes that the norms governing assertion are truth norms. I
have claimed that are only way into explicit knowledge through gaining a grasp of truth,
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and that we do so by seeing how truth functions as a norm of language, and in particular
of assertion. I make a defence of this norm below.
My other big concern is that perhaps the linguistic practice is not as hermtically
sealed from other concerns as I am making out. As I have it, anyone, at any time, can
issue an order. Once an order has been issued, one has to comply. It might be thought
that only those in legitimate authority can give orders, and that one should obey only if
the consequences of obeying are morally acceptable. Similarly, one might think that you
should not wish for destruction or promise to do wrong. 
The  reason  I  have  removed  ethical  and  practical  considerations  from  my
proposed norms is that I think that language use is a rational practice unto itself, and
that questions, commands, wishes and so on are distinctively linguistic actions. This to
say that someone who grasps the concept of a question or a command has understood a
linguistic action. It is not the case that questions, commands, wishes and so on exist
outside of language but that we find it convenient to use language to perform the action.
Rather, they are linguistic actions that we can, on occasion, find non-linguistic means of
carrying out. In addition, I think of that practice as being a self-contained area of human
activity.  The upshot is that an assertion,  a command, a question,  request and so are
actions  governed by procedural  norms.  Those  procedures  are  captured  by linguistic
rules. It seems plausible to me that those norms do not involve the wider social and
ethical context in which linguistic practice takes place. It is in this respect that talk of a
"language game" is  apt.  The practice  consists  of  a  series  of  possible  moves.  Those
moves are use of sentences. There are a variety of possible types of move available.
Each one has different grounds and consequences, but those grounds and consequences
are internal to the practice. As a result, a particular use of a sentence makes a particular
difference to the state of play in the practice. In a similar way the rules of the game
define  what  different  actions  are  possible,  when  they  are  permitted  and  the
consequences of performing them. 
It  is  of  course  true  that  non-linguistic  creatures  can  be  trained  to  follow
commands. This might make it look like commands, at least, are not, in any essential,
way  linguistic  actions.  No  doubt  some  animal  training  is  the  result  of  exploiting
Pavlovian conditioning and, thus, not a threat to my view. But this cannot be the whole
case. Much animal training involves carrot and stick, it seems plausible that much of the
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complex behaviour  exhibited is  in  fact  a  response to  perceived threat  or reward.  In
effect, the animal recognises the command as a hypothetical reason to perform a certain
action. However, it seems to me that, for example, dogs go beyond what is given in their
training. They come to recognise certain gestures or expressions as procedural reasons
to  perform  the  required  actions.  Does  this  mean  that  I  have  to  acknowledge  that
commands, at least, are not really linguistic actions? I do not think so. It is notable that a
verbal expression or gesture is required to command a dog to sit or jump through a
hoop. I want to say that such creatures are able to have practical, ground floor responses
to simple sentences, but that we cannot credit them with the ability to speak a language,
or even linguistic abilities, because the range of sentences they can respond to and the
range of responses they can make is much too limited.
Of course,  language use is  embedded in almost all  aspects of our lives.  The
alternative view is that the procedural rules which govern the practice are such that they
will  make  reference  to  practical  and  ethical  considerations.  Making  this  sort  of
modification would not affect the claim that language use is part of a linguistic practice,
nor is it incompatible with the claim that questions, commands, assertions and so on are
linguistic  actions  unavailable  to  creatures  without  language.  It  simply  makes  the
practice more complex by imbuing it with non-linguistic considerations. If I were to
make such a modification, the rules would look something like this:
ASS1': One should: assert S only if S is true.
ASS2': If S is true, one should: withdraw any assertion incompatible with S.
OPT1':  One should: wish for S to be true only if S's being true would not
be a bad thing101
101 'Bad' is here to be understood in its moral sense. The thought I am trying to capture is that you should
not have immoral wishes. The most obvious examples are wishing that unnecessary harm or suffering
come to the innocent. However, I do not want to phrase things like that because I think that it is
plausible  that  there  are  bads  which  do  not  involve  harm or  suffering.  Had  Narcissus  been  less
beautiful  there may have been less suffering for him and for those that  saw him. However,  it  is
plausible that beauty is a good in its own right, and so it is better for the world that Narcissus was so
gorgeous. Not being a Catholic, I think that Paradise was more than worth the price of an apple, but
certainly the knowledge gained by becoming a reflective creature aware of ourselves as a thing in the
world has caused pain and suffering. It could even be argued that it is a condition of possibility of
pain and suffering being things that matter. Nevertheless, I think it would be an immoral wish to wish
that we were as other animals.
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OPT2': If one wishes for S to be true, your wish is legitimate, and it is in
your power without undue effort, one should: make S true
INT1':  One may: ask whether S is true.
INT2': If one has been asked whether S is true, one should: answer in the
affirmative only if S is true.
IMP1': If one is in a position of legitimate authority,  and S's being true
would not be a bad thing one may: order someone to make S true.
IMP2': If one has received an order from a legitimate authority to make S
true, and S's being true would not be a bad thing one should: bring it about
that S is true.
I prefer not to make such modification because it makes things messy, and I see
no reason to embrace the mess.  Once practical or ethical considerations are included
within the grounds and consequences of particular linguistic acts, there are no good
grounds for including some practical and moral considerations but excluding others. For
example, it is plausible that having legitimate authority to demand compliance is part of
the procedural grounds for issuing an order, but it is less plausible that being tactful is
part of the grounds for making an assertion. Nevertheless, in general, one should not
make an assertion if doing so will cause offence. However, we cannot simply add an "if
tactful" clause to the grounds for making an assertion. There are times when one should
be rude. Tact,  honesty and deceitfulness are important considerations in choosing to
make an assertion, but they do not serve to define what an assertion is. In a similar
manner,  there  are  many  circumstances  in  which  changing  the  subject  is  rude  or
unhelpful. As I have it, there is no linguistic reason why one cannot change the subject
by asking a question unrelated to the topic at hand. However, relevance does not seem
to be a procedural problem when it comes to the asking of questions, and there would be
something odd about adding an "if relevant" clause to a proposed norm for interrogatory
uses. In addition, the scope of the clause would be much too wide. There are times when
one should change the subject, perhaps it has gone stale or the conversation is making
people  uncomfortable.  In  both  the  case  of  an  assertion  and of  a  question,  it  seems
plausible that what we have are different ways of using sentences. Those different ways
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are determined solely by differences between the way the truth value of the sentence
used determines the procedural grounds and consequences of each type of action. Given
that  those  procedures  introduce  new  types  of  action  to  the  world,  the  much  more
important  question is:  when should we perform those actions,  and when should we
comply with those procedures?
What about imperatives? Isn't it plausible that the notion of legitimate authority
is  built  into  the  concept  of  a  command?  It  seems  odd  to  think  that  any  one  can
legitimately  issue  an  order,  and  odd  to  think  that  any  order  requires  compliance.
However,  it  should  be  noted  that  on  my  view  these  are  only  procedural  norms.
Evaluation in terms of these rules is  of linguistic performance from the perspective
linguistic  practice.  It  does  not  evaluate  behaviour  from  the  much  more  important
perspective of correct human conduct. I want to say that it is categorically wrong to
issue an order without the requisite authority, in part, because the order procedurally
demands  compliance.  Thus,  in  issuing  an  order  one  lays  claim  to  the  right  to
compliance, and that is to claim the legitimate authority to demand compliance with the
order. Similarly, it is wrong to issue an immoral order because the procedural norm is
compliance. In issuing an immoral order you are laying an obligation on the one ordered
do something wrong. On receiving an immoral order, you should refuse to comply, and,
on receiving an order to do something from one who has no authority to command you
to do such a thing, you should have no qualms about refusing to comply; all you are
doing is shirking a procedural obligation. This is because imperatives require you to do
something. The relevant perspectives in considering what course of action to take are
firstly ethical considerations and subsequently practical. It does not follow that there are
not procedural norms in play. It simply means that the fact that some course of action is
correct procedurally does not, automatically, give you a reason to choose that course of
action. It does not follow that there are not procedural reasons, and this is shown by the
fact that we can evaluate an action from a procedural point of view102.
102 If that seems odd, consider a game like chess. The rules of chess provide procedural reasons by which
moves can be evaluated. However, when considering what to do the fact that a move is illegitimate
does  not  provide  a  reason  for  a  player  not  to  make  it.  The  reasons  players  have  for  playing
legitimately are practical and ethical. If you make illegitimate moves, it is difficult, and at some point
impossible, to engage in a game of chess. If you're not going to engage properly, you will let down
your opponent. That is not a nice thing to do. When it comes to any practice, practitioners act or
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The upshot is that I cannot see a good reason for treating anything other than the
truth value of a sentence as determining the linguistic procedures for different linguistic
actions.  Each  action  is  typed  by  procedural  grounds  for  making  that  action  and
procedural  consequences  of  so doing.  Those  grounds and consequences  are  entirely
captured in terms of the truth value of the sentences used to perform those actions. The
existence of  those procedures brings  into existence new types  of action.  Competent
language users are then able to use language to perform these actions, and to respond to
them. However, what they do with that ability is then up to them. They are responsible
for their actions, and so need to ask themselves if, for example, complying with this
order or making that assertion is the right thing to do. The key thought here is that the
existence of a procedural  reason for performing an action is  only one consideration
among many when considering what you should do. The shoulds which appear in the
proposed rules for making language acts are procedural shoulds. When it comes to what
you do, what matters is that you do the right thing, not that you get what you want or
that you follow procedures. So, the all things considered should which governs your
action is always a categorical should. 
Why assertion is governed by a truth norm
Treating truth as the norm which governs assertion is controversial, as is treating
truth as the norm which governs belief. When it comes to assertion, much ink has been
spilled over whether or not the right norm is knowledge or belief (see, for example,
Williamson, 2000, chapter 11 for a defence of a knowledge norm and Bach, 2008, p. 77
for a defence of a belief norm). When it comes to belief, the alternative view is that
epistemic  norms  are  in  play.  I  have  argued  that  truth  is,  in  the  first  instance,  an
evaluative property of uses of sentences, and it is through coming to be able to evaluate
language use that we come to explicit knowledge. The simple idea is that, because truth
is  the  substantial  property  that  organises  language  use  by  making  a  difference,  in
different ways, to the grounds and consequences of performing language acts, we can
come to  explicit  knowledge of  meaning through coming to  understand what  makes
different uses of language correct or incorrect. Once we have explicit  knowledge of
refrain from acting in accordance with the procedural shoulds of the practice because of practical or
ethical considerations.
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meaning, we can use that explicit knowledge to give us explicit knowledge of what we
think  and  also  of  how  things  are.  We  gain  these  latter  forms  of  knowledge  by
representing, in language, our thinking and the world to ourselves. The result is that my
thesis  is not effected if belief  is governed by epistemic norms. In addition, thinking
could still be a rational practice, but one that is not isomorphic to the practice of using a
language. If that is the case, then the procedural rules which govern belief are epistemic
in nature. The problem for me is the linguistic case. I need to explain why I take the
'belief or knowledge norm' debate to be misguided.
The  key thought  here  is  that  assertions  are  linguistic  actions.  They are  not
actions that exist independently of linguistic practices. The meaning of a sub-sentential
expression is its contribution to the ways in which sentences in which it can occur are
correctly  used.  The  practice  consists  of  a  series  of  types  of  possible  moves.
Understanding a sentence, on such a view, requires understanding how its parts make a
systematic difference to the right ways of using that sentence. This does not require
treating mood as a determiner of force. Instead, it requires thinking that the different
forces exist because there are rules for making different types of linguistic acts. It also
requires thinking that what competent speakers have to do is to get to grips with those
rules.
But, why do those rules have to be truth rules? Well, a sentence is meaningful by
being a representation of a way for the world to be. To do so, it must divide all possible
ways for the world to be into just two classes: the class of situations compatible with the
sentence and the class of situations incompatible  with the sentence.  Somebody who
grasps  the  content  of  a  sentence  is  somebody who has  explicit  knowledge of  what
situation it represents, and that is to grasp that division. In addition, it is to understand
that the sentence is true if and only if all actual states of affairs are in the former class.
However, to have that understanding is precisely to have an understanding of truth. 
I showed in chapter 2 that designation theories of truth are powerless to make
sense of that division because they deflate the normativity of meaning. They treat it as a
brute fact about a sentence that it picks out a state of affairs. However, on such a view, if
we are to have a grasp of which state of affairs a sentence picks out, then false sentences
also  pick  out  states  of  affairs.  But,  making  this  move,  leads  the  theorist  unable  to
account for the difference between truth and falsity.  It  becomes impossible to make
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sense  of  an  assertion  as  presenting  a  sentence  as  true  because  we  are  unable  to
distinguish between the states of affairs picked out by true sentences and the states of
affairs picked out by false sentences. The difference between a true sentence and a false
sentence is in the way that the truth value of the sentence affects the way it should be
used.  A sentence  is  meaningful  by  dividing  states  of  affairs  into  the  two  classes
mentioned above, but it does that because of the linguistic norms which govern correct
use. In particular, it does that because assertions are correct if and only if they are true.
It is because truth is an evaluative property of sentences that they are representations. As
correct use is captured in terms of truth value, the linguistic norms which govern the
practice have to be truth norms.
It might be thought that all I have shown is that the meaning of a sub-sentential
expression is its contribution to the way sentences in which it occurs should be used, but
that this does not preclude belief or knowledge norms governing correct use. However,
this  thought  is  wrong.  Grasp of  the  concept  of  knowledge requires  recognising  the
difference between how things are and what you are aware of.  But, to have a grasp of
the concept of how things are is to have a grasp of the concept of truth. So, to have the
concept of knowledge is to recognise that there are more truths than those you are aware
of. Similarly,  the concept of belief, as Davidson puts it,  picks up the slack between
"objective truth and the held true, and we come to understand it just in this connection"
(Davidson 2001b p. 170). We get the concept of belief  by recognising that the way
things are can be different from the way they strike us. So, we can neither have the
concept of knowledge nor the concept of belief without having the concept of truth. But,
as having the concept of truth is a matter of understanding that sentences present ways
for things to be,  we get the concept of truth from coming to explicit  knowledge of
meaning. Coming to explicit knowledge of meaning is, or so I have argued, a matter of
understanding what it is for assertoric uses of sentences to be correct. In particular, it is
understanding that  the  assertoric  use  divides  all  ways  for  the  world to  be  into  two
classes, those ways for the world to be which, if the world was that way, would make
that assertoric use correct, and those ways for the world to be which, if the world was
that  way,  would  make  that  assertoric  use  incorrect.  So,  it  cannot  be  that  belief  or
knowledge provides any norm for assertion.  If  either did,  each assertoric use would
divide all ways the world to be into the class of ways for the world to be which are
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known/believed to be the case and the class which are unknown/not believed to be the
case.  We could make no sense of the difference between being known/believed and
being true. That is to say, we could make no sense of our concepts of knowledge and
belief.
Another way of making the same point is as follows. The meaning of a sub-
sentential expression is its contribution to the way sentences are correctly used, but the
way sentences are correctly used depends in part on how it presents the world to be.
Assertoric uses of the sentence are correct when the world is as sentence presents it to
be. In other words, assertoric uses of the sentence are correct when the sentence is true.
So, at the very least, the meaning of a sub-sentential expression is its contribution to
whatever  property  evaluates  assertion,  and  whatever  property  evaluates  assertion  is
truth. In addition that property is the property which speakers have to grasp to make
sense  of  meaning,  and,  to  make sense  of  meaning,  speakers  need to  recognise  that
sentences divide the world into two classes: those that fit the norm and those that do not.
So,  if,  for  example  knowledge,  were  the  norm governing assertion,  then  competent
speakers would need to understand that sentences divide the world into the class of
situations which are known and the class of unknown sentences. But, as the concept of
being known requires recognising the possibility of unknown truths, such understanding
would be impossible.
4.2 How Language Works or What Reflective Speakers Need to Know
It  is  an  important,  if  obvious,  point  that  words,  the  basic  components  of  a
language, are not merely dispositions to respond to reasons. For a start, machines, which
do not respond to reasons, produce words. Words are also not the same as what they are
about. Combining these two self-evident observations results in the view that learning to
use a language is learning to operate with words, and that words are entities which,
when combined in the right ways, perform a variety of linguistic acts. Those linguistic
acts are about the world. In other words, linguistic practice is representational. The basic
move is to combine words into a sentence which represents the world, and then to do
something with that representation. For example, a particular use of a sentence might
claim that what it represents is true, or demand that the representation be made true.
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This may seem trivial. However, in what follows it is important to note that language
use  is  about  the  world  because  it  is  representational.  This  means  that  explicit
understanding  of  a  linguistic  practice  is  a  matter  of  explicit  understanding  of  a
representational practice. Gaining knowledge of meaning is gaining knowledge of what
and how words and sentences can be used to represent.
As truth is the value which organises linguistic practice, what reflective speakers
and thinkers need to have grasped is what it is for a sentence to have truth as a semantic
value.  Now, the reason sentences  have truth as  a  semantic  value,  when they do,  is
because of the semantic values of the sub-sentential parts. So, what a reflective speaker
has to realise is how the sub-sentential parts determine the truth conditions of sentences
in which they can occur. But, as I showed in chapter 2, this is not a matter of pairing up
expressions with features of the world. Pairing up leads to the problem of the unity of
the  proposition,  onto  the  problem  of  false  facts  and  with  it  the  impossibility  of
accounting for the rationality of linguistic practice. Instead, the semantic value of a sub-
sentential part is precisely its contribution to the truth values of sentences in which it
can occur. Someone who grasps that is someone who is able to grasp what it is for a
sentence to have a truth value, and that is to thereby be able to analyse a sentence into
its component parts. They must be able to see how different parts make a different sort
of contribution to the truth value of the whole by having different semantic roles. 
The basic case is sentences with subject-predicate structure, and here reflective
speakers must be able to see how sentences can be analysed into function and argument.
They must  recognise  that  the  singular  term picks  out  something  which  can  be  the
argument of a function, the function is determined by the predicate and is a function
from object  to  a  truth  value.  Things  get  more  complicated  with  more  complicated
sentences, for example ones involving quantification and truth functional connectives.
In the former case, they still need to discern the function argument structure, but this
time recognise how bound variables can provide a range of arguments for a function to
a truth value. In the latter case, they need to see how truth functions take the truth values
of sentences as arguments to yield truth values. This is a long-winded way of saying that
they need to understand how it is that language use represents. The next challenge is
showing how a speaker could possibly acquire such an ability. It is to this that I now
turn.
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4.3 Gaining Explicit Knowledge
Now, uses of language are things in the world.  This means that they can be
represented  and  talked  about.  But,  this  is  no  more  mysterious  than  talking  about
anything else in the world.  What is  required is  a way of referring to sentences and
words, and a way of predicating things of them. One way English achieves this is by the
device of quote naming sentences.  In English,  the effect of putting quotation marks
around a sentence is to refer to that sentence. English then contains a vocabulary for
predicating  properties  of  named  sentences.  Among  such  vocabulary  there  is,  "is  a
sentence",  "contains  words",  "is  grammatically  correct"  and,  of  course,  "is  true".
English  also  uses  quotation  marks  to  refer  to  sub-sentential  expressions.  There  are
examples of that in  the previous sentence.  It  then has a  semantic  vocabulary which
allows  for  talk  about  those  expressions.  This  includes  phrases  such  as,  "refers  to",
"denotes", "is true of" and "is true". The upshot is that English is powerful enough to be
its own metalanguage. Other languages have similar devices and, consequently, can be
their own metalanguage. However, even if another language lacked such vocabulary,
there is no reason why it could not develop in such a way that it can become its own
metalanguage.  That  metalanguage  will  take  the  form  of  a  theory  of  truth  for  the
language in question.
A bipartite  truth  conditional  theory  of  meaning  for  a  language  provides  a
representation of the procedural reasons which govern the activity of using a language.
A speaker with practical competence but no explicit knowledge is one who is able to
recognise and respond to those procedural reasons. As a result, such a bipartite theory
models the practical competence of a ground floor speaker by representing the reasons a
ground floor speaker can recognise and respond to. Explicit understanding of meaning
requires explicit understanding of the practice of using a language. The practice of using
a language is a rational practice. It is what is represented by a bipartite truth conditional
theory of meaning for a language.  So, somebody who has explicit  understanding of
meaning is somebody who has the abilities modelled by such a theory and who has the
ability to explicitly understand what she does when she uses a language. In addition to
the ability to use a language correctly, she has the ability to reflect on the proprieties of
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performing different linguistic acts, the ability to assign truth conditions to the sentences
of  her  language  and  the  ability  to  understand  those  reflections  and  assignations.
Somebody who is in a position to understand a representation of the rationality of using
a language is somebody who has the requisite abilities to be a reflective speaker. And, as
the rationality of using a language is represented with a bipartite truth conditional theory
of meaning, someone who is in a position to understand such a theory is someone who
has explicit knowledge of meaning. The central concept of such a theory is truth. The
rest of the vocabulary used in constructing such a theory is understood in terms of truth.
So, coming to reflective understanding of linguistic practice is coming to understand
how truth organises linguistic practice. I now want to show how that can be achieved.
The very simple thought is that language use is representational, and it is this
that allows us to grasp a semantic property of truth. A sentence is about the world by
being a  representation of  it.  Having explicit  knowledge of  meaning requires having
explicit knowledge of what situation a sentence is about. That involves two abilities.
The first ability is the ability to have an explicit thought about the situation, and the
second the ability to have an explicit thought about the sentence. Schematically, one
who has explicit knowledge of meaning has to be able to explicitly think that: 
S is about p 
Where, as always, S ranges over names of sentences and p ranges 
over sentences in use.
One way that  this  explicit  knowledge can be achieved is  if  the thinker  in  question
understands an instance of S as naming a particular sentence, and understands what is
named by S as representing it to be the case that p103.
As I said above, any language has the power, or could be expanded to have the
power, to name sentences and make claims about them. That is, human languages can
represent things about themselves. They can also represent things about the world, and
importantly can represent the way that they represent the world. I have also shown that
it  is  a  truth  conditional  theory  of  meaning  for  a  language  which  represents  the
representational power of that language. However, a truth predicate is also a device of
103 There are more involved abilities which will also get the same result. For example one who knows
that a name of S names S, and who knows that some other sentence, S*, represents it to be the case
that p, and who knows that S is equivalent to S* also knows that S represents it to be the case that p.
This more involved ability would be the ability of somebody who had learnt a second language.
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semantic ascent. Use of a truth predicate represents which situation a sentence is about,
and,  when we have  a  transparent  name of  the  sentence,  it  does  so in  a  transparent
manner. For example, the sentence, "poetry is an art form" is about poetry being an art
form. The sentence, '"poetry is an art form" is true if and only if poetry is an art form'
represents that in a transparent manner.
The upshot is  that  somebody who has grasped the point  of  a  semantic  truth
predicate is somebody who has understood that sentences can be named and used to
represent situations.  If  she has also grasped quote naming,  then,  for a  sentence that
admits  of  disquotation,  she  will  be  able  to  correctly  represent  what  situation  that
sentence is about by forming a quote name of the sentence, concatenating it with a truth
predicate and the bi-conditional, and then using the sentence to provide its own truth
conditions. She will end up with something of the form:
S is true if and only if p.
Moreover,  she  will  explicitly  understand  that  S  names  a  sentence,  and  explicitly
understand that the sentence in question represents it  to be the case that p. In other
words she meets the explicit knowledge constraint.
There  is  nothing  particularly  special  about  disquotational  contexts.  It  is  just
easier to formulate  an example with a disquotational context.  As long as somebody
understands that a truth predicate can be used to represent the rationality of linguistic
practice,  then she can understand instances of the above schema as representing the
rationality of linguistic practice. Grasping the point of a truth predicate which applies to
names of sentences is sufficient to be able to understand instances of the truth schema as
representing the truth conditions of sentences. For example, a speaker of English will
understand '"I am happy" is true if and only if the purported speaker of the sentence is
happy at the purported time of utterance' as correctly giving the truth conditions of the
sentence "I am happy". She will grasp which situation "I am happy" represents.
On  this  view,  truth  becomes  a  semantic  property.  It  evaluates  correct
representation.  It  applies  to  a  sentence  just  in  case  the  world  is  as  the  sentence
represents  it  to  be.  A thinker  gains  explicit  knowledge  of  meaning  by  coming  to
understand  that  sentences  represent  situations.  She  does  that  by seeing  that  a  truth
predicate  functions  as  a  value  predicate  which  marks  correct  representation.  But  in
recognising that truth is the value of a correct representation, not only does the thinker
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have  one  more  concept,  namely  the  concept  of  truth,  she  also  has  the  ability  to
understand a representation as a representation.  As sentences are things in the world,
she is also able to represent those sentences as having properties, and central among
those properties will be the property of representing the world as being a particular way.
So, in understanding representations she is able to understand representations which
represent the representational power of sentences. These are sentences of the form: S is
true  if  and only if  p.  In  other  words,  she gains  explicit  knowledge of  meaning.  In
addition, as she now understands what it is for S to be true, she understands what it
would be for it to be true that p. But, this latter ability is in fact the ability to have
explicit knowledge about how things might be in the world. So, if truth is a semantic
predicate, we can explain both how somebody can gain explicit knowledge of meaning
and how they can gain explicit knowledge at all.
The important moment is grasp of the point of a truth predicate. Truth is the
springboard which catapults a person into explicit knowledge. Possessing a concept is a
matter of being able to deploy that concept in thoughts. That is something that occurs at
the ground floor. In other words, as I have been insisting all along, having a concept is
not enough to give one explicit knowledge. So why is truth different? The answer is that
truth is fundamentally a first level concept. It is a concept of a theory of meaning. In
addition, it is the property proper to a correct representation. So, learning to deploy the
concept of truth in thought is learning to deploy the concept of a correct representation.
When one gets the concept of truth, on this view, one realises that a representation is
correct if and only if things are as it represents them to be. The important point is that in
thinking that, you gain the ability to have explicit thoughts about how things are. One
can do that,  because one can recognise a  representation as  a representation,  and so
explicitly represent a situation to oneself. That is a way of being at the first level. 
However, although a truth predicate is fundamentally a predicate in a theory of
truth, it can be used by speakers operating on the ground floor. Languages can and do
contain their own metalanguage, and this allows competent reflective speakers to train
novice speakers to respond appropriately. Of course, children are not usually taught by
being introduced to a Taski style semantic apparatus. Instead, people say things like
"that is wrong", "well done", "yes" and "no". But such talk does make implicit reference
to truth. Importantly, what is being done is training somebody to speak. That is training
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them to recognise and respond to the procedural reasons instituted by the rules of a
linguistic practice. As part of that, and still at the ground floor, they will learn to use a
truth predicate. But, it is the nature of language to be representational. As soon as they
grasp the point of a truth predicate they make a semantic ascent. That semantic ascent
allows them to understand that the sentences that they are operating are representations.
More over, understanding a representation is grasping what it is a representation of, and
so gaining explicit knowledge of meaning is gaining explicit knowledge of how things
are in the world.
4.4 More on Representation
Before  turning to  a  brief  discussion  on what  we should  say about  mentality
without language, I want to add a little bit more about representation. This is in part to
assuage a worry that my picture is in fact another version of Millikan's. It is also to
make clear what I think is involved in representation. Millikan holds that utterances of
sentences represent, when they do, because they are functioning properly. For Millikan,
to be a representation is to be an item that is about a particular situation and which is
designed  to  be  understood  by  allowing  representation  consumers  to  identify  the
situation  which  it  is  about.  I  objected  that  by making  identification  a  blind  causal
process,  Millikan  could  not  properly  make  sense  of  our  explicit  knowledge.  The
problem was that the identification has to be understood either in terms of the practical
ability to make new inferences, or in terms of the production of another representation
which  would,  in  turn,  require  interpreting.  The  former  makes  sense  of  implicit
understanding, but not explicit understanding; the latter leads to regress.
Why is my understanding of representation different? On the face of it, it might
look like I think that explicit knowledge of meaning is a matter of learning to identify
the referents of sentences. However, this is not the case. What first level speakers have
learnt is what truth means. The difference between my picture and Millikan's is that she
has a sophisticated correspondence theory truth. I do not. I see truth as the property
which organises linguistic practice. However, understanding that is understanding that
sentences represent situations.  But, because truth has its home has the key semantic
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value understanding representation is not to be able to line up sentences with situations.
Instead it is a matter of understanding how it is that sentences are about the world. The
key thought here is that there is no easy step from a sentence to the world. Sentences do
not share a form with the world nor are they correlated with situations in it. Instead,
they are the sort of thing that is used to make a claim about the world, ask about the
world, order that new things come about in the world and so on. 
To present my positive proposal, I am going to follow Charles Travis, who in
turn is following Frege. Travis points out that "In philosophy we typically think of a
thought as the thought that such-and-such. But we can also think of it as a thought of a
(given) way for things to be" (Travis, 2013, p. 237). The insight is that a thought has an
inbuilt generality. But, it is that inbuilt generality that brings truth into play at all. As
Travis writes:
Frege explains a thought as what brings truth into question at all.  Such is done only in
bringing  it  into  question  in  some  determinate  way,  by  raising,  or  speaking  to,  some
particular question of truth—for example, the question whether Sid is eating peanuts. Now
the idea is: whether a thought is true — what the answer is to the question of truth it raises
—depends on how things are. But, the idea continues, in the nature of the case it cannot
depend on everything in how things are.
(Travis, 2013, p. 439)
The view is that the thought that Sid is eating peanuts represents a way the world
might be. A way the world might be is always a range of configurations of what there is.
Different thoughts might have different degrees of generality. The thought that Sid is
eating peanuts is a fairly specific thought. It is less specific than the thought that Sid is
eating dry roasted peanuts, and more specific than the thought that peanuts are being
eaten. The specificity of a thought is a matter of how much it rules out. "Sid is eating
dry roasted peanuts"  rules  out  situations  in  which  Sid is  doing anything other  than
eating a specific type of peanut, the dry roasted ones. "Sid is eating peanuts" permits
more situations; it is neutral as to the type of peanut preparation. "Peanuts are being
eaten" is neutral as to what type of preparation has been used, and who and where the
eating is going on.  All of the thoughts are neutral as to the vast majority of things there
are in the world. Sid's height, his relationship with his mother or how daintily peanuts
are being consumed is irrelevant to the way these thoughts represent the world as being.
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To grasp a thought is to understand that it is presenting a way for the world to
be, and, understanding what it is to present a way for the world to be is to understand
what range of situations are ruled out. And that, of course, is to understand the thought
as  a  possible  response  to  a  particular  question  of  truth.  So,  grasping  a  thought  is
understanding what it would be for the thought to be true. That in turn, is understanding
what situations would be captured by that sort of generality. Here the crucial difference
between my position and Millikan's arises; understanding what situations are ruled in or
ruled out by a thought is an a priori matter. When somebody grasps the thought that Sid
is eating peanuts, she knows, a priori, that the thought is true if and only if Sid is eating
peanuts. But, this is simply because she knows how the world must be if it is to involve
and instancing of Sid eating peanuts. It is to know how thought works. 
It is time to depart from Travis. Travis presents the theory in terms of thoughts. I
have already shown that we have no access to pre-linguistic access to such entities.
Thoughts  are  the  possible  contents  of  acts  of  thinking.  But,  content  is  a  dependent
object. One understands content when one already has explicit knowledge of how things
are. What Travis, following Frege, has to say about thoughts is true. However, sentences
are more fundamental. What we understand when we come to explicit knowledge of a
language is that sentences have the generality intrinsic to representations. We come to
understand sentences  as  representing a  way for the world to  be.  But,  to  understand
sentences representing a way for the world to be is to understand generality, and that is
to understand what it is for a generality to be instanced. Understanding what it is for a
generality  to  be  instanced  is,  in  turn,  grasping  how the  parts  of  sentences  make  a
systematic contribution to the truth values of sentences in which they can occur. But,
and this is Travis' insight, that is not to require sentences to share a form with the world
or to be correlated with items in the world. It is to learn what it is for a sentence to be
true. It is to recognise the function-argument structure inherent in sentences. It is to see
that  atomic  sentences  make  claims  about  things  in  the  world,  the  objects.  Those
sentences will either make claims about the properties of those objects or make claims
about the relations in which those objects  stand to each other.  In both cases atomic
sentences  make  claims  about  what  is  true  of  objects.  Sentences  involving  truth
functional  connectives  represent  relations  between  ways  the  world  might  be.
Understanding that is  still  understanding how the truth value of the whole sentence
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depends  on  the  truth  value  of  its  sentential  parts.  Of  course,  understanding  these
sentential parts requires understanding what it would be for the sentential parts to be
instanced.  Understanding generality is  to recognise quantified statements  as being a
generality about generalities. So, to understand that somebody is eating peanuts is to
understand that some specific but unspecified person is eating peanuts. The truth of the
existentially qualified claim depends on there being at least some one way in which
peanuts are eaten by a person. What you have to understand is a whole range of ways
for it to be true that peanuts are eaten.
Perhaps  unsurprisingly,  as  all  sentences  represent  by  being  in  some  sense
general,  there  is  something  fundamental  in  understanding  quantification104.  To
understand  a  particular  instance  of  quantification,  you  must  recognise  the  structure
inherent in a range atomic sentences. For example, understanding "somebody is eating
peanuts"  is  to  recognise  a  common form in  sentences  which  represent  a  particular
person as eating peanuts. That involves two abilities. The first is to isolate the subject
term of the sentence,  and the second is  to  isolate  the predicate.  But,  because those
abilities come with the ability to understand quantification, there is no need to make
sense of that insight as a matter of being able to line up sub-sentential expressions with
things in the world. Instead, you understand the idea of a way for a thing to be. The idea
of a way for a thing to be is the idea of a property. In the example case, it is the idea of a
thing eating peanuts, or, as Dummett might put it, of the property "is eating peanuts".
You do not have that ability without recognising that singular terms pick out the sorts of
things that can eat peanuts, or, as Dummett might put it, 'fill in the gap marked by the
""'. Having those abilities is understanding the predicates are true of objects. But, that
is to understand that atomic sentences are about things in the world, objects, by saying
things about them. You understand that when you know what it is for a sentence to be
true. As Travis puts it:
What a concept does it does within a thought. We can understand what it does only in terms
of that notion of truth simpliciter whose first application is to whole thoughts. Objects fall
under concepts: concepts are true of them. No true of without true full stop.
(Travis, 2013, p. 251, italics original)
104  Both Dummett (Dummett, 1981, pp. 10-11) and Travis (Travis, 2013, p. 251), correctly in my view,
attribute this insight to Frege.
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Having these insights allows you to understand that the sentences you were already
operating with were making claims about the world, ordering that the world be changed,
asking about the world and so on. You no longer merely respond to those assertions,
orders and questions in an intelligent manner. You now understand them for what they
are, and that is to bring the world into view.
There  is  one  further  benefit  to  all  this,  and  that  is  that  you  now  have  the
resources  to  talk  about  your  mental  states.  Gaining  the  ability  to  understand  a
representation does not magically make the content of your mental states an object of
awareness. However, you will be able to recognise that the things that you hear and
touch  and  smell  are  the  same things  that  you  talk  about.  You will  also  be  able  to
recognise that the things that you encounter in the world and talk about are the same
things that other people encounter in the world. So, in order to grasp the content of a
mental state, either of your own or of others, you need to find a representation of what
the mental state is about, and then learn a vocabulary for making a mental ascent. In
English, one way that can be achieved is by using the locution "x thinks that". The
important  point  is  that  having explicit  knowledge that,  for  example,  you  think  that
Powell  and  Pressburger  directed  Black  Narcissus  comes  from  understanding  the
sentence, "Powell and Pressburger directed Black Narcissus" as asserting that just such
a  situation  obtained.  It  is  then  to  realise  that  you  believe  such  a  statement.  That
realisation is no more than the realisation that you accept the propriety of making just
such an assertion. It is our grasp of the language that gives us our grasp of thought
content. In other words, LPT is true.
§5 Thought Without Language
I take it that I have established the following:
LPT:  Truth  is,  in  the  first  instance,  a  substantial,  evaluative  property of
sentences.
I take it that I have also shown that this means that our grasp on how things stand in the
world requires us to understand a language. Moreover what we understand is a rational
practice. However, the significance of performances in that practice is independent of
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the  purposes  of  practitioners.  Reflective  practitioners  understand  the  linguistic
significance  of  performances.  That  is  to  understand the meanings  of  the  words  and
sentences they use. Because truth is the property which organises that practice, it  is
through understanding truth that practitioners come to reflective knowledge of meaning
and of how things stand in the world. I also want to say something about the possibility
of thought without language.  In summary, my view is that there is thinking without
language, but there is no belief without language. This is not an essential component of
my view, but, nevertheless, I think it is true.
5.1 Explicit Knowledge is Different in Kind from Ground Floor Knowledge
What is an essential component of my view is that reflective knowledge of how
things are is not the same thing as the sort of knowledge possessed by non-linguistic
agents. There is a leap to be made to being a creature which has explicit knowledge. To
understand truth  is  to  understand both how language works  and what  it  does.  That
cannot  be  grasped by a  creature  who is  operating  at  the  ground floor.  This  leap  is
reflected in the radical distinction between ground floor abilities and first level explicit
knowledge. At the ground floor, one thinks by responding to reasons. That involves
recognising and responding to features of the world. It is manifested by the ability to
engage in practical reasoning. The reflective knower can do all of those things, but in
addition she has explicit knowledge of what she does. This knowledge is not just an
ability  to  respond  to  things.  When  Nathan  utters  "the  cheese  is  in  the  fridge",  he
understands that his utterance is an assertion.  That is, he recognises that being in the
fridge is a spatial property which medium-sized dry (or wet) goods can have, and he is
aware that cheese is the sort of thing of which spatial properties can be true. He further
knows that "the cheese is in the fridge" represents a way for the world to be and is true
if and only if the cheese is in the fridge. He also knows that "the cheese is in the fridge"
has assertoric force, and thus claims to represent the world correctly. So, when Nathan
has knowledge of the location of the cheese, Nathan, unlike the rat, grasps how things
are in the world.  When Nathan reflects  on things,  he knows that the content of his
knowledge is the thought that there is cheese in the fridge. This does not, immediately,
affect Nathan's ability to get round the world. Instead, it gives him reflective knowledge
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of what he is up to. Ground floor ability, ground for knowledge, is the ability to respond
to  reasons.  First  level  ability,  first  level  knowledge,  is  the  ability  to  understand
representations as representations.
5.2 Concept Possession
One thing I can say is that non-linguistic creatures possess concepts. The view is
that the ground floor creatures respond to the world. They do so by recognising features
of the world that are salient for the completion of their projects. If a creature recognises
a feature of the world then it has a concept of it. However, those concepts are confused
and limited. The rat can distinguish cheese from chow. It has the concept of cheese and
of  chow.  It  is  certainly  no  expert  about  either  foodstuff.  It  takes  them both  to  be
nourishing, it takes one to be nicer than the other. It realises that they do not move under
their  own steam. It  has no conception of their  origin,  or their  chemical make up or
anything  beyond  what  it  needs  for  its  practical  engagement  with  the  world.
Nevertheless, to understand the rat we need to attribute the concept of cheese and chow
to the rat. But, those concepts are not different from our concepts of cheese and chow. In
fact, they are not different from the concept of cheese and chow. However, Christopher
Peacocke is right; there is no more to the concept of cheese or of chow than is required
by an account of complete possession of that concept. He is also right that any account
of complete possession requires an account of the range of propositional attitudes the
full concept possessor can adopt (Peacocke, 1999, p. 5). So, what we need to account
for the mentality of a rat, or any other minimally autonomous creature, is a bipartite
truth-conditional theory of thought. In other words, we have to understand the rat as
rational. 
5.3 No Beliefs at the Ground Floor
Non-linguistic creatures think, but thinking at the ground floor is recognising
and responding to reasons. As a result the mentality of a ground floor thinker has to be
described  by a  bipartite  truth-conditional  theory  of  thought.  I  want  to  suggest  that
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ground floor thinking is not governed by truth norms. I also want to suggest that non-
linguistic  creatures  do  not  have  beliefs,  because  having  beliefs  requires  procedural
norms  being  in  force.  In  summary,  the  view  is  that  non-linguistic  but  minimally
autonomous creatures think because they have a way of responding to the world that can
only be understood in terms of the rational connections between their  mental states.
However, to have a belief, I will argue, requires taking on rational commitments, and
that requires recognising procedural norms. To have a belief is not a mental act but a set
of commitments that you take on. It is not something that can be done without linguistic
abilities. The crucial assumption for the argument is that it is constitutive of belief that
the  grounds  for  adopting  a  belief  are  that  it  is  true,  and  the  consequences  are
commitment to what follows from the belief and to dropping beliefs incompatible with
the new belief. If that thought is denied, the rest of the argument in this section fails.
The failure of the argument of this section does not affect the main thesis that truth is a
substantial evaluative property of sentences. 
One worry might be that by insisting that truth is the grounds of a belief I am
begging the question against those who think that non-linguistic belief is possible. The
worry might be that creatures cannot take truth to be the grounds for a response to the
world  without  the  concept  of  truth  or  falsity.  However,  the  concept  of  truth  and
falsehood are useful in describing the projects of a minimally autonomous creature. It
seems plausible that a creature which is, for example, trying to get food and shelter
needs to minimise its errors and to get some things right. If this is right, it does have a
project,  of  secondary  importance,  of  seeking  some  truths.  It  also  has  a  project  of
shunning falsehoods, and hence can legitimately be credited with the practical projects
of  seeking  some  specific  truths  and  shunning  all  falsehoods.  However,  I  think  this
shows  that  seeking  some  truths  and  avoiding  falsehood  are  necessary  rather  than
sufficient conditions for being a believer. I am going to show that, in particular, the
project  of  avoiding falsehood gives  a  non-linguistic  creature  pragmatic  grounds  for
having a consistent take on the world, and plausibly underpins it seeking after some
specific truths. I am also going to suggest that having projects does not commit an agent
to anything.
It is not hard to show how the project of shunning falsehood leads to the attempt
to adopt states which are true and an attempt at maintaining consistency. A creature that
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is shunning falsehood tries only to adopt states which are true (assuming bivalence). It
should drop states which are false. In other words, the grounds for adopting a state will
be that it  is true. That determination to shun falsehood also shows why the creature
should drop what  is  incompatible  with its  new states.  For any pair  of contradictory
thoughts at least one is false, so, if you are shunning falsehood, holding one to be true
shows that you should not hold the other to be true. In other words, the consequences of
adopting a state will be dropping what is incompatible with that state. However, those
grounds and consequences are pragmatic grounds and consequences. The should here is
a hypothetical should. The non-linguistic creature does not need to take truth to be a
grounds for moving into a particular state, nor does it need to take its truth to require it
to  drop what  is  incompatible  with  the  new state.  What  matters  for  recognising  the
creature as rational is that it behaves in accordance with these hypothetical shoulds. By
and  large,  non-linguistic  creatures  do  manage  to  behave  in  accordance  with  these
shoulds. Although that behaviour is a byproduct of its ability to recognise and respond
to features of the world as reasons for it to undertake particular courses of action, we
cannot credit the creature with the concept of a reason.
So far, I have shown that having the project of shunning falsehood makes sense
of a pragmatic commitment to believing only truths and to having consistent states. To
show  that  pragmatic  considerations  are  sufficient  to  account  for  the  grounds  and
consequences  characteristic  of  beliefs  you would  also need to  show how pragmatic
considerations could lead to a commitment to the consequences of your takings of the
world. I think that there is no way that this can be done. The practical goal of avoiding
falsehood does not seem to commit the agent to the consequences of what it thinks. If
you do not draw any inferences, you never make any mistakes. We could make sense of
a  pragmatic  commitment  to  what  follows  from  your  thinking  only  if  you  have  a
pragmatic commitment to expanding your knowledge. What we would need to make
sense of is a pragmatic commitment to seeking out truth (rather than some particular
truths). However, one cannot have the desire for truth without the concept of truth. You
only need as much true information as gets you to your goal. If a rat takes it that there is
cheese to the left, it follows that there is a specific type of cheese to the left. But, why
would the rat have to be committed to there being a specific type of cheese to the left? It
is no part of the rat's project to find a specific type of cheese, it  can be completely
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agnostic,  from a practical  point  of view about  the distinction between Cheddar  and
Wensleydale.  From  a  pragmatic  point  of  view  we  only  need  as  much  accurate
information as will help us achieve our goals. All it requires is some conception of how
it stands to the world, and to not be wildly wrong about how it understands the world to
be. If I am right about belief requiring a commitment to the consequences of what you
believe, the pragmatic requirements of having a project are not sufficient to bring with it
pragmatic commitment to the consequences of how you take the world to be. Therefore,
having projects is not sufficient to make you a believer.
An account of the mental aims to make sense of the way the world strikes a
rational  creature.  Much  of  the  work  of  building  an  account  of  the  mental  requires
building  a  bipartite  truth  conditional  theory of  thought.  Such a  theory captures  the
mental role of the concepts a rational creature possesses. It does so by making sense of
their  contributions to the mental roles of thoughts in which they can occur.  For the
theory to contribute to making sense of the way the world strikes the thinker, the mental
roles of concepts and thoughts need to be understood in terms of the way that truth
organises the mental life of that creature. But, doing that requires seeing the mental
roles of concepts and thoughts, not in terms of their standard, or even Normal, effects on
what other propositional attitudes are adopted or dropped, but in terms of the grounds
and consequences  of  adopting  and dropping propositional  attitudes.  In  other  words,
building  a  bipartite  theory of  thought  requires  making sense of  the  rationality  of  a
thinker. Doing that is to make sense of what a creature does when it thinks in terms of
what it ought to do. Of course, in order to do that, the creature must very rarely, at least,
make inexplicable errors in the way it responds to the world. This is to say that the
creature needs to more or less live up to the constitutive ideal of rationality. As a result,
possession of such a theory puts the theorist in a position to make sense of the rational
connections between thoughts. Indeed, because building such a theory requires making
sense of the way the world strikes a rational creature, the theorist will have to expand
our conception of both what there is and also of what is rational.  
Non-linguistic  creatures,  like  my  exemplar  rat,  have  no  conception  of  the
constitutive ideal of rationality.  This is because they have no concept of truth. As a
consequence, they cannot be aiming at truth. As a result, the rat, or other non-linguistic
creature,  does not do very well at giving up to the constitutive ideal of rationality. In
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particular, although there is a sense in which it is rationally committed to drawing the
whole set of inferences, many of those it will never make. The rat, being a pragmatic
creature, never concerns itself with anything that goes beyond its own needs. It is only
somebody who has an interest in truth who can ever go beyond her own immediate
concerns to discover what her judgements commits her to. 
This is not to say that the mental roles of the rat's thoughts and concepts are not,
strictly speaking, what is captured by a bipartite theory of thought. Instead, it is to say
that there is much about the mental roles of its thoughts and concepts that the rat will
never  come to understand.  This  is  because  attributing  mental  roles  to  thoughts  and
concepts is not done as part of the project of predicting what a thinker will do. Instead,
it is done as part of the project of thinking about how the world strikes the thinker. It is
an attempt to think about what features of the world a thinker can respond to, and the
ways  in  which it  can  respond.  If  we want  to  use that  as  part  of  an explanation or
prediction  of  the  thinker's  behaviour,  we need  to  think  about  how well  the  thinker
possesses its concepts. If there are things about cheese that the rat does not understand,
then there will be things that the rat is unable to do that, from a rational perspective, it
should do. The conceptual ability that we in fact attribute to the rat, will not be the
ability  of  somebody  who  has  complete  possession  of  the  concept  of  cheese.
Nevertheless, it is precisely that concept that we do attribute to the rat. But, that concept
is  captured by describing the  mental  role  of  one who has  the requisite  abilities  for
complete possession of that concept105.
105 There will be borderline cases. There will be some concepts that a non-linguistic creature has a good,
but not complete, possession of. There will be many more where it will be difficult to say if the
limited abilities of the creature are sufficient to attribute it possession at all. To pick two examples
that were discussed above, I suspect that number and shape fall into this category. There are some
things that Frege's dog can do that make us want to attribute a concept of number to it, but equally we
will  be hesitant  about that  attribution because,  as  Frege points  out,  dogs seem a long way from
recognising what is in common between chasing one cat and fighting one dog. Similarly, it will work
out what can fit into what, but it is not going to manifest any understanding of shape as an abstract
object. This is not the most distressing problem. We can attribute proto-concepts to such creatures,
and recognise that attributions of mental content will not, strictly speaking, capture just what it is that
such a creature thinks. It also means that when we gain explicit knowledge, we put ourselves into a
position to sharpen our conceptions of what there is and to have a whole new range of propositional
attitudes.
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Now, it  might  be  thought  that  all  that  is  required  is  to  adopt  the  project  of
seeking out truth. But, I am not sure that we ever do adopt that project. There is much
that we do not want to know about the world. Instead, I think that to have beliefs one
needs to undertake the commitments characteristic of that belief. That is to recognise
that there are grounds for thinking what you do and consequences of thinking what you
do. Those grounds and consequences are determined by the concepts you are working
with. But, those grounds and consequences are procedural grounds and consequences. It
is to understand how adopting a stance to the world commits you to the world being a
particular way. It seems reasonable to reserve the title "belief" for undertaking those
rational commitments. It does not mean that one has to live one's life according to those
rational commitments. It would probably make life extremely difficult if you did. All
that matters is that you acknowledge that you have undertaken them. On this picture,
belief  is  an attitude available only to reflective creatures – that is,  to creatures who
understand what rationality is. And, if I am right about the relative priority of language
and thought, available only to language users. That is, available only to humans. 
§6 Summary and Conclusion
In this chapter, I have finally vindicated the linguistic priority thesis. I showed
that the activity of thinking, at least at the ground floor, could not be part of a rational
practice.  The  problem  is  that  it  would  require  being  guided  by  rules  that  were
constitutive of mental content. However, guidance by a rule requires knowledge of the
content of that rule. Trying to make sense of thinking as a rational practice thus leads to
a vicious regress. I showed that Brandom's pragmatic phenomenalism was motivated by
the same worry. However, his attempt to deal with it is radically pragmatic. He tries to
show that there is no more than the attitude of taking a performance to be correct. I
showed that this leads to the unspeakable and unthinkable conclusion that our utterances
do not say anything and our thoughts have no content. I pointed out that there was no
problem with taking part  in a rational practice just  so long as the existence of that
practice instituted procedural reasons for unreflective practitioners to respond to. I then
showed that the practice of using a language is organised by truth norms, and so gaining
the  concept  of  truth  brings  with  it  an  understanding  of  how language  works.  But,
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understanding how language works is understanding that sentences represent the world.
That  understanding  brings  with  it  the  recognition  that  the  sentences  you  had  been
operating with were representations of the world. Thus, grasp of truth not only brings
with it an understanding of meaning, it brings the world into view. Having the world in
view allows you to have explicit understanding of what your thoughts are about and to
grasp  what  you  are  thinking.  Finally,  I  suggested  that  having  a  belief  requires
acknowledging a  set  of  rational  commitments.  This  is  an  attitude  only available  to
creatures who understand rationality. Hence, it is an attitude only available to creatures
who  understand  truth.  As  a  result  belief  is  an  attitude  which  is  only  available  to
language using humans.
The big result of the thesis is, of course, that truth is, in the first instance, a
substantial, evaluative semantic property. It is the property which organises the practice
of speaking a language. People come to understand the meaning of what they say when
they come to understand the way that truth organises the practice that they were already
taking part in. In coming to see that an assertion should be true or that an order should
be made true, the infant speaker comes to see that the sentences she was already using
are  representations  of  how things  might  be  in  the  world.  By coming  to  see  that  a
sentence presents a way for things to be, the infant speaker comes to have the ability to
reflect on how things might be. She can ask herself questions about what follows from
what, and so come to sharpen her grip on what there is. This is to come to be at home
within the space of reasons. It is to begin to explore the sui generis ideal of rationality.
Gaining explicit knowledge of language allows us to become active seekers after truth.
We no longer merely have to be concerned with finding our way around the world, we
can also ask: how are things in the world? In short, the infant has become a philosopher.
A pleasant consequence of the thesis is that, just as language is proper to humans, so is
philosophy.
275
Conclusion
I set out to investigate what it is to have an understanding of how things are. We,
humans, express that understanding by using language. The understanding itself is a
mental  state.  When  we  make  a  claim  about  how  things  are  we  express  our
understanding of  a  way the  world might  be.  This  is  revealing  of  the fact  that  both
propositional  attitudes  and  uses  of  sentences  are  intentional  items.  They both  have
contents and are about ways for the world to be. One question that I wanted to answer,
then, was: do we understand the content of sentences by reference to our understanding
of the contents of our mental states, or do we understand the contents of our mental
states by understanding linguistic descriptions of those states? In some sense, which has
the whip hand, language or thought? 
The answer I came to was that,  in fact,  our understanding of what we think
comes via our our understanding of what we and other people say. The reason, in a
nutshell, is that understanding both mental and sentential content requires understanding
what  it  is  for  thoughts  and  sentences  to  be  about  ways  for  things  to  be.  That
understanding  requires  understanding  how  truth  organises  both  language  use  and
thinking.  In particular,  it  is  to  understand how the incomplete  items in the relevant
activity, sub-sentential expressions and concepts, make a systematic difference to the
truth values of sentences and thoughts in which they can occur, and to understand how
the truth values of the complete items make a systematic difference to the ways those
items are correctly used. However, thoughts are abstract objects to which our epistemic
access is through linguistic representations of them. So, it is through understanding truth
as a substantial,  semantic, evaluative property that we come to our understanding of
what there is and what it is to think about those things.
The Problem of Understanding Skilled Engagement
The thesis takes its point of departure from the thought that both using language
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and  thinking  are  rational  activities.  On  this  view,  using  language  and  thinking  are
fundamentally abilities that we have. When it comes to using language this is the ability
to produce utterances that effect linguistic acts and to understand what other people are
doing linguistically with their utterances. When it comes to thinking that is the ability to
recognise and respond intelligently to features of the world. As theorists we need to be
able to characterise those abilities. When it comes to language use, the question is: what
is  it  to understand a language? When it  comes to thinking, the question is:  what  is
involved in understanding in general?
This leads straight in to the problem of explicit knowledge. It is a commonplace
about  abilities  that  those  who  possess  them  can  exercise  them  without  reflective
understanding of  what  it  is  that  they do when they are  engaged  in  skilful  activity.
Understanding of a language or of anything else is no different. It is possible that you
could skilfully and successfully produce and respond to uses of language without ever
coming to realise that you were producing and responding to meaningful linguistic acts,
let alone having an explicit understanding of what you and others were saying. It is not
only  possible  but  more  than  plausible  that  there  are  intelligent  creatures  which
understand all sorts of things without having any awareness that they are recognising
and  responding  to  ways  for  things  to  be.  These  sorts  of  thinkers  have  implicit
understanding of how things are in the world. What we need to make sense of is how we
came to have reflective, explicit understanding.
This remains true whatever our view of thinking. When presented with cheese,
the lab rat knows or believes that there is cheese in front of it. It has a mental state with
a content. But, fundamentally, that is to have an ability. The big dispute here is over the
right way of characterising that ability. In the deflationary corner, there are those who
think that it  has to be characterised in terms of the rat having a characteristic set of
dispositions.  In  the  inflationary corner,  there  are  those  who think  that  it  has  to  be
characterised  in  rational  terms.  In  the  former  case,  the  rat's  belief  is,  very roughly,
treated as the disposition to eat the cheese when it is hungry. In the latter case, it is to
judge that  here be cheese.  However,  even if  we treat  judgement  as  sui  generis  and
irreducible to a dispositional state, judging that here be cheese is not a matter of having
a proposition, as it were, before your mind's eye and endorsing it. It is, rather, to deploy
conceptual abilities in an act of judgement. It is to respond to the presence of cheese by
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taking it to be true that that is how things are. It still remains to be explained how you
come to be aware that this is what you have done.
So, what is involved in reflective, explicit understanding? The first thing to note
is that someone who does have such understanding is aware that their uses of sentences
and their  propositional  attitudes  are  about  ways  for  things  to  be.  Furthermore,  they
recognise of their sentences and their propositional attitudes what ways for things to be
they are about. In other words, they understand the intentionality of uses of language
and mental states. An intentional item is about some situation in the world, but not by
simply being a response to it. To understand aboutness one needs to recognise that an
intentional  item  can  be  evaluated.  Different  uses  of  sentences  are  intentional  by
presenting ways for the world to be, and different propositional attitudes are intentional
by being attitudes towards ways for the world to be. To understand the intentionality of
those items you need to understand how to evaluate those items. The simplest cases are
assertions and beliefs. An assertion presents a way for the world to be and is correct if
the world is as presented. Similarly, a belief is the upshot of taking the world to be a
certain  way,  and so  it  is  correct  if  the  world  is  as  has  been taken.  Other  types  of
linguistic  actions  and  other  types  of  propositional  attitude  require  more  complex
evaluation, but nevertheless it is in seeing them as evaluable with respect to how things
are or might be that we are able to understand them as intentional. The key question,
then, for the thesis is how much do we need to pack into this notion of evaluation to
make sense of our coming to explicit understanding of meaning and mental content.
Language Use
Before we can come to settle the dispute about the relative priorities of language
and thought, we need some account of the relevant activity. These activities are using a
language and thinking. When it comes to using language what is wanted is something
that makes sense of the systematic difference each expression in a language makes to
the  activity  of  using  that  language.  In  other  words,  we  want  a  description  of  the
semantic role of each sentence and each sub-sentential part in a language. Because, the
activity proceeds by using sentences in different ways, the semantic role of sentences is
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central to a description of the activity. The semantic roles of sub-sentential expressions
are characterised in terms of the difference that  they make to the semantic  roles of
sentences in which they can occur.  The kinds of things that can be done with sentences
are the making of linguistic acts, such as assertions, commands, questions. These are the
different forces with which a sentence can be used. Those linguistic acts are different
ways of using sentences. The grounds and consequences of using a sentence in those
ways depends on the content of the sentence used. So, the semantic roles of sentences
are determined, in part, by the kinds of things that can be done with sentences and, in
part,  by the  contributions  of  the  sub-sentential  expressions  to  the  contents  of  those
sentences. Building a bipartite theory that shows how the contents of sentences affects
the ways they are used and shows how each sub-sentential expression in a language
contributes to the content of sentences in which it can occur will capture the semantic
role of each item in that language. Because, on any view of truth, we have to be able to
make sense of the, so-called, equivalence schema, Such a theory will be equivalent to a
truth conditional theory.
However, it is not sufficient to build a bipartite theory, the theorist also needs
some conception  of  what  it  models.  The  way to  do  that  is  to  think  about  what  is
involved in understanding language use. Doing that requires making sense of what is
done by different uses of language. That requires thinking about what is involved in
understanding linguistic acts. But, as each type of linguistic act is a different way of
presenting the content of a sentence, each type of linguistic act is a different way of
presenting the truth of a sentence. So, for example, an assertion presents a sentence as
true and a question asks if a sentence is true. It follows that someone who can speak a
language knows the truth conditions of the sentences of that language and knows how
the truth value of a sentence effects what can be done, linguistically, with that sentence.
So, modelling linguistic competence requires taking a view as to the nature and home of
truth.
Thinking
Thinking is also a rational activity. What we want from an account of the mental
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is an understanding of that activity. As with language, we need a way of modelling how
that  activity  proceeds.  The  activity  proceeds  by  the  adoption  and  dropping  of
propositional attitudes. I call the content of those propositional attitudes "thoughts". But,
in order to make sense of the generality of thinking, we to need understand thoughts as
composed out of concepts. This is to say, we need to understand acts of thinking as
being the exercise of conceptual capacities in the formation of propositional attitudes.
So, what is required is an account of the systematic difference made by thoughts and
concepts to the activity of thinking. In other words, an account of the mental roles of
thoughts and concepts. This part of an account of the mental is a theory of thought.
Because the activity of thinking proceeds by the adoption and dropping of propositional
attitudes the mental roles of thoughts are central to a theory of thought. The mental roles
of thoughts are characterised by making sense of the way adopting attitudes with that
thought as content affects the rest of the activity of thinking. To do that the theorist
needs  to  characterise  both  the  way  the  content  of  an  attitude  of  a  particular  type
determines the way in which that type of attitude makes a difference to the activity of
thinking  and  how  each  concept  makes  a  systematic  difference  to  the  contents  of
attitudes in which it can occur. So, what the theorist needs to do is build a bipartite
theory that shows how each concept contributes to the thoughts which are the contents
of propositional attitudes in which it can occur and how the difference made by attitudes
of each type is determined by the thoughts which can be their contents. Again, because,
on any view of truth, it is a device of ascent and denominalisation, such a theory will be
equivalent to a truth conditional one.
Again the key question is: what is modelled by such a theory? We need to know
what it is that someone can do when they are engaged in the activity of thinking. Again,
different understandings of the activity will commit the theorist to different answers as
to the question of the nature and home of truth. The big divide is between those who
think that we can characterise the activity without appeal to truth and those who think
that the activity needs to be characterised in rational terms. The former group try to
understand the activity in terms of characteristic dispositions. That is, they understand
both the possession of concepts and nature of propositional attitudes in terms of their
functional role in the activity of thinking. They then have to make sense of of why those
attitudes are attitudes towards anything. They have to face the question, 'why truth?' The
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alternative is to make sense of the activity in terms of thinkers taking attitudes towards
ways for things to be. So, instead of trying to explain and predict what a thinker does,
the theorist must take a view as to what the thinker ought to do. Attributing concepts to
a thinker is then a matter of understanding how different features of the world figure in
the  truth  conditions  of  thoughts.  Attributing  attitudes  to  the  thinker  is  a  matter  of
understanding  how  the  truth  values  of  the  subject's  thought  determine  its  rational
commitments and entitlements. Another way of seeing the distinction is that the former
group  attempt  a  perspective  neutral  account  of  a  mind,  whereas  the  latter  try  to
understand things from the point of view of the creature.
The Nature And Problem With Deflationary Theories
As I understand them, a deflationary theory is any theory that treats truth as no
more than a device of ascent and denominalisation. On such views, some version of the
equivalence schema captures all there is to the nature of truth. As a result, such views
deny that truth could ever account for content. In particular, such views deny that what
it  is  to  understand  language  use  or  thinking  can  be,  fundamentally,  explained  by
understanding what it is for sentences or thoughts to be true. Instead, they must have
some other account of what it is to understand a language or your thoughts. 
Deflationary theorists need to provide some account of the meaning of words
and sentences  that  appeal  to  the  way they are used.  So,  what  it  is  to  understand a
language is to be able to use words and sentences correctly. But, a speaker who knows
that the sentence, S, is correctly used to talk about a particular situation, the situation
described by using S, assuming that S means that p, is one who knows that S is true if
and only if p. However, on a deflationary theory, that summarises, but does not explain,
speaker knowledge. There must be some other account of what it is to understand the
'p's on the right-hand side. It cannot simply be knowledge of the meaning of S or any
other  sentence equivalent  to  S,  because that  is  simply to  be able  to  use S or some
equivalent  sentence  correctly.  So,  deflationary  theorists  need  to  be  mental  priority
theorists.
However, for the deflationary theorist, all understanding is a matter of having
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the right sort of dispositions (or, on slightly more sophisticated versions, having your
dispositions  explained by some non-intentional  relation to  the p's).  To have explicit
knowledge the thinker needs to recognise that her propositional attitudes are about ways
for the world to be. That requires more than the ability to update her attitudes as she
gains more information about how things are. That is something she does at the ground
floor. It requires understanding what it is for those propositional attitudes to be correct.
Once again the problem is with the right-hand sides. Recognising that, say, a belief, B,
is about some situation, it being the case that p, requires more than being able to update
your belief with respect to the situation that p. You need to be able to evaluate your
belief as correct if and only if p. That requires grasping the 'p's.  If we are not to go back
round in a circle, that is a matter of recognising that the content of B, the thought that p,
is true if and only if p. However, on a deflationary view, such a claim describes what a
thinker knows. It does not account for it. What the deflationary theorist gives us is a
description of typical responses to situations. She does not explain how she came by the
notion of a situation or of adopting an attitude towards it.
Designation Theories
Deflationary theories  are  unable to  make sense of intentionality.  There are  a
whole array of theories in the literature that treat  intentionality as a substantial  and
irreducible property of sentences or thoughts.  Amongst those theories are  those that
share  with  the  deflationary  theorist  the  view  that  truth  is  not  explanatory  of
intentionality.  I  called  such views "designation  theories".  The reason being that  the
fundamental relation is one of designation, either by parts to objects and properties or
by wholes to facts. The neat thought on the former set of views is that the meaning of a
truth bearer is simply its truth maker. However, falsehoods are just as meaningful as
truths. As a consequence, there truth makers are just as real as the truth makers of true
sentences. Indeed, they are real and of the same kind. The end result is that we cannot
make sense of our preference for truth over falsity. In fact, we cannot make sense of an
assertion as presenting as true. However, the recoil into treating the designation relation
being between truth bearers and truth makers leaves no space for an account of how we
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came  to  knowledge  of  what  each  truth-bearer  designates.  It  makes  a  mystery  of
competent speakers' ability to evaluate their uses of language or acts of thinking with
respect to their truth value. In other words, they do not end up with explicit knowledge.
Why we need a one task view of the mind
the  failure  of  designation  and  deflationary  theories  show  that  truth  is  a
substantial property which accounts for intentionality.
Truth as the property that we need to make sense of the perspective I think has
on the world.
We need to account for understanding in terms of idealising explanations that
treat the thinker as trying to get things right as it recognises and responds to how
things are.
The  failure  of  designation  and  deflationary  theories  show  that  truth  is  the
substantial property which accounts for intentionality.  To come to explicit knowledge is
to come to see how truth organises your mental life. In particular, it is to see that your
judgement  are  aiming  at  truth.  That  requires  understanding  how  your  abilities  to
respond to features of the world make a systematic difference to the truth values of the
thoughts that are the contents of your propositional attitudes. In other words, it is to
understand  that  you  have  a  perspective  on  the  world,  and  start  to  come  to  some
understanding of what that perspective is. It follows that the right way of thinking about
thinking is in terms of the constitutive ideal of rationality. You make sense of yourself as
a thinker  by making sense of  yourself  as  rational.  Your understanding of the world
deepens  as  you  come  to  be  able  to  recognise  more  features  of  the  world,  and,
importantly,  as  you  sharpen  your  conception  of  the  grounds  and  consequences  of
making each judgement.
However, to come to that understanding is to come to recognise what it is for
your thoughts to be true. It remains the case that a propositional attitude is a response to
your awareness of something. In other words, propositional attitudes are things that are
had.  They are  the  states  that  a  thinker  moves  into  and out  of  as  it  recognises  and
responds to things in the world. The content of a mental state, a thought, is not then, in
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the  first  instance,  an  object  of  awareness.  It  is  an  abstract  object  attributed,  by the
theorist, to a thinker to make sense of the way the world strikes that agent. This is not
true of the meaning of sentences. Uses of sentences are recognisable as events in the
world. You can be trained to use sentences correctly. Eventually, you can come to make
sense of  the  way truth is  organising  language use.  Doing that  is  to  realise  that  the
utterances people make are the uses of sentences and that those uses of sentences, along
with speakers' responses to them, can be evaluated with respect to how things are in the
world. You come to see what it is for the sentences that you, and others, use to be true.
That is, to come to see what ways for the world to be sentences are about. Someone
with that knowledge is then able to attribute mental states to themselves by attributing
contentful  propositional  attitudes  to  themselves.  They  are  able  to  understand  those
descriptions  as  making  claims  about  what  they  think,  and  thus  as  capturing  their
perspective on the world. The big result is that reflective understanding of the world we
live in and reflective understanding of thinking about it is a matter of understanding
language. That understanding is philosophical understanding. And so, the philosophy of
language is first philosophy.
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